Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors, Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors [1956] INSC 30 (24 April 1956)
1956 Latest Caselaw 30 SC

Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors, Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors [1956] INSC 30 (24 April 1956)

BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.

DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.

IMAM, SYED JAFFER

CITATION: 1956 AIR 676 1956 SCR 393

ACT:

Sugarcane, Regulation of Supply and Purchase of-Act passed byState Legislature and notifications issued there under by the State Government-Constitutional validity-If repugnant to Parliamentary Acts and notifications made there under--If violative of fundamental rights-Parliament's power of repeal-Delegation of such power, if permissible-U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (U.P. Act XXIV of 1953), ss. 15, 16-U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954-Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act LXV of 1951) as amended by Act XXVI of 1953, ss. 18-G, 15, 16-Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act X of 1955), s. 16(1)(b)-Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, cl. 7(1)-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1)(c), (f) and (g), 31, 301, 304, 254.

HEADNOTE:

The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act of 1953, and two notifications issued by the State Government on September 27, 1954 and November 9, 1955, the former under sub-sec. 1(a) read with sub-sec. 2(b) of s. 16 of the impugned Act providing that where not less than three-fourths of the canegrowers within the area of operation of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society were members thereof, the occupier of the factory to which that area is assigned should not purchase or enter into an agreement to purchase cane except through that society and the latter under s. 15 of the Act assigning to different sugarcane factories specified cane-purchasing centers for supply to them of sugarcane for the crushing season of 1955

56. They contended that the impugned Act was ultra vires the 394 State Legislature, the subject-matter of legislation being within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament, and repugnant to Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955 passed by Parliament and that ss. 15 and 16(1)(a) and (2)(b) and the two notifications infringed their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(1)(c), (f) and (g) and 31 and violated the provisions of Art. 301 of the Constitution.

Held, (1) that the impugned Act and the notifications issued there under were intra vires the State Legislature, did not infringe any fundamental rights of the petitioners nor violated the provisions of Art. 301 of the Constitution and the petitions must be dismissed;

(2)that the Central Acts in respect of sugar and sugarcane and the notifications there under having been enacted and made by the Central Government in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction under Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act of 1954, the State Legislature was not deprived of its jurisdiction there under and no question of legislative incompetence of the U.P. Legislature or its trespassing upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the centre in enacting the impugned Act could arise;

(3) that the provisions of the impugned Act compared to those of the Central Acts clearly showed that the impugned Act was solely concerned with the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane and in no way trenched upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre with regard to sugar and the U.P. Legislature was, therefore, quite competent to enact it;

(4) that no question of repugnancy under Art. 254 of the Constitution could arise where Parliamentary Legislation and State Legislation occupied different fields and dealt with separate and distinct matters even though of a cognate and allied character, and that where, as in the present case, there was no inconsistency in the actual terms of the acts enacted by Parliament and the State Legislature, the test of repugnancy would be whether Parliament and the State Legislature, in legislating under an entry in the Concurrent List, exercised their powers over the same subject-matter or whether the laws enacted by Parliament were intended to be exhaustive so as to cover the entire field;

(5) that the provisions of s. 18-G of Act LXV of 1951 did not cover sugarcane nor indicate the intention of the Parliament to cover the entire field of such legislation;

the expression "any article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled industry" used in ss. 18-G, 15 and 16 of the Act did not refer to raw materials but only to finished products of the scheduled industries the supply and distribution of which s. 18-G was intended to regulate, its whole object being the equitable distribution and availability of manufactured articles at fair prices and not to invest the Central Government with the power to legislate in regard to sugarcane;

395 (6) that even assuming that sugarcane was such an article and fell within the purview of s. 18-G of the Act, no order having been issued by the Central Government there under, no question of repugnancy could arise, as repugnancy must exist as a fact and not as a mere possibility and the existence of such an order would be an essential pre-requisite for it;

(7) that as the provisions of Act X of 1955, and those' of the impugned Act and the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1951, made there under, relating to sugarcane were mutually exclusive and did not impinge upon each other and the one legislature did not trench upon the field of the other, the Centre remaining silent where the State spoke and the State remaining silent where the Centre spoke, there could be no inconsistency between them and no provision of the impugned Act and the Rules made thereunder was invalidated by any of the provisions of Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953 or Act X of 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, issued there under;

Clyde Engineering Company, Limited v. Cowburn ([1926] 37 C.L.R. 466), Ex Parte McLean ([1930] 43 C L.R. 472), Stock -Motor Plough Ltd. v. Forsyth ([1932] 48 C.L.R. 128), G. P. Stewart v. B.K. Boy Chaudhury (A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 628) and Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh ([1939] F.C.R. 188), referred to.

(8) that the power of repeal conferred on Parliament by the proviso to Art. 254(2) of the Constitution was a limited power and could be exercised only by enacting a law relating to the matter dealt with by the state law and the state law must be one of the kind indicated in the body of Art. 254(2) itself, and as the impugned Act did not fall within that category the proviso did not apply and the impugned Act, the notifications made there under and the U. P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, stood unrepealed by s. 16(1)(b) of Act X of 1955 and cl. 7(1) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 made there under;

Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of Bombay ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 799), referred to.

(9) that the power of repeal conferred by the proviso to Art. 254(2) could be exercised by Parliament alone and could not be delegated to an executive authority and, consequently, the Central Government acquired no power of repeal under cl. 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955;

(10) that the contention that the impugned Act infringed the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 inasmuch as very wide powers were given to the Cane Commissioner which could be used in a discriminatory manner was without any foundation since his powers under s. 15 of the impugned Act were well defined and the Act and Rules framed there under gave the canegrowers or a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society or the occupier of a factory the right to appeal to the State Government against any orderpassed by him 396 and thus provided a sufficient safeguard against any arbitrary exercise of those powers;

(11) that equally unfounded was the contention that the impugned Act and the notification dated September 27, 1954, violated the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Although the right to form an association was a fundamental right, it did not necessarily follow that its negative, i.e. the right not to form an association must also be so, as all rights which an Indian citizen had were not fundamental rights. No canegrower was compelled to become a member of the Canegrowers' Cooperative Society or prevented from resigning there from or selling his crops elsewhere and, consequently, the impugned Act and the notification did not violate his fundamental right;

(12) that the powers given to the Cane Commissioner by s. 15 of the impugned Act to declare reserved or assigned areas were well defined and controlled by higher authorities and by no means absolute and unguided and were not, therefore, bit by Art. 19(1)(f) and (g) and the notification dated November 9, 1955, could not, therefore, be impugned on that ground;

(13) that the restriction imposed by the notification dated September 27, 1954, on canegrowers in regard to sale of sugarcane to occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society was not less than 75 per cent. of the total number of canegrowers was a reasonable restriction in the public interest, designed for the benefit of a large majority of canegrowers, and as such came within the protection of Art. 19(6) and did not violate Art. 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution;

(14) that the impugned notifications, being intra vires the State Legislature, could not also be challenged under Art.

31 as none of the petitioners was deprived of his property, if any, save by authority of law.

Messrs Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and two others ([1954] S.C.R. 803), referred to.

(15) Nor could it be contended that the impugned Act and the notifications contravened the provisions of Art. 301 of the Constitution in view of the provision of Art. 304(b) which made it permissible for the State Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest.

Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales ([1950] A.C. 235) and Hughes and Vale Proprietary Ltd. v. State of New South Wales and others ([1955] A.C. 241), referred to.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 585, 599, 611, 622, 625, 565, 576 of 1954 and 48, 58, 415, 416 of 1955 and 10, 16, 37, 39 and 47 of 1956.

397 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

G.S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and K. R. Chowdhry, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 10, 37 and 47 of 1956.

J.N. Bannerji and V. S. Sawhney, for petitioners in Petition No. 622 of 1954.

S.P. Sinha and K. R. Chowdhry, for petitioners in Petition No. 585 of 1954.

B.B. Tawakley and K. P. Gupta, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 565 and 576 of 1954.

K.R. Chowdhry, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 599 and 611 of 1954 and 58, 415 and 416 of 1955 and 16 and 39 of 1956.

R.Patnaik and K. R. Chowdhry, for petitioners in Petition No. 48 of 1955.

R.Patnaik, for petitioners in Petition No. 625 of 1954.

K.L. Misra, Advocate-General, U.P., K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of U.P. and the Cane Commissioner, U.P. in all the Petitions.

C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, and Jagdish Chandra, for the Cane-Growers' Co-operative Development Unions in Petitions Nos. 585 and 625 of 1954 and 10 and 47 of 1956.

Jagdish Chandra, for the Cane-Growers' Co-operative Development Unions in rest of the petitions except Petition No. 37 of 1956.

D.N. Mukerji, for Daurala Sugar Mills (respondent No. 4) in Petitions Nos. 611 of 1954, 58, 415 and 416 of 1955.

O.N. Srivastava, for Punjab Sugar Mills in Petitions Nos. 48 of 1955 and 47 of 1956.

A.S. Chawla, for respondent No. 3 in Petition No. 10 of 1956.

Ganpat Rai for respondent No. 9 in Petition No. 10 of 1956.

398 1956. April 24. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI J.-These Petitions under article 32 of the Constitution impugn the validity of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (U.P. Act XXIV of 1953) hereinafter called the impugned Act and the notifications dated 27th September, 1954 and 9th November, 1955 issued by the U.P.Government thereunder.

The petitioners are sugarcane growers in the several villages of the Districts of Meerut, Kheri, Gorakhpur and Deoria in the State of U.P. numbering 4,724 in the aggregate. Associated with them are the President, the Vice-Presidents and the Secretary of an association which is styled "the Ganna Utpadak Sangh" which is a rival body to the Co-operative Development Unions established and recognised under the impugned Act. The notification dated 27th September, 1954, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 1 (a) read with sub-section 2(b) of section 16 of the impugned Act ordered that where not less than 3/4 of the cane growers of the area of operation of a Cane Growers Co-operative Society are members of the Society, the occupier of the factory for which the area is assigned shall not purchase or enter into agreement to purchase cane grown by a cane grower except through such Cane Growers Co-operative Society. The notification dated 9th November, 1955 was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by section 15 of the impugned Act and reserved or assigned to the sugar factories mentioned in column 2 of the Schedule annexed thereto the cane purchasing centers (with the authorities attached to them) specified against them in column 3 for the purpose of supply of sugarcane during the crushing season 1955-56 subject to the conditions and explanations given therein. The former relates to the agency of supply of sugarcane to the factories and the latter relates to the creation of zones for particular factories. All the Petitions except Nos. 0 of 1956 and 37 of 1956 impugn the former notification 399 but the grounds of attack against both are common. The impugned Act is challenged as ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature, the subject-matter of the Act being within the exclusive field of Parliament and also as being repugnant to Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955 passed by Parliament, and section 15 and section 16 (1) (a) and 2 (b) and the notifications issued there under are challenged as unconstitutional inasmuch as they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 14, article 19(1)(c), (f) and (g) and article 31 besides being in violation of article 301 of the Constitution. All these Petitions involve common questions of law and may be disposed of by one judgment.

A short history of the legislation enacted by the Centre as well as the Province of U.P. in regard to sugar and sugarcane will be helpful for the determination of the questions arising in these Petitions. On 8th April, 1932, the Central Legislature passed the Sugar Industry (Protection) Act, 1932 (Act XIII of 1932) to provide for the fostering and development of Sugar Industry in India in pursuance of the policy of discriminating protection of industries with due regard to the well being of the community. As a result of the protection thus granted to the sugar industry, the number of sugar factories which was 31 prior thereto registered a rapid rise and by 1938 they were 139 in number. There was also a large expansion in the cultivation of sugarcane and millions of cultivators in the Province of U.P. took to growing sugarcane. In order to protect their interests and for the purpose of assuring to them a fair price for their produce, the Central Legislature enacted on 1st May, 1934 the Sugarcane Act, 1934 (Act XV of 1934) to regulate the price at which sugarcane intended to be used in the manufacture of sugar might be purchased by or for factories. Sugarcane was grown in various Provinces and the declaration of controlled areas and the fixing of minimum price for the purchase of sugarcane intended for use in any factory in any controlled area was of necessity left to the Provincial Governments and the Provincial 400 Governments were also empowered to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the objects of the Act including, in particular, the Organisation of growers of sugarcane into Co-operative Societies for the sale of sugarcane to factories.

With the coming into operation of the Government of India Act, 1935, there was a distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures and agriculture (Entry No. 20), trade and commerce within the Province (Entry No. 27) and production, supply and distribution of goods, development of industries subject to the provision in List 1 with respect to development of certain industries under Dominion control (Entry No. 29) were included in List 11, the Provincial Legislative List. The relevant provision in List 1 was contained in Entry No. 34: "Development of industries where development under Dominion control is declared to be in the public interest". As a result of this distribution of legislative powers, the entire subject-matter of Act XV of 1934 fell within the Provincial Legislative List. It was felt that Act XV of 1934 was not sufficiently comprehensive for dealing with the problems of the sugar industry and it was found necessary to replace it by a new measure which would provide for the better Organisation of cane supplies to sugar factories. The Governments of U.P. and Bihar, therefore, decided in consultation with each other to introduce legislation on similar lines for both the Provinces which together accounted for nearly 85 per cent.

of production of sugar in India. The U.P. Legislature accordingly enacted on 10th February, 1938 the U.P. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938 (U.P. Act 1 of 1938) to provide for the licensing of the sugar factories and for regulating the supply of sugarcane intended for use in such factories and the price at which it may be purchased and for other incidental matters. This Act provided for (a) the licensing of sugar factories, (b) the regulation of the supply of sugarcane to factories, (c) the minimum price for sugarcane, (d) the establishment of Sugar Control Board and Advisory.

Committee, and (e) a 401 tax on the sale of sugarcane intended for use in factories, and repealed Act XV of 1934. This Act was to remain in force initially until 30th June, 1947 but the period was extended to 30th June, 1950 by U.P. Act XIII of 1947 and to 30th June, 1952 by U.P. Act XXI of 1950.

The Second World War intervened and an emergency was proclaimed by the Governor-General under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Dominion Legislature acquired the power to make laws for the Provinces with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List. The result was in effect to make the Provincial Legislative List also a Concurrent Legislative List for the operation of the Dominion Legislature but if any provision of a Provincial law was repugnant to any provision of the Dominion law made in exercise of that power, the Dominion law was to prevail and the Provincial law was to be void to the extent of the repugnancy. The proclamation of emergency was to operate until revoked by a subsequent proclamation and laws made by the Dominion Legislature as above were to have effect until the expiration of a period of six months after the proclamation had ceased to operate. The Defence of India Act and the Rules made there under occupied the field, sugar was made a controlled commodity in the year 1942 and its production and distribution as well as the fixation of sugar prices were regulated by the Sugar Controller thereafter. The proclamation of emergency was revoked on 1st April, 1946 and the laws made by the Dominion Legislature in the field of the Provincial Legislative List were to cease to have effect after 30th September, 1946. On 26th March, 1946, the British Parliament enacted the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, Chapter 39). Section 2(1) (a) provided that notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Legislature shall during the period mentioned in section 4 of the Act have power to make laws with respect to the following matters:

"(a) trade and commerce (whether or not within 402 a Province) in, and the production, supply and distribution of, cotton and woollen textiles, paper (including newsprint), foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oils), petroleum and petroleum products, spare parts of mechanically propelled vehicles, coal, iron, steel and mica;.........." The period provided in section 4 was the period of one year beginning with the date on which the proclamation of emergency ceased to operate or, if the Governor-General by a public notification directed, a period of 2 years beginning with that date. There was a proviso to that section that if and so often as a resolution approving the extension of the said period was passed by both Houses of Parliament, the same period shall be extended for a further period of 12 months from the date on which it would otherwise expire but it was not to continue in any case for more than 5 years from the date on which the proclamation of emergency ceased to operate.

Acting under the power reserved to it under section 2(1)(a) aforesaid, the Central Legislature enacted on 19th November, 1946, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act XXIV of 1946) to provide for the continuance during the limited period of powers to control production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities. Section 1(3) of the Act provided that it shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946. In the absence of a notification by the Governor-General, the Act remained operative until 31st March, 1947 only. The Governor-General, however, issued a notification on 3rd March, 1947 continuing its force for a period of two years from the date of the cessation of emergency. By virtue of this notification, the Act would have remained in force till 31st March, 1948. On 18th July, 1947, the Indian Independence Act was passed and India became a Dominion on 15th August, 1947. Under section 9 read with section 19(4) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General passed an order on 14th August, 1947 which substituted the 403 words "Dominion Legislature" for "Both Houses of Parliament" in the proviso to section 4 of India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 and also introduced a new section 4(a) by way of adaptation providing that the powers of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Constituent Assembly. On 25th February, 1948, the Constituent Assembly passed its first Resolution extending the operation of the Act for one year up to 31st March, 1949. On 3rd March, 1949, a second Resolution was passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act by one year more up to 31st March, 1950. With the advent. of our Constitution on 26th January, 1950, Parliament was invested under article 369 with power for a period of 5 years from the commencement of the Constitution to make laws with respect to the following matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List:

"(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and the production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oil) ...................." The life of the Act was accordingly extended from time to time up to 26th January 1955 by Acts passed by Parliament.

Act XXIV of 1946 defined an essential commodity to mean any of the following classes of commodities:

"(1) Foodstuffs ....................." Food crops were defined as including crops of sugarcane.

Section 3 of the Act empowered the Central Government, so far as it appeared to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing the supply of any essential commodity or for securing its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices to provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. On 7th October, 1950, the Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 3 of the Act, promulgated the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, inter alia empowering it to prohibit or to restrict the export of sugarcane from any area, to direct that no gur or sugar shall be 404 manufactured from sugarcane except under and in accordance with the conditions specified in the licence issued in this behalf and to prohibit or to restrict the despatch of gur or sugar from any State or any area therein. Power was also given to fix minimum price of sugarcane and no person was to sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer and no producer was to purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane at a price lower than that notified thereunder. This power of fixing the price of sugarcane was exercised by the Central Government from time to time by issuing notifications fixing the minimum prices to be paid by the producers of sugar by vacuum pan process or their agents for sugarcane purchased by them during the 1950-51 crushing season in various States including U.P. On 31st October, 1951, Parliament enacted the Industries (Development and RegulatiOn) Act, 1951 (Act LXV of 1951) to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries. By section 2 of the Act it was declared that it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule which included in item 8 thereof the industry engaged in the manufacture or production of sugar.

The Province of Bihar which, along with U.P. contributed to nearly 85 per cent. of production of sugar in India had also on its Statute Book the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act VII of 1937. On 10th April, 1938, a joint meeting of the U.P. and the Bihar Sugar Control Boards was held at which it was resolved that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the working of the sugarcane rules and labour conditions prevailing in the sugar factories in the two Provinces. The Governments of the U.P. and Bihar accepted this recommendation of the Sugar Control Boards and accordingly appointed the Khaitan Committee, (1) to examine the working of the sugarcane rules, (2) to look into the complaints of malpractices received from time to time in connection with the supply of sugarcane to the sugar factories, (3) to enquire into the labour conditions of the sugar factories, and (4) to suggest remedial measures for the shortcomings as 405 noted in (1), (2) and (3) above. Shibban Lal Saxena, the present President of the Ganna Utpadak Sangh and one of the petitioners before us was also a member of that Committee.

That Committee submitted its Report in 1940 recommending inter alia abolition of the dual system of supply and creation of a strong co-operative Organisation of the sugarcane growers themselves as also creation of a zonal system. The Indian Tariff Board had also, in the meanwhile, made its Report on the sugar industry in the year 1938 commending the advantages of a zonal system. There was further the report of the U. P. Sugar Industry Enquiry Committee, 1951 called the Swaminathan Committee, which also recommended the abolition of dual agencies of cane supplies to factories and commended the desirability of employing the agency of the Co-operative Societies for the purpose. It also recommended that the U. P. Act I of 1938 should be amended in order to make this regulation possible. Act LXV of 1951 was brought into force with effect from 8th May, 1952. In view of the same, certain provisions of U. P. Act I of 1938 became inoperative. The U.P. Legislature, therefore, passed on 29th June, 1952 the U. P. Sugar Factories Control Amendment) Act) 1952, deleting those provisions and putting the amended Act permanently on the Statute Book. The U. P. Act I of 1938, as thus amended, continued in force till, as a result of the prior enactment of Act LXV of 1951 and the report of the Indian Tariff Board on the Sugar Industry as well as the reports of the Khaitan Committee and the Swaminathan Committee mentioned above, the U. P. Legislature enacted the impugned Act. The object of the enactment was stated to be as follows: "With the promulgation of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 with effect from 8th May, 1952, the regulation of the sugar industry has become exclusively a Central subject.

The State Governments are now only concerned with the supply of sugarcane to the sugar factories. The Bill is being introduced in order to provide for a rational distribution of sugarcane to factories, for its development on organised 406 scientific lines, to protect the interests of the cane growers and of the industry and to put the new Act permanently on the Statute Book" (Vide Statement of objects and reasons published in the U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 15th July, 1953). This is the impugned Act the vires of which is challenged in these Petitions. In exercise of the rule-making power conferred by section 28 of the Act, the U.P. Government made the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954. The U. P. Government also, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16 of the Act, promulgated the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, which came into effect from 19th September, 1954. All these related to the supply and purchase of sugarcane in U.P.

Act LXV of 1951 was amended by Act XXVI of 1953 which, by adding Chapter III(b), invested the Central Government inter alia with power so far as it appeared to it necessary or expedient for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled industry to provide by notified order for regulation of supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.

On 1st April, 1955, Parliament enacted the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act X of 1955) to provide in the interests of the general public for the control of production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities. The essential commodity there was defined to mean any of the following classes of commodities:

"(v) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds, and oils;

...........................................

(xi) any other class of commodity which the Central Government may, by notified order declare to be an essential commodity for the purposes of this Act, being a commodity with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws by virtue of Entry 33 in List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution;" Food crops were defined as inclusive of crops of sugar 407 cane. Section 3(1) empowered the Central Government, if it was of the opinion that it was necessary or expedient to do so for maintaining or increasing the supply of any essential commodity or for securing its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, to provide by order for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.

Section 3(2) (b) inter alia provided for the making of such an order for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land whether appurtenant to a building or not, for the growing thereon of food crops generally or of specified food crops. Section 16 of the Act repealed (a) the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, and (b) any other law in force in any State immediately before the commencement of the Act in so far as such law controlled or authorised the control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity.

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act, the Central Government promulgated on 27th August, 1955 the Sugar Control Order, 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955. The latter empowered the Central Government, after consultation with such authorities, bodies or associations as it may deem fit by notification in the official Gazette from time to time, to fix the price of sugarcane and direct payment thereof and also to regulate the movement of sugarcane. The power to regulate the movement of sugarcane comprised the power to prohibit or restrict or otherwise regulate the export of sugarcane from any area for supply to different factories and the power to direct that no gur (jaggery) or sugar shall be manufactured from sugarcane except under and in accordance with the conditions specified in a licence issued in this behalf Clause 7 of this order provided that the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, published by the Government of India in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, S.R.O. 735 dated 7th October, 1950, and any order made by a State Government or other authority regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of sugarcane and trade or 408 commerce therein were thereby repealed except as respect to things done or omitted to be done under any such order before the commencement of the order.

These are the respective Acts and Notifications passed by the Centre as well as the State of U. P. in regard to sugar and sugarcane.

Learned counsel for the petitioners urged before us:

(1) that the State of U. P. had no power to enact the impugned Act as the Act is with respect to the subject of industries the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest within the meaning of Entry 52 of List I and is, therefore, within the exclusive province of Parliament. The impugned Act is, therefore, ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature and is a colourable exercise of legislative power by the State;

(2)the impugned Act is repugnant to Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955 and in the event of the Court holding that the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, it is void by reason of such repugnancy;

(3)the impugned Act stands repealed to the extent that it has been repealed by section 16 of Act X of 1955 and by clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of Act X of 1955;

(4)the impugned Act infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 inasmuch as very wide powers are given to the Cane Commissioner which can be used in a discriminatory manner;

(5)the impugned Act and the notification dated 27th September, 1954, violate the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1) (e) in that the Co-operative Societies are not voluntary organisations but a cane grower is compelled to become a member of the Society before he can sell his sugarcane to a factory;

(6)the impugned Act and the notifications infringe the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) and (g) and article 31 of the Constitution;

(7) the impugned Act is void in that it confers 409 very wide powers on executive officials and is a piece of delegated legislation; and (8) the impugned Act is destructive of the freedom of trade and commerce and thus is violative of article 301 of the Constitution.

Re. (1): This contention relates to the legislative competence of the U.P. State Legislature to enact the impugned Act. It was contended that, even though the impugned Act purported to legislate in regard to sugarcane required for use in sugar factories, it was, in pith and substance, and in its true nature and effect legislation in regard to sugar industry which had been declared by Act LXV of 1951 to be an industry the control of which by the Union was expedient in the public interest and was, therefore, within the exclusive province of Parliament under Entry 52 of List I. The word 'industry', it was contended, was a word of very wide import and included not only the process of manufacture or production but also all things which were necessarily incidental to it, viz., the raw materials for the industry as also the products of that industry and would, therefore, include within its connotation the production, supply and distribution of raw materials for that industry which meant sugarcane in relation to sugar industry. It was also contended that in so far as the impugned Act purported to legislate in regard to sugarcane which was a necessary ingredient in the production of sugar it was a colourable exercise of legislative power by the State, ostensibly operating in its own field within Entry 27 of List II but really trespassing upon the field of Entry 52 of List I.

It was contended on behalf of the State on the other hand that., after the advent of war and the proclamation of emergency under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and by the combined operation of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 and article 369 of the Constitution taken along with the resolutions of the Houses of Parliament extending the life of Act XXIV of 1946 up to 26th January, 1955 and the Third Constitution Amendment Act of 1954 amending Entry 33 of List 410 III, the Central Legislature was operating all along on what became in effect the Concurrent field even in regard to sugarcane, that the investing of the Central Government with power to legislate in this sphere of the Provincial List did not deprive the Provincial Legislature of such power and that both the Central Legislature as well as the State Legislatures had legislative competence to legislate in regard to these fields which were for the purpose of legislative competence translated into Concurrent fields and that, therefore, the U.P. State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Act which would be valid within its own sphere except for repugnancy with any of the provisions of the Central Legislature covering the same field. The relevant Entries in the respective Lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are as follows:

List I, Entry 52: Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.

List II, Entry 24: Industries subject to the provisions of entry 52 of List 1.

Entry 27: Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III.

List III, Entry 33: As it stood prior to its amendment: Trade and commerce in and production, supply and distribution of, the products of industries where the control of such industries by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.

Entry 33 as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954: Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of(a)the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products;

(b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;

411 (c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates;

(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cottonseed; and (e) raw jute.

Production, supply and distribution of goods was no doubt within the exclusive sphere of the State Legislature but it was subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III which gave concurrent powers of legislation to the Union as well as the States in the matter of trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, the products of industries where the control of such industries by the Union was declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. The controlled industries were relegated to Entry 52 of List I which was the exclusive province of Parliament leaving the other industries within Entry 24 of List II which was the exclusive province of the State Legislature. The products of industries which were comprised in Entry 24 of List II were dealt with by the State Legislatures which had under Entry 27 of that List power to legislate in regard to the production, supply and distribution of goods, goods according to the definition contained in article 366(12) including all raw materials, commodities and articles. When, however it came to the products of the controlled industries comprised in Entry 52 of List 1, trade and commerce in., and -production, supply and distribution of, these goods became the subject-matter of Entry 33 of List III -and both Parliament and the State Legislatures had jurisdiction to legislate in regard thereto. The amendment of Entry 33 of List III by the Constitution. Third Amendment Act, 1954, only enlarged the scope of that Entry without in any manner whatever detracting from the legislative competence of Parliament and the State Legislatures to legislate in regard to the same.

If the matters had stood there, the sugar industry being a controlled industry, legislation in regard to the same would have been in the exclusive province of Parliament and production, supply and distribution of the product of sugar industry, 412 viz., sugar as a finished product would have been within Entry 33 of List III: Sugarcane would certainly not have been comprised within Entry 33 of List III as it was not the product of sugar industry which was a controlled industry.

It was only after the amendment of Entry 33 of List III by the Constitution -Third Amendment Act, 1954 that foodstuffs including edible oilseeds and oils came to be included within that List and it was possible to legislate in. regard to sugarcane, having recourse to Entry 33 of List III. Save for that, sugarcane, being goods. fell directly within Entry 27 of List 11 and was within the exclusive jurisdiction' of the State Legislatures. Production, supply and distribution of sugarcane being thus within the exclusive sphere of the State Legislatures, the U. P. State Legislature would be, without anything more, competent to legislate in regard to the same and the impugned Act would be intra vires the State Legislature.

The argument, however, was that the word 'industry' was a word of wide import and should be construed as including not only the process of manufacture or production but also activities antecedent thereto such as acquisition of raw materials and subsequent thereto such as disposal of the finished products of that industry. The process of acquiring raw materials was an integral part of the industrial process and was, therefore, included in the connotation of the word 'industry' and when the Central Legislature was invested with the power to legislate in regard to sugar industry which was a controlled industry by Entry 52 of List. I, that legislative power included also the power to legislate in regard to the raw material of the sugar industry, that is sugarcane, and the production, supply and distribution of sugarcane was, by reason of its being the necessary ingredient in the process of manufacture or production of sugar, within the legislative competence of the Central Legislature. Each entry in the Lists which is a category or head of the subject-matter of legislation must be construed not in a narrow or restricted sense but as widely as possible so as to extend to all ancillary 413 or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it (Vide The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum and Others(1), Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces (2), and Megh Raj and Another v. Allah Rakhia and Others(3)), and the topic 'industries' should, therefore, be construed to include the raw materials which are the necessary ingredients thereof and which form an integral part of the industrial process.

Our attention was drawn in this connection to the definition of 'industry' in section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947):

"Industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, bandicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen" and also to the wide construction which was put upon the term 'industry' in the Australian Insurance Staffs' Federation v. The Accident Underwriters' Association and Others(4) where it was construed to include "all forms of employment in which large number of persons are employed, the sudden cessation of whose work might prejudicially affect the orderly conduct of the ordinary operations of civil life". A similarly wide interpretation was put on the word 'industry' by our Court in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee and Others(5) where the dispute was between a Municipality and its employees. These interpretations of the term 'industry', however, do not help us because in defining the word 'industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as also in putting the wide construction on the term industry' in [1923] 33 C.L.R. 517, as well as 1953 S.C.R. 302, they were concerned mainly with the question whether an industrial dispute arose between employers and employees. Whether a particular concern came within the definition of an 'employer' was determined with respect to the criterion ultimately adopted (1) [1940] F.C.R. 110, 134. (2) [1946] F C R. 111, 119. (3) [1947] F.C.R. 77. (4) [19231 33 C.L.R. 517, (5) [1953] S.C R. 302.

414 which was that the sudden cessation of such work might prejudicially affect the orderly conduct of the ordinary operations of civil life and the withdrawal of service would be detrimental to the industrial system of the community and might result in its dislocation. What we are concerned with here is not the wide construction to be put on the term 'industry' as such but whether the raw materials of an industry which form an integral part of the process are within the topic of 'industry' which forms the subject-matter of Item 52 of List I as ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly or reasonably be said to be comprehended in that topic and whether the Central Legislature while legislating upon sugar industry could, acting within the sphere of Entry 52 of List 1, as well legislate upon sugarcane.

If both the Central Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures were entitled to legislate in regard to this subject of production, supply and distribution of sugarcane, there would arise no question of legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature in the matter of having enacted the impugned Act. The conflict, if any, arose by reason of the interpretation which was sought to be put on the two Entries, Entry 52 of List I and Entry 27 of List II put in juxtaposition with each other. It was suggested that Item 52 of List I comprised not only legislation in regard to sugar industry but also in regard to sugarcane which was an essential ingredient of the industrial process of the manufacture or production of sugar and was, therefore, ancillary to it and was covered within the topic. If legislation with regard to sugarcane thus came within the exclusive province of the Central Legislature, the Provincial Legislature was not entitled to legislate upon the same by having resort to Entry 27 of List 11 and the impugned Act was, therefore, ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. There was an apparent conflict between the legislative powers of the Centre and of the Provinces in this respect which conflict could not have been intended and, therefore, a reconciliation was to be attempted by reading the two provisions together and by interpreting and where necessary modifying the language of one by that of the other. Reliance was placed on the observations of the Judicial Committee in The Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. William Parsons(1):

"In these cases it is the duty of the Courts, however difficult it may be, to ascertain in what degree, and to what extent, authority to deal with matters falling within these classes of subjects exists in each legislature, and to define in the particular case before them the limits of their respective powers. It could not have been the intention that a conflict should exist; and, in order to prevent such a result, the two sections must be read together, and the language of one interpreted, and, where necessary, modified, by that of the other. In this way it may, in most cases, be found possible to arrive at a reasonable and practical construction of the language of the sections, so as to reconcile the respective powers which they contain, and give effect to all of them. In performing this difficult duty, it will be a wise course for those on whom it is thrown, to decide each case which arises as best they can, without entering more largely upon an interpretation of the statute than is necessary for the decision of the particular question in hand". and also at page 113:

"It is enough for the decision of the present case to say that, in their view, its authority to legislate for the regulation of trade and commerce does not comprehend the power to regulate by legislation the contracts of a particular business or trade, such as the business of fire insurance in a single province............ " These observations were quoted with approval by Gwyer, C. J. in Re: The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 (Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XI V of 1938) (2) and it was further held that the general power ought not to be construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field. The same duty of reconciling apparently conflicting provisions was reiterated in (1) [1881] L R. 7 A.C. 96,108.

(2) [1939] F.C.R. 18, 39.

416 Governor-General in Council v. The Province of Madras(1):

"But it appears to them that it is right first to consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be effected by giving to the language of the Federal Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it might in another context bear, is yet one that can properly be given to it, and equally giving to the language of the Provincial Legislative List a meaning which it can properly bear".

Reliance was also placed on the observations of Gwyer, C. J. quoted in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan(2):

"As interpreted by the Judicial Committee, the British North America Act presents an exact analogy to the India Act, even to the overriding provisions in section 100(1) of the latter: "The rule of construction is that general language in the heads of section 92 yields to particular expressions in section 91, where the latter are unambiguous": per Lord Haldane in Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King(3). The principles laid down by the Judicial Committee in a long series of decisions for the interpretation of the two sections of the British North America Act may therefore be accepted as a guide for the interpretation of similar provisions in the Government of India Act." and it was contended that Entry 27 of List II should be construed in a general manner as applying to production, supply and distribution of goods in general and Entry 52 of List I should be construed as comprehending within its scope ancillary matters in relation to the controlled industries thus excluding production, supply and distribution of goods which would be thus comprised within it as ancillary matters from the sphere of Entry 27 of List II. If this construction was adopted it would avoid the apparent conflict between the two Entries and would reconcile the powers of the Provincial Legislatures with those of the Central Legislature. It was, therefore, contended that the Legislation in regard to sugarcane (1) [1945] F.C R. 179, 191. (2) [1940] F.C.R. 188, 201.

(3) [1921] 2 A.G. 91, 116.

417 should be considered as ancillary to the legislation in regard to sugar industry which is a controlled industry and comprised within Entry 52 of List I and should be excluded from Entry 27 of List II which should be read as covering only those categories which did not fall within Entry 52 of List I even though on a wide construction of the words "production, supply and distribution of goods" they would be capable of covering the same. If this construction was put upon these two Entries, it would follow that the subject matter of the impugned Act was within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament being comprised in Entry 52 of List I and was ultra vires the U.P. State Legislature. The answer of the State of U.P. was two-fold: (1) after the advent of the Second World War and all throughout up to 1955 when Act X of 1955 was enacted by Parliament, the Centre was operating upon the Concurrent field of legislation and that whatever legislation in regard to sugarcane was enacted by the Centre as part of its legislative activities in regard to sugar was not under Entry 52 of List I but was in exercise of its legislative powers under Concurrent jurisdiction, and (2) that the impugned Act merely confined itself to legislation in regard to sugarcane and did not purport to legislate in regard to sugar which was exclusively dealt with by the Centre. There was, therefore, no trespass upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre and the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature.

As has been noted above, the entire subject-matter of Act XV of 1934 came within the Provincial Legislative List on a distribution of legislative powers effected under the Government of India Act, 1935 and the U.P. Legislature enacted the U.P. Act I of 1938 covering the same field and repealing Act XV of 1934. Entry 27 of List II related to production, supply and distribution of goods and development of industries except in regard to controlled industries, and, in so far as in 1938 sugar was not a controlled industry, the U.P. Legislature enacted provisions for the licensing of the sugar factories and for regulating the price and supply of sugarcane intended for use in 418 such factories. With the advent of War and the proclamation of emergency under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Centre was invested with the power to make laws for the Provinces with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List and the Central Legislature as well as the Provincial Legislatures were thus enabled to enact measures exercising concurrent jurisdiction in regard to the topics enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List. The emergency was about to come to an end on the 1st April, 1946 and the British Parliament, therefore, on 26th March, 1946, passed the India. (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, under which, notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Legislature was, for the period specified in section 4 thereof, invested with the powers to make laws with respect to (a) trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs, edible oilseeds and oils and this provision in effect continued the power which had been vested in the Central Legislature during the emergency under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The period mentioned in section 4 of this Act was extended from time to time up to 31st March, 1950.

It was in pursuance of these powers that the Central Legislature enacted Act XXIV of 1946 on 16th November, 1946.

The essential commodities therein comprised inter alia foodstuffs which would include sugar as well as sugarcane and both sugar and sugarcane, therefore, came within the jurisdiction of the Centre. Act XXIV of 1946 was continued in force up to 31st March, 1950 under the terms of section 4 of India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 by the notification of the Governor General and the resolutions passed by both the Houses of Parliament but before the expiration of this extended period the Constitution was inaugurated and under article 369 Parliament was invested with the power to make laws inter alia with respect to trade and commerce within a State and production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs, edible oilseeds 419 and oils as if they were enumerated in the concurrent list and it was by virtue of this power that Act XXIV of 1946 was extended up to 26th January, 1955 by diverse pieces of legislation enacted by Parliament. Sugar and sugarcane thus continued within the jurisdiction of the Centre right up to 26th January, 1955. When Entry 33 of List III was amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954, foodstuffs including edible oilseeds and oils were included therein and both Parliament and the State Legislatures acquired concurrent jurisdiction to legislate over sugar and sugarcane Trade and commerce in, and production, supply and distribution of, sugar and sugarcane thus could be dealt with by Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures and it was in exercise of this jurisdiction that Parliament enacted Act X of 1955. The list of essential commodities defined in section 2 of the Act comprised foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils, cattle fodder, raw cotton and cotton-seed and raw jute which were items (b), (c), (d) -and (e) in Entry 33 of List III and the products of the controlled industries, coal, textiles, iron and steel, paper, petroleum and petroleum products and any other class of commodity which the Central Government may by notification or order declare to be an essential commodity for the purposes of the Act being a commodity with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws by virtue of Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which were amongst the products of the controlled industries specified in the First Schedule to Act LXV of 1951. It follows that Act X of 1955 was enacted by Parliament in exercise of the legislative powers conferred upon it by Entry 33 of List III and was an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction.

It is clear, therefore, that all the Acts and the notifications issued there under by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane were enacted in exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction. The exercise of such concurrent jurisdiction would not deprive the Provincial Legislatures of similar powers which they had under the Provincial Legislative List and there would, there420 fore, be no question of legislative incompetence qua the Provincial Legislatures in regard to similar pieces of legislation enacted by the latter. The Provincial Legislatures as well as the Central Legislature would be competent to enact such pieces of legislation and no question of legislative competence would arise. It also follows as a necessary corollary that, even though sugar industry was a controlled industry, none of these Acts enacted by the Centre was in exercise of its jurisdiction under Entry 52 of List 1. Industry in the wide sense of the term would be capable of comprising three different aspects:

(1) raw materials which are an integral part of the industrial process, (2) the process of manufacture or production, and (3) the distribution of the products of the industry. The raw materials would be goods which would be comprised in Entry 27 of List II. The process of manufacture or production would be comprised in Entry 24 of List II except where the industry was a controlled industry when it would fall within Entry 52 of List I and the products of the industry would also be comprised in Entry 27 of List II except where they were the products of the controlled industries when they would fall within Entry 33 of List 111. This being the position, it cannot be said that the legislation which was enacted by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane could fall within Entry 52 of List I. Before sugar industry became a controlled industry, both sugar and sugarcane fell within Entry 27 of List II but, after a declaration was made by Parliament in 1951 by Act LXV of 1951, sugar industry became a controlled industry and the product of that industry, viz., sugar was comprised in Entry 33 of List III taking it out of Entry 27 of List II.' Even so, the Centre as well as the Provincial Legislatures had concurrent jurisdiction in regard to the same. In no event could the legislation in regard to sugar and sugarcane be thus included within Entry 52 of List 1.

The pith and substance argument also cannot be imported here for the simple reason that, when both the Centre as well as the State Legislatures were operating in the concurrent field, 421 there was no question of any trespass upon the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Centre under Entry 52 of List 1, the only question which survived being whether, putting both the pieces of legislation enacted by the Centre and the State Legislature together, there was any repugnancy, a contention which will be dealt with hereafter.

A more effective answer is furnished by comparison of the terms of the U.P. Act I of 1938 with those of the impugned Act. Whereas the U.P. Act I of 1938 covered both sugarcane and sugar within its compass, the impugned Act was confined only to sugarcane, thus relegating sugar to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre thereby eliminating all argument with regard to the encroachment by the U.P. State Legislature on the field occupied by the Centre. The U.P. Act I of 1938 provided for the establishment of a Sugar Control Board, the Sugar Commissioner, the Sugar Commission and the Cane Commissioner. The impugned Act provided for the establishment of a Sugarcane Board. The Sugar Commissioner was named as such but his functions under rules 106and 107 were confined to getting information which would lead to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and had nothing to do with the production or the disposal of sugar produced in the factories. The Sugar Commission was not provided for but the Cane Commissioner was the authority invested with all the powers in regard to the supply and purchase of sugarcane. The Inspectors appointed under the U.P. Act I of 1938 had no doubt powers to examine records maintained at the factories showing the amount of sugarcane purchased and crushed but they were there with a view to check the production or manufacture of sugar whereas the Inspectors appointed under the impugned Act were, by rule 20, to confine their activities to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane without having anything to do with the further process of the manufacture or production of sugar. Chapter 3 of U.P. Act I of 1938, dealing with the construction and extension of sugar factories, licensing of factories for crushing sugarcane, fixing of the price of sugar, etc., was deleted from the impugned Act. The power of licensing new industrial undertakings was thereafter exercised by the Centre under Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953, vide sections 1 1 (a), 12 and 13, and the power of fixation of price of sugar was exercised by the Centre under section 3 of Act XXIV of 1946 by issuing the Sugar Control Order, 1950. Even the power reserved to the State Government to fix minimum prices of sugarcane under Chapter V of U.P. Act I of 1938 was deleted from the impugned Act the same being exercised by the Centre under clause 3 of Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, issued by it in exercise of the powers conferred under section 3 of Act XXIV of 1946. The prices fixed by the Centre were adopted by the State Government an