Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State Of Rajasthan vs Brij Lal And Ors (2025:Rj-Jd:40405-Db) on 10 September, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

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       HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                        JODHPUR
                  D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 165/1995

    State Of Rajasthan
                                                                        ----Appellant
                                       Versus
    1. Brij Lal S/o Rameshwar Lal R/o Fefana, Tehsil, Nohar.
    2.     Mst. Meera W/o Rameshwar Lal R/o Fefana, Tehsil,
    Nohar.
    3. Hanuman Prasad S/o Virvar Dutt Sharma R/o Ramgarh,
    Tehsil Nohar, Dist. Sriganganagar.
    4.   Mst. Savitri Devi W/o Hanuman Prasad R/o Ramgarh,
    Tehsil Nohar, Dist. Sriganganagar.
                                                                 ----Respondent


    For Appellant(s)          :    Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, PP
    For Respondent(s)         :    Mr. Digvijay Singh Jasol, Amicus
                                   curiae


          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA
                                    Judgment

REPORTABLE
    10/09/2025
    BY THE COURT: (PER HON'BLE MR. MANOJ KUMAR GARG,J)

Instant criminal appeal has been filed under Section

378(3) and 378(1) Cr.P.C. by the appellant-State against the

judgment dated 25.07.1992 passed by learned Additional

District and Sessions Judge, Nohar, District Sriganganagar in

Sessions Case No.51/1987 and No.70/1987 by which the

learned Trial Court acquitted respondent No.1-Brij Lal from

the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B & 302

IPC and respondents No.2-Meera, No.3-Hanuman Prasad &

No.4-Savitri from the offences punishable under Sections

498-A & 304-B IPC.

The respondent No.2-Meera passed away on

28.05.2021 and vide order dated 17.09.2021 passed by a

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co-ordinate Bench of this Court, the present appeal qua

respondent No.2-Meera has already been dismissed as

abated.

Brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding the

controversy are that on 07.05.1987 at about 08:00 AM,

Smt. Madhu made a statement to the police wherein she

stated that she had entered into matrimonial alliance with

Respondent No. 1, Brij Lal, approximately four years prior.

She further alleged that subsequent to the marriage, she

was subjected to persistent harassment and cruelty by her

husband, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law in connection with

dowry demands. She specifically stated that her mother-in-

law frequently taunted her, asserting that as she had only

one son, the dowry provided by Smt. Madhu's father was

insufficient. The complainant further recounted that an

altercation arose when her 18-month-old daughter

misplaced a bottle of surma, which led to a quarrel initiated

by the respondents. She narrated that on the preceding day,

i.e., 06.05.1987, at around 2:00-2:30 PM, her mother-in-

law left the house to attend a marriage ceremony, leaving

her alone with Respondent No. 1, Brij Lal. At that time, Brij

Lal allegedly bolted the door from inside. When she

approached to drink water, he allegedly poured kerosene oil

over her and, with the apparent intention to cause her

death, set her ablaze using a matchstick. She further stated

that she managed to douse the flames by pouring water

over herself, after which Respondent No. 1 unlocked the

door. Upon raising a hue and cry, neighbors, namely

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Rampratap Bhamu, Hari Singh, and others arrived at the

scene. Thereafter, her mother-in-law and husband took her

to the hospital for medical treatment.

On the said report, Police registered the FIR against

the accused appellant for the offences punishable under

Sections 307 and 498-A of IPC and started investigation.

On the same day i.e., 07.05.1987 at approximately

04:15 PM, the deceased- Madhu, made another statement

before the Magistrate, wherein she stated that she had

poured kerosene on herself and her husband thereafter

ignited the fire using a matchstick. Subsequently, a third

statement was also made by the deceased- Madhu at a later

stage. On 29.06.1987, Madhu succumbed to burn injuries.

After thorough investigation, Police submitted a

charge-sheet against all the four accused. Thereafter,

learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the

charges for the offence under Sections 307, 498-A and 302

IPC to the accused respondents. They denied the charge and

sought trial.

During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as

many as 16 witnesses and also got exhibited relevant

documents in support of its case.

The accused respondents were examined under

Section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, DW/1 to DW/5 were

examined and also got exhibited relevant documents in

support of its case.

Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from

both the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating

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the documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses,

vide judgment dated 25.07.1992 acquitted the accused-

respondents from the offence as aforesaid.

Against the judgment of trial Court, the State preferred

this appeal.

Learned counsel for the State submits that in the first

dying declaration made by the deceased, she specifically

alleged that the accused-respondents had subjected her to

harassment on account of dowry demands and that her

husband had poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze.

Although the second and third dying declarations contain

certain minor inconsistencies, it cannot be said that all the

dying declarations are unreliable and ought to be discarded

in their entirety. It is further contended that the Trial Court

erroneously chose to rely solely on the second dying

declaration while discarding the first one, which contains

serious and specific allegations. Such selective reliance, it is

argued, is wholly unjustified and contrary to settled

principles of law. Therefore, the judgment rendered by the

Trial Court is per se illegal and liable to be set aside. It is

prayed that the accused-respondents be convicted and

punished appropriately in accordance with law.

Per contra, learned counsel for the accused-

respondents submits that the Trial Court has meticulously

appreciated all aspects of the case, including the three dying

declarations made by the deceased, as well as the letters

allegedly written by the father-in-law of the deceased to her

father. In these letters, it is purportedly stated that the

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deceased was involved in an illicit relationship with another

individual and, therefore, she should be taken back to her

parental home. It is further contended that the deceased-

Smt. Madhu, had also written a letter wherein she assured

that she would not engage in any such illicit relationship in

the future. These documents, according to the learned

counsel, clearly suggest that the deceased had committed

suicide of her own volition. It is thus argued that the

judgment passed by the Trial Court is well-reasoned and

fully justified. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal be

dismissed.

We have considered the submissions of the counsel for

the parties made at bar and perused the impugned

judgment as well as record of the case.

Admittedly, the alleged incident occurred on

07.05.1987. On the same day, the deceased- Madhu made

an initial statement to the police, wherein she alleged that

the accused appellant- Brij Lal, had bolted the door from

inside. When she proceeded to drink water, he allegedly

poured kerosene oil upon her and, with the apparent intent

to cause her death, set her ablaze by igniting a matchstick.

Subsequently, later on the same day, at approximately

04:15 PM, the deceased made a second statement before

the Magistrate. In this version, she stated that she had

poured kerosene on herself, and it was her husband who

subsequently lit the fire using a matchstick. Further, on

13.05.1987, the deceased made a third statement before

the police under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. (commonly

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referred to as the Titamba Bayan), wherein she made

allegations only with respect to the harassment meted out

by the accused-appellant and his family in relation to dowry

demands. However, notably, she made no reference to the

act of pouring kerosene or to the actual incident leading to

the fire.

Before delving into the merits of the matter, it is

essential to examine the legal principles governing cases

involving multiple dying declarations.

Under the framework of criminal jurisprudence, a dying

declaration is considered an exception to the rule against

hearsay, founded upon the maxim 'nemo moriturus

praesumitur mentire' which means "a man will not meet his

Maker with a lie on his lips." This principle is codified under

Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. However, as

the dying declarations suffer from inherent weaknesses,

such as the same being not made on oath nor in the

presence of the accused nor it could be tested by the cross-

examination, the law has been laid down that while

scrutinizing the dying declarations meticulous

circumspection is called for. While dealing with this aspect,

in the case of Dandu Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of A.P.

reported in AIR 1999 SC 3255, the Supreme Court

observed that a dying declaration must be sieved through

the judicial cullender and if it passes through gauzes it can

be made the basis of a conviction, otherwise not. In that

case the Supreme Court has adopted two tests in order to

satisfy the judicial conscience that the dying declaration

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contains nothing but truth; first test is to scrutinise whether

there are inherent improbabilities in the version and the

next test is whether there are any inherent contradictions

therein. While, dealing with the multiple dying declarations,

the Supreme Court in the case of Sandeep vs State of

Haryana reported in AIR 2015 SC (Cri.) 152, observed

that incompatibility or inconsistency between two dying

declarations can be said to arise if the assertions in one

dying declaration are so diametrically opposed to statements

in the other version, both cannot stand together. Dealing

with the said aspect, in the case of Lakhan vs. State of

M.P. reported in 2010 (8) SCC 514, the Supreme Court

held as under:

A dying declaration recorded by a competent Magistrate would stand on a much higher footing than the declaration recorded by officer of lower rank, for the reason that the competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration of the victim, however, circumstances showing anything to the contrary should not be there in the facts of the case. (vide Ravi Chander & Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1998) 9 SCC 303; Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1999) 6 SCC 545; Koli Chunilal Savji & Anr. v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562; and Vikas & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 2 SCC

516.).

This judgment was also referred to by this court

recently in Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana

reported in (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1019.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamla v.

State of Punjab reported in (1993) 1 SCC 1 (2-Judge

Bench) has held:

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"5. It is well settled that dying declaration can form the sole basis of conviction provided that it is free from infirmities and satisfies various tests (vide Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay [AIR 1958 SC 22 : 1958 SCR 552 :

1958 Cri LJ 106] ). The ratio laid down in this case has been referred to in a number of subsequent cases with approval. It is also settled in all those cases that the statement should be consistent throughout if the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration, they should be consistent. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without even any corroboration. In a case where there are more than one dying declaration if some inconsistencies are noticed between one and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies namely whether they are material or not. In scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances."

In the case of Amol Singh v. State of M.P. reported

in (2008) 5 SCC 468 ( 2-Judge Bench), has observed that:

"13. ... However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances."

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In the case of Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra

reported in (2013) 2 SCC 224, the court observed:-

"15. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated and assessed independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variations in the other."

In the case of Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)

reported in (2019) 8 SCC 779, the following principles

were observed:

"31. A survey of the decisions would show that the principles of declarations can be culled out as follows:

....

31.6. However, there may be cases where there are more than one dying declaration. If there are more than one dying declaration, the dying declarations may entirely agree with one another. There may be dying declarations where inconsistencies between the declarations emerge. The extent of the inconsistencies would then have to be considered by the court. The inconsistencies may turn out to be reconcilable.

31.7. In such cases, where the inconsistencies go to some matter of detail or description but is incriminatory in nature as far as the Accused is concerned, the court would look to the material on record to conclude as to which dying declaration is to be relied on unless it be shown that they are unreliable;

31.8. The third category of cases is that where there are more than one dying declaration and inconsistencies between the declarations are absolute

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and the dying declarations are irreconcilable being repugnant to one another. In a dying declaration, the Accused may not be blamed at all and the cause of death may be placed at the doorstep of an unfortunate accident. This may be followed up by another dying declaration which is diametrically opposed to the first dying declaration. In fact, in that scenario, it may not be a question of an inconsistent dying declaration buta dying declaration which is completely opposed to the dying declaration which is given earlier. There may be more than two."

In the case of Uttam v. State of Maharashtra

reported in (2022) 8 SCC 576, this court observed:

"15. In cases involving multiple dying declarations made by the deceased, the question that arises for consideration is as to which of the said dying declarations ought to be believed by the court and what would be the guiding factors for arriving at a just and lawful conclusion. The problem becomes all the more knotty when the dying declarations made by the deceased are found to be contradictory. Faced with such a situation, the court would be expected to carefully scrutinise the evidence to find out as to which of the dying declarations can be corroborated by other material evidence produced by the prosecution. Of equal significance is the condition of the deceased at the relevant point in time, the medical evidence brought on record that would indicate the physical and mental fitness of the deceased, the scope of the close relatives/family members having influenced/tutored the deceased and all the other attendant circumstances that would help the court in exercise of its discretion."

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In the case of Abhishek Sharma vs. State (Govt. of

NCT of Delhi) reported in, after consider the various

pronouncements of their court, the following principles

emerge, for a Court to consider when dealing with a case

involving multiple dying declarations:

"9.1 The primary requirement for all dying declarations is that they should be voluntary and reliable and that such statements should be in a fit state of mind;

9.2 All dying declarations should be consistent. In other words, inconsistencies between such statements should be 'material' for its credibility to be shaken;

9.3 When inconsistencies are found between various dying declarations, other evidence available on record may be considered for the purposes of corroboration of the contents of dying declarations. 9.4 The statement treated as a dying declaration must be interpreted in light of surrounding facts and circumstances.

9.5 Each declaration must be scrutinized on its own merits. The court has to examine upon which of the statements reliance can be placed in order for the case to proceed further.

9.6 When there are inconsistencies, the statement that has been recorded by a Magistrate or like higher officer can be relied on, subject to the indispensable qualities of truthfulness and being free of suspicion. 9.7 In the presence of inconsistencies, the medical fitness of the person making such declaration, at the relevant time, assumes importance along with other factors such as the possibility of tutoring by relatives, etc."

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In view of the above, the law on the issue of dying

declaration can be summarized to the effect that in case,

the Court comes to the conclusion that the dying declaration

is true and reliable, has been recorded by a person at a time

when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make

the declaration and it has not been made under any

tutoring/duress/prompting; it can be the sole basis for

recording conviction. In such an eventuality no

corroboration is required. In case, there are multiple dying

declarations and there are inconsistencies between them,

generally, the dying declaration recorded by the higher

officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon, provided that

there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about

its truthfulness. In the present matter, the deceased-

Madhu made her second statement before a Magistrate on

07.05.1987, which ordinarily would carry greater probative

value due to the impartial and official nature of the

recording authority. However, the totality of facts and

circumstances warrants closer scrutiny. It is an undisputed

fact that the deceased succumbed to her injuries on

29.06.1987, i.e., more than one and a half months after the

incident. The significant time lapse between the alleged act

and the death of the deceased raises a substantial question

as to the causal nexus between the conduct attributed to

the accused and the eventual cause of death. Additionally,

PW/1- Hari Singh and PW/2- Raj Kumar, who were

independent witnesses, have already been declared hostile

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and after perusal of the statement of the PW/5- Sudesh,

mother of the deceased, this court never feels her

statement trustworthy. Likewise, major improvements have

also arisen in the statements of other witnesses which are

contradictory to each other.

Additionally, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Phoolchand Rathore

reported in 2023 CriLR 724, while observing that courts

are generally reluctant to interfere with an order of

acquittal, recognized that such interference is warranted

when it becomes evident that the acquittal was based on an

entirely flawed reasoning process, legally erroneous, and

involved a perverse approach to the facts of the case. In

such circumstances, where the order of acquittal has led to

a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice, the Court

may reverse the acquittal and convert it into a conviction. In

support of this principle, the Court relied upon its prior

judgments, emphasizing the exceptional nature of such

interference to r ectify substantial errors in the acquittal

order. these are:-

21. In State of M.P. & Others v. Paltan Mallah & Others, (2005) 3 SCC 169, reiterating the same view it was observed:

"8. ... This being an appeal against acquittal, this Court would be slow in interfering with the findings of the High Court, unless there is perverse appreciation of the evidence which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and if the High Court has taken a plausible view this Court would not be justified in interfering with the acquittal passed in favour of the accused

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and if two views are possible and the High Court had chosen one view which is just and reasonable, then also this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the High Court."

22. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in Basheera Begam v. Mohd. Ibrahim & Others, (2020) 11 SCC 174, it was observed:

"190. ... Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the court might reverse an order of acquittal if the court finds that no person properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on record found the accused to be "not guilty". ..."

Similarly in the case of State of State of Uttrakhand Vs.

Sanjay Ram Tamta, reported in (2025) 2 SCC (Cri) 159,' the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:--

"6. Trite is the principle that the appellate courts would be slow in reversing an order of acquittal, especially since the presumption of innocence that is always available to the accused; as a basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, stands reinforced and reaffirmed by the acquittal and unless there are very substantive and compelling reasons to do so, there cannot be a reversal of an order of acquittal. Unless it is found that the findings are perverse and the only conclusion possible from the compelling evidence is of guilt; appellate courts will be slow to reverse an order of acquittal.

7. Recently, in Surender Singh Vs. State of Uttrakhand, one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) referring to various binding precedents of this Court

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succinctly laid down the principle in the following manner in SCC para 24:

24 It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of

the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case

against the accused-respondent for offence under Sections

302, 304-B and 498-A IPC beyond all reasonable doubt. The

appellant/State has failed to show any error of law or on

facts on the basis of which interference can be made by this

Court in the judgment under challenge. The judgment

passed by the learned trial court is detailed, reasoned and

perfectly justified and the same does not suffer from any

infirmity and does not warrant any interference from this

Court.

Hence, the criminal appeal preferred by the State is