Madhya Pradesh High Court
Suresh Tripathi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 13 May, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1 M.Cr.C. No.9413/2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
ON THE 13th OF MAY, 2024
MISCELLANEOUS CRIMINAL CASE No. 9413 of 2023
BETWEEN:-
1. SURESH TRIPATHI S/O GOPINATH
TRIPATHI, AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: AGRICUTURIST R/O
VILLAGE DIHI POLICE STATION
GOVINDGARH DISTRICT REWA
(MADHYA PRADESH)
2. ASHOK TRIPATHI S/O SURESH
TRIPATHI, AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURIST R/O
VILLAGE DIHI POLICE STATION
GOVINDGARH DISTRICT REWA
(MADHYA PRADESH)
3. NEHA TRIPATHI D/O SURESH
TRIPATHI, AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS, R/O
VILLAGE DIHI POLICE STATION
GOVINDGARH DISTRICT REWA
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPLICANT
(BY SHRI K.K. GAUTAM - ADVOCATE )
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH POLICE STATION
GOVINDGARH DISTRICT REWA
(MADHYA PRADESH)
2. RAMAVTAR BASORE S/O SURYADEEN
BASORE R/O VILLAGE DOOBI POLICE
STATION GOVINDGARH DISTRICT
REWA (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SWATI ASEEM GEORGE - DEPUTY GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE )
............................................................................................................................................
2 M.Cr.C. No.9413/2023
This application coming on for admission this day, the court passed
the following:
ORDER
This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed for
quashment of FIR in Crime No.258/2020 registered at Police Station
Govindgarh, District Rewa for offence under Sections 294, 374, 506, 34
of IPC and under Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) and 3(1)(h) of
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
2. By order dated 27.04.2023, this Court had called the record of the
trial Court, which has been received.
3. From the record, it appears that by order dated 26.04.2022,
charges under Section 294, 506-B of IPC and under Section 3(1)(r) and
3(1)(s) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act have been framed.
4. It is the case of applicants that respondent No.2 lodged an FIR
that he is a Mason by profession and a verbal contract has taken place
between him and the applicants for construction of house. According to
FIR, the complainant had raised a construction upto a particular height
and therefore, when he informed the applicants that an amount of
Rs.74,615/- is outstanding out of which only Rs.46,300/- have been
paid. Then applicants No.2 and 3 informed the complainant that he may
collect the same after some time. Ultimately on 28.07.2020 at about
10.00 A.M. the complainant went to the house of applicant No.2, where
he met with applicants No.2 and 3 and demanded the outstanding
amount of Rs.28,000/-. Thereafter, applicants No.2 and 3 stated that "r;
Mksekj rks vkgs lqvjh pjkus okys jkst jkst viuk eWaqg lqcg lqcg fn[kkor gSA eknjpksn
gekjs njokts ls pyk tk rsjk dksbZ iSlk ugha yxrs gSA fookn gksus yxk eSa Hkh cksyk dh
tkfrxr xkyh D;ksa nsrs gks geus dke fd;k gS eq>s iSlk pkfg;s csxkj ge ugha djrs gS eq>s
Hkh cPps ikyus gS rFkk etnwjksa dk Hkh iSlk nsuk gS rHkh v'kksd ,oa usgk f=ikBh ds firk
lqjs'k f=ikBh MaMk fy;s ?kj ls ckgj fudys rFkk cksys :d eknjpksn vHkh iSlk nsrs gS vHkh
tku ls [kre fd;s nsrs gS v'kksd ,oa usgk f=ikBh Hkh ekjihV djus dks nkSMs rks eSa ekjs Mj
ds viuh tku cpk dj Hkkxk mijksDr ?kVuk jkey[ku caly] izeksn dqekj f=ikBh]
jktdqekj caly ,oa ikl iMksl ds yksxks us ns[kk ,oa lquk eSa Mj dj viuh tku cpk dj
?kj pyk x;k FkkA"
5. Challenging the FIR as well as charge sheet it is submitted by Shri
Gautam that in fact complainant had teased the applicant No.3 by
entering inside the house and when she tried to lodge an FIR, then FIR
was not recorded and ultimately, she filed a complaint. However, it is
submitted that applicant No.3 has not given her statement under Section
200 of Cr.P.C. and submitted that the complaint is pending.
6. Be that whatever it may be.
7. The case has to be decided on the basis of allegations made in the
FIR as well as the statements given by the witnesses. This Court has
already reproduced the words allegedly uttered by applicants No.2 and
3.
8. It is contended by counsel for applicants that incident did not take
place in public view. In fact no house was constructed and the
allegations are false. It is further submitted that FIR has been lodged
with malicious intention.
9. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the applicants.
Whether the allegations are false or not?
10. This Court in exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can
quash the proceedings only if uncontroverted allegations do not make
out an offence.
11. The Supreme Court in the case of XYZ v. State of Gujarat
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337 has held as under:
"14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and after perusing the impugned order and other material
placed on record, we are of the view that the High Court
exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction conferred under
Section 482 CrPC, and quashed the proceedings. Even
before the investigation is completed by the
investigating agency, the High Court entertained the writ
petition, and by virtue of interim order granted by the
High Court, further investigation was stalled. Having
regard to the allegations made by the
appellant/informant, whether the 2nd respondent by
clicking inappropriate pictures of the appellant has
blackmailed her or not, and further the 2nd respondent
has continued to interfere by calling Shoukin Malik or
not are the matters for investigation. In view of the
serious allegations made in the complaint, we are of the
view that the High Court should not have made a roving
inquiry while considering the application filed under
Section 482 CrPC. Though the learned counsel have
made elaborate submissions on various contentious
issues, as we are of the view that any observation or
findings by this Court, will affect the investigation and
trial, we refrain from recording any findings on such
issues. From a perusal of the order of the High Court, it
is evident that the High Court has got carried away by
the agreement/settlement arrived at, between the parties,
and recorded a finding that the physical relationship of
the appellant with the 2nd respondent was consensual.
When it is the allegation of the appellant, that such
document itself is obtained under threat and coercion, it
is a matter to be investigated. Further, the complaint of
the appellant about interference by the 2nd respondent
by calling Shoukin Malik and further interference is also
a matter for investigation. By looking at the contents of
the complaint and the serious allegations made against
2nd respondent, we are of the view that the High Court
has committed error in quashing the proceedings.
(Underline supplied)"
12. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S.
Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718 has held as under:-
"7. In our view the assessment made by the High Court
at a stage when the investigation was yet to be
completed, is completely incorrect and uncalled for
..........."
13. The Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Das v. State of
Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319 has held as under :
"12. The counsel appearing for the appellant also drew
our attention to the same decision which is relied upon
in the impugned judgment by the High Court i.e. State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. In the said decision, this
Court held that it may not be possible to lay down any
specific guidelines or watertight compartment as to
when the power under Section 482 CrPC could be or is
to be exercised. This Court, however, gave an
exhaustive list of various kinds of cases wherein such
power could be exercised. In para 103 of the said
judgment, this Court, however, hastened to add that as a
note of caution it must be stated that the power of
quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases for the Court would not be justified
in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
first information report or in the complaint and that the
extraordinary or the inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its
whim or caprice."
14. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v.
State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350 has held as under :
"5. Ordinarily and in the normal course, the High Court
when approached for quashing of a criminal proceeding
will not appreciate the defence of the accused; neither
would it consider the veracity of the document(s) on
which the accused relies. However an exception has
been carved out by this Court in Yin Cheng Hsiung v.
Essem Chemical Industries; State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal and Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley to the
effect that in an appropriate case where the document
relied upon is a public document or where veracity
thereof is not disputed by the complainant, the same can
be considered."
15. The Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. v. Gourishetty
Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226 has held as under :
"18. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark
upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of
it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function
of the trial Judge/Court. It is true that the Court should
be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and
should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, otherwise, it would
be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the
same time, Section 482 is not an instrument handed over
to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and brings
about its closure without full-fledged enquiry.
19. Though the High Court may exercise its power
relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, the power should be exercised sparingly. For
example, where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused or
allegations in the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence or do not disclose commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused or where there
is express legal bar provided in any of the provisions of
the Code or in any other enactment under which a
criminal proceeding is initiated or sufficient material to
show that the criminal proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused due to private and personal
grudge, the High Court may step in.
20. Though the powers possessed by the High Court
under Section 482 are wide, however, such power
requires care/caution in its exercise. The interference
must be on sound principles and the inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
We make it clear that if the allegations set out in the
complaint do not constitute the offence of which
cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open
to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of
inherent powers under Section 482."
16. The Supreme Court in the case of M. Srikanth v. State of
Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373 has held as under :
"17. It could thus be seen, that this Court has held,
that where the allegations made in the FIR or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute a
case against the accused, the High Court would be
justified in quashing the proceedings. Further, it has
been held that where the uncontroverted allegations in
the FIR and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose any offence and make out a case
against the accused, the Court would be justified in
quashing the proceedings."
17. The Supreme Court in the case of CBI v. Arvind Khanna
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686 has held as under :
"17. After perusing the impugned order and on
hearing the submissions made by the learned Senior
Counsel on both sides, we are of the view that the
impugned order passed by the High Court is not
sustainable. In a petition filed under Section 482
CrPC, the High Court has recorded findings on
several disputed facts and allowed the petition.
Defence of the accused is to be tested after
appreciating the evidence during trial. The very fact
that the High Court, in this case, went into the most
minute details, on the allegations made by the
appellant CBI, and the defence put forth by the
respondent, led us to a conclusion that the High Court
has exceeded its power, while exercising its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
18. In our view, the assessment made by the High
Court at this stage, when the matter has been taken
cognizance of by the competent court, is completely
incorrect and uncalled for."
18. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of State of MP Vs.
Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A. No.709/2021
has held that a detailed and meticulous appreciation of evidence at the
stage of 482 of CrPC is not permissible and should not be done. In the
case of Kunwar Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held as under:-
"8........At this stage, the High Court ought not to
be scrutinizing the material in the manner in which
the trial court would do in the course of the criminal
trial after evidence is adduced. In doing so, the High
Court has exceeded the well-settled limits on the
exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 of
CrPC. A detailed enquiry into the merits of the
allegations was not warranted. The FIR is not
expected to be an encyclopedia..........."
19. Similar view has been taken by Supreme Court in the cases of
Munshiram Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2018) 5 SCC 678,
Teeja Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221,
State of Orissa Vs. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan reported in (2012) 4 SCC
547, S. Khushboo Vs. Kanniammal reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600,
Sangeeta Agrawal Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2019) 2 SCC 336,
Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460,
Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri Satyanarayana Reddy
reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437, M.N. Ojha Vs. Alok Kumar
Srivastav reported in (2009) 9 SCC 682.
20. Therefore, whether the allegations made in the FIR are correct or
not is beyond the scope of this application and it is for the trial Court to
decide the same after recording evidence.
Whether the FIR has been lodged with malafide intentions or not?
21. By referring to the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the
case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335, it is submitted that if prosecution is instituted because of
malafide intentions, then the same can be quashed.
22. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the applicants.
23. The Supreme Court in the case of Renu Kumari Vs. Sanjay
Kumar and others reported in (2008) 12 SCC 346, after considering
the law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra)
and R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 has
held as under:
"9. "8. Exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC
in a case of this nature is the exception and not the
rule. The section does not confer any new powers
on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power
which the Court possessed before the enactment of
CrPC. It envisages three circumstances under which
the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,
(i) to give effect to an order under CrPC, (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible
rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with
procedure can provide for all cases that may
possibly arise. The courts, therefore, have inherent
powers apart from express provisions of law which
are necessary for proper discharge of functions and
duties imposed upon them by law. That is the
doctrine which finds expression in the section which
merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of
the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express
provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such
powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo
a wrong in the course of administration of justice on
the principle of quando lex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non
potest (when the law gives a person anything, it
gives him that without which it cannot exist). While
exercising the powers under the section, the court
does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide,
has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by
the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which
alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists
for advancement of justice and if any attempt is
made to abuse that authority so as to produce
injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse.
It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow
any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers the court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing
of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends
of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
report, the court may examine the question of fact.
When a report is sought to be quashed, it is
permissible to look into the materials to assess what
the report has alleged and whether any offence is
made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960
SC 866 : (1960) 3 SCR 388] this Court summarised
some categories of cases where inherent power can
and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want
of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge. (AIR p. 869)
10. In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction between a
case where there is no legal evidence or where there
is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
support the accusations. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court
would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the
function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should
not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless
harassment. The court should be circumspect and
judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing process, lest it would be an
instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At
the same time the section is not an instrument
handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The
scope of exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC
and the categories of cases where the High Court
may exercise its power under it relating to
cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice
were set out in some detail by this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . A note of
caution was, however, added that the power should
be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of
rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by
this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para
102)
'(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.'
11. As noted above, the powers possessed by
the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are very
wide and the very plenitude of the power requires
great caution in its exercise. The court must be
careful to see that its decision, in exercise of this
power, is based on sound principles. The inherent
power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. The High Court being the highest court
of a State should normally refrain from giving a
prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts
are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and produced
before the Court and the issues involved, whether
factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen
in their true perspective without sufficient material.
Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in
regard to cases in which the High Court will
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing
the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36
: AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran
(Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1
Cri LJ 1].] It would not be proper for the High Court
to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of
all probabilities in order to determine whether a
conviction would be sustainable and on such
premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings
are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess
the material before it and conclude that the
complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an
information is lodged at the police station and an
offence is registered, then the mala fides of the
informant would be of secondary importance. It is
the material collected during the investigation and
evidence led in the court which decides the fate of
the accused person. The allegations of mala fides
against the informant are of no consequence and
cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the
proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna
Kumar [1990 Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri)
142], State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1)
SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] , Rupan Deol
Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 :
1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , State of Kerala v. O.C.
Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304]
, State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 :
1996 SCC (Cri) 497] , Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri)
415], Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503]
and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3
SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] .]"
The above position was again reiterated in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC 89 :
2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , State of M.P. v. Awadh
Kishore Gupta [(2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
353] and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar
Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri)
272] , SCC pp. 547-50, paras 8-11."
24. Unless and until this Court comes to a conclusion that no incident
had taken place, it cannot be said that the FIR in question has been
lodged out of malicious intentions. If the FIR discloses the commission
of cognizable offence, then the malafides of the informant would
become secondary in nature.
Whether FIR is belated?
25. It is next contended by counsel for applicants that in fact the
incident is an afterthought incident and the FIR was lodged with a delay
of 17 days.
26. Considered the submissions made by counsel for applicants.
27. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a ground to quash the
proceedings.
28. The Supreme Court in the case of Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India)
Private Limited. Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2021) 5 SCC
795 has held that in a petition for quashing the FIR, the Court cannot go
into disputed question of fact. The mere delay on the part of complainant
in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR.
The Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in FIR or in complaint
and criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at initial stage.
29. The Supreme Court in the case of Ravinder Kumar and another
Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 690 has held that attack on
prosecution cases on the ground of delay in lodging FIR has almost bogged
down as a stereotyped redundancy in criminal cases. It is a recurring
feature in most of the criminal cases that there would be some delay in
furnishing the first information to the police. It has to be remembered that
law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not
illegal. Of course, a prompt and immediate lodging of FIR is ideal as that
would give the prosecution a twin advantage i.e. firstly it affords
commencement of the investigation without any time lapse and secondly
that it expels the opportunity for any possible concoction of a false version.
Even otherwise promptly lodged FIR is also not an unreserved guarantee
for the genuineness of the version incorporated therein. There may be
variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgement to get delayed.
30. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid and another
Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in AIR 2023 SC 3784 has held that
delay in registration of FIR, by itself cannot be a ground for quashing of
FIR. Thus, it is clear that merely because according to applicants there is
delay in lodging the FIR by itself is not sufficient to quash the same.
31. Unless and until the prosecution is barred by time, this Court
cannot quash the proceedings because even in the case of delay in
lodging the FIR, the complainant can always explain the delay.
Furthermore, in the present case, the complainant is a Mason, who had
allegedly gone to the house of applicants to recover his outstanding
amount. There was no previous enmity between the parties.
32. Under these circumstances, mere delay in lodging the FIR by
itself would not be a ground to quash the proceedings.
Whether FIR has been lodged at the behest of another person?
33. At the last, it was submitted by counsel for applicants that FIR has
been lodged at the instance of one Pramod Sharma, who is a neighbour
of the applicants and against whom applicants have taken legal action.
34. The aforesaid defence taken by applicants cannot be considered
by this Court in exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and it is
for the applicants to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt by leading
evidence before the trial Court.
Whether the pendency of complaint will have any adverse effect on
the present case or not?
35. It is submitted by counsel for applicants that in fact the
complainant had forcibly entered inside the house of applicants and had
tried to outrage the modesty of applicant No.3 and accordingly,
complaint case is filed.
36. From the abovementioned submission, one thing is clear that
some incident had taken place between the complainant as well as the
applicants. Merely because complaint was filed by the applicants cannot
be a ground to quash the proceedings. Whether the complaint filed by
applicants narrates the correct facts or the allegations made in the FIR
narrate the correct facts, is a disputed question of fact, which cannot be
decided by this Court while exercising power under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C.
37. No other argument is advanced by counsel for the applicants.
38. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court is of considered opinion that no case is made out warranting
interference.
39. The application fails and is hereby dismissed.
40. The office is directed to immediately return back the record of the
trial Court.
41. Since, the trial had remained stayed for the reason that the record
was called, accordingly, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the trial
preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of
certified copy of this order.
(G.S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
SR*
Date: 2024.05.14 11:01:32 +05'30'
