M/S Mafatlal Industries Ltd vs General Manager And Another
2025 Latest Caselaw 1928 ALL

Allahabad High Court

M/S Mafatlal Industries Ltd vs General Manager And Another on 15 July, 2025

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:114280-DB
 
Chief Justice's Court
 

 
Case :- APPEAL UNDER SECTION 37 OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 DEFECTIVE No. - 123 of 2025
 

 
Appellant :- Mafatlal Industries Ltd
 
Respondent :- General Manager and another
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Rishi Bhushan Jauhari
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Krishna Agrawal
 

 
Hon'ble Arun Bhansali, Chief Justice
 
Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra, J.
 

 

1. This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('the Act') is directed against judgment dated 19.09.2024 passed by the Commercial Court, Bareilly whereby the application filed by the respondents under Section 34 of the Act has been allowed and the award dated 04.08.2016 has been set aside.

2. The office has reported the appeal as barred by 154 days.

3. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

4. In the affidavit filed in support of the application seeking condonation of delay, it has been indicated that the appellant had appointed an Advocate for contesting the matter before the Commercial Court and a reply to the application under Section 34 of the Act was also filed. It is claimed that after filing of the reply, the Advocate was contacted by Assistant Manager (Legal) through calls to get an update on the date fixed, however, every time it was informed by the counsel that dates have been fixed in the matter and he will inform the developments of the case.

5. It is then claimed that the appellant was kept in dark by the counsel regarding passing of the judgment and order dated 19.09.2024. In spite of calling the counsel various times, he stopped responding to the calls made and when no information could be received from the counsel, Assistant Manager (Legal) and Legal Executive of the appellant company visited Commercial Court on 25.03.2025, when the counsel refused to meet the officers of the appellant company.

6. On enquiry, it was revealed that the matter had already been decided by the Court on 19.09.2024. Copy was applied and after procuring the copy, the file was entrusted to the counsel at the High Court on 27.03.2025 and the appeal has been filed on 16.04.2025 without any further delay.

7. Further submissions have been made that appellant company is having office at Ahmedabad and Mumbai and does not have any office in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The company relied on the counsel for obtaining information on developments of the case, however, it was kept in dark and no information in this regard was given and on coming to know of the order on 25.03.2025, the appeal had been filed without any further delay and therefore, the delay deserves to be condoned.

8. A reply to the application has been filed by the respondents contesting the submissions made therein. It was indicated that despite the appellant being a company, no material has been placed by it to support the plea raised regarding the omission/inaction of the counsel in not informing the appellant and therefore, the present is a case of gross negligence and therefore, the huge delay of 154 days in filing the appeal cannot be condoned and the application deserves to be dismissed.

9. A rejoinder has been filed seeking to reiterate the submissions made in the application seeking condonation of delay.

10. We have considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record.

11. The present is a case arising under the provisions of the Act, wherein the parameters for condonation of delay have been laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government of Maharashstra Vs. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. : (2021) 6 SCC 460 wherein it has been laid down as under:

"63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches."

12. The stipulation made in the judgment is specific wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved, both under the Limitation Act and the Commercial Courts Act, observed that a delay beyond 60 days is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule and in a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bonafidely and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the Court, be condoned.

13. In the present case, from the plea raised in the application seeking condonation of delay, it would be seen that the entire blame for the delay of 154 days in filing the appeal has been placed on the Advocate who was representing the appellant before the Commercial Court.

14. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajneesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Ved Prakash : (2024) 11 SCR 1466, in similar circumstances, has laid down as under:

"10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.

11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court observed as under:-

"8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engage him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq [MANU/SC/0076/1981 : 1981:INSC:95 : AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not deposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear they chose to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted."

(Emphasis supplied)

12. As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation : (1971) 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:

"The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims."

(Emphasis supplied)

15. From the above observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that on the spacious plea by blaming the counsel without indicating any kind of vigilance on part of the appellant, the delay cannot be condoned.

16. It would further be seen that the appellant, despite being a public limited company, has not produced any material worth the name to indicate the company having made enquiries from the counsel, neither any correspondence nor any e-mail has been produced to substantiate the submissions made in this regard. A lame excuse has been indicated that the officer contacted on phone only, however, even the call details have not been produced especially when the allegations have been disputed in the counter affidavit by the respondents.

17. In view of above the fact-situation, we do not find any good reason to condone the huge delay of 154 days in filing the appeal. The application seeking seeking condonation of delay is therefore, dismissed.

18. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed.

Order Date :- 15.7.2025

AHA

(Kshitij Shailendra, J) (Arun Bhansali, CJ)