State vs Jadawali And Ors
2025 Latest Caselaw 10621 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State vs Jadawali And Ors on 16 June, 2025

Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                  D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 634/2009

State of Rajasthan
                                                                      ----Appellant
                                        Versus
1. Jadawali wife of Shri Budh Ram
2. Jai-Gopal @ Gopal son of Budh Ram
3. Miss. Khushwanti daughter of Budh Ram
All residents of 54 G.G. Sangatpura, Police Station Srikaranpur,
Tehsil Sri-karanpur Distt. Sri-ganganagar.
                                                                    ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Ramesh Dewasi, PP
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Vikram Choudhary



      HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL

Judgment

Reserved on 21/05/2025 Pronounced on 16/06/2025

Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:

1. In the instant criminal appeal, the appellant-State has

challenged the judgment of acquittal dated 03.02.2009 passed by

the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shrikaranpur ('Trial Court')

in Sessions Case No. 16/2007 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Jadawali

and ors.), whereby the accused-respondents herein were

acquitted of the charges against them under Sections 302 & 304B

IPC, though, they were convicted and sentenced under Section

498A IPC.

2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year

2007 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 2009.

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3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by the

learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf the appellant-State,

are that on 04.04.2007, a written report was presented before

Police Station, Shrikaranpur alleging therein that one Vimla @

Pammi (daughter of the complainant) was married to accused-

respondent Gopal, 11 months prior to the presentation of the

report. It was alleged that just after 3 months of the marriage his

daughter was being harassed for demand of dowry by the

accused-respondent Gopal (Husband), accused-respondent

Jadawali (Mother in law) and accused-respondent Khushwanti

(Sister in law). The report stated that, due to the said harassment

the complainant made his daughter stay at his home, whereupon

2 months prior to the presentation of the report, one relative by

the name of Gevarram, who had mutual relations with the

complainant and the accused-respondents assured that the

accused-respondents would not fight or beat the daughter of

complainant, and would also not make any demand of dowry or

money, and thereupon Gevarram took the daughter of

complainant along with him. It was further alleged in the report

that thereafter, the complainant with his daughter went to his

home, from where the accused-respondent Gopal, after 2 days

took her with him. It was further alleged in the said report that on

03.04.2007 at around 8:30 p.m. the complainant got to know that

all accused-respondents had set the daughter of the complainant

on fire, and she had been admitted in the Shriganganagar

Hospital. It was further alleged that when complainant inquired,

his daughter told him that accused-respondents poured kerosene

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on her and set her on fire, and the father in law of the

complainant's daughter was not in home at the relevant time.

3.1. On the basis of the aforementioned information, a case was

registered under Section 498A and 304B IPC, and upon

completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the

accused-respondents under Sections 304B and 498A IPC before

the concerned Court, and after hearing arguments on the stage of

framing of charge, the said charges were read over to the

accused-respondents, who denied the same and claimed trial,

thereafter upon an application being preferred by the prosecution,

the learned Trial Court passed order dated 01.09.2008 for addition

of the charge under section 302 IPC, in alternative of charge

under section 304B IPC and the said charges were also read over

to the accused-respondents, which were denied and trial was

claimed, the trial commenced accordingly.

3.2. Owing to the nature of offences charged, the matter was

committed to the Court of Sessions for the necessary trial.

3.3. During the course of trial, the statements of 18 witnesses

(P.W. 1 to P.W. 18) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to 30)

were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; in defence, document

(Ex.D.1 to 6) were exhibited; where-after, the accused-respondent

was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which he pleaded

innocence and false implication in the criminal case in question.

3.4. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, while

finding that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case

beyond all reasonable doubts with respect to the charges under

section 302 and 304B, acquitted the accused-respondents herein

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB] (4 of 15) [CRLA-634/2009]

of the charges framed under section 302 and 304B against them,

however convicted and sentenced them with respect to the charge

under section 498A, vide the impugned judgment dated

24.11.2012; against which, the present appeal has been preferred

by the appellant-State to the extent of the acquittal as stated

above of the accused-respondents.

4. Mr. Ramesh Dewasi, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that

the learned Trial Court has erred in law as well as facts in

acquitting the accused respondents, whereas prosecution has

proved the guilt of the accused-respondents beyond all reasonable

doubts.

4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that as per the record

the deceased was tortured for dowry and the learned Trial Court

has convicted the accused-respondents for the offence punishable

under section 498A on the basis of the evidences on record,

however has acquitted the accused-respondents under the

charges of section 302 and 304B on the same set of evidences,

which has resulted in miscarriage of justice.

4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that Om Prakash (father

of the deceased and P.W.5), Mayadevi (mother of the deceased

and P.W.6) and sister of the deceased (P.W.13) and Gevarram

(relative of the deceased and P.W.7) have explicitly and in the

same lines stated in their testimonies that the deceased was being

harassed for dowry.

4.3. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that P.W.6 in her

testimony stated that just after 3 months of the marriage the

deceased told P.W.6 that accused-respondents demanded a gold

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB] (5 of 15) [CRLA-634/2009]

ring, television and money from her, and used to beat her.

Furthermore, it was submitted that the P.W.5 and P.W.13 have

corroborated with the testimony of P.W.6. It was submitted the

said P.W.6 along with P.W.5 and P.W.13 have equivocally stated in

their testimonies that due to such demands of dowry by accused-

respondents the situation aggravated to the level that the

deceased was beaten up with wires by accused-respondents, and

was thrown out of the house for non-fulfillment of the said

demands, whereupon the deceased went to the house of her aunt.

4.4. Learned Public prosecutor submitted that the said witnesses

have further stated that the father in law of the deceased, brother

of the father in law, her husband Gopal (accused-respondent) and

Gevarram (P.W.7) went to the house of complainant and promised

not to demand any dowry and beat the deceased. It was

submitted that the said witnesses stated, that it was upon this

assurance the deceased was sent to matrimonial house along with

accused-respondents, however, the harassment with respect to

demand of dowry did not stop. It was further submitted that P.W.7

had stated in the testimony that a compromise was arrived to the

effect that the deceased would not be subjected to any further

demands of dowry and beatings in connection therewith. However,

despite the aforementioned assurances and compromise the

complainants daughter was murdered by the accused-

respondents.

5. Per Contra, Mr. Vikram Choudhary, learned Counsel for the

accused-respondents while opposing the submissions made on

behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that learned Trial Court

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after taking into consideration the statements made by the

prosecution witnesses and the evidences on record concluded that

the accused-respondents cannot be held liable under section 302

and 304B IPC.

5.1. Learned counsel submitted that the statement of the

deceased under section 164 IPC (Ex.P 13) which was taken before

the death of the deceased, wherein it had been alleged that the

deceased was set on fire by the accused-respondents was not

believable as it lacked corroboration, and a doctors' certificate of

mental fitness was not taken before recording the said statement

despite the deceased being critically burnt. Furthermore, it was

submitted that the testimony of P.W.5 (father of the deceased)

stating that the deceased told him that the accused-respondents

set her on fire cannot be believed as the father was an interested

witness. Thus, it was contended that statements of the deceased

recorded under 164 Cr.P.C. and the testimony of P.W.5 do not

come in aid to establish a case under section 302 and 304B IPC.

5.2. Learned counsel further submitted that Rajesh Bheel

(P.W.18), a police personnel stated in his testimony that it was a

case of suicide and not murder. Moreover, it was contended that it

was the accused-respondents themselves who took the deceased

to the hospital.

5.3. Learned counsel also submitted that there was no eyewitness

to the incident in question, rather the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P.8) or

the postmortem report (EX.P.11) did not suggest any marks or

signs of struggle, meaning thereby that it was a case of suicide.

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5.4. Learned counsel also submitted that even if story as alleged

by prosecution is believed, it did not reveal that there was a

demand of dowry soon before the death of Vimla (deceased) as

after the compromise was arrived to the extent that there will be

no demand of dowry of any kind in future, as stated by P.W.5,

P.W.6 and P.W.7, there is no evidence on record that reflects that

any such demand was made soon before her death. Thus, it was

contended that one of the essential condition of section 304B that

soon before the death of the woman, she being subjected to

cruelty or harassment, in connection with dowry demand, was not

fulfilled.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the

record of the case.

7. This Court observes that the evidences on record revealed

that Vimla @ Pammi was married to the accused-respondent

Gopal approximately 11 months prior to the incident and that

there existed disputes and allegations of harassment for dowry in

the matrimonial home. The learned Trial Court, after appreciation

of evidence, found sufficient ground to convict the accused-

respondents under Section 498A IPC, acknowledging the fact of

cruelty. However, with respect to the charges under Sections 302

and 304B IPC, the Trial Court passed the judgment of acquittal by

extending the benefit of doubt. The instant appeal has been

preferred by the appellant-State assailing the judgment dated

03.02.2009 passed by the learned Trial Court to the extent of

acquittal of the accused-respondents under Sections 302 and

304B IPC.

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB] (8 of 15) [CRLA-634/2009]

8. This Court observes that in the absence of any direct or

ocular evidence regarding the incident in question, the present

case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, and the locus

classicus on circumstantial evidence is the judgment of Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs.

State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, wherein the five

golden principles for the cases based on circumstantial evidence

were laid down. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are

reproduced as hereunder:

"...the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case

against an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to

be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the

circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may

be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal

distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should

be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao

Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973

SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations

were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]

"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused

must be and not merely may be guilty before a court

can convict and the mental distance between 'may

be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague

conjectures from sure conclusions."

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB] (9 of 15) [CRLA-634/2009]

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the

hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they

should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that

the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and

tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the

one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to

leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent

with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all

human probability the act must have been done by the

accused.

154.These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute

the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial

evidence."

9. This Court further observes that the factual matrix of the

present case needs to be scrutinized in light of the aforementioned

principles of circumstantial evidence.

9.1. This Court also observes that the prosecution has primarily

relied on the oral testimonies of related witnesses (P.W.5, P.W.6,

and P.W.13), who deposed about demands of dowry and

harassment in connection therewith and earlier incidents of

cruelty. However, no witness had rendered testimony so as to

prove the veracity of the prosecutions case.

9.2. This Court finds that the testimony of P.W.18 (Police

Personnel) that the deceased committed suicide, and the admitted

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB] (10 of 15) [CRLA-634/2009]

fact that the accused-respondents themselves took the deceased

to the hospital, coupled with the absence of any signs of struggle

as per the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P.8) and postmortem report

(Ex.P.11), introduces a plausible alternative hypothesis, i.e., that

the deceased may have committed suicide. Moreover, the absence

of any mental fitness certificate in support of the deceased's

statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex.P.13), despite the

deceased being critically burnt, coupled with the fact that the

same is not corroborated by any independent witness renders it

doubtful.

9.3. In view of the above and upon careful application of the five

guiding principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda

(supra), the prosecution has failed to establish a complete and

unbroken chain of circumstances which could irresistibly point

towards the guilt of the accused-respondents in the commission of

offence under Section 302 IPC. The presence of multiple

alternative hypotheses, including suicide, and the absence of

corroborative medical evidence, independent testimony, and the

lack of any direct evidence, rule out the applicability of Section

302 IPC in the present case.

10. This Court observes that for establishing the offence under

Section 304B IPC, one of the essential ingredients is that the

woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her

husband or his relatives soon before her death in connection with

any demand for dowry. The legislative intent behind the use of the

expression "soon before" has been interpreted by the Hon'ble

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB] (11 of 15) [CRLA-634/2009]

Supreme Court in the case of Satbir Singh vs. State of

Haryana(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1735-1736 of 2010 decided

on 28.05.2021) to mean that there must be a proximate and live

link between the cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry

demand and the death in question.

10.1.This Court also observes that in the factual matrix of the

present case, while the prosecution witnesses P.W.5, P.W.6, and

P.W.13 have deposed about incidents of dowry-related

harassment, it is also on record that a compromise had been

effected approximately two months prior to the incident, pursuant

to which the deceased was sent back to her matrimonial home

with assurances of good conduct. No specific or cogent evidence

has been brought on record to show that any demand of dowry or

act of cruelty occurred subsequent to that compromise and

proximate to the death of the deceased. No witness has stated

with clarity that any fresh demand for dowry or act of cruelty

occurred "soon before" the death. In fact, as per P.W.5, after the

settlement was reached and the deceased returned to her

matrimonial home, no specific instance of cruelty or dowry

demand was brought to his knowledge. This absence of proximate

causation significantly weakens the foundation of the charge under

Section 304B IPC.

10.2.This Court observes that in the absence of any reliable

evidence indicating that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or

harassment in connection with dowry demands in the period

immediately preceding her death, the requirement of "soon

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before", a sine qua non for conviction under Section 304B IPC,

remains unfulfilled.

11. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce

the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of

Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on

12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.

Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010,

decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:

Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):

"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:

(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;

(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB] (13 of 15) [CRLA-634/2009]

(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."

Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):

"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:

"8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."

39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record;

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB] (14 of 15) [CRLA-634/2009]

(c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

12. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court

passed the impugned judgment to the extent of acquittal of the

accused-respondents under Sections 302 and 304B IPC, which in

the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the

settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of

the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it

demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in

arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial

Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each

and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed

the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of

the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned

judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as

to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal.

13. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the

acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,

and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court

demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a

contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and

thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no

interference by this Court in the instant appeal.

[2025:RJ-JD:26943-DB] (15 of 15) [CRLA-634/2009]

14. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into

the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the

aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit

case warranting its interference.

15. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.

16. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481

B.N.S.S., the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a

personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the

like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made

effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event

of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for

grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice

thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as soon as

they would be called upon to do so.

17. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the

learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.

(SUNIL BENIWAL),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J

SKant/-

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