Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
State vs Bheru Singh on 12 June, 2025
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 855/2013
State of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
Bheru Singh s/o Gopal Singh, r/o Raisinghpura, P.S. Mandalgarh,
District Bhilwara (Raj.).
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. C.S. Ojha, PP
For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.S. Chundawat
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH
Judgment
Reserved on 25/04/2025
Pronounced on 12/06/2025
Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:
1. In the instant criminal appeal, the appellant-State has
challenged the judgment of acquittal dated 24.11.2012 passed by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Women Atrocities Cases,
Bhilwara ('Trial Court') in Sessions Case No.65/2005 (State of
Rajasthan Vs. Bheru Singh), whereby the accused-respondent
herein was acquitted of the charges against him under Sections
498A & 302/306 IPC.
2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the
year 2005 and the present appeal has been pending since the year
2013.
3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by the
learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf the appellant-State,
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are that on 12.05.2005, one Devi Singh (complainant) submitted
a written report (Ex.P.4) before the Aarakshi Kendra (Reserve
Centre), Mandalgarh, District Bhilwara alleging therein that one
Hemkanwar, wife of the accused-respondent was often being
subjected to abuse at the hands of the accused-respondent in
drunken state, who was also complainant's paternal aunt's son
(cousin). It was further alleged that on 11.05.2005 at around 5:00
p.m., the accused-respondent, with an intention to kill
Hemkanwar, set her on fire after pouring kerosene on her as a
result of which, she got burnt. Thereupon, she was taken to
Bhilwara Hospital by Mahendra Singh, Hans Kanwar and Chandra
Kanwar. The said incident, as alleged, was informed to the
complainant by Hemkanwar herself. The marriage of the accused-
respondent with Hemkanwar was solemnized 14-15 years prior to
the incident in question and two children were born out of the said
wedlock.
3.1. On the basis of the aforementioned information, a case was
registered under Sections 307 & 498A IPC and the investigation
began accordingly. While the investigation was going on,
Hemkanwar died under treatment, and the accused-respondent
was arrested. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-
sheet was filed against the accused-respondent under Sections
498A & 302/306 IPC before the concerned Court, and after
hearing arguments on the stage of framing of charge, the said
charges were read over to the accused-respondent, who denied
the same and claimed trial, and the trial commenced accordingly.
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (3 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
3.2. Owing to the nature of offences charged, the matter was
committed to the Court of Sessions, wherefrom the case was
transferred to the learned Trial Court for the necessary trial.
3.3. During the course of trial, the statements of 22 witnesses
(P.W. 1 to P.W. 22) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to 29)
were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; in defence, witnesses
D.W. 1 & D.W. 2 were examined and document Ex.D.1 was
exhibited; whereafter, the accused-respondent was examined
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which he pleaded innocence and false
implication in the criminal case in question.
3.4. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, while
finding that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case
beyond all reasonable doubts, acquitted the accused-respondent
herein of the charges framed against him, as above, vide the
impugned judgment of acquittal dated 24.11.2012; against which,
the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State.
4. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the
appellant-State submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred in
passing the impugned judgment of acquittal as on the basis of the
testimony of the witnesses and other evidence on record, the case
against the accused respondent is proved beyond all reasonable
doubts.
4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the
deceased in her Parchabayan (Ex.P. 12), which was recorded by
Jagdish Chandra (PW.21) Head Constable, at Police Station
Mandalgarh, has clearly stated that her husband accused-
respondent after consuming liquor, quarreled with her and on the
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (4 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
date of incident, set her on fire after pouring kerosene on her. The
Parchabayan is corroborated by the testimony of Jagdish Chandra
(PW.21).
4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Smt. Mamta
Vyas (PW.20) ACJM, Bhilwara, recorded the dying declaration of
the deceased, wherein it has been clearly stated that there was a
dispute between the deceased and the accused-respondent, which
escalated to the situation leading to pouring of kerosene and
setting the deceased on fire.
4.3. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that
Chandrakanwar (PW.1) sister of the deceased, Devi Singh (PW. 3)
and Mahendra Singh (PW.2) neighbour of the deceased, in their
statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. have clearly stated that the
accused-respondent was upset with the deceased as she refused
to give money for liquor and therefore, in the fit of anger, the
accused-respondent poured kerosene on the deceased and set on
her fire. Furthermore, the Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P.13) reveals
that the deceased was severely burnt.
4.4. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the Naksha-
Mauka (Ex.P. 3) reveals that the deceased was set on fire within
the four walls of house of the accused-respondent and the half
burnt clothes of the deceased were found at the place of incident.
It was further submitted that the F.S.L. Report (Ex.P. 26) reveals
that kerosene residue was detected in partially burnt clothes of
the deceased.
4.5. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the F.I.R.
(Ex.P. 4) was lodged by Devi Singh (PW.3) cousin of the accused-
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (5 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
respondent, narrating the entire incident at early hours (around
6:30 a.m.) on 12.05.2005, after the alleged incident happened on
11.05.2005.
5. On the other hand, Mr. R.S. Chundawat, learned counsel for
the accused-respondent while opposing the submissions made on
behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that the prosecution has
failed to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubts against the
accused-respondent. Thus, the learned Trial Court after due
consideration of all the material on record has rightly acquitted the
accused-respondent of all the charges leveled against him.
5.1. Learned counsel also submitted that the prosecution
witnesses, namely, Chandra Kanwar (PW.1), Mahendra Singh
(PW.2), Debi Singh (PW.3), Ladu Jat (PW.4), Nand Singh (PW.5),
Lakshman Singh (PW.7), Bansilal (PW.8), Smt. Neeru (PW. 13),
Smt. Bhanwar (PW.14), Pratap Singh (PW.15), Bhagwan Singh
(PW.17) have been declared hostile and rest of the prosecution
witnesses do not allege anything against the accused-respondent.
5.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the Parchabayan
(Ex.P. 12) was recorded on 12.05.2005, around 9:00 a.m. by the
Head Constable Jagdish Chandra (PW.21), thereafter, at
10:00p.m. on the same day, the dying declaration (Ex.P. 25) was
recorded by Smt. Mamta Vyas (PW. 20) in a question-answer
format, after ascertaining the mental fitness of the deceased
Hemkanwar, wherein it has been clearly stated that it was not the
accused-respondent who set the deceased on fire, rather the
deceased herself who lit the match-stick. Dr. V.D. Sharma (PW.
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (6 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
22) in his testimony admits that he gave the fitness certificate as
asked from him.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the
record of the case.
7. This Court observes that the present case pertains to an
incident dated 11.05.2005, wherein one Hemkanwar, wife of the
accused-respondent, suffered burn injuries. Pursuant to a written
report submitted by Debi Singh on 12.05.2005, an FIR was
registered, and subsequent investigation led to the filing of a
charge-sheet under Sections 498A and 302/306 IPC. The Trial
Court proceeded with the case and, upon full consideration of the
evidence, found that the prosecution failed to prove the case
beyond all reasonable doubts. Accordingly, the accused-
respondent was acquitted by judgment dated 24.11.2012, against
which the present challenge has been laid by the appellant-State.
8. This Court observes that the deceased gave two statements
on 12.05.2005. In the Parchabayan (Ex.P-12) recorded by PW-21,
she alleged that the accused-respondent poured kerosene on her
and set her on fire. Later that day, a formal dying declaration
(Ex.P-25) was recorded by the Magistrate (PW-20), after a
medical fitness certificate was issued by PW-22, wherein the
deceased stated that she herself lit the matchstick following a
quarrel. Both statements were recorded within close proximity of
time. However, the two versions were materially inconsistent on
the core issue of how the fire was ignited. In the absence of
corroborative evidence and due to this contradiction, this Court
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (7 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
finds that the benefit of doubt has to be granted to the accused-
respondent.
8.1. This Court further observes that a significant number of
prosecution witnesses, including Chandrakanwar (PW-1),
Mahendra Singh (PW-2), Devi Singh (PW-3), Ladu Jat (PW-4),
Nand Singh (PW-5), Lakshman Singh (PW-7), Bansilal (PW-8),
Smt. Neeru (PW-13), Smt. Bhanwar (PW-14), Pratap Singh (PW-
15), and Bhagwan Singh (PW-17), were declared hostile by the
prosecution during trial. These witnesses have failed to support
the prosecution case on material points. The lack of consistent and
supportive testimony from these key witnesses considerably
weakened the prosecution's case, and thus created a reasonable
doubt about the involvement of the accused-respondent in the
incident.
8.2. In view of these inconsistencies and lack of credible
evidence, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving
the accused-respondent's guilt under Sections 302/306 IPC.
9. This Court further observes that the charge under Section
498A IPC, which relates to cruelty by the husband or his relatives,
was not established by the prosecution. The evidence on record
did not demonstrate any cruelty, harassment, or mental or
physical torture on the deceased by the accused-respondent for
any unlawful demand. Apart from isolated allegations, there was
no reliable and consistent testimony indicating that the accused-
respondent subjected the deceased to cruelty as envisaged under
Section 498A. Moreover, the majority of witnesses relevant to this
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (8 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
charge were declared hostile and did not support the prosecution's
version. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused-respondent committed the
offence punishable under Section 498A IPC.
10. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on
12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.
Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010,
decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:
Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the
promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the
safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are
intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which
come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be
summarized as:
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal
trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of
all evidence, oral or documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a
miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two
views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall
ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view,
mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal
of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in
appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (9 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal
and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or
error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."
Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):
"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the
principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of
CrPC as follows:
"8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the
presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against
acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary
evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible
view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence
on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal
only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can
be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the
guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and
no other conclusion was possible."
39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment
of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused
has to be exercised within the four corners of the following
principles:
(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (10 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to
consider material evidence on record;
(c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the
view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from
the evidence available on record."
11. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court
passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-
respondent under Sections 498A, 302/306 IPC which in the given
circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled
principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the
Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it
demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in
arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial
Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each
and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed
the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of
the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned
judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as
to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
12. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the
acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,
and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court
demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a
contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and
thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no
interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (11 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
13. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into
the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the
aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit
case warranting any interference by this Court.
14. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.
15. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481
B.N.S.S., the accused-respondent is directed to furnish a personal
bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the like
amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made
effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event
of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for
grant of leave, the accused-respondent, on receipt of notice
thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as soon as
they would be called upon to do so.
16. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the
learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
SKant/-
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