[Cites 23, Cited by 0]
Patna High Court
Smt. Savitri Joshi, And Ors vs Rameshwar Yagnik @ Lall Saheb And Anr on 4 December, 2025
Author: Sunil Dutta Mishra
Bench: Sunil Dutta Mishra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
FIRST APPEAL No.131 of 2014
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1. Smt. Savitri Joshi, C/o Surendra Joshi, House No. K./57/152, Nawab Ki
Dyodi, Lohatia, Nawapura, Baranashi U.P.
2. Aditya Kumar C/o Nagina Paswan R/o Vill.- Basantpur, P.O.- Manwa- Parci,
P.S.- Matiyania, West Champaran.
3. Anish Kumar C/o Nagina Paswan R/o Vill.- Basantpur, P.O.- Manwa- Parci,
P.S.- Matiyania, West Champaran.
4. Raugi Paswan Son of Laxman Paswan R/o Vill.- Basantpur, P.O.- Manwa-
Parci, P.S.- Matiyania, West Champaran.
5. Shankar Mahto Son of Late Shivnandan Mahto R/o Vill.- Naurangia, P.O.-
Gurwalia, P.S.- Bettiah Muffasil, West Champaran.
6. Mahanth Mahto
7. Birendra Mahto
8. Dhirendra Mahto All Sons of Late Jhakar Mahto and All resident of R/o
Vill.- Parsa, P.O. and P.S.- Bettiah Manuapul, West champaran.
9. Lalmati Devi W/o Nandlal Yadav R/o Vill.- Gobraura, P.S.- Sathi, West
Champaran.
10. Jhaman Paswan Son of Late Tapsi Paswan R/o Vill.- Basantpur, P.O.-
Manwa- Parci, P.S.- Matiyania, West Champaran.
11. Gadri Paswan Son of Late Tapsi Paswan R/o Vill.- Basantpur, P.O.- Manwa-
Parci, P.S.- Matiyania, West Champaran.
12. Pushpa Mehta W/o Bhola Prasad R/o- Vill. Seswa, Patjirwa, P.O. and P.S.
Srinagar, West Champaran.
13. Lalji Prasad S/o Late Ganga Sah R/o Vill.- Siswa, P.O and P.S. Srinagar,
West Champaran.
14. Ramchandra Prasad S/o Late Mahanth Prasad R/o Vill.- Krishna Nagar,
Bauswaria, Bettiah, P.S. Bettiah, Town, West Champaran.
15. Ranjan Maurya S/o Ramchandra Prasad, Son of Late Tapsi Paswan R/o
Vill.- Basantpur, P.O.- Mauna- Parsi, P.S.- Matiyania, West Champaran.
16. Rajeev Maurya S/o Ramchandra Prasad, Son of Late Tapsi Paswan R/o Vill.-
Basantpur, P.O.- Mauna- Parsi, P.S.- Matiyani, West Champaran.
17. Khobhari Ram
18. Harwari Ram
19. Jagjiwan Ram All sons of Ramautar Ram All R/o Vill.- Siswa Patjirwa, P.O.
and P.S.- Srinagar, West Champaran.
20. Dwarkanath Kushwaha Son of Late Gaya Kushwaha R/o Vill.- Alpaha
Bairiya, P.O.- Baizuwa, P.S.- Srinagar, West Champaran.
21. Harihar Prasad Son of Late Shivbachan Prasad New Colony, Baswaria, P.S.-
Bettiah Town, West Champaran.
22. Ajay Kumar Son of Nagendra Prasad R/o I.T.I. Jaiprakash Nagar, Bettiah,
P.S.- Bettiah Muffasil, West Champaran.
23. Munger Lal Son of Rameshwar Prasad R/o New Colony, Baswaria, Bettiah,
P.S.- Bettiah Town, District- West Champaran.
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
24. Shatrughan Sah Son of Late Sitaram Sah R/o Vill.- Ekderwa, P.O.- Mauna-
Parsi, P.S.- Matiyania, District- West Champaran.
25. Suman Sonar Son of not knwon R/o Vill.- Thana Road, Ramnagar, P.O and
P.S. Ramnagar, West Champaran.
26. Raifal Ansari Son of Ramzan Ansari R/o- Vill.- Chariyani, P.O.- Mauna-
parsi, P.S.- Matiyania, District- West Champaran.
27. Ramanand Kushwaha Son of Late Puran Bhagat resident of Vill.- Chariyani,
P.O.- Mauna- Parsi, P.S.- Matiyania, District- West Champaran.
28. Satyendra Singh Son of Late Ram Mitar Singh resident of Vill.- Barnihar,
P.S.- Shikarpur, District- West Champaran.
29. Pratima Devi W/o Pramod Tiwary resident of Village- Mushari, P.S. Sathi,
West Champaran.
30. Arun Kumar Yagnik Son of Late Durga Shankar Yagnik R/o Rajguru
Chowk, Bettiah, P.O.- Bettiah, P.S.- Bettiah Town, District- West
Champaran, presently residing at 302, Chanakya Saquare, 59 Srinagar Main,
Indore, District- Indore, M.P..
31. Smt. Sudha Shukla W/o Rajiv Lochannath Shukla, Shukla Sadan, Khaidore,
Aligarh U.P..
32. Smt. Shakuntala Dave W/o Harish Dave 163 Srinath Nagar, Sector-9A,
Hirau, Magri, Udaipur, Rajasthan.
33. Smt. Shobha Bhatt W/o Anand Shankar Bhatt, 170, S.F.S. Pocket, B- Phase,
1st Sheikh Sarai, New Delhi.
34. Smt. Gayatri Sharma W/o Shashi Mohan Sharma Q.921/2/II/I
BHEL,Haridwar, Uttranchal.
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
1. Rameshwar Yagnik @ Lall Saheb Son of Late Bindhyawasini Yagnik R/o
Madhuri Village, Rajguru Chowk, Bettiah, P.O and P.S. Bettiah, District-
West Champaran.
2(i) Most. Meenakshi Yagnik @ Minu W/o Late Anup Yagnik.
2(ii) Bighnesh Yagnik S/o Late Anup Yagnik.
2(iii) Sakcham Yagnik (Minor) S/o Late Anup Yagnik.
Under the guardianship of his mother Most. Meenakshi Yagnik @ Minu.
All are Resident of Village Rajguru Chowk, Bettiah, P.O and P.S. Bettiah,
District- West Champaran. At present residing at Village P.O. and P.S.
Udaipur (Rajasthan).
... ... Respondent/s
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Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. Ranjan Kumar Dubey, Advocate
Mr. Kumar Gaurav, Advocate
Mr. Sheshadri Kumari, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Jitendra Kishore Verma, Advocate
Mr. Ravi Raj, Advocate
Mr. Abhishek Kumar Srivastava, Advocate
Ms. Sweta Raj, Advocate
Mr. Achyut Kumar, Advocate
Ms. Kumari Shreya, Advocate
: Mr. Ayush, Advocate
Mr. Shreyash Goyal, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL DUTTA MISHRA
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
Date : 04-12-2025
1. Heard Learned counsel for both the parties.
2. The instant First Appeal has been preferred by the
appellants against the judgment dated 28.04.2014 and decree
dated 23.05.2014 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge IV,
Bettiah in Title Suit No. 72 of 2010 wherein the learned Trial
Court disposed of the suit on admission and decreed in terms of
pronouncement of compromise decree of Partition Suit No. 159 of
1949 and permanently restrained the appellants (defendants) to
interfere in peaceful possession of respondents (plaintiffs) over the
suit land.
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are being
referred to as defendants-appellants or plaintiffs-respondents.
4. To understand the relationship between the parties
to the suit is shown in the Genealogical Table (Schedule 1 of
plaint) which is given below:
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
5. As per the plaint, Bindhyawasini Pd. Yagnik (Jani)
@ Bacchan Babu was common ancestor who died leaving behind
Smt. Krishna Kumari Devi, his second wife from whom three sons
and one daughter namely Rajeshwar Pd. Yagnik @ Babu Saheb,
Rameshwar Pd. Yagnik @ Lall Sahab (P-1) and Chandeshwar Pd.
Yagnik @ Kunwar Saheb and a daughter Manju Yagnik (Shukla)
were born. First wife of Bindhyawasini Pd. Yagnik (Jani) pre-
deceased and one son namely Durgashankar Yagnik @ Lala
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
Maharaj was born who died leaving behind his son Tripura
Shankar Yagnik (born through his first wife Rama Devi), second
wife Manorma Devi and his son Arun Kumar Yagnik @ Bachhaji
and six daughters namely Sudha Shukla, Shobha Bhatt, Subhashini
Tiwari, Shakuntala Dave, Gaytri Sharma and Savitri Joshi.
Rajeshwar Pd. Yagnik died leaving behind his widow Anjana Devi
and a son namely Amit Yagnik. Chandeshwar Pd. Yagnik @
Kunwar Saheb also died leaving behind his wife Shanti Devi @
Renu Devi and three sons namely Anup Yagnik, Sudhanshu
Yagnik and Ashutosh Yagnik (died unmarried) and a daughter Priti
(Yagnik) Shukla. Bindhyawasini Pd. Yagnik died in 1974 and his
second wife Krishna Kumari died in 1996.
6. The case of the plaintiffs-respondents is that a
prior partition suit bearing Partition Suit No. 159 of 1949, between
the ancestors of the parties was compromised on 03.01.1951.
Under the terms of the compromise, Rameshwar Pd. Yagnik
(plaintiff no.1) was allotted the entire land of village Charihani,
tauzi no. 799, and Krishna Kumari Devi (mother of plaintiff no.1)
was allotted the entire land of village Basantpur, tauzi no. 799. The
parties came into possession of their respective shares, and the
revenue records were mutated accordingly.
7. The plaintiffs-respondents alleged that during her
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
lifetime, Krishna Kumari Devi, in order to protect her estate,
executed a nominal and non-operative gift deed dated 31.01.1962
in favour of her step-granddaughters Sudha and Sakuntala
(daughters of Durgashankar Yagnik), however, possession was
never delivered, and the deed was later cancelled by a registered
deed of cancellation in 1973. Subsequently, Krishna Kumari Devi
executed a will dated 08.07.1978, bequeathing her entire share in
village Basantpur to her youngest son Chandeshwar Pd. Yagnik
(father of plaintiff no.2 Anup Kumar Yagnik), and upon her death
in 1996, Chandeshwar Pd. Yagnik came into possession. After
death of Chandeshwar Pd. Yagnik, possession continued with his
widow wife.
8. It is alleged that defendant no.1 (son of
Durgashankar Yagnik) after almost disposing the properties in his
share with dishonest intention in collusion with other defendants
and some antisocial elements managed to get their names mutated
with respect to lands of Charihani and Basantpur Mauza after
canceling the names of plaintiffs by showing some void,
inoperative and dead papers and concealing the truth, and actual
state of papers against which revision petition is pending for
disposal before the learned Additional Collector, Bettiah. On the
basis of the illegal Jamabandi, they are trying to dispose of lands
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
in Schedule-2 to various persons of that area.
9. Apprehending further alienation and asserting
continuous possession based on the 1951 compromise as well as
the 1978 Will, the plaintiffs-respondents instituted the suit in
question bearing Title Suit No. 72 of 2010 (Rameshwar Yagnik
and Anr. v. Arun Kumar Yagnik and Ors.) seeking declaration,
confirmation of possession, permanent injunction restraining the
defendants from interfering in possession of plaintiffs over the suit
land as given in Schedule 2 of the plaint as well as restraining the
defendants from disposing of the suit land, and other ancillary
reliefs.
10. The defendants-appellants appeared and filed
their written statements in various sets, wherein it was submitted
that the suit, as framed, was not maintainable in law and suffered
from absence of a valid cause of action and was further hit by the
principles of waiver, acquiescence and estoppel. It was further
submitted that the suit was defective for non-joinder of necessary
parties and had been under valued with insufficient court fees.
Moreover, the genealogy furnished by the plaintiff-respondents in
the plaint was incomplete and incorrect inasmuch as the daughter
of Krishna Kumari Devi, namely Manju had not been included and
several family members are residing outside the state.
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
11. It is stated that Bindhyawasini Pd. Yagnik had
filed a Partition Suit No.159 of 1949 in the Court of Sub-Judge,
Motihari, East Champaran in which Bindhyawasini Pd. Yagnik
was plaintiff no.1 and Rameshwar Pd. Yagnik, Chandeshwar
Prasad Yagnik and Smt. Krishna Kumari Devi were defendants
and on the basis of compromise the said suit was decreed but it is
denied that total land of Charihani was given in share of
Rameshwar Prasad Yagnik or Krishna Kumari Devi got all shares
in Mauza Basantpur and on that basis they are in possession of the
same and the same belongs to them. It is submitted that Yagnik
family were big Zamindars having lands in Mauza Basantpur,
Charihani and other villages and at that time abolition of
Zamindari did not happen, the partition was effected village-wise
among the family members, and Pattidars had got Zamindari
rights only, not the land.
12. It is further, the case of the defendants-appellants
is that upon the subsequent abolition of Zamindari, the earlier
partition under Title Suit No. 159 of 1949 became nullified by
operation of law. It has been further submitted that the deed of gift
dated 31.01.1962 was valid and binding, and the vendees of the
land continued in the possession of the gifted land whereas the
alleged deed of cancellation has no legal force and could not
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
adversely affect the said gift deed, the validity of which had been
upheld by the competent Civil Court, therefore on these grounds,
the plaintiff's suit is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.
13. From the proceeding of the learned Trial Court, it
appears that on 01.04.2014, the issues were framed and the next
date fixed for plaintiff's evidence was on 07.04.2014, but before
the said date, without any information to the defendants, some
documents were filed on record on 03.04.2014 on behalf of
plaintiffs.
14. The application dated 07.04.2014 was filed by
plaintiffs-respondents with prayer to hear the suit in the light of
final judgment dated 03.01.1951 passed in Partition Suit No.
159/1949 on the basis of compromise, available documentary
evidence and thereby to pass the final judgment. It is stated in the
said petition that the plaintiffs have on previous date already filed
his original document which comes under the category of public
documents which are to be marked as 'Exhibit' in the interest of
Justice.
15. On the same day i.e., 07.04.2014 on behalf of
intervenor Rustom Ansari, a petition under Order VII Rule 11
C.P.C. was filed praying to reject the plaint. On 07.04.2014, 49
alleged purchaser of the land from defendant no. l (Arun Kr.
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
Yagnik), filed petition under Order I Rule 10 and Section 151 of
the C.P.C. for their impleadment as defendants in the suit. It is
stated that copy of the said petitions were refused to receive. The
next date was fixed on 15.04.2014.
16. Furthermore, rejoinder on behalf of defendant
nos. 7 to 30, 34 and 35 was filed on 15.04.2014 to the petition
dated 07.04.2014 praying to reject the petition of plaintiffs and to
proceed the suit in accordance with law and procedure. The
documents filed on behalf of the plaintiffs and copy of sale deeds
filed on behalf of intervenors were exhibited and issues were
allegedly framed again. The next date was fixed on 21.04.2014 for
hearing. On 21.04.2014, after hearing some argument, the next
date was fixed on 28.04.2014. Addition was made in the order-
sheet dated 28.04.2014 wherein it was recorded in the petition
dated 16.03.2012 to delete the names of deceased defendant nos.
32 and 33 was allowed. The record was again put up in the learned
Trial Court and it was recorded therein that on oral consent of both
parties, the case is disposed of under Order XII Rule 6 of the
C.P.C. and all the interlocutory petitions were accordingly
disposed of.
17. The learned Trial Court passed a 43 pages
judgment on the same day i.e. on 28.04.2014 wherein it has been
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
held that the suit stand disposed of and the same was decreed in
the terms of pronouncement of compromise decree in Partition
Suit No. 159 of 1949 and the defendants-appellants have been
restrained from interference in peaceful possession of plaintiffs-
respondents over the suit land.
18. Learned Trial Court held that in view of admitted
documents, there is no scope of oral evidence against Exhibit-15
series. The suit is liable to be disposed of in the light of
constructively admitted documents like Exhibit-15 series.
19. The learned Trial Court noted that on the similar
footing, between the same parties and in similar cause of action,
the said Court already delivered the judgment dated 21.07.2013 in
Title Suit No.306 of 2010 which has been quoted entirely in the
impugned judgment. It was further observed that under Sections
91 & 92 of Indian Evidence Act in case of contradiction,
documentary evidences have a prevailing effect over the oral
evidences.
20. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants have preferred
the present appeal. Some of the appellants are the legal heirs of
Durga Shankar Yagnik from his second wife Manorma Devi and
some of the appellants are the purchasers of land through different
sale deeds from the defendants claiming that they are coming in
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
peaceful possession of the disputed land.
21. Mr. Ranjan Kumar Dubey, learned counsel for the
appellants, submitted that the impugned judgment is perverse as
the learned Trial Court quoted the entire judgment delivered in
Title Suit No. 306 of 2010 where parties were also mostly different
and question of consideration was also not identical which were
not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is further
submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred in recording that
the counsel for both the parties gave an oral consent to dispose of
the suit in accordance with Order-XII Rule-6 of the C.P.C. and
thereafter on the same day, a 43 pages ready and typed judgment
was delivered, all-in-one continuation. It is submitted that the
defendants-appellants have not given any consent oral or written
as recorded since both the parties were contesting tooth and nail on
all disputed question of facts. The learned Trial Court has not
rendered any independent findings in the suit. Moreover, it is
submitted that the learned Trial Court did not permit the parties to
lead evidence, oral or documentary, despite the fact that
defendants were contesting the suit and it has wrongly preempted
the parties from leading evidence on their behalf, therefore, the
impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
22. Learned counsel for appellants further
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
specifically submitted that the learned Trial Court committed a
serious error in relying upon the compromise decree passed in
Partition Suit No. 159 of 1949, as the said suit was instituted only
for adjustment of Zamindari interests among different maliks who
were parties therein. He contends that the decree itself, as quoted
by the respondents-plaintiffs, shows that the properties mentioned
in the Schedule of the present plaint do not find place in the
description of properties covered under that partition. Therefore,
the assertion of respondents-plaintiffs that the suit land stand
allotted under compromise in Partition Suit No. 159 of 1949 is
wholly misconceived. It is further submitted that with respect to
Title Suit No.306 of 2010, even the decree of this suit has not been
produced by the respondents-plaintiffs. It remains entirely
uncertain as to who were the actual parties in that suit. Therefore,
drawing any inference in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs in the
absence of the decree itself, and the reliance placed by the learned
Trial Court on such unproved proceedings is not sustainable and
perverse.
23. Learned counsel for the appellants further
submitted that on 28.04.2014, the defendant nos. 1 to 5 filed an
application praying for adjournment on the ground of pendency of
CWJC No. 15592 of 2013 to the Hon'ble High Court against the
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
order dated 27-06-2013 passed by the learned Trial Court whereby
plantiff's amendment petition was allowed but the said prayer for
adjournment was rejected and the learned trial Court
simultaneously delivered a 43 pages judgment decreeing the suit.
He further submitted that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act
is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.
24. Learned counsel for the appellants also pointed
out the biased conduct of the learned Trial Court in passing the
impugned judgment and decree. He referred the judgment of the
Division Bench of this Court in Hriday Narayan Pandey v. the
State of Bihar & Ors. reported in (2020) 1 PLJR 631; 2019 SCC
OnLine Pat 1894 wherein the Hon'ble Court came to the
conclusion that the petitioner (P.O. of Trial Court) did not conduct
himself in the manner befitting a Trial Judge while dealing with a
case and unnecessary haste was shown by him in delivering
judgment. It was observed therein that timely disposal is important
but not in a manner which would render the judgment suspect.
25. Learned counsel for appellants pointed out many
lapses on the part of Presiding Officer of the Trial Court in
conducting the Title Suit wherein certain interpolations and
additions in the order sheet of the record of Title Suit No.72 of
2010 was found. The departmental proceedings were initiated with
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
charge that in complete disregard of established practice and
procedure, inasmuch as, the issues were framed twice on one
occasion on 01.04.2014 and later on 15.04.2014. The defendants-
appellants were not given reasonable opportunity to produce
evidence; also a 43 pages judgment was delivered on 28.04.2014
without fixing any date for passing judgment and when the
aforesaid date was fixed for further hearing in the matter. It was
alleged that he was pre-determined to pass the judgment in the suit
on 28.04 2014. The Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that
P.O. of Trial Court did not frame any issue and wrongly recorded
that he had framed issue on 01.04.2014 as well as on 15.04.2014.
He had not put his signature on the plaintiff's exhibits and that he
delivered final judgment in utter haste. All the charges were found
proved.
26. Learned counsel for the appellants, on the merit
of the case, has submitted that there was no actual partition of the
land between the parties by the said compromise decree, which is
evident from the fact that there is no specific area or specific
boundary had been mentioned, terminology is used in terms of
Anna in Zamindari and Zaidad is used for personal home/house
etc. It is further submitted that though the Bihar Land Reforms
Act, 1950 came into force on 25.09.1950 but by virtue of the
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
notification issued under Sub-section 2 of Section 3A of the Act.
Zamindari of estate in Champaran district has vested in the State
of Bihar from 26.01.1955 only.
27. Per contra, Mr. J.K. Verma, learned counsel for
the plaintiffs-respondents, submitted that the judgment and decree
of the learned Trial Court are based on correct appreciation of the
pleadings, evidence and the long standing family arrangement. It is
further submitted that the plaintiffs-respondents have clearly
established their title and possession over the suit lands on the
basis of the compromise decree in Partition Suit No. 159 of 1949,
under which Rameshwar Pd. Yagnik and Krishna Kumari Devi
were allotted the land of Charihani and Basantpur respectively; the
registered deed of cancellation executed in 1973 canceling the
earlier gift deed of 1962; and the Will dated 08.07.1978 executed
by Krishna Kumari Devi in favour of her youngest son
Chandeshwar Pd. Yagnik. It is submitted that the evidence on
record demonstrates uninterrupted possession of Chandeshwar Pd.
Yagnik during his life time and thereafter of the plaintiffs-
respondents. It is further submitted that the alleged mutation
obtained by defendant no.1 (Arun Kr. Yagnik) was procured by
suppression and manipulation, and in any event, mutation does not
confer title, nor does it dislodge the lawful possession or
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
testamentary disposition of the plaintiffs-respondents. He further
submitted that the appellants are not challenging the documents
but they are challenging the interpretation of the documents.
Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Trial Court
rightly held that there is no scope of oral evidence against Ext. 15
series and the suit is within the scope of Order XII Rule 6 of
C.P.C. read with Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act.
Accordingly, the instant appeal raises no question of law or
perversity in the findings of the learned Trial Court, and the
judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents is
liable to be affirmed.
28. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents
submitted that it appears from the record that in Partition Suit No.
159 of 1949, on the basis of family settlement, the entire landed
property of the parties had been partitioned and the suit was
decreed on the basis of compromise. An identical Title Suit No.
306 of 2010 had also been decreed on the terms of the aforesaid
settlement in Partition Suit No. 159 of 1949 in which judgment
was delivered on 21.07.2013. Incidentally, the aforesaid Title Suit
was with respect to the residential plots of the parties in dispute
whereas in the instant Title Suit No. 72 of 2010, the Schedule of
property contained the agricultural plot between the same parties.
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
Under such circumstances, large part of judgment in Partition Suit
No.159 of 1949 and Title Suit No. 306 of 2010 were incorporated
in the judgment of Title Suit No. 72 of 2010 which made it very
easy to deliver a 43 pages judgment on the day when a date was
fixed.
29. He further submitted that clerical errors were
corrected and the interpolations could not have any bearing on the
final outcome of the case nor could it have impact the judgment in
any manner. Even if there is any procedural lapse that did not
render the judgment delivered by the P.O. of trial Court suspect in
any manner.
30. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that law is well-settled that it is required in Law to bring a suit for
cancellation of the said document or at least seeking necessary
declaration that the decree in question was not acted upon in order
to avoid its legal effect. Further he submitted that even if decree in
question is void ab intio, declaration to that effect has to be
obtained by the person aggrieved from the competent Court. More
so, such a declaration cannot be obtained in collateral proceedings.
In support of the same, he referred para- 21 of the judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of
Punjab and Ors. reported in (2011) 12 SCC 588. He next
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
submitted that if the Court has recorded with respect to admission,
concession or consent, the course open to the appellants was to file
review or clarification by filing affidavit that they have not given
consent. It is well established that the factual recitals or
observations made in a judgment or order are taken to be correct
unless rebutted.
31. He next submitted that the Bihar Land Reforms
Act, 1950 came into force on 25.09.1950 whereas the compromise
in previous case i.e. T.P.S. No. 159 of 1949 was taken place
thereafter on 03.01.1951 which shows that the partition was taken
place between the parties by metes and bound, which is evident
from the perusal of the decree in the said case where the
possession was given to the parties accordingly and the term used
as 'Aar Darer', 'Zaidad' and 'Estate' and not Zamindari.
32. Learned counsel for the parties submitted that for
procedural lapse by the learned Trial Court, administrative action
has already been taken against the Presiding Officer of the Trial
Court, accordingly, it is not required to give any
finding/observation in this appeal with respect to his conduct while
dealing with the case except to take note of the procedural lapse in
the proceeding in the Trial Court. Learned counsel for the parties
submitted that in this appeal, it has to be decided whether the
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pronouncement of judgment on alleged admission is legal and
merit of the case depends upon the conclusion of the same.
33. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, the
principal point that arises for determination before this Court is
"whether the learned Trial Court is justified in exercising its
jurisdiction under Order-XII Rule-6 of the CPC read with Sections
91 and 92 of the Evidence Act in decreeing the suit on the basis of
admitted documents i.e. compromise decree dated 03.01.1951 in
Partition Suit No. 159 of 1949?"
34. In order to appreciate the submissions made by
the learned counsel and facts and circumstances of the case, it is
relevant to discuss the law with respect to Order-XII Rule-6 C.P.C.
and Sections 91 and 92 of Evidence Act, I would like to reproduce
Order-XII Rule-6 of C.P.C. which reads as under:
"6. Judgment on admissions.
(1) Where admissions of fact have been
made either in the pleading or
otherwise, whether orally or in writing,
the Court may at any stage of the suit,
either on the application of any party or
of its own motion and without waiting
for the determination of any other
question between the parties, make such
order or give such judgment as it may
think fit, having regard to such
admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be
drawn upon in accordance with the
judgment and the decree shall bear the
date on which the judgment was
pronounced."
The bare perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that it
confers wide discretion on the Court to pass a judgment at any
stage of the suit on the basis of admission of facts made in the
pleading or otherwise without waiting for the determination of any
other question which arose between the parties. The principle
behind Order-XII Rule-6 C.P.C. is to give the plaintiff a right to
speedy judgment so that the either party may get rid of the rival
claims which are not in controversy.
35. The aforesaid Rule was amended by Act No. 104
of 1976, by which several amendments were made to the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. Earlier to 1976 amendment, judgment on
admissions was confined only on application in writing. By virtue
of the amendment whether admissions are oral or in writing, Court
is empowered at any stage of the suit to give judgment on such
admission.
36. In the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v.
United Bank of India reported in (2000) 7 SCC 120, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed with respect to the legislative intent of
Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, as under:
"12. As to the object of Order 12 Rule
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
6, we need not say anything more than
what the legislature itself has said when
the said provision came to be amended.
In the Objects and Reasons set out
while amending the said Rule, it is
stated that "where a claim is admitted,
the court has jurisdiction to enter a
judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a
decree on admitted claim. The object of
the Rule is to enable the party to obtain
a speedy judgment at least to the extent
of the relief to which according to the
admission of the defendant, the plaintiff
is entitled". We should not unduly
narrow down the meaning of this Rule
as the object is to enable a party to
obtain speedy judgment. Where the
other party has made a plain admission
entitling the former to succeed, it
should apply and also wherever there is
a clear admission of facts in the face of
which it is impossible for the party
making such admission to succeed."
37. It is now well-settled that Order-XII Rule-6 of the
C.P.C. empowers the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of
admission when such admissions are clear, categorical
unconditional and capable of establishing the rights of the parties
without requiring further evidence. This Court is, therefore,
required to examine whether the trial Court correctly appreciated
this statutory threshold while decreeing the suit. It must further be
evaluated whether the trial Court, in invoking Order-XII Rule-6,
overlooked material defences of the defendants.
38. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikrant Kapila &
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
Anr. v. Pankaja Panda & Ors. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1298 has held in paragraphs 31 to 34 which are as under:-
"31.The judicial discretion conferred
on the Court is structured on the
definition of admission under
Section17of the Evidence Act, 1872 and
Rule 5 of Order VIII, Rule 6 of Order
XII and Rules 1 & 2 of Order XV of the
CPC.
32. An "admission" means, 'a
statement, oral or documentary or
contained in electronic form, which
suggests any inference as to any fact in
issue or relevant fact, and which is
made by any of the persons, and under
the circumstances, hereinafter
mentioned'.
33. Admission in pleadings means a
statement made by a party to the legal
proceedings, whether oral,
documentary, or contained in an
electronic form, and the said statement
suggests an inference with respect to a
fact in issue between the parties or a
relevant fact. It is axiomatic that to
constitute an admission, the said
statement must be clear, unequivocal
and ought not to entertain a different
view. Coming to admission in
pleadings, these are averments made by
a party in the pleading, viz., plaint,
written statement, etc., in a pending
proceeding of admitting the factual
matrix presented by the other side. To
constitute a valid admission in
pleading, the said admission should be
unequivocal, unconditional, and
unambiguous, and the admission must
be made with an intention to be bound
by it. Admission must be valid without
being proved by adducing evidence and
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
enabling the opposite party to succeed
without trial. A court, while
pronouncing a judgment on admission,
keeps in its perspective the
requirements in Order VIII Rule 5,
Order XII Rule 6 and Order XV Rules 1
& 2, CPC read with Sections 17, 58 and
68 of the Indian Evidence Act.
34. The logic behind such
jurisprudential examination of an
admission is that a judgment
pronounced on admission, not only
denies the right of trial on an issue but
denies the remedy of appeal. Hence,
discretion has to be exercised
judiciously and objectively while
making a judgment on admission in a
pleading. The existence of the power to
pronounce a judgment on admission
under Rule 6 of Order XII and Rules 1
and 2 of Order XV is not an issue in the
appeal but rather the issue is whether
pronouncing judgment on alleged
admission is valid and legal."
(Emphasis supplied)
39. If any party brought the statement showing
admission of liability by an application filed under Order-XII
Rule-6 C.P.C., the other side has to be given sufficient opportunity
to explain the said admission.
40. The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling,
discretionary and permissive. They are not mandatory, obligatory
or peremptory. This is also clear from the use of the word "may" in
the Rule. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recently, in the case of
Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Narayan Jaiswal reported in 2025 SCC
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
OnLine SC 751 observed in its para 29, 30, 31, 42 and 43 as
under:
"29. The powers conferred on the court
by this rule are untrammeled and
cannot be crystallized into any rigid
rule of universal application. They can
be exercised keeping in view and
having regard to the facts and varying
circumstances of each case.
30. If the court is of the opinion that it
is not safe to pass a judgment on
admissions, or that a case involves
questions which cannot be
appropriately dealt with and decided on
the basis of admission, it may, in
exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass
a judgment and may insist upon clear
proof of even admitted facts.
31. To make order or to pronounce
judgment on admission is at the
discretion of the court. First, the word
"may" is used in Rule 6 and not the
word "shall" which prima facie shows
that the provision is an enabling one.
Rule 6 of Order 12 must be read with
Rule 5 of Order 8 which is identical to
the Proviso to Section 58 of the
Evidence Act. Reading all the relevant
provisions together, it is manifest that
the court is not bound to grant relief to
the plaintiff only on the basis of
admission of the defendant
42. Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to
enable the plaintiff to get judgment on
admission of the defendant to the extent
of such admission, he must get the
benefit thereof immediately without
waiting for the determination of "non-
admitted claim". Sub-rule (2) makes it
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
imperative for the court to draw up a
decree in terms of judgment on
admission which can be executed by the
plaintiff." [See : Uttam Singh (supra)].
In such cases, there may be two
decrees; (i) in respect of admitted
claim; and (ii) in respect of "non-
admitted" or contested claim. [See :
Bai Chanchal v. United Bank of India,
(1970) 3 SCC 124 : AIR 1971 SC
1081].
43. A decree under Rule 6 may be either
preliminary or final. [See : Sivalinga v.
Narayani, AIR 1946 Mad 151]."
41. In the case of Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar
reported in (2022) 10 SCC 496, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
explicitly clarified the position and application of Order-XII Rule-
6 of the C.P.C. The relevant paragraphs from the judgment read as
under:-
"23. Order 12 Rule 6 confers
discretionary power to a court who
"may" at any stage of the suit or suits
on the application of any party or in its
own motion and without waiting for
determination of any other question
between the parties makes such order
or gives such judgment as it may think
fit having regard to such admission.
24. Thus, legislative intent is clear by
using the word "may" and "as it may
think fit" to the nature of admission.
The said power is discretionary which
should be only exercised when specific,
clear and categorical admission of facts
and documents are on record, otherwise
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
the court can refuse to invoke the power
of Order 12 Rule 6. The said provision
has been brought with intent that if
admission of facts raised by one side is
admitted by the other, and the court is
satisfied to the nature of admission,
then the parties are not compelled for
full-fledged trial and the judgment and
order can be directed without taking
any evidence. Therefore, to save the
time and money of the court and
respective parties, the said provision
has been brought in the statute..........
..."
42. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Hari Steel and General Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. Daljit
Singh and Ors. reported in (2019) 20 SCC 425 has laid down the
principle with respect to disposal of application under Order-XII
Rule-6 of C.P.C. which reads as under:-
"33. .......... In view of the serious
factual disputes and the defence of the
appellants in the suit, it is not
permissible for making roving inquiry
for disposal of the application filed
under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. When the
trial is already commenced, it is
desirable to record findings on various
contentious issues and disputes in the
suit on merits by appreciating evidence
but at the same time there is no reason
or justification to decree the suit at this
stage. For the aforesaid reasons, we are
of the view that the impugned judgment
[Daljit Singh v. Hari Steel & General
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
Industries Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del
13327] of the High Court cannot be
sustained and is liable to be set aside
on this ground alone."
(Emphasis supplied)
43. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Himani Alloys Limited v. Tata Steel Limited reported in (2011) 15
SCC 273 has observed with respect to the use of discretion by the
Court in Order-XII Rule-6, in para 11 as under:
"11. It is true that a judgment can be
given on an admission contained in the
minutes of a meeting. But the admission
should be categorical. It should be a
conscious and deliberate act of the
party making it, showing an intention to
be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being
an enabling provision, it is neither
mandatory nor peremptory but
discretionary. The court, on
examination of the facts and
circumstances, has to exercise its
judicial discretion, keeping in mind that
a judgment on admission is a judgment
without trial which permanently denies
any remedy to the defendant, by way of
an appeal on merits. Therefore unless
the admission is clear, unambiguous
and unconditional, the discretion of the
Court should not be exercised to deny
the valuable right of a defendant to
contest the claim. In short the discretion
should be used only when there is a
clear admission which can be acted
upon. (See also Uttam Singh Duggal &
Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India [2000
(7) SCC 120], Karam Kapahi vs. Lal
Chand Public Charitable Trust [2010
(4) SCC 753] and Jeevan Diesels and
Electricals Ltd. vs. Jasbir Singh
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
Chadha [2010 (6) SCC 601]............. "
(Emphasis supplied)
44. In law the person on whom the burden of proof
lies has to produce the evidence before the Court of Law. The best
proof ought to be given. It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence
that the best available evidence should be brought before the Court
to prove a fact or points in issue. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Tulsi v. Chandrika Prasad reported in (2006) 8 SCC 322 observed
that:
"20. Section 91 of the Evidence Act
mainly forbids proving of the contents
of a writing otherwise than by writing
iteself and merely lays down the best
Evidence Rule. It is, however, does not
prohibit to parties to adduce evidence
in a case, the deed is capable of being
construed differently to show how they
understood the same."
45. Sections 91 and 92 are substantive provisions
under the Evidence Act, 1872. Unless and until the case falls under
one or the other exceptions enabling receipt of oral evidence on a
written document, the Court is precluded from entertaining oral
evidence.
46. Three Judges bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Mangala Waman Karandikar (D)th Lrs. v. Prakash Damodaar
Ranade reported in (2021) 6 SCC 139 held:-
"15. It is manifest from these two sections
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
that it is only in cases where the terms of the
document leave the question in doubt, then
resort could had to the proviso. But when a
document is a straight forward one and
presents no difficulty in construing it, the
proviso does not apply. In this regard, we may
state that Section 95 only builds on the
proviso 6 of Section 92.
16. If the contrary view is adopted as correct
it would render Section 92 of the Evidence
Act, otiose and also enlarge the ambit of
proviso 6 beyond the main section
itself................."
47. Proviso (1) of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1972 provides that any fact may be proved which invalidates
any document on the ground that the document suffers from a
mistake of law.
48. It is material to note that tendering oral evidence
against a written document is not totally barred. The submission
that, in wake of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, oral evidence in
contradiction with written agreement cannot be given is not
applicable in the present case. Section 92 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 applies only to the terms of the document not to the
facts mentioned in the documents. Even otherwise, as per the
proviso to Section 92 oral evidence is admissible to show that the
document was never intended to be acted upon or in cases
whenever the true character of a document is questioned, extrinsic
evidence by way of oral evidence is admissible.
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
49. If the language of an instrument does not yield
clear meaning and is open to two interpretations, extrinsic
evidence of surrounding circumstances could be adduced.
50. In any document where there is a statement of
fact other than the terms of the contract, oral evidence can be
placed to prove or disprove the fact.
51. The learned Trial Court invoked Order-XII Rule-
6 of the CPC on the basis of consent recorded in the ordersheet,
wherein both parties agreed to proceed under the said provision.
Such consent, if voluntarily and unequivocally given, empowers
the Court to pass a decree on admitted facts, thereby avoiding
unnecessary trial proceedings and expediting disposal of the
matter but in the present case, the appellants/defendants disputed
that they have given any consent and submitted that they were
contesting the suit and there was no occasion or circumstances to
show that they had given consent. The principle underlying Order-
XII Rule-6 is that where parties admit facts or agree to the
admission of facts, the Court may act without examining the
disputed issues at length. However, it is equally well settled that
the power under Order-XII Rule-6 is discretionary and must be
exercised with caution. Even when consent is recorded, the Court
must ensure that the admission is clear, unambiguous, and covers
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
the material facts necessary to justify a decree. Consent alone
cannot substitute for proof where significant issues such as title,
possession, or the legality of transactions remain disputed.
52. By applying the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, it is to be held that
there is no categorical and unconditional admission. In case
appellants prove that the said documents are not acted upon due to
abolition of Zamindari, post trial it goes to the root of the case as
claim of the respondents-plaintiffs.
53. From a careful reading of the pleadings presented
by the parties, there exists a triable issue which are to be decided
only after the parties adduce oral and documentary evidence.
54. The scope of admitted judgment in earlier suit
was insufficient to justify a decree without a full adjudication on
merits, and the matter necessarily required examination of the
substantive claims of the parties.
55. For the reasons discussed above and in view of
the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court cannot upheld
the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court. The learned
Trial Court is not justified in exercising its jurisdiction under
Order-XII Rule 6 C.P.C. read with Sections 91 and 92 of the
Evidence Act. The point for determination is decided accordingly
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
in favour of the appellants and against the respondents.
56. This appeal is allowed and the impugned
judgment dated 28.04.2014 and decree dated 23.05.2014 passed by
the learned Subordinate Judge IV, Bettiah in Title Suit No. 72 of
2010 is set-aside and the petition dated 07.04.2014 filed on behalf
of plaintiffs under Order-XII Rule-6 C.P.C. stands dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
57. The matter is remanded to the learned Trial Court
for framing issues and affording an opportunity of trial to the
parties, to prove their respective cases and pronounce the
judgment in accordance with law expeditiously.
58. Pending Interlocutory Application(s) (if any)
including I.A. No.06 of 2024 (under Order-XLI Rule-27 read with
Section 151 C.P.C.) are accordingly disposed of.
59. It is made clear that the findings and observations
made by this Court are confined only for the purpose of deciding
the core issue in this appeal with respect to justification of the
learned Trial Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Order-XII
Rule-6 of C.P.C. read with Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act.
This Court has not made any observation on the merits of the case
and all contentions of the parties are left open for the learned Trial
Court to record findings on various issues which fall for
Patna High Court FA No.131 of 2014 dt.04-12-2025
consideration in the suit on its own merits in accordance with law.
60. Let the Trial Court records be sent back to the
concerned Court forthwith.
(Sunil Dutta Mishra, J)
utkarsh/-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE 19.09.2025
Uploading Date 04.12.2025
Transmission Date NA
