Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 457 Meg
Judgement Date : 16 August, 2022
Serial No. 09
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No. 31 of 2022
Date of Decision: 16.08.2022
Shri. Adelbert Marbaniang & Anr. Vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Ms. S. A. Pandit, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. K. P. Bhattacharjee, GA
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press: Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
1. This is an application filed under Section 482 CrPC with a prayer to
set aside and quash the FIR registered as Laban P. S Case No 102(11) of 2021
under Section 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and the consequent
proceedings in Special POCSO Case No. 28 of 2022 pending before the learned
Special Judge (POCSO) at Shillong.
2. Heard Ms. S. A. Pandit, learned counsel for the petitioners who has
submitted that the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioner No. 2 have known each
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other since the month of January, 2021 and have developed mutual love for
each other. They have also got into a physical relationship in course of their
acquaintance.
3. In the month of April, 2021, the petitioner No 2 realised that she is
pregnant and she accordingly informed the petitioner No 1. Thereafter, the
petitioner No. 1 came and started living together with the petitioner No. 2 and
since then they cohabited as husband and wife.
4. On 21.11.2021, the petitioner No. 2 felt some pregnancy contractions
and was taken to the Ganesh Das Hospital, Shillong by the petitioner No. 1 for
medical check-up. At the hospital, she has given her age as 17 years. On the
basis of this information, the hospital staff accordingly informed the police. The
petitioner No. 2 however, was subsequently admitted to Robert Hospital,
Shillong where she gave birth to a baby girl on 23.11.2021.
5. In the meantime, the police on receipt of the said information from
Ganesh Das Hospital, has treated the same as an FIR and caused registration of
Laban P. S Case No. 102(11) of 2021 under Section 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO
Act, 2012.
6. On investigation being conducted, the Investigating Officer have
eventually filed the charge sheet on 23.01.2022 implicating the petitioner No. 1
as the accused who is to face trial before the competent court, a regular case
was registered as Special POCSO Case No. 28 of 2022 and the matter was taken
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up by the learned Special Judge (POCSO), Shillong.
7. The petitioner No. 1 was never arrested during the period of
investigation as the petitioner No. 2 in her statement before the police have
stated that she is in a relationship with the petitioner No. 1 and that they are now
staying together after she gave birth to a baby girl on 23-11-2021 and if the
petitioner No. 1 is arrested, then there will be no one to look after the family.
8. The petitioner No. 1 has been summoned to enter appearance before
the Trial Court and the matter is at the stage of consideration of charges.
9. Being highly aggrieved by the proceedings initiated against the
petitioner No. 1 before the court of the learned Special Judge (POCSO),
Shillong, the petitioners as stated above have approached this Court with a
prayer to set aside the FIR and the related POCSO case wherein the petitioner
No. 1 has been named as the accused.
10. Heard Ms. S. A. Pandit, learned counsel for the petitioners who has
submitted that admittedly the petitioner No. 2 was about 17 years of age when
she cohabitated with the petitioner No. 1 and at the time when she gave birth to
her child she was also above 17 years but less than 18 years of age. However,
the fact that the relationship between the alleged victim and the accused has
been established to be that of husband and wife, the sexual relationship between
the two is one of consensual and not forced and in fact, cannot be considered to
be a case of sexual assault.
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11. The fact that the petitioner No. 2 has by now attained the age of
majority on 25-05-2022 and, as such, can be considered to be legally living
together with petitioner No. 1 as husband and wife is also one of the contentions
raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
12. The union between the petitioners herein as husband and wife have
also been blessed by the family members of both sides, therefore, continuation
of the said proceedings would not be for ends of justice. It is prayed that this
petition would be allowed and that the related FIR and criminal case against the
petitioner No. 1 be set aside and quashed.
13. Mr. K. P. Bhattacharjee, learned GA for the State-respondent has not
made any strong objection to the prayer of the petitioners herein, but has only
submitted that since the case before the Trial Court against the petitioner No. 1
is at the stage of consideration of charges, it may not be prudent for this Court
to curtail the proceedings at this juncture.
14. Upon hearing the learned counsels this Court has given due
consideration to the submission made and has also produced the petition in
hand.
15. Facts
as indicated above need not be mentioned again, suffice it to say
that the prayer of the petitioners has to be considered while looking into the
related provisions of the POCSO Act. However, on an overall assessment of
the fact situation, this Court is of the view that an exercise of power under
Section 482 CrPC to ensure that real and actual justice is done cannot be
curtailed by the strict interpretation or application of the related provisions of
law.
16. This Court in the case of Skhemborlang Suting & Anr. v. State of
Meghalaya & Anr. at para 7 has observed as follows:-
"7. Though, the POCSO Act has been rightly enacted to safeguard children from sexual exploitation, but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case of the petitioners herein, the rigors of the said Act may not be applied to their case and the converse would only result in the breakdown of a happy family relationship and the possible consequence of the wife having to take care of a baby with no support, physically or financially from her husband who may be languishing in jail."
17. The observation of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court at para 47, 48 and
49 in the case of Ranjit Rajbanshi v. State of West Bengal & Ors. C.R.A No.
458 of 2018, has also been found relevant by this Court when it was observed
as follows: -
"47. In the present case, the victim girl was admittedly 16 ½ years old and studied in Class XII at the relevant point of time. She was not naïve enough not to know the implication of sexual intercourse; rather, the victim admittedly had a physical relationship with the accused, who was also of a very young age, on several occasions prior to the incident. Although the consent of a minor is not a good consent in law, and cannot be taken into account as 'consent' as such, the expression 'penetration' as envisaged in the POCSO Act has to be taken to mean a positive, unilateral act on the part of the accused. Consensual participatory intercourse, in view of the passion involved, need not always make penetration, by itself, an unilateral positive act of the accused but might also be a union between two persons out of their own volition. In the latter case, the expression 'penetrates', in Section
3(a) of the POCSO Act might not always connote mere voluntary juxtaposition of the sexual organs of two persons of different genders. If the union is participatory in nature, there is no reason to indict only the male just because of the peculiar nature of anatomy of the sexual organs of different genders. The psyche of the parties and the maturity level of the victim are also relevant factors to be taken into consideration to decide whether the penetration was a unilateral and positive act on the part of the male. Hence, seen in proper perspective, the act alleged, even if proved, could not tantamount to penetration sufficient to attract Section 3 of the POCSO Act, keeping in view the admitted several prior occasions of physical union between the accused and the victim and the maturity of the victim.
48. As such, it cannot be said that the accused was guilty of penetrative sexual assault, as such, since here the act of penetration, even if true, would have to be taken not as an unilateral act of the accused but a participatory moment of passion involving the participation of both the victim and the accused.
49. Although the question of consent does not arise in case of a minor, in order to attract Section 376(1) of the IPC, it had to be established that the alleged offence was committed against the will of the victim. Read in conjunction, the provisions of Section 376 of the IPC 7 and Section 3 of the POCSO Act ought to be construed on a similar footing and cannot incriminate the accused for a voluntary joint act of sexual union."
18. As has been observed above, this Court for securing ends of justice
would not be found wanting if under the peculiar facts and circumstances and
if there is no drastic impact on the societal balance, the case of the parties be
required to be looked at sympathetically.
19. The present position being that the petitioners, particularly the
petitioner No. 2 being of legal marriageable age and said to be living a married
life with petitioner No. 1 along with their new born child, continuation of the
criminal proceedings against the petitioner No. 1 would indeed serve no
purpose for all concerned.
20. Accordingly, the prayer of the petitioners herein finds merit with this
Court and the same is allowed.
21. The FIR registered as Laban P. S Case No. 102(11) of 2021 under
Section 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and the consequent proceedings in
Special POCSO Case No. 28 of 2022 pending before the learned Special Judge
(POCSO) at Shillong, are hereby set aside and quashed.
22. Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya 01.08.2022 "Biswarup-PS"
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