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Anoop Sharan (Deleted) Through Lrs (I) ... vs Govind Das Rai Thr Attorney Holder Smt. ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 2890 MP

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 2890 MP
Judgement Date : 24 March, 2026

[Cites 11, Cited by 0]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Anoop Sharan (Deleted) Through Lrs (I) ... vs Govind Das Rai Thr Attorney Holder Smt. ... on 24 March, 2026

Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
         NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:10135




                                                                1                                  FA-210-2016
                              IN     THE      HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                    AT GWALIOR
                                                           BEFORE
                                            HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
                                                   ON THE 24 th OF MARCH, 2026
                                                   FIRST APPEAL No. 210 of 2016
                             ANOOP SHARAN (DELETED) THROUGH LRS (I) NIRMLA GUPTA
                                                     Versus
                           GOVIND DAS RAI THR ATTORNEY HOLDER SMT. BHAWNA SHIVHARE
                           Appearance:
                                 Mr. Prashant Sharma - Advocate for appellant.
                                 Mr. Naval Kumar Gupta and Mr. Vivek Khedkar - Senior Advocates,
                           assisted by Mr. Saket Sharma and Mr. Himanshu Pathak - Advocates for
                           respondent.

                                                              JUDGMENT

This first appeal under Section 96 of CPC has been filed against judgment

and decree dated 20/10/2016 passed by 10th Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Suit No. 11A/2012, by which a decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act has been granted.

2. Since the controversy revolves in a very narrow compass, therefore, it is suffice to mention here that a suit for eviction under Section 12 (1) (a) and 12 (1)

(c) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act was filed. The claim of plaintiff/respondent for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent was held to be not proved by the Trial Court. However, decree was granted under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act on following grounds:

(i) Defendant is creating nuisance, and

(ii) Defendant has denied the title of plaintiff.

3. So far as decree under Section 12(1)(c) for creating nuisance is

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:10135

2 FA-210-2016

concerned, this Court is of considered opinion that the evidence led by plaintiff in that regard is completely unsatisfactory. Except mentioning that whenever the plaintiff went to collect the rent, the defendant had created nuisance, without any specific date of incidence or without any corroborating document like FIR, this Court is of considered opinion that vague averment made either in the plaint or in the evidence or in the notice (Exhibit P-2) is not sufficient to grant a decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) on the ground of creating nuisance. Accordingly, decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act for creating nuisance cannot be upheld and it is, accordingly, set aside.

4. However, the Trial Court has also granted a decree under Section 12(1)

(c) on the ground of denial of title.

5. It is a well-established principle of law that even denial of title in the

written statement is sufficient to grant a decree, and it would serve as a valid ground for eviction, unless that denial of title is proven to be bona fide . The Supreme Court in the case of Keshar Bai vs. Chhunulal , reported in (2014) 11 SCC 438 , has held as under:

11. The first question that arises is: how denial of title falls within the ambit of Section 12(1)(c ) of the M.P. Act? Under Section 111( g )(2) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the lease is determined by forfeiture, if the lessee denies the lessor's title. While dealing with eviction suit, arising out of the M.P. Act, in Devasahayam [Devasahayam v. P. Savithramma , (2005) 7 SCC 653] this Court has held that so just is the above rule that in various rent control legislations such a ground is recognised and incorporated as a ground for eviction of a tenant either expressly or impliedly within the net of an act injurious to the interest of the landlord. It is further held that denial of the landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by the tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. It is, therefore, covered by Section 12(1)(c ) of the M.P. Act.

12. The following observations of this Court in Devasahayam [Devasahayam v. P. Savithramma , (2005) 7 SCC 653] are relevant: (SCC pp. 662-63, para 27)

" 27. In Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash [Sheela v.

Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375] whereupon

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:10135

3 FA-210-2016 Mr Nageswara Rao placed strong reliance, Lahoti, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, while construing the provisions of clause (c ) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 observed: (SCC p. 384, para

13)

'13. The law as to tenancy being determined by forfeiture by denial of the lessor's title or disclaimer of the tenancy has been adopted in India from the law of England where it originated as a principle in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience. On enactment of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the same was incorporated into clause (g ) of Section 111. So just is the rule that it has been held applicable even in the areas where the Transfer of Property Act does not apply. (See:

Mohd. Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur [AIR 1965 SC 1923] .) The principle of determination of tenancy by forfeiture consequent upon denial of the lessor's title may not be applicable where rent control legislation intervenes and such legislation while extending protection to tenants from eviction does not recognise such denial or disclaimer as a ground for termination of tenancy and eviction of tenant. However, in various rent control legislations such a ground is recognised and incorporated as a ground for eviction of tenant either expressly or impliedly by bringing it within the net of an act injurious to the interest of the landlord on account of its mischievous content to prejudice adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord.'

* * *

'17. In our opinion, denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of clause (c ) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:10135

4 FA-210-2016 third party. A tenant bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove his ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so as to protect himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available to him by the rent control law but without disowning his character of possession over the tenancy premises as tenant cannot be said to have denied the title of landlord or disclaimed the tenancy. Such an act of the tenant does not attract applicability of Section 12(1)(c ) abovesaid. It is the intention of the tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability.' ( Sheela case [Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375] , SCC p. 386, para 17)"

6. To find out as to whether the decree for eviction on the ground of denial of title can be granted or not, it is necessary to refer to the pleadings of defendant. Paragraph 3 of the written statement reads as under:

"3. यह क, वाद प क पद . 2 का उ र इस कार है क हजीरा फोट रोड थत मकान करण मांक 138/10-11/ए-68 म चल रह कायवाह एवं नजूल तहसीलदार वािलयर ारा उ करण म जार सूचना प दनांक 29.07.2011 से मकान क भूिम, जो सव मांक 183 पर क पल माकट के प म थत है , उसको शासक य होने के संबंध म कायवाह क जा रह है , और वाद ितवाद स हत क पल माकट के सम त दक ु ानदार को शासक य अिधका रय व कमचा रय ारा मौ खक तौर पर आदे िशत कया गया है , क वे शासन से अपने प म ववा दत दक ु ान का करायानामा संपा दत कर और कराये क रािश शासन को अदा कर, इसिलये वाद वंय मा णत कर, क भवन उसके व व वािम व एवं आिधप य का है । वा त वकता यह है , क वाद ने ितवाद को ववा दत दकु ान भाड़े पर द थी उस समय यह बताया था, क ववा दत दक ु ान वाली संप उसके व व वािम व एवं आिधप य क है , जसका वह एकमा प से मािलक है ।"

Thereafter, an amendment was carried out by the plaintiff and a decree for eviction on the ground of denial of title was also sought. Accordingly, the written statement was amended, and paragraph 6A was incorporated. If paragraph 3 of the written statement is seen on its face value, then it is clear that defendant had specifically pleaded that in view of the notice issued by Nazul Tahsildar, Gwalior, it appears that proceedings are going on to declare the property as government property, and tenants have been directed to pay rent to the State, and therefore, it

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:10135

5 FA-210-2016 was specifically pleaded that now it is for the plaintiff to prove his title and possession over the property in dispute. However, it was also accepted that the suit shop was let out by plaintiff, but it was claimed that at that time, plaintiff had informed the defendant that he is the sole owner of the property in dispute.

7. Thus, in view of specific plea in paragraph 3 of the written statement, it can be safely held that defendant had denied the title of plaintiff as he had called upon the plaintiff to prove his title over the property in dispute and had set up the title in a third party.

8. Anup Saran Gupta (DW-1) was cross-examined in detail in this regard, and in paragraph 16, he had admitted that he is not in possession of any document pertaining to the proceedings pending in the Court of Nazul Tahsildar. He also admitted that he has not seen the said case file in the Court of Nazul Tahsildar. Although he specifically stated that no employee of the office of Nazul Tahsildar had ever contacted/instructed him to pay the rent to the government, but claimed that employees of the Municipal Corporation were talking in the market. Similarly, in paragraph 24 of his cross-examination, he has specifically stated that no case is pending against the plaintiff in the Court of Nazul Tahsildar.

9. Furthermore, it is not out of place to mention here that defendant has not filed any document to support his contention that government employees had ever informed the defendant to pay the rent to the State. Therefore, pleading of defendant in paragraph 3 of his written statement, that in view of the notice issued by Nazul Tahsildar, plaintiff must prove his title, clearly amounts to denial of title and has provided a valid ground for eviction.

10. So far as the bona fides of defendant to take such a defense is concerned, it suffice to mention here that once defendant has clearly admitted in his cross-examination that neither he is in possession of any document to support

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:10135

6 FA-210-2016 his defense nor he has seen any file in the Court of Nazul Tahsildar, and in paragraph 24 he has accepted that no case is pending against the plaintiff in the Court of Nazul Tahsildar, it is clear that the denial of title was not a bona fide act on the part of plaintiff, but it was done with a mala fide intention to bring the title of plaintiff under cloud.

11. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that the Trial Court did not commit any mistake by granting a decree under Section 12(1)

(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act on the ground of denial of title.

12. At this stage, it is submitted by counsel for appellant/defendant that he may be granted nine months' time to vacate the suit premises, whereas it was submitted by counsel for respondent/plaintiff that six months' time is sufficient to vacate the premises.

13. So far as the period to vacate the premises is concerned, this Court is of considered opinion that this Court cannot compel the appellant/plaintiff/landlord to grant more time than what he is intending to give. Since the plaintiff has agreed to give a time of six months to vacate the premises, therefore, while affirming the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in respect of a decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) on the ground of denial of title, it is directed that subject to payment of rent by the 15th of every succeeding month, appellant/defendant shall be entitled to retain the possession of the suit premises for a period of six months from today, i.e., up to 23/09/2026.

14. Appellant/Defendant shall also submit his undertaking before the Trial

Court that he would vacate the suit premises on or before 23/09/2026.

15. It is made clear that if the suit premises is not vacated on or before 23/09/2026, then not only respondent/plaintiff would be well within his right to file an application for execution, but appellant/defendant shall also be liable to be

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:10135

7 FA-210-2016

prosecuted for contempt of Court.

16. With aforesaid observation, appeal is partially allowed and judgment

and decree dated 20/10/2016 passed by 10th Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 11A/2012 in respect of eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act on the ground of nuisance is hereby set aside, whereas decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act on the ground of denial of title is hereby affirmed.

17. No order as to cost.

(G. S. AHLUWALIA) JUDGE

AKS

 
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