[Cites 6, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Pramod Pawar vs Collector on 20 January, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:33970
1 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:1805
1 W.P. No.43709/2025
W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE JAI KUMAR PILLAI
WRIT PETITION No.34443 of 2025
PRAMOD PAWAR
Versus
COLLECTOR AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Aviral Vikas Khare and Shri Sachin Patel- Advocate for
the petitioner.
Shri Pradyumna Kibe - GA for the respondents/State.
WRIT PETITION No. 32744 of 2025
VIPIN KUMAR SINGH
Versus
COLLECTOR AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: HARIKUMAR
NAIR
Signing time: 1/20/2026
6:30:26 PM
2 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:1805
W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
Shri Aviral Vikas Khare and Shri Sachin Patel - Advocate
for the petitioner.
Shri Pradyumna Kibe -GA for the respondents/State.
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Reserved on : 08/01/2025
Post on : 20/01/2026
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ORDER
The petitioners have filed the present writ petitions under Article
226 of the Constitution of India challenging the termination orders
dated 08/08/2025 (Annexure-P/1 in both the writ petitions) passed by
the Respondent No. 1, which are founded solely on a common inquiry
report dated 28/07/2025 (Annexure-P/17 in W.P. No. 34443/2025 and
Annexure-P/12 in W.P. No. 32744/2025).
2. Since both the writ petitions arise out of the same set of facts,
involveing identical grounds of challenge, and the impugned actions are
based upon the same inquiry report, learned counsel for the parties
jointly submitted that both the matters be heard analogously and
decided by a common order. Accordingly, with the consent of parties,
both the writ petitions are being disposed of by this common order.
3. It is the case of the petitioners that they were appointed under the
District e-Governance Society after undergoing due selection process
3 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:1805
W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
conducted by the Madhya Pradesh State Electronics Development
Corporation Ltd. (MPSEDC). Their services were renewed periodically
on account of satisfactory performance.
4. During their tenure, complaints were received alleging
irregularities in relation to operation and allotment of Aadhaar centers
within the district. Acting upon such complaints, an inquiry was
directed to be conducted by certain district-level officers.
5. The inquiry culminated in a report dated 28/07/2025, holding the
allegations as substantiated. Relying solely on the said inquiry report,
the respondents proceeded to terminate the services of both the
petitioners by passing separate but identically founded termination
orders.
6. The petitioners submit that the inquiry conducted was not a
regular departmental inquiry but only a preliminary fact-finding
exercise. No charge-sheet was issued, no witnesses were examined in
their presence, and no opportunity of cross-examination was provided.
It is further pleaded that the complaints were motivated, made by ex-
Aadhaar Operators who were earlier subjected to punitive action, and in
one instance, the complaint was found to be in the name of a fictitious
person. These facts were specifically pleaded in the rejoinder along with
supporting documents. It is contended that since the termination orders
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W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
dated 08.08.2025 are stigmatic in nature, they could not have been
passed without holding a full-fledged inquiry in accordance with the
principles of natural justice.
7. Per contra, the respondents have defended the impugned action
by contending that the petitioners were contractual employees, that the
Collector was the competent authority to terminate their services, and
that sufficient opportunity was provided during the inquiry. It is further
contended that considering the gravity of allegations concerning
Aadhaar related activities, the termination orders do not warrant
interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
8. Heard both parties at length and examined the entire record
available.
9. On careful examination of the inquiry report dated 28/07/2025, it
is evident that no formal disciplinary proceedings were initiated. No
charge-sheet was served upon the petitioners, no list of documents and
witnesses were supplied and no presenting officer was appointed.
10. Statements of certain persons were recorded behind the back of
the petitioners. The petitioners were neither supplied copies of such
statements nor permitted to cross-examine the witnesses whose
statements were relied upon.
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W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
11. This Court finds that the inquiry conducted against the petitioner
cannot be treated as a regular departmental inquiry. It is only a
preliminary inquiry meant for administrative satisfaction and could not
have been made the sole basis for passing punitive and stigmatic
termination orders dated 08.08.2025.
12. The rejoinder filed by the petitioners demonstrates that the
complaints were motivated and, in one case, made by a non-existent
person. These serious objections were neither examined by the inquiry
officer nor considered by the competent authority while passing the
termination orders.
13. The petitioners have also placed on record contemporaneous
official documents such as UIDAI reports, weekly reports, and
MPSEDC records, which do not indicate any irregularity. These
materials were completely ignored during the inquiry. The termination
orders dated 08/08/2025 attribute misconduct and irregularities to the
petitioners and are, therefore, clearly stigmatic in nature. Even in the
case of contractual employees, such stigmatic termination cannot be
sustained without following the principles of natural justice.
14. The denial of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to
adduce defence evidence amounts to a clear violation of the principles
of natural justice, rendering the inquiry and consequential termination
orders illegal. The attempt of the respondents to justify the termination
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W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
orders by raising additional allegations in the reply is impermissible in
law, as an order must stand or fall on the reasons contained therein. The
competent authority has acted mechanically by relying solely upon the
inquiry report dated 28/07/2025, without independent application of
mind, while passing the termination orders dated 08/08/2025.
15. The submission of the respondents that the petitioners were
merely contractual employees does not constitute a valid ground for
dispensing with a full-fledged disciplinary inquiry and resorting
straightaway to termination. The said issue is no longer res integra and
has been authoritatively settled by the learned Division Bench of this
Court in Malkhan Singh Malviya Vs. State of M.P., W.A. No.
1166/2017, decided on 08.03.2018 (Bench at Gwalior). In the
aforesaid decision, it has been categorically held that even an employee
who is not borne on the regular establishment is entitled to be afforded
a reasonable opportunity of being heard before passing a stigmatic order
of termination. The Division Bench has further held that mere issuance
of a show-cause notice and calling for a reply would not suffice, unless
the adverse material relied upon against the employee is supplied to him
and an effective opportunity is granted to adduce evidence in support of
his defence. The relevant observations of the Division Bench may be
read as under:
13. Reverting to the facts of the case, it is noticeable that before
casting stigma on the petitioner by holding him guilty of
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W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
misconduct, a mere preliminary inquiry report prepared behind
the back of the petitioner and reply of petitioner to the show
cause notice was considered by the competent authority before
issuing order of termination of service. The misconduct as
alleged in the show cause notice and the preliminary inquiry
conducted behind the back of the petitioner were the foundation
of the termination. The termination was not merely on the basis
of finding the services of the petitioner to be no more required
but because he was found guilty of the misconduct.
16. A reference may be also made to the recent judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swati Priyadarshni v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 9758 of 2024 [arising out of SLP
(C) No. 11685 of 2021], decided on 22.08.2024, wherein the Hon'ble
Court reiterated that:-
34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this
Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v Union of India,
1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
"28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows:
Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service
brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per
se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in
Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420:
(1953) SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by
compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating
the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of
a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also
been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh
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W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
[(1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases
the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal
consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of
the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the
motive or the inducing factor which influences the
Government to take action under the terms of the contract of
employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a
right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the
service the motive operating on the mind of the Government
is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of
India [LR 58 Bom 673 : AIR (1956) Bom 455] wholly
irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on
the right flowing from contract or the service rules then,
prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries
with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not
attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or
under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without
going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the
punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the
Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant
and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification,
then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311
must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got
a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of
employment or the rules provide to the contrary, terminated
cannot than for services otherwise misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination
of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a
punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within
Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he
is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and
allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting
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W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way
of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the
government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the
very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he
will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If,
however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction
from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank
will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the
servant has no title to the post or the rank and the
Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the
rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean
that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank
cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test
for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is
not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the
reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences.
Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his
pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his
substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future
chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate
that although in form theGovernment had purported to
exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the
servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of
employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the
Government has terminated the employment as and by way of
penalty. The use of the expression "terminate" or
"discharge" is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such
innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests
mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right
to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with
evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the
case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that
the servant has been punished and the termination of his
service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service
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W.P. No.34443/2025 & W.P.No.32744/2025
or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a
reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and
Article 311, which give protection to government servant have
not been complied with, the termination of the service or the
reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation
of the constitutional servant."
17. Thus, the Competent Authority has acted mechanically by relying
solely upon the inquiry report dated 28/07/2025, without independent
application of mind, while passing the termination orders on
08/08/2025.
18. Consequently, the termination orders dated 08/08/2025
(Annexure-P/1) passed against the petitioners are hereby quashed.
19. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioners forthwith
on their respective posts.
20. So far as the claim relating to consequential benefits, including
back wages and other service benefits for the period during which the
petitioners remained out of service, is concerned, in the absence of any
specific pleading that the petitioners were not gainfully employed
during the said period, the petitioners shall be entitled to 50% back
wages. The entire exercise shall be completed by the respondents within
a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order.
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21. It is, however, made clear that the respondents shall be at liberty
to initiate a full-fledged departmental inquiry, if so advised, strictly in
accordance with law after following the principles of natural justice.
22. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are allowed in the terms
hereinabove mentioned.
23. A copy of this order shall be placed on the record of the
connected writ petition for ready reference and compliance.
24. Pending applications if any, shall be disposed off accordingly.
(Jai Kumar Pillai)
hk/ Judge
