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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mukesh Thakurani vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 19 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:15082
1 MCRC-8212-2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE B. P. SHARMA
ON THE 19th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 8212 of 2021
MUKESH THAKURANI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Manish Datt - Senior Advocate alongwith Shri Eshaan Datt -
Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Aatmaram Bain - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
Shri Anand Chawla - Advocate for respondent/objector.
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has
been preferred by the petitioner seeking quashment of First Information
Report bearing Crime No. 14/2020 registered at Police Station Mahila
Thana, District Katni, for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n), 377,
294 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, along with the charge-sheet and all
consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
2. The prosecution case, as it emerges from the FIR, statements under
Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., is that the prosecutrix, a married woman, came
into contact with the petitioner in the year 2019 and a relationship developed
between them. It is alleged that the petitioner misrepresented himself as a
divorced person and induced the prosecutrix into a relationship on the pretext
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of marriage, and on such representation established physical relations with
her on multiple occasions. It is further alleged that upon the prosecutrix
discovering that the petitioner had married, she objected to the relationship,
whereafter the petitioner allegedly resorted to threats, intimidation and
coercion, including threats to circulate obscene videos and to cause harm to
her minor daughter, thereby subjecting her to repeated sexual and unnatural
acts.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the relationship
between the parties was consensual as the respondent No.2/prosecutrix is a
married lady with one year old child, who has been living separately from
her husband and was well aware of the fact that she cannot get married
elsewhere, till she gets a divorce, as is reflected from her statement recorded
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the applicant has also
submitted that as far as the allegation with regard to obscene videos being
made by the petitioner and the respondent No.2 in a compromising position
is concerned, nothing has been recovered by the cyber cell, which is
reflected from the charge-sheet filed by the police. Therefore, learned
counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegation of the respondent
no.2/prosecutrix having being allured into the relationship on the basis of
false disclosure by the petitioner that he has divorced his wife, is prima facie
untrue.
4. It is submitted that, the prosecutrix has given an affidavit before the
concerned authority dated 08.01.2020, whereby no allegations have been
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levelled against the present applicant, and on the contrary it has been stated
that, the present petitioner is a good person, and it is the wife of the petitioner
who has been continuously been threatening him and has been demanding
money. It is further submitted that, the prosecutrix and her husband came
back together to save their image in the society, thus this false FIR has been
lodged against the petitioner.
5. It is also submitted that, all the allegations levelled against the
petitioner are false and frivolous, and especially the fact that there was a
breakdown of consensual relationship between two person who are already
married and with the passage of time, the relationship broke down by itself
cannot be a ground for lodging the FIR against the petitioner, and he has
been falsely implicated.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment in
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra , (2019) 9 SCC 608 ,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has elaborately held, after considering
earlier decisions including Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana , Yedla
Srinivasa Rao vs. State of A.P. and Uday vs. State of Karnataka , that there is
a clear distinction between a false promise made with no intention of being
fulfilled and a mere breach of promise, and that for consent to be vitiated
under Section 90 IPC, it must be established that from the inception the
accused had no intention to marry because she already been married and has
been living separately from her husband in the petitioner's house. It has been
further stated that where the relationship is based on mutual love and passion,
or where the prosecutrix was aware of impediments to marriage, consent
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cannot be said to be vitiated.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon Rajiv Thapar
vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has laid down the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C. and has held that where the material relied upon by the accused
is of sterling and impeccable quality which completely demolishes the
prosecution case and renders the allegations untenable, the High Court would
be justified in quashing the proceedings. Reliance has also been placed upon
Rukmini Narvekar vs. Vijaya Satardekar , (2008) 14 SCC 1 , wherein it has
been held that in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the Court is not
precluded from considering defence material to prevent abuse of process,
and upon Kunaldev Singh Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh , MCRC No.
2360/2014, wherein it has been held that in rare cases where defence material
convincingly demonstrates that the prosecution case is absurd or inherently
improbable, such material can be considered at the threshold.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent submits and cites Central Bureau
of Investigation vs. Arvind Khanna , AIR 2020 SC (Criminal) 1147, Bhawna
Bai vs. Ghanshyam, AIR 2020 SC 554, State vs. M. Maridoss, AIRONLINE
2023 SC 1279, Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Aryan Singh, AIR 2023
SC 1987, Vijay Kumar Soni vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, MCRC No.
41986/2021, State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, AIRONLINE
2023 SC 865, State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, AIR 2025 SC 359,
Rajnish Kumar Biswakarma vs. State of NCT of Delhi, SLP (Criminal) No.
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5290/2024, Punit Jain vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, MCRC No. 31811/2025,
Muskan vs. Ishaan Khan, AIR 2025 SC 5458, Miss XYX vs. State of
Gujarat, AIRONLINE 2019 SC 1286, Punit Beriwala vs. State of NCT of
Delhi, AIRONLINE 2025 SC 412, Ramveer Upadhyay vs. State of U.P.,
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 396, Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. vs. KS
Infraspace LLP Ltd., AIR 2020 SC 307 and Deepak Kumar Sahu vs. State of
Chhattisgarh, AIR 2025 SC 3763 , and submits, in essence, that the High
Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., ought not to
conduct a mini trial or enter into a meticulous examination of the evidence.
The Court is required only to see whether a prima facie case is made out on
the basis of the allegations in the FIR and the material collected during
investigation. It has been further submitted that defence material cannot
ordinarily be considered at this stage and disputed questions of fact must be
left to be adjudicated during trial and also delay in lodging FIR is not by
itself a ground for quashing, that electronic evidence must be proved during
trial, and that even the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can be sufficient to
sustain conviction.
9. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the entire
submissions advanced and the law laid down in the judgments cited.
However, it is well settled that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court is to be
exercised to prevent abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of
justice. In appropriate cases where the allegations are inherently improbable
or where the material on record clearly demonstrates that the prosecution is
mala fide, the Court would be justified in exercising such jurisdiction.
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10. From the perusal of the FIR, it is reflected that, physical relationship
between the petitioner and the prosecutrix existed for over a period of
approximately 1.5 years, and perusal of the record also reflects that,
petitioner and the prosecutrix both are married and both of them knew this
fact from the starting. In this case, the misconception of fact alleged by the
prosecutrix is that, the petitioner's promise to marry her, specifically in the
context of a promise to marry, it is observed that, there is a distinction
between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will
be broken, and the breach of promise which is made in good faith but
subsequently not fulfilled.
11. In the case of "Anurag Soni Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 13 SCC
1", Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:
'12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would
be that if it is established and proved that from the inception
the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry,
did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave
the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the
accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to
be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as
per Section 90 of the IPC and, in such a case, such a consent
would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be
said to have committed the rape as defined under Section 375
of the IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section
376 of the IPC.'
12. In the case of "Pramod Suryabhan Pawar"(supra), Hon'ble Supreme
Court has observed as under:
"16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the
maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide
by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in
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sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates
the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false
promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention
of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a
woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
"misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis
for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this
Court observed:
"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false
promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where
the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of
her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account
of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an
accused on account of circumstances which he could not have
foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry
her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be
treated differently.
...
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to
show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the
accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when
a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure
to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date,
due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence
available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In
order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of
fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance". Section
90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the
act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other,
unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very
beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her."
13. To summarise the aforesaid legal provision the consent of a woman
with respect to section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation
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towards the proposed act. The question whether the consent was vitiated by a
misconception of fact arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions
must be established. To establish the offence the promise of marriage must
have been a false promise, given in malafide and with no intention of
marriage at the time it was given.
14. Perusal of the entire material available on record and the allegations in
the FIR clearly indicated that at the time of alleged crime is set to have been
occurred both of them i.e. petitioner and respondent no.2 were married. This
fact is clearly established from the complainant's affidavit dated 08/01/2020
and complaint dated 18/09/2019 and statement of the complainant given by
her in another criminal case dated 18/09/2019. The allegation in the FIR and
statement of the complainant recorded u/s 164 C.R.P.C indicates that the
petitioner has established sexual relations in first time on 30/05/2019. The
complainant and petitioner knew each other since 2016 and met regularly,
travelled together and to meet each other with her mother. It is also
established from the record that complainant resided in the petitioner's
rented house and in multiple occasions both engaged in sexual intercourse
regularly over a period of approximately one and a half year.
15. The consent of the complainant as defined under Section 90, also
cannot be said to have been obtained under a misconception of fact because,
it is clearly established that, on the date of incident both were married and
this fact is very well in the knowledge of both of them, despite this the
complainant had engaged in the physical relationship with the petitioner, on
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the assurance of the marriage, while she was already married, having a child,
therefore such promise was completely unenforceable qua the petitioner.
There is no evidence of coercion or threat of injury to the complainant to
attract the complainant under Section 506 of the IPC. The allegation of the
complainant does not corroborate with her conduct.
16. It is also necessary to consider the legal position with regard to the
allegation under Section 377 IPC in the backdrop of consensual intimacy
between two adults. The constitutional and statutory position is no longer res
integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of
India, (2018) 10 SCC 1", while examining the constitutional validity of
Section 377 IPC, authoritatively declared that insofar as the provision
criminalised consensual sexual acts between two adults, it would be
unconstitutional. In a similar vein, this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 8403/2016 ,
while dealing with a case founded upon allegations under Section 377 IPC
between consenting adults, held that even if the assertions of the complainant
are taken at face value, the offence would not be made out where the material
indicates consent. In such circumstances, the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court may be exercised to prevent abuse of process, particularly where
the chances of ultimate conviction are bleak. The said principle traces its
jurisprudential foundation to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
"Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1
SCC 692", wherein it was held that where the uncontroverted allegations do
not prima facie establish the offence and where allowing the prosecution to
continue would serve no useful purpose, the proceedings may be quashed
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even at a preliminary stage.
17. It is not in dispute that the prosecutrix was a major, married woman
and having one child. The material placed on record discloses inconsistencies
in the statements of the prosecutrix regarding the dates of alleged incidents
and reflects that in an earlier police inquiry dated 04.10.2019 no allegations
were levelled against the applicant. It is also borne out that the prosecutrix
had executed an affidavit dated 08.01.2020 before the competent authority
wherein no accusation was made against the petitioner and, on the contrary,
it was stated that he was a good person and disputes pertained to his
matrimonial discord. The record further indicates that in an earlier case
registered against the petitioner, whereby he was arrested on 18.09.2019
under Section 377 IPC at the instance of the petitioner's wife, the prosecutrix
had signed as a witness in favour of the petitioner, which circumstance is
wholly inconsistent with the later allegations. There is no material
demonstrating any injury or force, and the allegation regarding obscene
videos has not been substantiated as per the cyber cell. The overall factual
matrix, including the inquiry report of the Additional Superintendent of
Police, the admitted circumstances, and the conduct of the parties, clearly
indicates that the relationship between the parties was consensual in nature
and developed over a period of time. A consensual relationship turned sour
when the complainant and her husband had again came together, and in order
to save their image in the society, this baseless FIR has been lodge against
the petitioner. In light of these cumulative circumstances, the essential
ingredients of offences under Sections 376(2)(n), 377, 294 and 506 IPC are
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not prima facie made out, and the continuation of criminal proceedings
would amount to abuse of the process of law.
18. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is of the considered
opinion that allowing the criminal proceedings to continue would not serve
the ends of justice. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. FIR bearing Crime
No. 14/2020 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana, District Katni, for
offences under Sections 376(2)(n), 377, 294 and 506 IPC, along with the
charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby
quashed.
(B. P. SHARMA)
JUDGE
L/SM
