[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Mamta Sharma vs Badruddin on 15 April, 2026
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 15 th OF APRIL, 2026
SECOND APPEAL No. 24 of 2017
SMT. MAMTA SHARMA AND OTHERS
Versus
BADRUDDIN
Appearance:
Shri Rajeev Shrivastava, Advocate for appellants.
Shri R.K.Upadhyay, Advocate for respondent.
JUDGMENT
This second appeal, under section 100 of CPC, has been filed against the
judgment and decree dated 8/12/2016 passed by II Additional District Judge,
Shivpuri in Civil Appeal No. 46/2014, by which the judgment and decree dated
5/8/2014 passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of I Civil Judge Class II,
Shivpuri in Civil Suit No. 4A/2012 has been reversed and the suit filed by
appellants has been dismissed.
2. Facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that
appellants/plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction against the respondent, as well as, for
recovery of arrears of rent on the ground that appellants/plaintiffs are the owners
and in possession of a house situated in Pragati Bazar, Halwaikhana Road, Tekri,
Shivpuri. In the said house, one shop admeasuring 11.6 ft x 11.6 ft was let out to
the respondent/defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 600/-. The said shop is the
disputed property. A written rent note dated 04/01/2010 was also executed. The
defendant/respondent has paid the rent up to July 2010 and thereafter he has
stopped making payment of rent. Although plaintiff had demanded rent from
defendant on multiple occasions, but the rent has not been paid. Thus, it was
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pleaded that defendant is a defaulter in making payment of rent and accordingly,
the appellant is entitled to get a decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(a) of the
M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ( for short "the Act" ). Similarly, son of
plaintiff namely Jackson Sharma, who is Plaintiff No. 2, is major and unemployed.
Jackson Sharma has already completed his education and now he wants to start a
business of readymade garments in the tenanted premises. The plaintiffs do not
have any suitable and alternative accommodation in the city of Shivpuri to start the
business of readymade garments by plaintiff No. 2 Jackson Sharma. Multiple
shops of readymade garments are situated in the nearby vicinity and, therefore, the
shop in question is the most suitable and reasonable accommodation for starting a
business of readymade garments by plaintiff No. 2. For the time being, plaintiff
No.2 has no business and accordingly, the plaintiffs have terminated the tenancy of
defendant by sending a registered notice dated 17/01/2011. Said notice was
received by defendant on 19/01/2011. However, a reply was sent by the defendant
on false grounds. After the receipt of notice, defendant has paid the rent up to the
month of January, 2011, whereas he should have paid the rent on monthly basis
i.e. by 15th of every succeeding month. It was pleaded that in spite of service of
notice dated 17/01/2011, defendant has not vacated the suit premises and,
accordingly, the suit was filed for eviction as well as for recovery of arrears of rent
from the month of February 2011.
3. Defendant filed his written statement and claimed that he is the tenant of
plaintiff No. 1, therefore, suit filed by plaintiff Nos. 2, 3 and 4 is bad in law and
accordingly, it was prayed that the suit is liable to be dismissed on account of
misjoinder of parties. Defendant admitted his tenancy with effect from 04/01/2010
but denied the averment that the defendant was a defaulter in depositing the rent.
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The defendant had sent rent to the plaintiff from time to time through money order
which was not accepted by her. After the receipt of notice, defendant has deposited
the entire arrears of rent on 14/09/2011 by receipt No. 28610 in the Court. It was
denied that plaintiff No. 2, Jackson Sharma is an unemployed person. It was also
denied that Jackson Sharma is in need of suit premises. It was claimed that in fact
one Ravindra Mittal was a tenant in one of the shops for last 20 to 25 years on
monthly rent of Rs.125/-. After the death of the husband of Plaintiff No. 1, she
persuaded the defendant to exchange his shop with the shop of Ravindra Mittal
and accordingly, the shop of defendant was exchanged with the shop which was in
possession of Ravindra Mittal and a new rent note was executed. It was pleaded
that the shop which was vacated by the defendant was not given to plaintiff No. 2
Jackson, but alienated the same to Ravindra Mittal by registered sale deed dated
23/01/2010 for a consideration amount of Rs. 8,90,000/-. On 23/06/2009,
Surendra Kumar Soni has vacated the shop which was in his possession and the
said fact was suppressed in the plaint. It was denied that plaintiffs do not have any
other shop in the vicinity, but it was claimed that in the same building, the
plaintiffs are in possession of a big shop in which the plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3,
namely Jackson and Johnson are carrying out the business. The area of the said
shop is 15 into 30 square feet. It was claimed that the plaintiff No. 2 is already
running a business of readymade garments.
4. Plaintiffs amended their plaint and it was pleaded that defendant has
started keeping his goods in a street belonging to the plaintiffs and therefore he has
encroached upon the street causing inconvenience to the plaintiffs and
accordingly, the defendant has caused a nuisance. It was further claimed that
defendant has caused damage to the disputed property, thereby diminishing its
value. It was further pleaded that earlier one Surendra Kumar Soni was one of the
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tenants in another shop which was vacated by him on 23/06/2009 and thereafter
plaintiff No. 1 has started a business in the name of Glorious Ladies Wear. The
registration of the said shop is also in the name of plaintiff No. 1. Thus it was
claimed that the suit shop which was vacated by Surendra Kumar Soni is not lying
vacant but plaintiff No. 1 is carrying out her business. It was denied that Jackson
had tried to compromise the matter with defendant. It was claimed that suit shop is
bonafidely required for non-residential purposes of plaintiff No. 2. It was claimed
that all the plaintiffs are the joint owners of the property in dispute.
5. Consequently, the defendant also amended his written statement and
claimed that there is another big shop in the same building in which the suit shop
is situated and in that shop plaintiff No. 2 is carrying out the business of clothes
along with plaintiff No. 3, Johnson. It was further pleaded that in fact plaintiff
has caused damage to the roof as well as the wall, as a result, the rainy water gets
accumulated in the disputed shop. Accordingly, defendant had filed an application
before RCA on 25/07/2010 which is still pending. It was denied that defendant has
caused any damage to the property. It was further claimed that about 4-5 days prior
to the date of amendment, plaintiff No. 2 had come to the shop of defendant and
made an offer that he wants to construct a big market and for constructing a
passage, the shop in dispute is required and in lieu of this shop, the plaintiffs are
ready to give a shop in their market which will be constructed by the plaintiffs.
6. The trial Court after framing issues and recording evidence, decreed the
suit under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act but also held that plaintiffs have failed to
prove their case for eviction under Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(d) of the Act.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court,
respondent preferred an appeal which has been allowed by the II Additional
District Judge, Shivpuri by judgment and decree dated 08/12/2016 passed in Civil
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Appeal No. 46/2014.
8. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Court below, it is
submitted by counsel for appellants that the appellate Court has committed a
material illegality by reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court
for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act.
9. Per contra , the appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for respondent.
10. Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
11. By order dated 31/10/2023, the appeal was admitted on the following
substantial question of law:-
"(i) Whether the appellate Court has wrongly interferred in the judgment
pertaining to bona fide need of the plaintiff's son ?"
12. Before considering the facts of the case, this Court would like to
mention that suit was filed by plaintiffs on 01/08/2011 primarily for non-
residential requirement of plaintiff No. 2, but the plaintiffs did not examine
plaintiff No. 2 Jackson Sharma to prove the bonafide need.
13. It is submitted by counsel for appellants that it is not necessary that the
person for whom the suit is filed or for whose bonafide need the suit has been filed
is to be examined. To buttress his contention, counsel for appellants has relied
upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Mehmooda
Gulshan Vs. Javaid Hussain Mungloo reported in 2017 (5) SCC 683 .
14. Considered the aforesaid submission made by counsel for appelants.
15. The Supreme Court in the case of Mehmooda Gulshan (Supra) has held
as under:-
13. Mere non-examination of the family member who intends to do the
business cannot be taken as a ground for repelling the reasonable
requirement of the landlord. Under the Act, the landlord needs to
establish only a reasonable requirement. No doubt, it is not a simple
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desire. It must be a genuine need. Whether the requirement is based on a
desire or need, will depend on the facts of each case.
14. In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan [Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad
Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 273] , this Court has taken the view that the
requirement only connotes an element of genuine need. To quote from
para 13 : (SCC p. 279)
"13. Moreover, Section 11( h) of the Act uses the words
"reasonable requirement" which undoubtedly postulate that there
must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish.
The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept
in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing
but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us
that the connotation of the term "need" or "requirement" should
not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or
strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the
landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat
the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of
the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This
appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts
prevalent in other States in the country. This Court has considered
the import of the word "requirement" and pointed out that it
merely connotes that there should be an element of need."
15.Bega Begum [Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan , (1979) 1 SCC
273] has also considered the scope and ambit of the expression
"reasonable requirement" at para 17 : (SCC p. 280)
"17. This brings us to the next limb of the argument of the learned
counsel for the respondents regarding the interpretation of Section
11(1)(h) of the Act. Section 11(1)( h) of the Act runs thus:
'11. (1)( h) where the house or shop is reasonably required by the
landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding, or for his
own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose
benefit the house or shop is held;
Explanation.--The Court in determining the reasonableness of
requirement for purposes of building or rebuilding shall have
regard to the comparative public benefit or disadvantage by
extending or diminishing accommodation, and in determining
reasonableness of requirement for occupation shall have regard to
the comparative advantage or disadvantage of the landlord or the
person for whose benefit the house or shop is held and of the
tenant.'
It was submitted by Mr Andley, learned counsel for the
respondents that the words used in Section 11(1)( h) are 'that the
house should be required by the landlord for his own occupation or
for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house or
shop is held'. It was argued that the words "own occupation"
clearly postulate that the landlord must require it for his personal
residence and not for starting any business in the house. We are,
however, unable to agree with this argument. The provision is
meant for the benefit of the landlord and, therefore, it must be so
construed as to advance the object of the Act. The word
"occupation" does not exclude the possibility of the landlord
starting a business or running a hotel in the shop which also would
amount to personal occupation by the landlord. In our opinion, the
section contemplates the actual possession of the landlord, whether
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for his own residence or for his business. It is manifest that even if
the landlord is running a hotel in the house, he is undoubtedly in
possession or occupation of the house in the legal sense of the
term. Furthermore, the section is wide enough to include the
necessity of not only the landlord but also of the persons who are
living with him as members of the same family."
16. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal [Joginder Pal v. Naval
Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397] , after extensively referring to all the
decisions of this Court and some other High Courts, it was held that in
interpreting "own use", the court should adopt a practical and
meaningful approach guided by realities of life. The guidelines are
being summarised at para 33 : (SCC p. 414)
"33. Our conclusions are crystallised as under:
(i) The words "for his own use" as occurring in Section 13(3)( a)(ii)
of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 must receive
a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow
construction.
(ii) The expression--landlord requires for "his own use", is not
confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord
personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but
also of the normal "emanations" of the landlord is included
therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical
occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation
or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively
enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as
interrelationship and interdependence -- economic or otherwise,
between the landlord and such person in the background of social,
socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society or
region to which they belong.
(iii) The tests to be applied are : ( i) whether the requirement
pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord's
own requirement; and, (ii) whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of a given case, actual occupation and user by a
person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as
"his own" occupation or user. The answer would, in its turn,
depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or
dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as "his
own" and the person who would actually use the premises; (ii) the
circumstances in which the claim arises and is put forward; and
(iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The court on being
satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as
distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold
the landlord's claim.
(iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall adopt a
practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life.
(v) In the present case, the requirement of the landlord of the suit
premises for user as office of his Chartered Accountant son is the
requirement of landlord "for his own use" within the meaning of
Section 13(3)(a)(ii)."
17.Joginder Pal [Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal , (2002) 5 SCC
397] was followed in many subsequent decisions and one close to the
dispute in the instant case is Ajit Singh v. Jit Ram [Ajit Singh v. Jit
Ram, (2008) 9 SCC 699] . It has been held in para 19 : (SCC p. 705)
"19. From the aforesaid decision of this Court (in Joginder Pal
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case [Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal , (2002) 5 SCC 397] ), it
is therefore clear that this Court has laid down authoritatively that
a non-residential premises, if required by a son for user by him
would cover the requirement of the words used in the section i.e.
"for his own use" in reference to a landlord."
18. In C. Karunakaran v. T. Meenakshi [C. Karunakaran v. T.
Meenakshi, (2005) 13 SCC 99] , one issue which arose for
consideration was whether non-examination of the person for whose
need the building was required was fatal. It was held that "mere non-
examination of the person for whose need the building was required by
itself was no ground to non-suit the landlady". To quote : (SCC p. 101,
para 5)
"5. ... Mere non-examination of the person for whose need the
building was required by itself was no ground to non-suit the
landlady. In a number of decisions (this fact is acknowledged by
the first appellate court also), it has been held that it is not
necessary to examine the person for whose need the premises are
required. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case."
19. In Gulraj Singh Grewal v. Harbans Singh [Gulraj Singh
Grewal v. Harbans Singh , (1993) 2 SCC 68] , this Court had an
occasion to see whether a landlord can be non-suited on the ground of
non-examination of the son for whose benefit the premises are sought to
be vacated. This Court held that in case the need has otherwise been
established in evidence, the non-examination is not material. At the
best, it is only a matter of appreciation of evidence. To the extent
relevant, para 8 reads as follows : (SCC p. 72)
"8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
personal need found proved is only of Respondent 2, son of
Respondent 1, who did not enter the witness box and, as stated in
an affidavit filed in this Court, even he is carrying on his
profession at a place about 25 km away from Ludhiana, in our
opinion, this finding of fact is unassailable. The High Court has
clearly observed that no meaningful argument could be advanced
on behalf of the appellant to challenge this finding of the appellate
authority. Respondent 1 who is the father of Respondent 2, has
supported and proved the need of Respondent 2, who also is a
landlord. The fact that for want of suitable accommodation in the
city of Ludhiana, Respondent 2 is at present carrying on his
profession at some distance from Ludhiana is not sufficient to
negative the landlord's need. In these circumstances, the non-
examination of Respondent 2 also, when Respondent 1 has
examined himself and proved the need of the landlord, is
immaterial and, at best, a matter relating only to appreciation of
evidence, on which ground this finding of fact cannot be
reopened."
Therefore, non-examination of the person for whose bonafide
requirement the suit has been filed by itself cannot be a sole ground to non-
suit the plaintiff.
16. Section 12(1)(f) of the Act reads as under:-
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"(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is
required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or
starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried
daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose
benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such
person has no other reasonably non-residential accommodation of
his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned];"
From plain reading of this section, it is clear that the requirement
should be bonafide and not a mere desire, as also held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Mehmooda Gulshan (Supra) . Thus, plaintiff has to prove that
the need for non-residential purpose is "bonafide or reasonable" and not a
mere desire. Therefore, the facts of this case shall be considered in the light
of the law laid down by the Court in the case of Mehmooda Gulshan (Supra).
17. In the plaint, plaintiffs did not disclose that prior to institution of
suit, one of the tenants namely Surendra Kumar Soni had vacated his
tenanted premises by handing over its possession to plaintiff No. 1 on
23/06/2009. However, plaintiffs were compelled to amend their plaint only
after the said defence was taken by the respondent in his written statement.
The plaintiffs had also suppressed the fact that the shop which was originally
let out to defendant was exchanged with the shop which was in possession of
another tenant Ravindra Mittal and after the shops were exchanged, plaintiffs
sold the shop to Ravindra Mittal instead of giving it to plaintiff No. 2
Jackson Sharma. The shop was sold to Ravindra Mittal on 23/01/2010.
Under these circumstances, the following dates become essential:-
On 23/01/2010, one shop was sold by plaintiffs to Ravindra Mittal.
On 23/06/2009, another shop was vacated by Surendra Kumar Soni.
Both the aforesaid facts were suppressed by plaintiffs in their plaint.
However, as already pointed out, they were compelled to amend their plaint
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only when the said facts were pleaded by defendant in his written statement.
The civil suit was filed on 01/08/2011. Therefore, it is clear that immediately
prior to institution of suit i.e. on 23/06/2009, one shop was vacated by
Surendra Kumar Soni and another shop was sold by plaintiffs to Ravindra
Mittal by registered sale deed dated 23/01/2010. It is the case of plaintiffs
that plaintiff No. 2 Jackson Sharma is aged about 24 years and he is an
unemployed person and has completed his education. Under these
circumstances, it becomes necessary for plaintiffs to prove on what date
bonafide need for Jackson Sharma arose.
18. Plaintiff Mamta Sharma (PW-1), in paragraph 9 of her cross-
examination, had admitted that her husband had expired about 15-16 years
back i.e. in the year 1997. She further admitted that prior to institution of suit,
defendant had filed an application before RCA, Shivpuri complaining that
plaintiffs are causing damage to the roof, as a result of which water gets
accumulated in the shop. However, it was claimed by Mamta Sharma (PW-1)
that the said application was based on false averments. However, she
admitted that the said proceedings are pending before the RCA. In paragraph
18, she admitted that on 23/01/2010, she had sold another shop to Ravindra
Mittal for a consideration amount of Rs. 8,90,000/-. She further admitted that
prior to the sale of said shop to Ravindra Mittal, she got the said shop
vacated from Badruddin by allotting another shop to him. However, she on
her own explained that she was in need of money for her son as well as for
doing business and repayment of loan, therefore she had sold the property to
Ravindra Kumar. She further admitted that in the plaint, in the examination-
in-chief, as well as in the notice (Ex.P/1), she did not disclose that as she was
in need of money therefore she had sold one shop to Ravindra Kumar. She
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further admitted in paragraph 19 that on her instructions, defendant had
voluntarily vacated the shop which was in his possession and took possession
of another shop which is disputed in the present case. She further admitted in
paragraph 20 that she did not plead in the plaint about the availability of
suitable alternative accommodation. She further admitted that in the building
there are two more shops. She denied that both the shops are in possession of
her sons, but claimed that she is running a business of clothes. She stated that
she is running the business from the year 2010 and in one shop, another
tenant is in possession. She further admitted that she has not filed the
registration of the shop. She further admitted that she has not filed any
document, bill, or voucher in relation to the sale and purchase of the goods
from her shop. She further admitted that her shop is of readymade garments.
However, she denied that the shop is being run by her sons. She claimed that
she is selling ladies garments. She admitted that in the plaint as well as in her
statement under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, she did not disclose that she is
running the business of ladies garments. She denied that she had filed any
application before the RCA for eviction against Surendra Kumar Soni.
However, she admitted that on 23/06/2009, she got the vacant possession of a
shop which was let out to Surendra Kumar Soni. She also admitted that the
said shop was not given to plaintiff No. 2, but claimed that the said shop was
got vacated for her own purposes. She admitted that in her plaint as well as in
her affidavit, she has not disclosed that the shop was got vacated for her own
purposes. In paragraph 25 of her cross-examination, she admitted that she had
agreed to sell the shop to Ravindra Mittal for a consideration amount of Rs.
15 lakhs and the registered agreement to sell was filed as Ex.P/6. She further
claimed that after getting the shop vacated, she had executed a sale deed in
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favor of Ravindra Mittal (Ex.D/3) for a consideration amount of Rs.
8,90,000/-, but the said property was sold in the form of a plot and not a
shop. She further claimed that in the sale deed (Ex.D/3), the description of the
property has been shown as a residential plot.
19. Thus, it is clear that although the plaintiffs might have charged Rs.
15,00,000.- from Ravindra Mittal for selling the shop, but with an intention to
evade stamp duty, the sale deed was executed by showing the shop as a
residential plot. Thus it is clear that the plaintiffs were acting contrary to law
in order to evade stamp duty and for that purpose they went to the extent of
converting the shop into a residential plot.
20. Furthermore, Surendra Kumar Soni had also vacated the suit shop,
and according to plaintiff No. 1, she is personally using that shop for running
the business of ladies garments, but she has not filed any document to show
that she is running the business. She clearly admitted that she has not filed
any bill or voucher of sale and purchase of goods to show that she is running
the business. She did not file registration certificate of her shop under the
M.P. Shops and Establishments Act. On the contrary, it was the case of
defendant that in fact plaintiff No. 2 and plaintiff No. 3 are running the
business of readymade garments.
21. From the record of Municipal Council, Shivpuri, it appears that the
building where the disputed shop is situated was initially recorded in the
name of Ramesh Chandra Sharma, and after his death, the names of the
plaintiffs were recorded as legal representatives. Under these circumstances,
plaintiff No. 2 Jackson Sharma, for whose benefit the suit for eviction was
filed, should have been examined by plaintiffs. Although counsel for
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appellants has tried to impress upon this Court by pleading that in fact this
plaint was filed by Mamta Sharma for the bonafide requirement of her son
Jackson Sharma, but in fact, it is a suit by Jackson Sharma also for his own
personal bonafide requirement for non-residential purposes.
22. Under these circumstances, although the judgment passed by
Supreme Court in the case of Mehmooda Gulshan (Supra) lays down a law
that a person for whose benefit the suit was filed is not necessarily required
to be examined, but in the present case the suit was filed by Jackson Sharma
and other plaintiffs for the benefit of one of the plaintiffs/co-owners. It is the
case of defendant that one shop had fallen vacant which was earlier not
disclosed by plaintiffs, but later on, it was admitted by plaintiffs by
amending their plaint. It was claimed by plaintiff No. 1 that the suit shop
which was vacated by Surendra Kumar Soni is in her possession and she is
running the business, but the said pleadings are completely missing in the
plaint, as well as, in her affidavit filed under Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC. In fact,
in her affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC, she did not disclose that any
shop was ever vacated by Surendra Kumar Soni which is being used by the
plaintiff. She also did not disclose that any shop was sold by her to Ravindra
Mittal for a consideration amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- (as evident from the
agreement to sell though the sale deed was executed for a consideration
amount of Rs. 8,90,000/- by showing the shop as a residential plot).
23. Thus it is clear that plaintiff No. 1 has miserably failed in
establishing that her son Jackson Sharma is in bonafide need of suit shop for
non-residential purposes. Thus, this Court is of considered opinion that the
evidence led by plaintiffs does not show that the need is bonafide or
reasonable, but it is clear that the need is merely a desire.
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24. Under these circumstances, the appellate Court did not commit
any mistake by reversing the findings as well as decree granted by the trial
Court under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act.
25. So far as the other grounds are concerned, it is suffice to mention
here that no decree was granted by the trial Court on other grounds, and no
appeal or cross-objection was filed by the plaintiffs before the District Court.
Even otherwise, the Substantial Question of Law which has been framed is
only in respect of the bonafide need for non-residential purposes.
26. No other argument is advanced by the parties.
27. For the reasons mentioned above, it cannot be said that the
appellate Court has committed any mistake in reversing the judgment and
decree passed by the trial Court and therefore, the judgment passed by the
appellate Court does not require any interference.
28. The substantial question of law is answered against the appellants.
29. Ex consequenti , judgment and decree dated 8/12/2016 passed by II
Additional District Judge, Shivpuri in Civil Appeal No. 46/2014 is hereby
upheld.
30. Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
(and)
