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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Govind Singh Meena vs State Of M.P. Through Panchayat And ... on 6 April, 2026
1 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:9027
W.P. No. 19847/2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE JAI KUMAR PILLAI
WRIT PETITION No. 19847 of 2019
GOVIND SINGH MEENA
Versus
STATE OF M.P. THROUGH PANCHAYAT AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Avinash Kumar Khare - Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Swati Ukhale -GA for the respondents/State.
Reserved on : 26/03/2026
Post on : 06/04/2026
______________________________________________________
ORDER
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This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India has been filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned
order dated 13.08.2019 passed by Respondent No. 2,
Commissioner, Bhopal Division, Bhopal. By the said order, the
second appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed, thereby
affirming the appellate order dated 25.09.2017 passed by the
Collector, District Rajgarh, and the original termination order dated
15.08.2016.
2. The petitioner seeks the issuance of an appropriate writ,
order, or direction to quash and set aside the impugned order dated
13.08.2019 (Annexure P/1) and the consequential termination of his
services. The petitioner further prays for a direction to the
respondents to reinstate him in service with all consequential
benefits.
Facts of the Case
3. The petitioner was appointed to the post of Gram Rojgar
Sahayak vide order dated 24.08.2011 passed by the Chief Executive
Officer, Janpad Panchayat, District Rajgarh. It is stated that he
discharged his duties efficiently until a show-cause notice dated
08.10.2015 was issued to him, alleging that funds meant for
beneficiaries under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
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Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) scheme were not
transferred to their accounts.
4. On 10.10.2015, the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat,
District Rajgarh, issued a letter directing an enquiry into the
complaints against the petitioner. Following this, on 13.07.2016,
another letter was issued directing the termination of the petitioner's
services. Consequently, on 15.08.2016, a termination order was
issued on the basis of alleged financial irregularities under the
MNREGA scheme.
5. Aggrieved by the termination, the petitioner preferred a first
appeal before Respondent No. 3, Collector, Rajgarh, which was
dismissed vide order dated 25.09.2017. A subsequent second appeal
filed before Respondent No. 2, Commissioner, Bhopal Division,
detailing his replies to the allegations, was also dismissed vide the
impugned order dated 13.08.2019. Further, a Gram Sabha
resolution dated 02.12.2015 had been passed in favour of the
petitioner, recommending his retention in service.
Contentions of the Petitioner
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
termination order is ex-facie illegal, arbitrary, malafide, and without
authority of law. It is contended that the respondents passed the
termination order without conducting any formal disciplinary
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enquiry, which is a mandatory prerequisite for inflicting a major
penalty such as removal from service.
7. It is further argued that the petitioner was never afforded a
reasonable opportunity of hearing. The replies submitted by the
petitioner, clarifying that the disputed amount had already been
transferred in compliance with the show-cause notice, were entirely
ignored by the authorities, including the appellate courts.
8. Lastly, the petitioner contends that the allegations do not
align with the factual matrix, and the abrupt termination has cast a
stigma on his unblemished career, causing social disgrace. The
resolution of the Gram Sabha dated 02.12.2015, which supported
giving the petitioner an opportunity, was also overlooked.
Contentions of the Respondents
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently
opposes the petition, submitting that the petitioner was guilty of
serious financial irregularities, corruption, and misusing
government funds. It is alleged that the petitioner committed fraud
under the Kapildhara Well Scheme by disbursing amounts without
executing actual construction work.
10. The respondents submit that an FIR bearing Crime No.
224/2014 was registered against the petitioner at Police Station
Sironj, District Vidisha, under Sections 420/511, 467, 468, and 471
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of the Indian Penal Code, resulting in his detention in Sub-Jail
Lateri. They contend that the petitioner held a public office and
breached the public trust.
11. Relying upon the provisions of Sections 89 and 92 of the
M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, the respondents argue that
adequate procedures were followed. They place reliance on the
judgments in Noida Enterprises Association Vs Noida & Others,
2011(6) SCC-508, and Narendra Pandey Vs. State of MP &
Others (W.A. No. 294/2016) to assert that a full-scale enquiry is
not required and that the summary powers exercised to protect
public funds justify the termination.
Analysis and Conclusion
12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution in matters of disciplinary action is well-settled. This
Court is primarily concerned with the decision-making process,
adherence to statutory rules, and the observance of the principles of
natural justice.
13. The core issue in the present case is whether the services of
the petitioner could be terminated on grounds of severe financial
irregularities and criminal charges without conducting a full-
fledged disciplinary enquiry. It is an admitted position that while a
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show-cause notice was issued, no formal enquiry as contemplated
in law for proving misconduct was held before terminating the
petitioner.
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent decision of
Sandeep Kumar vs. GB Pant Institute of Engineering &
Technology Ghurdauri & Ors., 2024 INSC 309, has explicitly laid
down the law regarding termination without enquiry:
"19. In this background, we are of the firm view that the
termination of the services of the appellant without holding
disciplinary enquiry was totally unjustified and dehors the
requirements of law and in gross violation of principles of
natural justice. Hence, the learned Division Bench of the
High Court fell in grave error in dismissing the writ petition
filed by the appellant on the hyper technical ground that the
minutes of 26th meeting of the Board of Governors dated
16th June, 2018 had not been placed on record."
15. Even though the petitioner was appointed as a contractual
employee, the principles of natural justice must strictly be followed.
This position is fortified by the decision of this Court in Malkhan
Singh Malviya Vs. State of M.P., W.A. No. 1166/2017, decided on
08.03.2018, wherein it was held:
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"13. Reverting to the facts of the case, it is noticeable that
before casting stigma on the petitioner by holding him guilty
of misconduct, a mere preliminary inquiry report prepared
behind the back of the petitioner and reply of petitioner to the
show cause notice was considered by the competent authority
before issuing order of termination of service. The
misconduct as alleged in the show cause notice and the
preliminary inquiry conducted behind the back of the
petitioner were the foundation of the termination. The
termination was not merely on the basis of finding the
services of the petitioner to be no more required but because
he was found guilty of the misconduct."
16. A reference may also be made to the recent judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swati Priyadarshni v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 9758 of 2024, decided on
22.08.2024, wherein the Hon'ble Court reiterated: "34. It is
profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid
down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v Union of India, 1957 SCC
OnLine SC 5:
"34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges
of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v
Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
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"28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as
follows: Any and every termination of service is not a
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of
service brought about by the exercise of a contractual
right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held
by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India
[(1953) 1 SCC 420: (1953) SCR 655]. Likewise the
termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms
of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not
tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not
attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court
in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1955) 1 SCR 26].
In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination
of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences
of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the
Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be
the motive or the inducing factor which influences the
Government to take action under the terms of the contract
of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if
a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate
the service the motive operating on the mind of the
Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas
Ganesh v. Union of India [LR 58 Bom 673 : AIR (1956)
Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of
service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the
service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a
punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and
so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government
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has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate
the employment without going through the procedure
prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or
removal or reduction in rank, the Government may,
nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the
termination of service is sought to be founded on
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
disqualification, then it is a punishment and the
requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As
already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in
the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the
rules provide to the contrary, terminated cannot than for
services otherwise misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or
other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the
service of such a servant on such grounds must be a
punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within
Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and
he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and
allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer
affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise
may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous
thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular
rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate
as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and
privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the
particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher
rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a
punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title
to the post or the rank and the Government has, by
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contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right
to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order
of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in
any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for
determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is
not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the
reduction also visits the servant with any penal
consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the
forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his
seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or
postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that
circumstance may indicate that although in form
theGovernment had purported to exercise its right to
terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a
lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment
or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has
terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The
use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not
conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous
expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned
above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the
post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with
evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If
the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held
that the servant has been punished and the termination of
his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from
service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be
regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of
the rules and Article 311, which give protection to
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government servant have not been complied with, the
termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be
held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional
servant."
17. The case laws relied upon by the respondents are
distinguishable and inapplicable to the present context. The reliance
on Narendra Pandey (supra) is misconceived, as Section 92 of the
Adhiniyam, 1993, deals strictly with the recovery of records,
articles, and money through summary proceedings, and does not act
as a substitute for the mandatory disciplinary procedures required
before imposing the stigmatic penalty of termination. The judgment
in Noida Enterprises Association (supra) emphasizes public trust,
but does not condone the bypassing of established legal procedures
and the rules of natural justice.
18. In light of the aforesaid settled legal principles, it is
abundantly clear that the allegations leveled against the petitioner
pertaining to severe financial irregularities, commission of fraud
under the Kapildhara Well Scheme, and the registration of a
criminal case are inherently stigmatic in nature. When an order of
termination is founded upon such grave allegations of misconduct,
it transcends the realm of a termination simpliciter and assumes the
character of a punitive dismissal. In such circumstances, a mere
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issuance of a show-cause notice dated 08.10.2015, followed by
preliminary administrative directions to separate the petitioner from
service, falls grossly short of the mandatory procedural safeguards
required by law.
19. The record unequivocally demonstrates that the respondent
authorities arrived at a finding of guilt based on preliminary reports
and internal communications prepared entirely behind the back of
the petitioner. No regular departmental enquiry was convened, no
evidence was recorded in his presence, and no opportunity was
afforded to him to cross-examine the authors of the preliminary
reports or to substantiate his specific defense that the disputed
amounts had already been transferred. Condemning an employee,
placing an indelible stigma on his career, and stripping away his
livelihood on the basis of untested, unilateral administrative letters
is a flagrant violation of the fundamental tenets of natural justice.
20. Consequently, a termination order built upon such a
fundamentally flawed and unconstitutional foundation cannot be
permitted to stand. The appellate authorities, namely Respondent
No. 3 (Collector) and Respondent No. 2 (Commissioner),
misdirected themselves in law by failing to recognize this glaring
procedural lapse. Instead of rectifying the illegal termination, they
mechanically affirmed the same, completely ignoring the
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petitioner's detailed replies and the absence of a full-fledged
enquiry. Therefore, the impugned termination order, as well as the
subsequent appellate orders upholding it, are legally unsustainable
and cannot be sustained in the eyes of the law.
21. Consequently, the present Writ Petition is allowed. The
impugned order dated 13.08.2019 passed by Respondent No. 2, the
order dated 25.09.2017 passed by Respondent No. 3, and the
termination order dated 15.08.2016 are hereby quashed and set
aside.
22. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in
service forthwith. However, liberty is granted to the respondents to
initiate a full-fledged departmental enquiry against the petitioner
strictly in accordance with law and upon due compliance with the
principles of natural justice.
23. Since there is no specific pleading regarding whether the
petitioner was gainfully employed during the termination period or
not, the petitioner is not entitled for any back wages during his
termination period. The entire exercise shall be completed within a
period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order.
24. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of accordingly.
No order as to costs.
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(Jai Kumar Pillai)
Judge
hk/
