[Cites 27, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Manorma Agrawal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 April, 2026
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1 Criminal Revision No.3252 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AMIT SETH
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 3252 of 2025
MANORMA AGRAWAL
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER
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Appearance:
Shri Sanjay Gupta - Advocate for applicant.
Shri Atul Kumar Sharma - Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1/State.
Shri Vibhor Kumar Sahu
hu - Advocate for respondent No.2.
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Reserved on : 24.03.2026
Delivered on : 02.04.2026
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ORDER
1. With the consent of the parties, the matter is finally heard.
2. The instant criminal revision filed under Section 397 read with Section
401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereinafter referred to as
"Cr.P.C."]
"] takes exception to the order dated 04.06.2025 passed by the
Second Additional Judge to the Court of the First Additional
Additional Sessions Judge,
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Ashoknagar,in Session Case No.02/2025, whereby charges have been framed
against the applicant for commission of offences under Sections 420, 467,
468 r/w 120-B
B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred to as
"IPC"].
3. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present revision are as under:
3.1. A complaint was made by the respondent No.2, who happens to be the
son of the applicant, to the police authorities stating that the applicant herein,
by creating a forged ppower of attorney dated 30.11.2017, said to have been
executed in her favour by the applicant and his brothers, Amit Agarwal, Anuj
Agarwal and sister Mithul Agarwal, with the aid of co-accused
co accused Smt. Deepa
Shrivastav, i.e, the Notary, had tried to misappropri
misappropriate
ate various properties said
to be jointly owned by the complainant and his brothers/sister.
3.2. On the said complaint, an F.I.R. bearing Crime No.110/2021 was
registered at Police Station Kotwali, Ashoknagar, against the applicant and
Notary Smt. Deepa Shrivastav
hrivastav for commission of offences under Sections
420, 467, 468 and 120--B
B IPC. On completing the investigation, a final report
under Section 193 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [hereinafter
referred to as "BNSS"]
"] came to be filed by the respondent
ndent No.1 before the
learned trial Court on 20.10.2024 against the applicant as well as the co-
co
accused Smt. Deepa Shrivastav for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and
120-B IPC.
3.3. On the basis of the material placed on record alongwith the charge
sheet, the learned trial Court, vide order dated 04.06.2025, framed charges
against the applicant for the offences as stated hereinabove. It is this order
which is under challenge in the present criminal revision.
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4. Learned counsel appearing for the appl
applicant
icant submits that the charge
sheet filed by the prosecution does not contain any material to indicate that
the power of attorney dated 30.11.2017, of which the applicant is alleged to
be the beneficiary, has ever been used by the applicant at any place. H
He
further submits that the entire investigation conducted by the authorities
nowhere conclusively establishes that the power of attorney in question bears
any signature made by the applicant. He further submits that the aforesaid
power of attorney has not been recovered from the applicant but has been
produced by the respondent No.2. In view whereof, the charges on the
strength of the aforesaid power of attorney could not have been framed
against the present applicant. By referring to the statements of comp
complainant
Aman Agarwal and the opinion given by the Examiner of Questioned
Documents dated 21.12.2022, learned counsel appearing for the applicant
submits that neither the signature of the applicant on the questioned power of
attorney has been found to be proved
proved by the State Examiner of Questioned
Documents nor, the statement of complainant Aman Agarwal constitute any
evidence of offences against the present applicant. The aforesaid aspects have
been overlooked by the learned trial Court while framing charges against the
applicant and, therefore, the applicant deserves to be discharged by quashing
the order impugned. To buttress these submissions, learned counsel appearing
for the applicant places reliance on Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009)
8 SCC 751and Devendra v. State of U.P., (2009) 7 SCC 495
5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1
/State as well as the counsel appearing for the respondent No.2, by taking this
Court to the statements of complainant Aman Agarwal, his brother Anuj
Agarwal, and sister Mitul Agarwal, submits that in all the statements, it has
come on record that the persons who are said to have executed the power of
attorney in question were not in the country on the relevant date, yet their
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signatures are fraudulently endorsed on the power of attorney in question. By
further referring to the statements of Shivkumar Verma and Shriram Kurmi,
i.e, witnesses to the questioned power of attorney recorded by the
prosecution, learned counsel appearing for the res
respondents
pondents submits that in
their statements, they have specifically stated that at the instance of the
present applicant, they have signed as witnesses on the questioned power of
attorney.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents further draws attention
attent
of this Court to the supplementary opinion of State Examiner of Questioned
Documents dated 20.08.2024 to contend that as per the said opinion, the seal
of the Notary endorsed on the questioned power of attorney has been found to
be that of the co-accused,
ed, i.e., Smt. Deepa Shrivastav. Smt. Deepa Shrivastav,
in her statement, has also stated that at the instance of the present applicant,
she had notarized the questioned power of attorney. Accordingly, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents submit that there exists sufficient
material on record to prima facie indicate the involvement of the applicant in
the offence in question, and therefore, the framing of charges cannot be
questioned in view of the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction of this
Court, as has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of State of
Rajasthan vs. Fatehkaran Mehdu
Mehdu, Criminal Appeal No.217 of 2017,
decided on 03.02.2017. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2
further places reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shri
Sukhbir Singh Badal vs. Balwant Singh Khera and Others,
Others Criminal
Appeal No.1116 of 2023 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 7872 of 2021)
2021),, to contend that
even if, the questioned document is not used, then also, for the act of
preparing the forged documents the charges can very well be framed.
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7. In rejoinder arguments, learned counsel appearing for the applicant
submits that even the statements of witnesses to the power of attorney in
question indicate that the aforesaid witnesses, in their sstatements
tatements before the
police authorities, have expressed their ignorance as regards the document on
which, they had put their signatures as witnesses.
8. No other point has been raised by the leaned counsel appearing for the
parties.
9. Heard the learned counsel
counsel appearing for the parties and perused the
record.
10. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section
397 of Cr.P.C. has been time and again explained by the Apex Court. Further,
the scope of interference under Section 397 Cr.P.
Cr.P.C.
C. at a stage, when charge
had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the
court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation
allegation. Rather, it has to focus
on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion
suspicio that the
accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt.
The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage final test of guilt is to be
applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should
form
rm an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence,
is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with
scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure.
11. Now, reverting to the limit of the scope of jurisdiction under Section
397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine the
records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the
legality and regularity of an
anyy proceedings or order made in a case. The object
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of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law
or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding.
12. It is useful to refer to judgment of the Apex Court in Amit Kapoor
Kapo and
Ramesh Chander and Another, (2012) 9 SCC 460
460,, where scope of Section
397 Cr. P.C. have been succinctly considered and explained. Para 12 and 13
of Amit Kapoor (supra) are as follows:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power
to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for
the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The
object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an
error of jurisdicti
jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded
founded
error and it may not be appropriate for the court to
scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token
of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various ju judgments
dgments of this
Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be
invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly
erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of
law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material
evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes,
but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits."
13. Another well-accepted
well accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction
tion of the higher court is a very limited one and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt
restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or
interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jujurisdiction
risdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed properly
and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be
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reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional
revisional jurisdiction
unless the case substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced
stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
13. The Apex Court in para 27 has recorded its conclusion and laid down
principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397
particularly in context of quashing of charge fr
framed
amed under Section 228 Cr.P.
Cr.
C. Para 27, 27 (1), (2), (3), (9), (13) are extracted as follows:
"27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under
under these
two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the
Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it
will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with
reference to which the courts should exercise such
jurisdiction. Howeve
However,r, it is not only difficult but is
inherently impossible to state with precision such principles.
At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of
this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to
be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction,
particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of
the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court
under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the
more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking
these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings,
particularly, the charge fra
framed
med in terms of Section 228 of
the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the
case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so
patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent
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person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the
basic ingredients of a criminal ooffence
ffence are not satisfied then
the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No
meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for
considering whether the case would end in conviction or not
at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have
to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and
materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient
material on the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the
allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an
offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court
leading to injustice.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rul rule of
continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly
satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit
continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the
records with a view tto
o decide admissibility and reliability of
the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima
facie."
14. When the facts of the case are examined in light of the settled
principles of law as stated hereinabove, the charge sheet filed by the
respondent No.1 against the applicant/accused contains the statement of the
complainant/respondent No.2, which, in no una
unambiguous
mbiguous terms, states that
the applicant herein had prepared a forged power of attorney dated
30.11.2017 in respect of the properties jointly own
owned
ed by the applicant and his
brothers, namely Anuj Agarwal, and sister Mithul Agarwal, who were not
present at Ashoknagar on the said date and the complainant and his brothers
were, in fact, out of India, whereas sister Mithul Agarwal was residing at
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Indore.. The statement of the brother of the complainant, namely Anuj
Agarwal, also specifically states that on 30.11.2017, neither he nor the
complainant nor sister were at Ashoknagar, on 30.11.2017, i.e., the date of
execution of the power of attorney in question,
question, and the said power of attorney
does not contain their signatures. The statement of Mithul Agarwal, i.e., the
sister of the complainant and daughter of the applicant, is also on the same
lines. The witnesses to the power of attorney, namely Shriram Kurmi
Kurm and
Shivkumar Sharma, have also stated that on the date of execution of the
power of attorney, Aman Agarwal, Anuj Agarwal, Amit Agarwal, and Mithul
Agarwal were not at Ashoknagar and at the instance of the applicant, they
have signed as witnesses
witnesse to the power of attorney. The supplementary
opinion given rendered by the State Examiner of Questioned Documents,
Government of M.P., dated 20.05.2024, states that the seal impression of co-
co
accused Notary Deepa Shrivastav on the questioned power of attorney tallies
talli
with the seal recovered from her.
15. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the
applicant that the signatures of the applicant on the questioned power of
attorney are not proved from the material collected during the course of
arguments
uments and therefore, the charges could not have been framed are, in the
considered opinion of this Court, fallacious at this stage. This aspect is to be
considered at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charges.
Though it has been vehemently
vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the
applicant that since there is no evidence collected by the prosecution to
indicate that the questioned document has been used by the applicant, the
charges could not have been framed. Therefore, so
o far as the offence
offe relating
to forgery is concerned, the material collected during the course of
investigation, as discussed hereinabove, prima facie indicates that the power
of attorney dated 30.11.2017 is alleged to have been prepared when the
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purported executants were not present at the place of its execution and their
signatures are stated to have been affixed thereupon. The statements of the
attesting witnesses further indicate that they had signed the document at the
instance of the applicant, and the supplementary opinion of the State
Examiner of Questioned Documents lends support to the prosecution case
insofar as the involvement of the co
co-accused Deepa Shrivastav is concerned.
At this stage, this Court is only required to see whether a prima facie case
exists and not to examine the probative value of the material on record in
detail.. In view whereof, this Court finds that sufficient grounds exist for
framing of charges against the applicant for offences under Sections 467 and
468 read with Section 120-B
120 of IPC.
16. However, ass regards the offence under Section 420 of IPC, this Court
finds that even
ven if the entire material placed on record by the prosecution is
accepted on its face value, there is no material to indicate that the
complainant was deceived and, as a consequence
consequence thereof, was dishonestly
induced to deliver any property or to consent to the retention of any property
so as to result in wrongful loss to the complainant and corresponding
wrongful gain to the applicant
applicant.. The prosecution case, as it stands, only alleges
preparation of a forged power of attorney, but does not disclose any act
whereby the said document was acted upon so as to bring about delivery of
property or alteration of any valuable security.
17. In A.M. Mohan v. State, (2024) 12 SCC 181
181, the Hon'ble
on'ble Apex Court
has held that unless the ingredients of Section 415 are first disclosed, Section
420 cannot be pressed into service. The relevant paras of A.M. Mohan v.
State (supra) are reproduced herein:
"20.
20. This Court in R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam
Seetharam
[R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC
739] has culled out the ingredients to constitute the offence
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under Sections 415 and 420IPC, as under: (SCC pp. 745-
46, paras 15--20)
"15. Section 415 of the Penal Code reads thus:
thus
'415. Cheating.
Cheating.--Whoever,
Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so
deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
consent that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit
to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were
not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat".'
16. The ingredients to constitute
constitute an offence of cheating
are as follows:
follows
16.1. There should be fraudulent or dishonest
inducement of a person by deceiving him:
him
16.1.1. The person so induced should be intentionally
induced to deliver any property to any person or to
consent that any person shall retain any property; or
16.1.2. The person so induced should be intentionally
induced to do or to omit to do anything which he would
not do or omit if he were not so deceived;
deceived and
16.2. In cases covered by 16.1.2. above, the act or
omission should be one which caused or is likely to
cause damage or harm to the person induced in body,
mind, reputation or property
property.
17. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential
ingredient of the offence. A person who dishonestly
induces another person
person to deliver any property is liable
for the offence of cheating.
18. Section 420 of the Penal Code reads thus:
thus
'420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
property.--
--Whoever
Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
induces the person deceived to deliver any property to
any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any
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part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed
or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a
valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either descri
description
ption for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.'
19. The ingredients to constitute an offence under
Section 420 are as follows:
follows
19.1. A person must commit the offence of cheating
under Section 415;
415 and
19.2. The perso
personn cheated must be dishonestly induced to
(a) deliver property to any person;
person or
(b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything
signed or sealed and capable of being converted into
valuable security.
security
20. Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to
constitute an offence under Section 420
420."
xxx-xxx-xxx-xxx-xxx-xxx-xxx-xxx
22. It could thus be seen that for attracting the provision of
Section 420IPC, the FIR/complaint must show that the
ingredients of Section 415IPC are made out and the
person
son cheated must have been dishonestly induced to
deliver the property to any person; or to make, alter or
destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and
capable of being converted into valuable security
security.. In other
words, for attracting the provisions
provisions of Section 420IPC, it
must be shown that the FIR/complaint discloses:
(i) the deception of any person;
(ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to
deliver any property to any person; and
(iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making
the inducement.
inducement."
[Emphasis Supplied]
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18. When tested on the anvil of law laid down hereinabove, in the given
facts and circumstances, even if the material placed on record by the
prosecution is taken on its face value, the ingredients of Section 415 of IPC
are prima facie not met out. Rather, the case of the complainant is that their
signatures were "forged
forged" on the document, as they had never executed or
signed the same. Such an allegation, even if taken at its face value, does not
fulfil the essential ingredients of "cheating" as defined under Se
Section 415
IPC.
19. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar,
(2009) 8 SCC 751has
has held that in order to constitute an offence of
cheatingthere must be deception coupled with fraudulent or dishonest
inducement leading to delivery of pr
property
operty or alteration of a valuable
security.. The Apex Court has further held that where the allegations do not
disclose that the complainant was induced to part with any property on
account of such deception, the essential ingredients of the offence under
Section 420 IPC would not be satisfied. The relevant paras of the Mohd.
Ibrahim (supra) are reproduced herein as follows:
"18.
18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an
offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients
of the offence of "c
"cheating" are as follows:
(i) deception of a person either by making a false or
misleading representation or by dishonest concealment
or by any other act or omission
omission;
(ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person
to either deliver any property or to consent to the
retention thereof by any person or to intentionally
induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit if he were not
so deceived
deceived; and
(iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause
damage or harm to that person in body, mind,
reputation or property
property.
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14 Criminal Revision No.3252 of 2025
19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there
should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such
cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the
person deceived
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable
security (or anything signed or sealed and which is
capable of being converted into a valuable security).
security)
21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the
accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or
misleading representation or by any other action or
omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any
fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property
or to consent to the rete
retention
ntion thereof by any person or to
intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived.
Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant
pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale sa
deeds.. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by
the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second
accused or the second accused by reason of being the
purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason
of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to
the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner.
22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415
are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence
punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the
Code."
[Emphasis Supplied]
20. Upon examining the facts of case in hand and in view of the law laid
down in A.M. Mohan (supra) and Mohd. Ibrahim (supra), in the absence of
the essential ingredient of "cheating" as defined under Section 415 IPC, and
further in the absence of any material indicating inducement leading to
delivery of property,, both of which are sine qua non for constituting an
offence under Section 420 of IPC, the said charge cannot be said to be made
out even prima facie against the applicant.
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15 Criminal Revision No.3252 of 2025
21. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the given facts and
circumstances of the present case
case,, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the learned trial Court has erred in framing the charge against the applicant
under Section
ection 420 of IPC, whereas the charges framed under Sections 467,
468 read with Section 120-B
120 B of IPC are based on sufficient prima facie
material and do not warrant any interference.
22. Accordingly, the present criminal revision is partly allowed. The
impugned
ugned order dated 04.06.2025 is hereby modified to the extent that the
charge framed against the applicant under Section 420 of IPC is quashed. The
charges framed against the applicant under Sections 467, 468 read with
Section 120-B
B of IPC are hereby affir
affirmed.
med. The learned trial Court shall
proceed with the trial in accordance with law.
23. It is made clear that any observation made hereinabove is only for the
purpose of deciding the present revision and shall not be construed as an
expression on the merits of the case during trial.
(AMIT SETH)
JUDGE
AK/-
