[Cites 12, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Lalit Jhariya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 April, 2026
1 MCRC-14625-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
ON THE 2 nd OF APRIL, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 14625 of 2026
LALIT JHARIYA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ashish Tiwari - Advocate for the applicant.
Shri A.S. Baghel - Government Advocate for the respondent/State.
Shri K.K. Gautam - Advocate for the respondent No.2/objector.
ORDER
This is the first application filed on behalf of the applicant under
Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) for
grant of anticipatory bail. The applicant is apprehending his arrest in relation
to Crime No.183/2026 registered at Police Station - Ranjhi, District Jabalpur
(M.P.) for the offence punishable under Sections 69 of B.N.S, 2023.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is
innocent and has been falsely implicated in the said offence. He further
submits that the applicant is 35 years old and victim/complainant is aged 33
years and both are major. As per the case of the prosecution, the applicant
and victim both are in relationship since 2015 and at the first time of incident
they both were unmarried and recently the applicant is going to perform
marriage. It is further submitted that considering the long relationship of
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more than 10 years as per the FIR and considering the fact that at various
time they entered into physical relationship at various places with consent of
each other. He will be available and cooperate in the process of
investigation. There is no need of custodial interrogation of present
applicant. The conclusion of trial will take considerable time. In these
circumstances, applicant may be granted anticipatory bail.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the objector as well as
counsel for the State have opposed the bail application and prays for its
rejection.
4. Heard the submissions made at the bar and perused the case diary
and also considered sections 69 of BNS, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 69- Sexual intercourse by employing
deceitful means etc.
Whoever, by deceitful means or by making
promise to marry a woman without any
intention of fulfilling the same, and has
sexual intercourse with her, such sexual
intercourse not amounting to the offence of
rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may
extend to ten years and shall also be liable to
fine.
5. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also
considering that the present applicant is aged 35 years and
victim/complainant is 33 is years and they both are major and the
relationship continued for more than 10 years. It is now submitted that the
same was maintained under the false pretext of marriage and by misuse of
the complainant's nude photograph. Both are adults and they are in
relationship for about 10 years and visited various places and have entered
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into physical relationship.
6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Samadhan Vs. State if
Maharashtra in Cr.A. No.5001/2025, in para 34 to 40 has held as under:
34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific
allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or
compelled respondent No.2 to accompany him to the
hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting
deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to
procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical
inference that emerges is that respondent No.2, of her
own volition, visited and met the appellant on each
occasion. It is also borne out from the record that
whenever the appellant brought up the subject of
marriage, respondent No.2 herself opposed the proposal.
In such circumstances, the contention of respondent
No.2 that the physical relationship between the parties
was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the
appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.
35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of
this Court in Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a
woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual
relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and
without any cogent evidence to show that such
relationship was induced by misconception of fact or
false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the
inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under
Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the
judgment is extracted as under:
"33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006
onwards, the complainant and the appellant were
residing in different towns. The complainant is an
educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever
upon her which could have prevented her from filing a
police complaint against the accused if she felt that the
sexual relations were under duress or were being
established under a false assurance of marriage. On
many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the
wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation
that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right
from the inception of the relationship.
4 MCRC-14625-2026
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was
mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the
appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are
convinced that the relationship between the complainant
and the appellant was consensual without the existence
of any element of deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at
One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it
abundantly clear that she was in a consensual
relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged
in the complaint that when she had proposed that they
should marry and live together, the appellant physically
abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of
truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been
registered immediately after this incident.
However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of
the complainant that the appellant was getting married
to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage,
she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre
wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as
the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be
stopped.
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for
the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to
maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised
that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse
on account of her love and passion for the accused."
(underlining by us)
36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High
Court observed that although it was contended on behalf
of the appellant that the relationship between him and
respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such
categorical statement was made by him in the memo of
application and that the plea of consent was merely
inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High
Court on the case of Ganga Singh vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278, wherein this Court had
stated that unless there was a specific defence of a
consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be
inferred.
37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails
to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question
itself reveals that the relationship between the parties
was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No.2
5 MCRC-14625-2026
met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to
meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major
and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with
the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her
own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the
relevant time, the marriage of respondent No.2 was
subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even
upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is
manifest that the relationship between the parties was
consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express
statement to that effect in the memo of application, as
emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held
against the appellant when the same can be otherwise
clearly discerned.
38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of
this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following
observations were made:
"29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false
promise to amount to misconception of fact within the
meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made
from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the
woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship.
Therefore, if it is established that such consent was
given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is
vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may
refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3
SCC (Cri) 660] , in which it was held as follows: (SCC
pp. 682-84, paras 21 &
24) "21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or
misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this,
the court must very carefully examine whether the
accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had
mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this
effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within
the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling
a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
6 MCRC-14625-2026
involved was given after wholly understanding the
nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There
may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion
for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where
an accused on account of circumstances which he could
not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her, despite having every intention
to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An
accused can be convicted for rape only if the court
reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused
was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
xxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the
initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances.
The 'failure to keep a promise made with respect to a
future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact",
the fact must have an immediate relevance'. Section 90
IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to
pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal
liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the
fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never
really intended to marry her." (underlining by us)
39. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335, this Court formulated the parameters in terms
of which the powers under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the
BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not necessary to
revisit all these parameters, a few that are relevant to the
present case may be set out. The Court held that
quashing may be appropriate:
"102. xxx (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
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case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
xxx"
40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to
concur with the findings recorded by the High Court,
inasmuch as the present case pertains to a consensual
relationship, and the acts of respondent No.2 clearly
manifest consent to such a relationship devoid of any
coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as contemplated in
Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In our
opinion, the High Court's refusal to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS is
unsustainable. The acts complained of in the present
case occurred within the contours of a relationship that
was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The
continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be
nothing short of an abuse of the court machinery.
7. Considering the judgment and facts of the present case and keeping
in view the conduct of the parties as well as status and age of the
parties, without commenting anything on the merits of the case, the
anticipatory bail application filed by the applicant is allowed. It is directed
that if the applicant is arrested by the police then he shall be released on bail
on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rs. Fifty
Thousand only) with one solvent surety of the like amount to the satisfaction
of the Investigating Officer/Arresting Authority.
8. Applicant shall abide by the following conditions under Section 480
(2) of Cr.P.C:-
(a) Applicant shall make himself available for interrogation by a
Police Officer as and when required;
8 MCRC-14625-2026
(b) He shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or
promise to complainant or witnesses;
(c) He shall not leave India without the previous permission of the
Court;
(d) He shall not commit similar offence, of which, he is accused or
suspected.
9. However, it is being made clear that in case of bail jump and in
violation of any of conditions imposed herein above, this order shall become
ineffective and Investigation Officer/Trial Court shall be at liberty to proceed
against the applicant as per law.
Certified copy as per rules.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT)
JUDGE
b
