Madhya Pradesh High Court
Janki Prasad Jadia vs Ajay Kumar on 8 January, 2025
Author: Dwarka Dhish Bansal
Bench: Dwarka Dhish Bansal
1 S.A. No. 1238/1998
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DWARKA DHISH BANSAL
ON THE 08th OF JANUARY, 2025
SECOND APPEAL No.1238 of 1998
JANAKI PRASAD JADIA
Versus
AJAY KUMAR
...................................................................................................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Ajay Pal Singh, Advocate for appellant.
None for the respondent though served and represented.
..............................................................................................................................................................
JUDGMENT
This second appeal has been preferred by the
appellant/defendant/tenant challenging the judgment and decree dtd.
28.11.1998 passed by District Judge, Panna in Civil Appeal No. 5-A/97
affirming the judgment and decree dtd. 23.12.1996 passed by Civil Judge
Class-I, Panna in Civil Suit No. 39-A/93, whereby Courts below have
decreed respondent/plaintiff's suit for eviction on the ground available under
Section 12(1)(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short
"the Act").
2. Facts in short are that the plaintiff instituted a suit for eviction with
the allegations that the defendant is tenant of the plaintiff in the house no. 22
on monthly rent of Rs.40/-. It is alleged that the house in question was
owned by Radha Mohan Jadia, which was purchased by plaintiff on
25.08.1988 for consideration of Rs.20,000/-. It is alleged that defendant was
inducted as tenant on 01.05.1987 by Radha Mohan Jadia and a rent
agreement was also executed. It is alleged that after purchase of house, the
appellant/defendant has become tenant of plaintiff and the plaintiff being in
need of the house for residence purpose, he by issuing registered notice dtd.
22.09.1988, requested the defendant to vacate the house, but he did not
vacate the same. On inter alia allegations, the suit was filed.
3. By filing written statement, the defendant denied plaint averments
and contended that the plaintiff is not owner of the house in question but it
belongs to Mst. Kashi Bai. It is also contended that defendant is not tenant
of plaintiff but he is tenant of Mst. Kashi Bai and there is no relationship of
landlord and tenant in between the plaintiff and defendant. It is also
contended that the defendant did not take the house on rent on 01.05.1987
from Radha Mohan Jadia. On inter alia contentions the suit was prayed to be
dismissed.
4. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed issues and
recorded evidence of the parties and upon due consideration of the same and
on the basis of findings recorded in the judgment and decree dtd. 04.02.1994
(Ex.P/4) held that house in question was owned by Radha Mohan Jadia and
not by Mst. Kashi Bai. It is also held that that the defendant is tenant of
plaintiff. With these findings and holding the need of the plaintiff to be
genuine, trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dtd.
23.12.1996. Upon filing civil appeal by the defendant/appellant, the
judgment and decree of trial Court was affirmed by first appellate Court
vide judgment and decree dtd. 28.11.1998. Against which, instant second
appeal was preferred.
5. Second appeal came in hearing on 05.10.2004 and was admitted for
final hearing on the following substantial questions of law:-
"1. Whether in absence of pleading essential facts making out a
ground envisaged under Section 12(1)(e) of M.P. Accommodation
Control Act, 1961, two Courts below erred in substantial error of law
in decreeing the suit of plaintiff ?
2. Whether in absence of pleading in regard to essential ingredients
for making out a ground under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act, whether
learned courts below erred in substantial error of law in decreeing
the suit of plaintiff under Section 12(1)(a) of M.P. Accommodation
Control Act, 1961?"
6. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submits that the suit in
question was filed in respect of the house no. 22 and appellant/defendant is
in possession of house no. 25. He submits that house no. 22 is already in
possession of the plaintiff and the appellant has unnecessarily been dragged
into false and frivolous allegations. With these submissions, he prays for
allowing the second appeal.
7. Heard learned counsel for the appellant/defendant and perused the
record.
8. From perusal of judgment and decree passed by Courts below, it is
clear that although the suit has been decreed in respect of arrears of rent, but
no decree of eviction on the ground under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act has
been passed, therefore, in my considered opinion, substantial question of
law no. 2 does not arise in the instant second appeal.
Substantial question of law No.1.
9. Courts below have concurrently held that the plaintiff is owner of the
house no. 22 and holding the relationship of landlord and tenant in between
the plaintiff and defendant, held the plaintiff to be in bonafide requirement
of the house in question.
10. In the case of Kishore Singh vs. Satish Kumar Singhvi, 2017(3) JLJ
375, a coordinate Bench of this Court has relied upon the decision of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm Prem
Machinary and Company, AIR 2000 SC 534, and held that the findings
recorded on the question of bonafide requirement do not give rise to any
substantial question of law.
11. In view of the aforesaid and further in view of the arguments
advanced on behalf of the appellant, substantial question of law no. 1 is
decided against the appellant/defendant and in favour of the
respondent/plaintiff.
12. So far as the argument raised on behalf of the appellant regarding
identity of the house is concerned, this question was not raised by the
appellant/defendant in the written statement and even in the memo of second
appeal no substantial question of law has been proposed, therefore, in my
considered opinion at the second appellate stage, the question of identity
being raised by learned counsel for the appellant, cannot be permitted to be
raised and considered.
13. Resultantly, declining interference in the judgment and decree passed
by Courts below, instant second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
14. Miscellaneous application(s), pending if any, shall stand closed.
(DWARKA DHISH BANSAL)
JUDGE
KPS
Date: 2025.01.09 11:56:57 +05'30'
