Jharkhand High Court
St. Joseph‟S College vs Jharkhand State Information ... on 25 September, 2025
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Review No. 126 of 2025
[Filing No. Civil Review 7408 of 2025]
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St. Joseph‟s College, situated at Torpa, P.O. and P.S.
Torpa, District Khunti, through its Principal namely,
Gabriel Surin, aged about 57 years, son of Juel Surin,
resident of Village Paro Tongri, P.O. Banki, P.S. Bano,
District Simdega (Jharkhand), PIN 835201.
... ...Petitioner/Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
1.Jharkhand State Information Commission, through
Chief Information Commissioner, National Informatics
Centre, Jharkhand State Centre, 2nd Floor, Engineering
Hostel-2, Dhurwa, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi,
PIN 834004 (Jharkhand).
2.Prof. Akshay Kumar Rai, Father‟s name not known to
Petitioner, resident of Village Shantinagar, P.O. and P.S.
Torpa, District Khunti, PIN 835227 (Jharkhand).
3.The State of Jharkhand
... Respondents/Respondents/ Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate
Mr. Ritesh Kumar Gupta, Advocate
Mr. Prakhat Harit, Advocate
For the Resp.-State : Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG-IA
Mr. Yogesh Modi, AC to AAG-IA
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CAV on 19/09/2025 Pronounced on 25/09/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J:
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Prayer
1. The instant review petition has been filed on behalf of
petitioner, who was appellant in LPA No. 358 of 2024,
seeking review of order dated 20th June, 2025 passed in
L.P.A. No. 358 of 2024, whereby and whereunder Letters
Patent Appeal preferred by the petitioner/appellant has
been dismissed.
Factual Matrix:
2. Before proceeding to examine the availability of ground
seeking review, the facts of the case, as per the pleading
made in the writ petition, needs to refer herein, which
reads as under:
3. The review petitioner-college is a society registered under
the Societies Registration Act, 1860.
4. The respondent no.2, professor, ex-employee of the review
petitioner-college, sought certain information vide his
application dated 14.09.2015 under the Right to
Information Act, 2005 seeking information regarding the
appellant-college.
5. The information as sought for by Respondent No. 2 under
the RTI Act, 2005, as mention in the impugned order
under review, reads as under:
(a) Copy of the Audit Report for the periods
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2011-12 to 2014-15;
(b) Copy of the Utility Certificate for the
periods 2011-12 to 2014-15;
(c) Proceedings of the Minutes of the
Governing Body of St. Joseph‟s College for the
periods 2011-12 to 2014-15;
(d) The concerned Rules which have been
relied upon by the St. Joseph‟s College, Khunti for
not making payment of the grant-in-aid received
from the State Government to the teachers
working under the said Government for the
periods 2012-13 to 2014-15.
6. But the aforesaid required information was not provided,
by the college-review petitioner. Thereafter, the
Respondent No. 2 approached the Chief Information
Commissioner stating inter alia that the information
required by him, with regard to the appellant-college, has
not been provided to him and thus filed Second Appeal
before the Jharkhand State Information Commission on
01.02.2016 which was registered as Appeal Case No. 334
of 2016.
7. The appellant-college, the review petitioner herein, was in
receipt of a letter issued by the office of the Respondent
No. 1, Jharkhand State Information Commission, wherein
notice of hearing of appeal case was issued to the
appellant-review petitioner.
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8. In reply to the above notice, the review petitioner inter alia
stated that the review petitioner is neither a Public
Authority as defined under Section 2(h) of the Right to
Information Act, 2005 nor the information sought for by
Respondent No. 2 is required to be furnished to him in
view of the Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005.
9. In continuation of the reply given to the Respondent No. 2,
the appellant, the review petitioner herein reiterated its
stand that the appellant, the review petitioner herein is
not a Public Authority as defined under Section 2(h) of the
Right to Information Act, 2005 and the information sought
for by the Respondent No. 2 from the appellant- review
petitioner falls under the category of Exempted
Information as provided under Section 8 of the Right to
Information Act, 2005 and hence the appellant- college
was not liable to furnish information to the Respondent
No. 2.
10. The respondent no.1 Jharkhand State Information
Commission vide order dated 30.09.2016 passed in Appeal
Case No. 334 of 2016, issued vide Memo No. 23354 dated
07.10.2016, while giving due consideration to the
provisions of RTI Act 2005 has held that since the college
receives aid from the Government of Jharkhand, the writ
petitioner/appellant/review petitioner- college is obligated
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to furnish the information asked from it under the Right to
Information Act, 2005.
11. Aggrieved by the order dated 30.09.2016 passed in Appeal
Case No. 334 of 2016, the writ petitioner-college [the
review petitioner herein] preferred writ petition W.P.(C) No.
6689 of 2016.
12. Before the learned writ Court the ground has been taken
by the petitioner-college that the college has been
established under the aegis and control of Khunti Catholic
Diocese which is a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and is not a Public Authority as
defined under Right to Information Act, 2005 and hence
the appellant [the review petitioner herein] does not fall
under the purview of RTI Act, 2005 and is not obligated
under the law to provide information which has been
sought for by the Respondent No. 2.
13. Further ground has been taken that the appellant college
is neither controlled nor substantially financed by the
funds provided by the appropriate Government and is
thus not a Public Authority in terms of Section 2(h) of the
RTI Act, 2005. The appellant college receives grant in aid
from the State Government for payment of salary to its
employees, but it is only a scanty fraction of the amount
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which is spent by the college by giving salaries to the
teachers and meeting other expenses of the College.
14. It has been submitted that the appellant is a Minority
Institution duly recognized by the National Commission
for Minority Educational Institution, Government of
Jharkhand and Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution of
India recognizes the Right of the Minority to protect its
right and interest and to establish and administer its
educational institutions. The above Fundamental Right of
the appellant college has been sought to be infringed and
violated by the Respondent No. 2, by seeking information
from the appellant college which pertains to day-to-day
affairs of the appellant college/educational institution.
15. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent has
submitted before the writ Court that the writ petitioner
college in question falls within Section 2 (h) (i) of Right to
Information Act; hence, it is liable to furnish information
sought by the respondent no.2 and further the counsel for
the respondent has drawn the attention of the writ court
about grant in aid as received by the petitioner college
under Jharkhand State Unaided Educational Institution
(Grant) Rule, 2004.
16. After hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge
dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 02.05.2024 on
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the ground that since the college is substantially financed
both directly and indirectly by the fund provided by the
appropriate government; hence, the writ petitioner college
can be termed as a public authority within the meaning of
Section 2 (h) (i)of Right to Information Act, 2005.
17. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 02.05.2024
the intra-court appeal was preferred by the writ petitioner
college, which was also dismissed vide order dated 20th
June, 2025, giving the finding that the learned Single
Judge has taken into consideration the implication of
Section 2(h) as also the receiving of grant in aid by the
State Government under the provision of 2(h)(d)(i) and
therefore has come to the conclusion of applicability of the
judgment rendered in the case of D.A.V. College Trust
and Management Society and Others v. Director of
Public Instructions and others (supra) will be
applicable. Further it has been held that since the writ
petitioner college is substantially financed both directly
and indirectly by the fund provided by the appropriate
government; hence, the writ petitioner college can be
termed as a public authority within the meaning of
Section 2 (h) (i)of Right to Information Act, 2005.
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18. The present review thereafter has been filed seeking review
of order dated 20th June, 2025 passed in LPA No. 358 of
2024.
Submission on behalf of review petitioner:
19. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has taken the
following grounds seeking review of the order passed by
the intra-court appeal court.
20. Submission has been made that the learned appellate
court has failed to take into consideration that although
Petitioner-college in Sessions 2009-10 to 2015-16,
received amount towards grant-in-aid, but expenditure
made by the College for the said years was much more
than the amount received as Grant-in-Aid.
21. Further the learned counsel has submitted that the
appellate court did not appreciate the ratio laid down in
particular Para-48 of the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of 'Thalappalam Service Cooperative
Bank Limited and ors vs. State of Kerala and Ors.,
reported in (2013) 16 SCC 82 and without appreciating
the law laid down in the said case has dismissed the intra-
court appeal.
22. It has been submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of "Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank
Limited and ors vs. State of Kerala and Ors. (supra),
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has clearly held that burden to prove that authority is a
'Public Authority' is upon the information seeker and not
the Body from whom information has been sought but
without appreciating the law laid down by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, the intra-court appeal has been
dismissed, which requires interference by way of review of
the order impugned passed in intra-court appeal.
23. It has further been submitted that as a matter of fact the
Petitioner-college, from Academic Session 2016-17, has
not been paid any grant by the State Government, this fact
was brought to the notice of this Court by filing additional
Affidavit, but that was not appreciated.
24. Further submission has been made that 'The Jharkhand
State Unaided Education Institutions (Grant) Act. 2004',
provides for payment of grant-in-aid by the State
Government on or the other Institutions and provisions of
aforesaid Act, 2004 itself would demonstrate that grant-in-
aid is a continuous process and it is to be granted on year
to year basis depending upon the eligibility of the
Institution but this fact was not appreciated.
25. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has further
submitted that the information sought for by Respondent
No.2 pertains to internal books of account including audit
report of the Petitioner-college, which is an exempted
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information in terms of Section 8 of the Right to
Information Act, 2005.
26. Learned counsel for the review petitioner, on the aforesaid
ground, has submitted that it is a fit case where the
judgment passed by the LPA Court requires to be reviewed
both on the ground of facts and the legal position, as
argued above.
Submission on behalf of respondents-State
27. While on the other hand, learned counsel for the
respondents has submitted that it is well settled principle
of law that the scope of an application for review is much
more restricted than that of an appeal and further review
proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and
ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC. Submission has been
made that the review petitioner has not been able to
demonstrate that the order passed by the intra court
appeal is fit to be reviewed and grounds which has been
raised in reviewing the order impugned has already been
raised by the appellant, which has elaborately dealt with
by the intra-court appeal court, as such, the instant
petition is fit to dismissed.
Analysis
28. This Court, before appreciation of the arguments
advanced on behalf of the parties with respect to the issue
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as to whether the power of review can be exercised in the
factual background of the present case, needs to refer
herein the underlying principle to invoke the power or
review.
29. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Moran Mar Basse
lios Catholicos and Anr. vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasius and Ors., [AIR 1954 SC 526], particularly at
paragraph-32, has observed as under:
"32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to
bear in mind the scope of the application for review which
has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to
emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much
more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions
in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in
terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction
circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language
used therein. It may allow a review on three specified,
grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not
within the applicant‟s knowledge or could not be produced by
him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other
sufficient reason."
30. Likewise, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Col.
Avatar Singh Sekhon Vrs. Union of India (1980) Supp.
SCC 562, has observed that review of an earlier order
cannot be done unless the Court is satisfied that the
material error which is manifested on the face of the order,
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would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its
soundness. The observations made are as under:
"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear
Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has
been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our
earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on
the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh
Habib 1975 1 SCC 674 this Court observed: „A review of a
judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper
only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave
error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ..... The present
stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order
which has the normal feature of finality."
31. Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh
Verma v. Mayawati, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 has
observed that review proceedings have to be strictly
confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1,
CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review
application has already been dealt with and answered,
parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned
judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The
principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly
summarized as under:
"20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge
of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
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(iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other
sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki,
and approved by this Court in Moran Mar BasseliosCatholicos
v. Most Rev. Mar PouloseAthanasiusto mean "a reason
sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in
the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of
India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.,.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:--
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to
reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original
hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or
results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for
patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be
a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be
an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the
domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be
advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at
the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."
32. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power
of review is to be exercised if there is any error occurred
on the face of the order or the factual aspect could not
have been brought to the notice of this Court in spite of
the due diligence having been taken in the matter of
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making available the factual aspect of the relevant
documents.
33. The position of law is well settled, as would appear from
the reference of the judgment made hereinabove that the
review of the judgment can only be made if the new fact
has come which could not have been brought to the notice
of the Court in spite of due diligence, as has been held by
the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose (supra).
34. It is evident that while power of review may be inherent in
the High Court to review its own order passed in a writ
petition, the same has to be exercised on well-recognised
and established grounds on which judicial orders are
reviewed. For example, the power may be exercised on the
discovery of some new and important matter or evidence
which was not within the knowledge of the parties seeking
review despite due exercise of diligence when the order
was made.
35. Review can also be sought when the order discloses some
error apparent on the face of record or on grounds
analogous thereto. These are all grounds which find
mention in various judicial pronouncements right from the
earliest time as well as in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil
Procedure Code as permissible grounds of review.
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36. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very
connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from
the record of the case and does not require detailed
examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or
the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and
detection thereof requires long debate and process of
reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on
the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1
CPC.
37. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent
on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident
and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its power of review
under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction
under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an
erroneous decision to be „reheard and corrected‟. There is
a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an
error apparent on the face of the record. While the first
can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can
be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review
petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be
„an appeal in disguise‟.
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38. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar
Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) &Anr., reported in
(2024) 2 SCC 362, the Hon‟ble Apex Court while
interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C.
the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review,
as has been held at paragraph16.1 to 16.7 which reads as
under:-
"16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a
mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and
departure from that principle is justified only when
circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make
it necessary to do so.
16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected
by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error
apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise
its power of review.
16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1
CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be
"reheard and corrected".
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be
allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be
permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have
already been addressed and decided.
16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error
which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should
not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points
where there may conceivably be two opinions.--"
39. This Court is now proceeding to examine the factual
aspect as to whether the factual aspect as available in the
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present case and the ground which has been agitated is
available to exercise the power of review or not.
40. The main ground has been taken by Mr. Sumeet Gadodia,
learned counsel for the petitioner that the intra-court
appeal court did not take into consideration the law laid
down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
'Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited and
ors vs. State of Kerala and Ors (supra) wherein it has
clearly been held that burden to prove that authority is a
'Public Authority' is upon the information seeker and not
the Body, from whom information has been sought for,
but without appreciating the law laid down by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has dismissed the intra-court appeal
which requires interference by way of review of the order
impugned passed in intra-court appeal.
41. It has been submitted that though the said judgment has
been considered but in since in the said judgment it has
been held that the financial aid, which can be a ground for
consideration to bring an establishment/institution under
the fold of RTI, 2005 is required to be assessed on the
basis of fact that the extent of the financial aid to have
bearing upon the survival of the said institution.
42. So far aforesaid ground is concerned, this Court after
going through the judgment sought to be reviewed has
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found that the clear-cut finding has been given that the
judgment rendered in the case of Thalappalam Service
Cooperative Bank Limited and ors vs. State of Kerala
and Ors. (supra) is not applicable on facts. However, it
has been held that even in the said judgment it has been
laid down that the applicability of Section 2(h) will depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each and every case
to be assessed independently with the facts involved
therein. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the
judgment is quoted as under:
"42.The judgment rendered in the case of Thalappalam
Service Cooperative Bank Limited and others V. State of
Kerala and others (supra) although is not applicable, but
even in the said judgment, it has been laid down by the
Hon‟ble Apex Court that the applicability of Section 2(h)
will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
and every case to be assessed independently with the
facts involved therein. It has also been observed in the
said judgment that in a case if the materials to show that
they are owned, controlled or substantially financed by
the appropriate Government, then Section 2(h) of the RTI
Act 2005, will be applicable.
43.Further, the consideration which is to be given by the
Court that the financial aid is substantial or not. If the
financial aid by the State is substantial, then certainly
Section 2(h) of the Act, 2005 will be applicable.
44.Substantial financed has also been interpreted by the
Hon‟ble Apex court in the case of Thalappalam Service
Cooperative Bank Limited and others V. State of Kerala
and others (supra). For ready reference, the relevant para
of the said judgment is being referred herein which reads
as under:
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Substantially financed
46. The words "substantially financed" have been used
in Sections 2(h)(d)(i) and (ii), while defining the expression
public authority as well as in Section 2(a) of the Act,
while defining the expression "appropriate Government".
A body can be substantially financed, directly or
indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate
Government. The expression "substantially financed", as
such, has not been defined under the Act. "Substantial"
means "in a substantial manner so as to be substantial".
In Palser v. Grinling [1948 AC 291 : (1948) 1 All ER 1
(HL)] , while interpreting the provisions of Section 10(1) of
the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1923,
the House of Lords held that "substantial" is not the
same as "not unsubstantial" i.e. just enough to avoid
the de minimis principle. The word "substantial"
literally means solid, massive, etc. The legislature has
used the expression "substantially financed" in Sections
2(h)(d)(i) and (ii) indicating that the degree of financing
must be actual, existing, positive and real to a
substantial extent, not moderate, ordinary, tolerable, etc.
45.The issue of substantial financial aid whether
available or not is evident from the admitted fact as has
been reproduced by way of tabular chart as available in
Para 19 hereinabove that the State is aiding under the
Jharkhand State Unaided Educational Institution (Grant)
Rules 2004, the amount to the tune of Rs. 3,15,000 in the
year 2009-10, Rs. 7,77,778 in the year 2010-11, Rs.
10,80,000 in the 2011-12, Rs. 10,80,000 in the 2012-13,
Rs. 14,40,000 in the year 2013-14, Rs. 14,40,000 in the
year 2014-15 which has been enhanced later to Rs.
40,00,000 in the financial year 2015-16.
46.This Court, therefore is of the view that the aforesaid
financial aid is substantial and hence applying the ratio
in the case of Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank
Limited and others V. State of Kerala and others (supra)
or the D.A.V. College Trust and Management Society and
Others v. Director of Public Instructions and others
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(supra), the college in question will come under the fold of
Section 2(h) of the Act 2005.
47.The issue accordingly is being answered."
43. The question of consideration of quantum of the financial
aid said to be substantial or not has also been taken as
the ground to review the order by relying upon the said
judgment but the said judgment has been held to be not
applicable on the facts and circumstances of the case
rather in the intra court appeal court has held that
judgment rendered in the case of D.A.V. College Trust
and Management Society and Others v. Director of
Public Instructions and others will be applicable.
44. The said ground cannot be said to be a ground to review
the order since thoughtful consideration has been given in
following paragraphs of the judgment sought to be
reviewed. For ready reference the same is referred herein:
"48.This Court, after having answered the issue, has
gone through the order passed by the learned Single
Judge, has found therefrom that the learned Single
Judge has taken into consideration the implication of
Section 2(h) as also the receiving of grant in aid by the
State Government under the provision of 2(h)(d)(i) and
therefore has came to the conclusion of applicability of
the judgment rendered in the case of D.A.V. College
Trust and Management Society and Others v.
Director of Public Instructions and others (supra)
holding further that since the writ petitioner college
(appellant herein) is substantially financed both directly
and indirectly by the fund provided by the appropriate
government; hence, the writ petitioner college can be
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termed as a public authority within the meaning of
Section 2 (h) (i)of Right to Information Act, 2005.
49.This Court based upon the discussion made
hereinabove, is of the view that the judgment passed by
the learned Single Judge, therefore, suffers from no error
as requires no interference.
45. We have considered the grounds, as referred hereinabove
and are of the view that such ground cannot be said to be
fit to review the order since whatever ground is being
referred for the purpose of seeking review of the order that
has already been taken care of by the appellate court in
the intra-court appeal while deciding the LPA No. 358 of
2024.
46. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has tried to
impress upon this Court by advancing her argument by
raising the ground showing infirmities in the finding.
Showing infirmity in the finding cannot be a ground for
review rather the same may be a ground to prefer an
appeal before the higher forum.
47. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid facts,
discussions and judicial pronouncements, has considered
the grounds seeking review of this Court on the touch
stone of the proposition laid down for the purpose of
exercising the power of judicial review, as per the
judgment rendered by Hon‟ble Apex Court, as referred
hereinabove and the paramount consideration to exercise
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such power as has recently been dealt with by Hon‟ble
Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs.
State Tax Officer (1) &Anr (supra) and found that none
of the parameters is available for review of the order
passed by the LPA Court.
48. This Court, in view thereof, is of the view that it is not a fit
case where power of judicial review is required to be
exercised.
49. Accordingly, the present review application stands
dismissed.
50. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed
of.
I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.)
25th,Sept. 2025
Alankar/- A.F.R.
