Cr. Rev. No. 1354 of 2022
Ram Kumar Singh, aged about 63 years son of late Rajendra Prasad Singh
resident of Flat No.6A, Solitaire Apartment, Opposite D.A.V. Nandraj,
Bariatu, PO and PS Bariatu, District-Ranchi .... Petitioner(s)
Union of India, through C.B.I. ...... ..... .... Opp. Party
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
For the Petitioner(s) :- Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
For the C.B.I. :- Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharati, Advocate
12/21.11.2025 Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner and Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharati, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent C.B.I.
2. At the outset, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioner submits that so far as the order taking cognizance dated
16.11.2013 as contained in Annexure-6 is concerned, the same is not being
pressed by the petitioner as the order rejecting the discharge petition is also
3. This criminal revision petition has been filed for quashing the order dated
20.08.2022 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI whereby the petition filed
by the petitioner for discharge has been rejected in connection with RC
03(A)/2011-R for the alleged offence under sections 120B, 420, 468 and 471 of
the IPC, sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
Section 52 of Jharkhand Regional Development Authority (JRDA) Act, 2001 and
Section 82 of Registration Act, pending in the court of learned Additional
Judicial Commissioner-XVIII- cum-Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi.
4. The order framing charge dated 17.12.2022 in connection with the said
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the
registered the R.C.03(A)/2011-R for the alleged offence as aforesaid. He further
sections. He then submits that the petitioner being Assistant Engineer of Water
sheet. One M/s Ashlesha Corporation and Mr. Binay Prakash have challenged
Annexure-4. He then submits that so far as the present case is concerned, it
relates to charge sheet no.1/2013 in connection with R.C.03(A)/2011-R. He
Hospital and Research Centre (P) Ltd. the illegality is done in sanctioning of the
map. He submits that in this background the discharge petition has been filed
discharge petition which is not in accordance with law. He draws the attention
space. He further submits that the Master Plan is not on the record and in view
frame the charge. He next argued that in absence of any valid sanction order,
the learned court has taken cognizance. He then draws the attention of the
submits that in view of this letter, the sanction sought was refused and in spite
of that, the learned court has taken cognizance. He submits that in light of
there by order no.143 dated 10.10.2011. He then submits that in view of that,
there is no sanction order. On this ground, he submits that the learned court
has wrongly dismissed the discharge petition filed by the petitioner and has also
order. On these grounds, he submits that the petitioner may kindly be
discharged. He relied in the case of A. Sivaprakash v. State of Kerala
reported in (2016) 12 SCC 273 and refers to paragraph no. 18 of the said
(1) The public servant has abused his position.
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(2) By abusing that position, he has obtained for himself or for
any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage."
6. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that it is not a case that the
petitioner has abused his position and has obtained some gain due to the said
order and in view of that the case of the petitioner is fully covered in light of the
said judgment. He then relied in the case of Central Bureau of
Investigation , Hyderabad v. K. Narayana Rao reported in (2012) 9 SCC
512 and refers to paragraph no.24 of the said judgment, which is as under :
"24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal
conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the
persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement
should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal
means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other
words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to
do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either
by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and
in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to
prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the
circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to
be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused.
Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must
be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an
agreement made between the accused persons who were
parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved
circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when
such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable
explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot
be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and
surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and
acceptable evidence."
7. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that if the act is not
clear, the learned court was ought to discharge the petitioner. He also relied in
the case of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat and
Another reported in (2019) 16 SCC 547 and referred to paragraph no.23 of
the said judgement, which is quoted as under:
"23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance
with the principles which have been laid down by this Court,
what the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere
post office. The court must indeed sift the material before it.
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The material to be sifted would be the material which is
produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not
to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of
the trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has
been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not
whether the prosecution has made out the case for the
conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court must
be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made
out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices.
However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some
material. The material must be such as can be translated into
evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be
the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of
the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the
accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be
the suspicion which is premised on some material which
commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the
prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence."
8. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that even if strong suspicion
is there, that is required to be founded on some material. He submits that in
absence of any material, the learned court has rejected the discharge petition
filed by the petitioner and has subsequently framed the charge. On these
grounds, he submits that the petitioner may kindly be discharged.
9. Per contra, Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharati, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent C.B.I. has vehemently opposed the prayer and submits
that this Court is exercising its power under the revisional jurisdiction and in
view of that, the case is required to be decided as per the parameters of
revision application. He submits that the sanction is already there dated
19.10.2011 as contained in Annexure-7 at page no.133. He next submits that
the trial has already been commenced and charge has been framed and in view
of that, if any, error is there in the sanction, that can be the subject matter of
trial only. At this stage, this Court is not required to roam into to come to the
conclusion as to whether prima facie the case is made out or not? He then
submits that by order dated 08.09.2023 the order taking cognizance was
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allowed to be challenged whereas the said order is dated 16.11.2013. He draws
the attention of the Court to Section 131 of the Limitation Act and submits in
view of that 90 days limitation period to prefer the revision is there, however,
this argument is not relevant to the present case as the said prayer has not
been pressed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner at the outset.
He also submits that sanction of prosecution order no.124/2011-147 dated
19.10.2011 was received by the C.B.I on the basis of said sanction order. The
learned court has taken cognizance against the accused petitioner and after
hearing, the learned Special Judge has framed the charge against the accused
petitioner and has fixed the case for prosecution evidence. In this background,
he draws the attention of the Court to the case of Dinesh Kumar v.
Chairman, Airport Authority of India and Another [Criminal Appeals
Nos.2170-71 of 2011] reported in 2011 SCC OnLine SC 1497 and refers to
paragraph no.8, which is given below:
"8. The provisions contained in Sections 19(1), (2), (3)
and (4) of the PC Act came up for consideration before this
Court in Parkash Singh Badal [(2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC
(Cri) 193] . In paras 47 and 48 of the judgment, the Court held
as follows: (SCC p. 37)
"47. The sanctioning authority is not required to separately
specify each of the offences against the accused public
servant. This is required to be done at the stage of framing of
charge. Law requires that before the sanctioning authority
materials must be placed so that the sanctioning authority can
apply his mind and take a decision. Whether there is an
application of mind or not would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and there cannot be any
generalised guidelines in that regard.
48. The sanction in the instant case related to the offences
relatable to the Act. There is a distinction between the absence
of sanction and the alleged invalidity on account of non-
application of mind. The former question can be agitated at
the threshold but the latter is a question which has to be raised
during trial."
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10. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that earlier the in 'Prakash
Singh Badal' case, this issue has already been decided which has been further
reiterated in the case of Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport Authority of
India and Another(supra). He then draws the attention of the Court to
Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 464 of the
Cr.P.C. By way of referring the aforesaid sections, he submits that any order
passed by the Special Judge cannot be reversed even if any error, omission or
irregularity is there in the sanction. He submits that can be only if it is there in
the opinion of the Court that any failure of justice has occurred, then only the
interference can be made. He further submits that the same is also the
parameters of Section 464 and 465 of the Cr.P.C. He next refers to the case of
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Jagat Ram [Cr.Appeal No.496 of
2024 (@ SLP (CRL) No.16978/2024 @ D.No.9288/2018)] and refers to
paragraph no.9 of the said judgment, which reads as under:
"9. Apart from the clear statutory prescription of
Section 19 of the Act, as informed by relevant court
precedents, the High Court has also lost sight of Section 465 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 19735, which provides that a
sentence or an order passed by the court of competent
jurisdiction shall not be reversed or altered by a court of
appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error or
irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution unless in the
opinion of the court, a failure of justice has in fact been
occasioned thereby. Section 465 of the Cr.P.C is as under:
"Sec. 465 Finding or sentence when reversible by reason
of error, omission or irregularity:- (1) Subject to the provisions
hereinbefore contained, on finding, sentence or order passed
by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or
altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on
account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint,
summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other
proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other
proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any
sanction for the prosecution unless in the opinion of that
Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
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(2) In determining whether any error, omission or
irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or
irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned
a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact
whether the objection could and should have been raised at an
earlier stage in the proceedings."
11. He next submits that in the aforesaid judgment, the spirit of Sections 19
and 465 of the Cr.P.C. has been considered and it has been held that at the
intermediary stage, the criminal prosecution cannot be nullified on account of
any such error, omission or irregularity unless failure of justice is shown. He
submits that respondent CBI has conducted inquiry pursuant to the direction
issued by the Division Bench in aforesaid W.P.(PIL) and the FIR was instituted
on written information of the learned Registrar General of Jharkhand High
Court. He then submits that charge sheet No.16 of 2011 and 17 of 2011 were
submitted before the learned court on 24.10.2011 and the learned court has
taken cognizance on 25.10.2011 in the aforesaid charge sheet. He next submits
that some of the accused persons have challenged the cognizance of charge
sheet no.16 of 2011 which has been quashed by the coordinate Bench of this
Court and that has also been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He
further submits that, however, the subject matter of the present case and the
charge sheet is different and both the cases are on different footing. He then
submits that quashing of the cognizance with regard to another offence has got
no bearing so far as the present case is concerned. So far as the construction
is made, that is made on plot no.564 and this is public open space. He further
submits that manipulation in sanction of the map has been done by writing the
plot number as plot no.568 in place of plot no. '564' and in view of that
maneuvering has been done and sanction has been granted to construct the
building on the open space violating the entire bye-laws. He then draws the
attention of the Court to the order framing charge as contained in page no.143
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and submits that the learned court has elaborately explained the charge of the
accused and thereafter has been pleased to frame the charge and there is no
illegality in the impugned order so far as the framing of charge is concerned. He
also relied in the case of Phul Chandra Oraon v. Union of India through
C.B.I. [Cr. Rev. No.131 of 2025] and submits that the case of Supriya Jain
v. State of Haryana and Anther reported in (2023) 7 SCC 711 and Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Another reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460
have considered in that judgment and this Court has been pleased to reject the
discharge petition considering the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the aforesaid two judgments. On these grounds, he submits that trial has
already been commenced and in view of that, the argument advanced by the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner can be the subject matter
of trial only and that cannot be scope of revision in this petition. On these
grounds, he submits that this petition may kindly be dismissed.
12. In view of above submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record including the
relevant documents which has been placed by the learned counsel for the
petitioner as well as the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent
C.B.I.
13. It is an admitted position that the FIR has been lodged pursuant to the
direction issued by the Division Bench in the aforesaid W.P.(PIL) to the Registrar
General of this Court and thereafter the C.B.I took over the matter and
investigated the allegations and three charge sheets have been filed. So far as
the charge sheet no.16 of 2017 and 17 of 2017 are concerned, they were filed
on 24.10.2011 and the learned court has been pleased to take cognizance on
two charge sheets on 25.10.2011. The charge sheet is annexed with the petition
wherein 23 documents have been relied by the C.B.I and 34 witnesses are said
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to be examined in the said case. The argument is advanced by the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that so far as Annexure-8 is
concerned, that is a document by the C.B.I and the ground is taken that Master
Plan has not been brought on record, however, there are 23 documents in the
charge sheet and 34 witnesses and only one submission is made that the
Master Plan is not on the record and that can be the subject matter of trial only
and if any benefit with regard to the said document is coming to help of the
petitioner or not, that can be the subject matter of trial only as there are other
documents on record. There is no doubt that learned court or the High Court
are not required to act like a post-office; the judicial mind is required to be
applied in passing any order, even if the discharge petition is being considered.
However, at the same time, it is well settled that the Court is not required to
roam into and come to the conclusion as to whether the materials are there to
frame the charge or not, and even if on suspicion certain material is there, the
Court is not required to interfere in discharge petition. This aspect of the matter
has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Supriya Jain
v. State of Haryana and Anther(supra) wherein at paragraph nos.16 and
17, it has been held as under:
"16.This is a case where the charges have been framed
and the accused are awaiting trial. Having regard to the
totality of the facts and circumstances, noticed above, we are
of the considered opinion that the investigation and the follow-
up steps are not so patently and unobtrusively defective or
erroneous (except to the extent we propose to mention before
concluding our judgment) that allowing the trial to progress
might cause a miscarriage of justice. This is also not an
appropriate stage to delve deep into the records. It is no part
of the business of any of the courts to ascertain what the
outcome of the trial could be, conviction or acquittal of the
accused. The small window that the law, through judicial
precedents, provides is to look at the allegations in the FIR and
the materials collected in course of investigation, without a
rebuttal thereof by the accused, and to form an opinion upon
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consideration thereof that an offence is indeed not disclosed
from it. Unless the prosecution is shown to be illegitimate so as
to result in an abuse of the process of law, it would not be
proper to scuttle it.
17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to quashing
of a charge / proceedings either in exercise of jurisdiction
under section 397, Cr. PC or section 482, Cr. PC or together, as
the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many
a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary.
However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this
Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the
point, the principles have been summarized by this Court
succinctly. In Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chandra1, this Court laid
down the following guiding principles:
"27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court
under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the
more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these
powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings,
particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the
Code should be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the
case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently
absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients
of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may
interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No
meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for
considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at
the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential
to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting
some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate
courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to
interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in
exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the
provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very
initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal
proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific
protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person
and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate
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and prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used
for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from
the record and documents annexed therewith to
predominantly give rise and constitute a 'civil wrong' with no
'element of criminality' and does not satisfy the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in
quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not
embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to
observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and
materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient
material on the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the
allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an
offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading
to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to
hold a fullfledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected
by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of
acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also
amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is
maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot
be maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or
under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration
external materials given by an accused for reaching the
conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was
possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record
and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of
continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly
satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit
continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records
with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the
documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of
the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court
may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court
finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or
that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the
charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to
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do real and substantial justice for administration of which
alone, the courts exist.
27.16. These are the principles which individually and
preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into
consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and
wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence
has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should
not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that
one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear
to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the
requirements of the offence."
14. In the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and
Another(supra) it has been held at paragraph nos.7, 13, 17 and 27.3 as
under:
"7. The investigating officer prepared the site plan,
effected recoveries of the articles from the place of occurrence
and thereafter recorded the statements of the witnesses. Upon
completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed in
terms of Section 173(2) of the Code wherein Ramesh Chander
Sibbal was stated as the accused and names of his wife, Suman
Sibbal and son Gaurav Sibbal were shown in Column 2. Upon
committal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge framed
charges against the accused under Sections 306 and 448 of the
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot
be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions
is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie.
Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the
charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law
in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within
the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much
advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.
17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial
court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is
discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these
provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the
case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing
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the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it
appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall
frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section
exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is
ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge
accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as
such. The C satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence
of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that
offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It
may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine
distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of
the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion
and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus,
to say that at the stage of framing of d charge, the Court
should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of
committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible
in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere, No
meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for
considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at
the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge."
15. In light of the aforesaid ratio of the judgments of Hon'ble
Supreme Court, it is well-settled that the Court is not required to examine the
facts, evidence and the materials on record to determine as to whether there is
sufficient materials on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction;
the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether
they will constitute an offence and, if so, the Court is not required to interfere.
16. In view of above facts and further the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the cases of Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport
Authority of India and Another(supra) as well as Central Bureau of
Investigation v. Jagat Ram(supra), relied by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent C.B.I. and the materials in the present case which
are on record, prima facie, it appears that there is sufficient material to proceed
against the petitioner.
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17. It is well settled that if any error in the sanction is there, that can be the
subject matter of trial only and it is required to be proved by way of leading
evidence before the learned court as to what prejudice is caused to the
accused. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Jagat Ram [Criminal Appeal No(s).
4964 of 2024 (@ SLP (Crl.) No.16978/2024 @ D.No.9288/2018)] at
paragraph no.12 it has been held as under:
"12. Justice Gogoi, (as he then was) has explained this
position in State of Bihar (supra):
"6. In a situation where under both the enactments any
error, omission or irregularity in the sanction, which would also
include the competence of the authority to grant sanction,
does not vitiate the eventual conclusion in the trial including
the conviction and sentence, unless of course a failure of
justice has occurred, it is difficult to see how at the
intermediary stage a criminal prosecution can be nullified or
interdicted on account of any such error, omission or
irregularity in the sanction order without arriving at the
satisfaction that a failure of justice has also been occasioned.
This is what was decided by this Court in State v. T. Venkatesh
Murthy9 wherein it has been inter alia observed that:
"14. ... Merely because there is any omission, error or
irregularity in the matter of according sanction, that does not
affect the validity of the proceeding unless the court records
the satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has
resulted in failure of justice."
7. The above view also found reiteration in Parkash
Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [(2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC
(Cri) 193 (para 29)] wherein it was, inter alia, held that mere
omission, error or irregularity in sanction is not to be
considered fatal unless it has resulted in failure of justice. In
Parkash Singh Badal [(2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193
(para 29)] it was further held that Section 19(1) of the PC Act is
a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of
jurisdiction. On the same line is the decision of this Court in R.
Venkatkrishnan v. CBI [(2009) 11 SCC 737 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
164] . In fact, a three-Judge Bench in State of M.P. v. Virender
Kumar Tripathi [(2009) 15 SCC 533 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 667]
while considering an identical issue, namely, the validity of the
grant of sanction by the Additional Secretary of the
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Department of Law and Legislative Affairs of the Government
of Madhya Pradesh instead of the authority in the parent
department, this Court held that in view of Section 19(3) of the
PC Act, interdicting a criminal proceeding mid-course on
ground of invalidity of the sanction order will not be
appropriate unless the court can also reach the conclusion that
failure of justice had been occasioned by any such error,
omission or irregularity in the sanction. It was further held that
failure of justice can be established not at the stage of framing
of charge but only after the trial has commenced and the
evidence is led (para 10 of the report).
8. There is a contrary view of this Court in State of Goa
v. Babu Thomas [(2005) 8 SCC 130 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1995]
holding that an error in grant of sanction goes to the root of
the prosecution. But the decision in Babu Thomas [(2005) 8
SCC 130 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1995] has to be necessarily
understood in the facts thereof, namely, that the authority
itself had admitted the invalidity of the initial sanction by
issuing a second sanction with retrospective effect to validate
the cognizance already taken on the basis of the initial
sanction order. Even otherwise, the position has been clarified
by the larger Bench in State of M.P. v. Virender Kumar Tripathi
[(2009) 15 SCC 533 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 667] ."
18. So far as the judgments relied by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner are concerned, in those cases, it has not been proved
that even on suspicion what are the materials and in view of that, the said
order was passed. So far as the present case is concerned, as discussed
hereinabove, there are sufficient materials. The sanction order dated
19.10.2011 was before the learned court on the basis of which the learned
court has been pleased to take cognizance and the grounds have been taken
that in absence of sanction the cognizance has been taken, however, that stage
has further passed and the discharge petition filed subsequently by the
petitioner has been rejected.
19. At such a belated stage when the cognizance order is not challenged by
the petitioner and further the petitioner is required to prove that point in the
trial, that cannot be subject matter of revision.
2025:JHHC:34883
20. In view of above reasons and analysis, the Court finds that there is no
merit in the present revision petition. As such, this revision petition being
Cr. Rev. No.1354 of 2022 is, hereby, dismissed.
21. Pending petition, if any, also stands disposed of.
( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Dated : 21th Nov.,2025
SI/ A.F.R.
Uploaded on 29.11.2025
