Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 934 j&K
Judgement Date : 12 May, 2023
Sr. No. 6
IN THE HIGH C0URT 0F JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
WP(C) No. 2554/2021
CM No. 8803/2021
Reserved on: 25.04.2023
Pronounced on: 12.05.2023
Shamim Ahmed ...Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. Sarfaraz Hamid Rather, Advocate
Vs.
UT of JK and Ors. ...Respondent(s)
Through: Ms. Monika Kohli, Sr. AAG
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
ORDER
.05.2023
Per Wasim Sadiq Nargal-J
01. The petitioner in the instant petition is aggrieved of and has
assailed the Judgment and Order dated 1st July, 2021 passed
by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Jammu, (for
short "CAT") in T.A.No. 5061/2021 (SWP No. 945/2010),
by virtue of which, the T.A.(Writ Petition) filed by the
petitioner against the order of discharge has been dismissed,
as such, he seeks issuance of writ, order or direction in the
nature of:-
"i). Certiorari, quashing Judgment and Order dated 1st July, 2021, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) Jammu in T.A. No. 5061/2021 (SWP No. 945/2010), by virtue of which, the T.A. (writ petition) filed by the petitioner against the order of discharge has
been dismissed without following principle of natural justice.
ii) Certiorari, quashing Order No. 457/2009 dated 31st October, 2009 issued by the respondent no. 3 virtue of which, the petitioner has been discharged without enquiry and without following principle of natural justice.
iii). Mandamus, commanding the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service retrospectively with all consequential benefits."
02. Before adverting to the grounds of challenge taken in the
instant writ petition, a brief factual matrix leading to the
filing of present writ petition is reproduced as under:-
Factual Matrix
03. The petitioner was initially appointed as Constable in the
Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police and, as per the stand of
the petitioner, he has joined his duties on 23rd February,
1993. And after more than one year of his service, while
discharging the duties, he became ill in the month of May,
1994 and, accordingly, he after informing his immediate
senior officers, left for his home to seek proper medical
treatment. The petitioner thereafter resumed his duties on
5th July, 1994 and subsequently, a departmental enquiry
was initiated against him, however, no charge sheet was
ever served upon him nor he was afforded any opportunity
of being heard, therefore, the enquiry was conducted in
flagrant violation of Rule 359 of Jammu and Kashmir
Police Rules. The further case set up by the petitioner in the
writ petition is that the said enquiry officer was, however,
made aware of the reason of absence from duty by the
petitioner, who while agreeing with those reasons
recommended that the period of absence of the petitioner be
treated as "Dies Non"
04. The further case of the petitioner is that the respondent no.
3, after receiving the recommendation of enquiry officer,
has issued the show cause against the petitioner as to why
he should not be discharged from the service. Moreover, as
the ill luck would have it, the petitioner again fell ill and
sought permission from his senior officers on 6th
September, 1994, which was ultimately granted in his
favour. Besides this, the petitioner remained under medical
treatment and resumed his duties on 7th November, 1994,
where he came to know that he had already been discharged
from services by the respondent no. 3 vide Order No. 666
of 1994 dated 2nd November, 1994.
05. Feeling aggrieved of aforesaid order of discharge, the
petitioner has filed writ petition, which was registered as
SWP No. 390/2002 and the same was disposed of by this
Court vide Order dated 22nd May, 2009. For facility of
reference, operative part of aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced as under:-
"...For the above stated reasons, this petition is allowed, the impugned Order No. 666/1994 dated 2nd November, 1994 passed by the respondent no. 3 is quashed. The respondents are given liberty to pass order either under Rule 187 of J&K Police Manual in case they so choose or they may conduct regular enquiry. It is further made clear the petitioner is not entitled to any salary from the date he was discharged till passing of this Judgment. Disposed of..."
Arguments on behalf of the petitioner:-
06. Mr. Sarfaraz Ahmad Rather, learned counsel, appearing for
the petitioner, submits that after passing of the aforesaid
Judgment dated 22nd May, 2009, the matter was examined
by the respondents on their own, but the petitioner was
never associated with enquiry and finally an order came to
be passed by the respondents vide Order No. 457 of 2009
dated 31st October, 2009, by virtue of which, the petitioner
was again discharged w.e.f. 7th September, 1994 on the
ground that „the petitioner had not proved to be a good
police officer keeping in view his conduct during his
probation period.' st
07. Feeling aggrieved of aforesaid order of discharge dated 31
October, 2009, the petitioner has once again knocked the
door of this Court by way of second round of litigation and
filed writ petition, which was registered as SWP No.
945/2010 on various grounds including the ground that the
order of discharge was penal in nature and not a simpliciter
discharge, inasmuch as, the same was passed on basis of
misconduct by attaching stigma to the aforesaid order of
discharge. Learned counsel for the petitioner has
vehemently argued that the stigma was required to be
enquired into by conducting detailed enquiry and providing
an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner and in the
instant case, admittedly, no enquiry whatsoever, was
conducted before issuing the order impugned dated 31st
October, 2009.
08. Learned counsel further submits that in view of the
enactment of J&K Reorganization Act, 2019 and
subsequent establishment of Central Administrative
Tribunal, the aforesaid writ petition came to be transferred
to the CAT, Jammu Bench, vide Order dated 4th March,
2021, and, accordingly, the petition was listed before the
CAT on 1st July, 2021 at Serial No. 8, in which,
inadvertently, the name of counsel for the petitioner was
wrongly mentioned as Shri N.P.Kotwal, Advocate.
However, the fact of the matter is that petitioner has never
engaged Shri N.P.Kotwal, Advocate, as his counsel. It is
further submitted that the above named Advocate has since
passed away on 11th April, 2021. Learned counsel for the
petitioner further submits that neither the petitioner nor his
counsel was informed about the listing of case on 1st July,
2021, and on the said date the matter was heard in ex-parte
in absence of the petitioner and, accordingly, the writ
petition came to be dismissed vide Order dated 1st July,
2021, which is impugned in the present writ petition.
09. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the
Judgment impugned has been passed without affording an
opportunity of being heard to the petitioner and the same is
in violation of principles of natural justice. It is further
argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner
has been continuously contesting his case since 2nd
November, 1994, when he was discharged from his service.
However, after a long 27 years of litigation, the petitioner
was not heard when the matter was taken up for final
disposal and he has been condemned unheard due to the
inadvertent mistake on the part of Registry of the CAT and
this has caused grave prejudice to the petitioner. Learned
counsel for the petitioner has also urged that in the earlier
round of litigation, the order of discharge was held to be
bad and, accordingly, the respondents have again passed the
order of discharge by attaching stigma to the aforesaid
order and the said discharge order, as per the stand of the
petitioner, is not a discharge simipliciter, but attaching
stigma to the aforesaid order, which is penal in nature and
cannot be passed without conducting any enquiry under the
provisions of law and without affording an opportunity of
being heard to the petitioner. The further stand of the
petitioner is that no reasonable opportunity has been given
to him before passing the order impugned nor stigma
attaching to the aforesaid order has been enquired into by
the respondents, therefore, the order impugned cannot
sustain the test of law and is liable to be quashed.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
foundation of passing of the order of discharge is based on
the allegations of misconduct, as such, the respondents
were under legal obligation to have conducted a detailed
departmental enquiry, which has not been done in the
present case. In that view of the matter, the order impugned
cannot sustain the test of law and is liable to be quashed.
Arguments on behalf of respondents.
11. Per contra, the objections have been filed on behalf of
respondent no. 3, in which, a specific stand has been taken
that the petitioner has absented un-authorizedly on his own
will w.e.f. 1st May, 1994 and resumed his duties on 6th July,
1994 i.e., after remaining absent from duties for 64 days
and it is for this grave misconduct of the petitioner, a
departmental enquiry was initiated against him by the then
Coy Commander C Coy of the Unit. The further stand of
the respondent no. 3 is that the Enquiry Officer conducted
the enquiry in accordance with Rule 359 of Jammu and
Kashmir Police Mannual, therefore, the plea of the
petitioner that he was not served with charge sheet is
baseless. It is further submitted that petitioner is misleading
the Court as well as the department as he was served with
charge sheet and reply from him was also received. It is
also stated in the objections that a baseless and concocted
story has been narrated by the petitioner that he became ill
in the month of May, 1994, and after informing his
immediate senior officer he left for his home to seek
medical treatment, whereas in the reply of the charge sheet
of the instant enquiry, the petitioner has deposed that one
person resident of Nowshera came to him and informed him
that his mother was seriously ill and, accordingly, he
proceeded to his home without seeking proper permission
from his senior officer.
12. In the objections, it is further stated that after restoration of
health of mother of the petitioner, he reported back for duty
and forgot to bring the medical documents of his mother.
The Enquiry Officer after conducting the enquiry had
recommended that the period of absence of the petitioner be
treated as „Dies-Non' on the basis of no work no pay. The
further stand of the respondent no. 3 is that the
recommendation made by the Enquiry Officer does not
commensurate with the gravity of offence, as such, a show
cause notice was served upon the petitioner as to why he
should not be discharged from services and was directed to
reply the notice within a period of seven days. It is also
stated in the objections that instead of replying to the show
cause notice, the petitioner again absented unauthorizedly
on 7th September, 1994 and, accordingly, he was informed
through concerned police station to resume his duties, but
the petitioner neither resumed his duties nor he informed
the department with regard to his ailment. As per the stand
of the respondent no. 3, the petitioner did not resume his
duties up to 2nd November, 1994 and his whereabouts were
also not known and no information with regard his ailment
was ever supplied to the concerned Battalion. Accordingly,
the respondents had no other option, but to discharge the
service of the petitioner, as he was on probation and did not
prove to be a good officer during the probation period, as
such, the order impugned came to be passed against him.
Legal Analysis and discussion.
13. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused
the record.
st
14. We have gone through the Order dated 1 July, 2021,
passed by the CAT as also the order of discharge, which
was subject matter before the CAT. From the perusal of the
Order dated 31st October, 2009, issued by the respondent
no. 3, vide which, the petitioner was discharged from the
services from the date he remained absent i.e., 7th
September, 1994 in terms of Rule 187 of J&K Police
Manual by attaching stigma to the aforesaid order on the
ground that he had not proved to be a good police officer.
Besides, much emphasis has been laid down on the conduct
of the petitioner during his probation period in the aforesaid
order. As a matter of fact, the earlier writ petition which
was filed by the petitioner challenging the order impugned
dated 2nd November, 1994 passed by the respondent no. 3
stood quashed and the respondents were given liberty to
pass orders either under Rule 187 of J&K Police Manual in
case they so choose or conduct regular enquiry. The
respondents, in pursuance to the Judgment passed by this
Court in SWP No. 390/2002, without conducting the
detailed enquiry, discharged the petitioner from the services
w.e.f. 7th September, 1994, by relying upon the Rule 187 of
the Jammu and Kashmir Police Manual by attaching stigma
to the aforesaid order on the ground that "he had not
proved to be a good officer and his conduct did not remain
satisfactory during the probation period". Admittedly, the
petitioner was appointed as constable on 22nd February,
1993, and was on probation for a period of three years and
the said probation was to be completed in February, 1996,
and after completion of probation period, the petitioner
ought to have been confirmed as a regular constable, but
vide Order dated 2nd November, 1994, the petitioner was
discharged from the services during the probation period
w.e.f. 7th September, 1994, which order was subject matter
in SWP No. 390/2002. The said writ petition was disposed
of in terms of Order dated 22nd May, 2009, whereby, the
order of discharge dated 2nd November, 1994 passed by the
respondents stood quashed and the respondent were given
liberty to pass orders either under Rule 187 of Jammu and
Kashmir Police Manual in case they so choose or they may
conduct regular enquiry. In that view of the matter the order
impugned dated 31st October, 2009, in the instant case, is
in flagrant violation to the Judgment passed by this Court.
The respondents without application of mind and in a haste
manner, have discharged the petitioner retrospectively
w.e.f. 7th September, 1994. It is not so, even the order
impugned is not a simpliciter, but punitive in nature,
wherein the respondents have specifically mentioned the
reasons for such discharge by attaching stigma that the
petitioner had not proved to be good police officer. The
language and the expression used in the order of discharge
is stigmatic in nature and the petitioner has been
categorized as a bad police officer, which renders the
impugned discharge order bad in the eyes of law. The
rights of the petitioner are guaranteed under Article 311 of
the Constitution of India. The expression used in the
impugned order on the face of it is stigmatic and would
disentitle the petitioner to seek an employment in future.
Such type of order can be passed only, when regular
departmental enquiry is conducted. But, admittedly, in the
present case, no enquiry was conducted pursuant to the
Judgment passed by this Court in SWP No. 390/2002 and in
absence of departmental enquiry being conducted in such
type of cases, the petitioner cannot be thrown out by way of
a stigmatic order.
15. It is well settled law that right to life and personal liberty is
one of the fundamental rights guaranteed to a person under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which would include
right to livelihood, as such, before taking any action with a
view to put an end to the services of the petitioner, it
requires a reasonable opportunity to be given to the
petitioner to putforth his case so as to comply with the
universally accepted principles of natural justice, which has
not happened in the present case. Since, the services of the
petitioner has been brought to an end by virtue of a
stigmatic order, which can be held to be a punitive in nature
and violative of his Constitutional right and, as such, the
order can be passed only after subjecting the incumbent to a
regular enquiry. The finding recorded in the order of
discharge is based on allegation of misconduct, as such, the
respondents were under legal obligation to conduct a
regular enquiry by affording an opportunity of being heard
to the petitioner, which, in the present case, has not been
done. In that view of the matter, the order of discharge
cannot sustain the test of law.
16. The issue as to whether a probationer can be terminated or
his services can be dispensed with without conducting the
enquiry was considered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
case titled Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and Anr.
reported in AIR, 1994 SC 2192( 7 Judges' Bench),
wherein it was held that decisive factor in the context of
discharge of a probationer from service is the substance of
the order and not the form in determining whether the order
of discharge is stigmatic or not or whether the same formed
the motive for or foundation of the order.
17. The same view was reiterated by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in case titled Redhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State
Agro Industries Corporation Ltd and Anr. reported in
(1992) 2 SCC 21 followed by a decision rendered in case
titled Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan vs. Mehbub Alam
Laskar reported in (2008) 2 SCC 479 and decision
rendered in case titled Union of India and Ors. vs.
Mahaveer C.Singhvi reported in (2010) 8 SCC 2020. In
Mahaveer C.Singhvi‟s case cited above, a plea was taken
that the respondent had been discharged from service by a
simple order of discharge without a stigma, therefore, being
a probationer he was not entitled to protection of Article
311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The said argument was
repelled noting the fact that due to allegations only he was
discharged and the Special Leave Petition challenging the
order of the High Court was dismissed with costs of Rs.
25,000/-.
18. Admittedly, no enquiry was conducted to prove alleged
misconduct of petitioner with regard to his unauthorized
absence by the respondents. On this count also, the
stigmatic order cannot sustain the test of law and this aspect
of the matter has not been gone into in detail by the CAT,
as such, the order passed by the CAT is liable to be
quashed.
19. Reliance is placed on the Judgment passed by the Division
Bench of this Court dated 13th August, 2015 in case titled
State of J&K vs. Ramesh Lal in LPA (SW) No. 156/2005
reported in 2015(4) JK (HC) 95, wherein, the order passed
by the Single Bench by setting aside the order of discharge
was upheld by directing the appellants to implement the
same within a period of two months.
20. We are fortified by the Judgment passed by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court dated 28th January, 2020 in Civil Appeal
No. 777/2020 reported in 2020 Latest Case Law 89 SC in
Dr. Vijaykumaran C.P.V. vs. Central University of Kerala
and Ors, wherein it was observed as under:-
".. The above decision is, in our review, a clear authority for the proposition that the material which amount to stigma need not be contained in the order of
termination of the probationer but might be contained in any document referred to in the termination order or in its annexurer. Obviously, such a document could be asked for or called for by any future employer of the probationer. In such a case, the order of termination would stand vitiated on the ground that no regular enquiry was conducted.
"...One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was
(a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld ..."
"...In such cases, a regular inquiry or departmental action as per service rules is also indispensable so as to enable the employee concerned to vindicate his position and establish his innocence..." "... We have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned termination order dated 30.11.2017 is illegal being ex-facie stigmatic as it has been issued without subjecting the appellant to a regular inquiry as per the service rules..."
21. In the present case, all the aforesaid three elements are
attracted and it can safely be concluded that the order
impugned is ex-facie stigmatic and punitive in nature,
which can be issued only after subjecting the incumbent to
a regular enquiry as per the service rules. The petitioner has
been discharged from his services by placing reliance on
Rule 187 of the Jammu and Kashmir Police Manual. For
facility of reference, the same is reproduced as under:-
"187. Discharge of inefficient:- A constable, who is found unlikely to prove an efficient police officer, may be discharged by the Superintendent at any time within three years of enrollment."
22. From the perusal of aforesaid Rule, it is manifestly clear
that by invoking Rule 187 of the J&K Police Manual,
discharge of an incumbent during probation period
obviously would mean that he is not found fit to continue in
service on the basis of materials which are available before
the authority. Therefore, a person can be discharged under
Rule 187 by way of discharge simplicitor though the motive
may be because of omission and commission on the part of
the incumbent. However, it is not necessary to mention
those omissions and commissions in the termination or
discharge order. In case any such reason is given in the
discharge order showing the deficiency in the service of the
incumbent, it would amount to be stigmatic and if such a
discharge order is put to challenge, may not sustain on the
ground being stigmatic. However, if the discharge order is
simply passed without mentioning the deficiency of an
incumbent, it would be a discharge simplicitor in which
event such a discharge order can be sustained.
In the present case, the authorities apparently invoked
Rule 187 which entitles the authority to discharge a
constable who is found and is likely to prove an inefficient
officer yet if the said reason is mentioned in the discharge
order, which otherwise is not required to be mentioned for
the purposes of issuing the discharge order, such a
discharge order qualified by the deficiencies would be
stigmatic even if invoked under Rule 187, and cannot be
sustained in law.
nd
23. The respondents by virtue of order dated 2 November
1994, has discharged the petitioner from services, which
was quashed by this Court in the earlier round of litigation
in SWP No. 390 of 2002. The respondents have invoked
the provisions of Rule 187 of Jammu and Kashmir Police
Manual and in the aforesaid order a finding was recorded to
the effect that petitioner was absconding. It was specific
stand of the petitioner before the writ court in the earlier
round of litigation that such finding can only be recorded
after thorough enquiry. This argument of the petitioner was
accepted by the writ court and accordingly, quashed the
impugned discharge order with liberty to the respondents to
pass order either under Rule 187 of J&K Police Manual in
case they so choose or they may conduct regular enquiry.
However, the respondents have exercised the first option
and passed the impugned order on the same ground which
was rejected by this Court in the earlier round of litigation.
Rule 187 can be invoked only if the department does not
intend to stigmatize the concerned person, such power can
be exercised within a period of three years i.e., from the
date of enrollment and not otherwise. Admittedly, in the
present case the reliance has been placed by the respondents
on Rule 187 of Jammu and Kashmir Police Manual, which
is not applicable to the case of petitioner as the aforesaid
rule can be applied only within 3 years of enrolment and
not after 15 years. This aspect of the matter has not been
correctly appreciated by the CAT and has dismissed the
TA. No. 5601/2021 by holding that the respondents have
simply discharged the petitioner from the services without
attaching any stigma to him.
24. No doubt under Rule 187 of the Jammu and Kashmir
Police Manual, a Superintendent of Police has powers to
discharge the probationer within a period of three years of
enrolment, if he is of the view that the incumbent does not
prove himself to be a good police officer. Since the finding
recorded in the order impugned casts a stigma on the career
of the constable and there would be an impediment for the
petitioner to secure his future employment, therefore, the
provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India are
attracted in the present case. The discharge order should
have been passed by affording an opportunity of being
heard to the petitioner and also by issuing a show cause
notice against him, which, in the present case has not
happened and, accordingly, the order impugned cannot
sustain the test of law.
25. In the similar facts and circumstances, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in para 3 of the Judgment reported in AIR
1995 SC 984 has been pleased to observe as under:-
"It would thus be clear from the order of discharge that it is not an order of discharge simpliciter. On the other hand, the S.P. Considered the record and found him to be habitual absentee, negligent to his duty and indisciplined. The findings of habitual absence and indiscipline necessarily cast stigma on his career and they would be an impediment for any of future employment elsewhere. Under those circumstances, the principles of natural justice do require that he should be given an opportunity to explain the grounds on which the S.P. Proposes to pass an order of discharge and then to consider the explanation submitted by the police officer. Then the S.P. is competent to pass appropriate orders according to the rules. Since this part of the procedure had not been adopted, the order of discharge is vitiated by manifest error of law.
7. It shall be quite relevant to quote under as to what has been held in the judgment captioned Kulbir Singh Sanina v. State of JK and Anr. reported in SlJ 1989 J&K page
43. "Rule 187 of the Police Rules does not give an arbitrary power to the appointing authority to remove any employee of the police without observing the principles of natural justice, which is minimal requirement to hold an employee liable for removal from service, who has been appointed on a clear vacancy and has been put on probation of three years from the date of appointment."
26. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid referred Judgment is
that when the order of discharge is stigmatic, then without
enquiry, the same cannot be passed even against the
probationer by invoking the power under Rule 187 of the
Jammu and Kashmir Police Manual. Since the allegation of
misconduct constitute the foundation of the action taken in
the present case, the decision taken by the competent
Authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of
Rules of natural justice. We are also fortified by the
observations of Division Bench Judgment of this Court
rendered in case titled Kuljeet Singh vs. State of JK and
Ors. reported in 2014 (1) JKJ 382. The relevant para of
the Judgment is taken note of:-
"However, if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice."
27. Thus, in the light of aforesaid analysis and discussion,
we conclude as under:-
a. That Rule 187 of the Jammu and Kashmir
Police Manual can be pressed into service only in
the eventuality when a constable is found unlikely to
prove an efficient police officer and can be
discharged by the Superintendent at any time within
three years of enrolment and not otherwise.
Admittedly, the respondents have placed reliance on
the aforesaid Rule after expiry of the aforesaid
period of three years. Accordingly, Rule 187 of the
Jammu and Kashmir Police Manual was not
applicable to the case of the petitioner.
b. The powers under Rule 187 can be invoked
only against a probationer within a period of
probation i.e., three years from the date of
enrolment and not to a permanent employee after a
period of 15 years from the date of his
appointment. It cannot be assumed that after 15
years the petitioner continued to be a probationer
and can be discharged by invoking the powers
under Rule 187 of the Jammu and Kashmir Police
Manual, as the petitioner has since become a
regular constable on the establishment of the police
department after completion of probation period.
c. The services of petitioner is protected under
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and the
procedure as envisaged under the aforesaid
Constitutional provision was required to be followed
by giving an opportunity of being heard to the
petitioner and also by issuing show cause notice to
him, which, in the present case has not happened and
thus, the order impugned cannot sustain the test of
law.
d. The petitioner has been discharged by virtue
of order impugned by way of a stigmatic order by
incorporating that "he had not proved to be a good
officer and his conduct did not remain satisfactory
during the probation period" and the stigma was
required to be enquired into by conducting a detailed
enquiry and providing an opportunity of being heard
to the petitioner. In absence of any enquiry being
conducted or providing an opportunity of being
heard to the petitioner, the order impugned cannot
sustain the test of law as the stigma attached to the
aforesaid order will haunt the petitioner for all times
to come for his future employment.
e. The order impugned is in flagrant violation
of the direction issued by this Court in the earlier
round of litigation in SWP No. 390/2002, wherein
the stigmatic order of discharge was quashed by this
Court by giving liberty to the respondents to pass
orders either under Rule 187 of J&K Police Manual
in case they so choose or conduct regular enquiry.
The respondents without conducting the enquiry
have invoked the provisions of Rule 187 of J&K
Police Manual, which was not applicable to the case
of the petitioner. Thus, the action of the respondents
in issuing the order impugned is contemptuous and
the same is in flagrant violation of Order/Judgment
passed by this Court in the earlier round of litigation
in SWP No.390/2002.
f. The punishment of discharging the petitioner from services is major 7and not
commensurate to the gravity of the allegations
leveled against him and the major punishment being
disproportionate to the allegations leveled against
the petitioner by way of order impugned, cannot
sustain the test of law.
Conclusion.
28. For the forgoing reasons and in view of the discussions
made above, we find merit in this petition and the same is,
accordingly, allowed. The impugned order dated 1st July,
2021, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal
(CAT), Jammu is set-aside/quashed, as a necessary
corollary whereof, the order of discharge dated 31st
September, 2009 issued by the respondent no. 3 shall also
stand quashed/set aside. The respondents are directed to
reinstate the petitioner with immediate effect. The
petitioner is also held entitled to all the consequential
benefits minus monetary benefits retrospectively from the
date he joined his services i.e., w.e.f., 23rd February, 1993,
as this Court is not aware whether the petitioner during the
intervening period was gainfully employed elsewhere or
not.
(WASIM SADIQ NARGAL) (N.KOTISWAR SINGH)
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
SRINAGAR
12.05.2023
"Shamim Dar"
Whether the Judgment is speaking? Yes/No. Whether the Judgment is reportable? Yes/No
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