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Gujarat High Court
Kantibhai Prabhudash Patel Through Poa ... vs State Of Gujarat on 13 April, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/485/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/04/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 485 of 2023
In F/FIRST APPEAL/10317/2022
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KANTIBHAI PRABHUDASH PATEL THROUGH POA DASHRATHBHAI
KANTIBHAI PATEL
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
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Appearance:
MR AMIT N CHAUDHARY(5599) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS DHWANI TRIPATHI, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 13/04/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present application, invoking Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, seeks condonation of an inordinate delay
of 2945 days in preferring the captioned First Appeal.
2. Factual matrix of the case are as under:-
2.1 The lands of the applicants claimants situated at village
Ambagam, Tal: Bayad, Dist: Sabarkantha came to be acquired
by the State for the purpose of Suzlam Suflam spearing canal
scheme by issuing notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the
Act on 24.9.2004 and 22.11.2004 respectively. The Special
Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs.6.50/- per sq mtr as
compensation for the acquired lands. The claimants preferred
reference under section 18 of the Act before the Court of
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learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Modasa, who by
impugned common judgment and award, partly allowed the
reference of the original claimants and granted amount of
compensation of Rs. 5000/- per Are.
2.2 After passing the judgment and award of the learned
Reference Court on 16.12.2011, the applicants applied for
certified copy of the judgment and award on 27.9.2021.
2.3 Thereafter, the applicants have filed First Appeal, but
since, there is delay in filing the First Appeal, the applicants
have filed present application for condonation of delay.
3. Learned advocate Mr. Chaudhary appearing for the
applicants in line of the ground stated in the application
submitted that mainly delay has occurred since the applicants
claimants have waited for the outcome of other group of
matters arising out of the same judgment and award and after
disposal of that group of matters, the claimants have filed the
First Appeal with delay and therefore, present CA is filed.
3.1 Merely upon above submission, learned advocate Mr.
Chaudhary prays to allow this application by condoning the
delay and to register the First Appeal.
4. Learned advocate appearing for the respondent No.2 did
not appear despite last chance was granted by previous order.
4.1 Learned AGP vehemently opposed the applications and
submitted that since there is huge delay not properly
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explained by the claimants, the same may be dismissed.
5. The factual assertion, which is stated in the foregoing
paras are the main reasons stated to condone huge and
colossal delay of 2945 days.
6. As far as delay has been sought to be condoned, under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, let refer section 5 as
under:-
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain
cases.--
Any appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), may be admitted after the prescribed
period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring
the appeal or making the application within such
period.
Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the
applicant was misled by any order, practice or
judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or
computing the prescribed period may be sufficient
cause within the meaning of this section."
7. The applicants were obliged to satisfactorily
demonstrate and explicate the colossal delay and to convince
the Court that sufficient cause existed for not preferring the
appeal / application or moving the requisite application within
the statutorily prescribed period. Ordinarily, the Courts adopt
a liberal approach while considering applications for
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
provided that the delay is duly attributable to sufficient cause.
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Delay cannot be condoned by a mere invocation of "liberal
approach," "justice-oriented approach," or "substantial
justice." These oft-quoted expressions cannot be deployed to
jettison or emasculate the substantive law of limitation.
8. Rule of limitation is based upon principles of sound
public policy and principles of equity. Indeed expression
'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice. This proposition comes into
picture when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is
imputable to party seeking condonation of delay. Whether
explanation furnished would constitute 'sufficient cause' or
not will depend on facts of each case and there cannot be
straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation
furnished for delay caused in taking steps. While considering
the matter, the Court is also required to consider all the fact
that why party has not taken steps within time prescribed.
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking
steps within the time prescribed time, valuable right has
accrued to other party which should not lightly be defeated by
condoning delay in routine like manner.
9. Theory of liberal approach should be adjudicated on
theory of due diligence. In the present case, length of delay is
2945 days. It is quite long delay and on going through
application as well as arguments, it remains unexplained.
They are propelled by the applicants, it does not seem to be
germane one and none of the reasons prevented the
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applicants from filing FA within time period. It is to be
remembered that pleadings and reasons are not backed out by
any documentary evidence.
10. According to this Court, the applicants have failed to
establish any sufficient reasons which has prevented them to
file FA within stipulated time period.
11. Recently, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka
Housing Board and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its aureate enunciation, has
held thus:-
"257. We also wish to highlight that the High Court
applied the legal position incorrectly in the
impugned order and performed an exercise of
'merithunting'. It gave a prima facie relevance to
the argument of the respondent no. 1 on the
grounds that the suit of the appellant was not at all
maintainable in the first place. In paragraph 13 of
the impugned order, the High Court recorded that a
semblance of right in favour of respondent no. 1
swayed its mind to allow the condonation of delay,
and it accepted the same as a 'sufficient cause'. We
hold such observations to be erroneous and ex facie
bad in law. Similar contentions were rejected by
this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654 ,
wherein the appellant-State was seeking a
condonation of delay of 663 days. This Court sternly
noted that it will not let the courts to be forums
wherein the Government can walk-in, when it
desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation,
and buttress reliance on cases of this Court wherein
it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary
powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of
those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted
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below:
3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the
government inefficiencies but the sad part is that
the authorities keep on relying on judicial
pronouncements for a period of time when
technology had not advanced and a greater leeway
was given to the Government [...]
xxx xxx xxx
5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be
propounded that if there is some merit in the
case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by.
If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any
case. It is really a bar of limitation which can
even shut out good cases. This does not, of
course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court
in an appropriate case to condone the delay.
6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid
approach is being adopted in what we have
categorised earlier as 'certificate cases'. The
object appears to be to obtain a certificate of
dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a
quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing
could be done because the highest Court has
dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this
formality and save the skin of officers who may
be at default that such a process is followed. We
have on earlier occasions also strongly
deprecated such a practice and process. There
seems to be no improvement. The purpose of
coming to this Court is not to obtain such
certificates and if the Government suffers
losses, it is time when the officer concerned
responsible for the same bears the
consequences. The irony is that in none of the
cases any action is taken against the officers,
who sit on the files and do nothing. It is
presumed that this Court will condone the delay
and even in making submissions, straightaway
the counsel appear to address on merits without
referring even to the aspect of limitation as
happened in this case till we pointed out to the
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counsel that he must first address us on the
question of limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and
we propose to do in all matters today, where
there are such inordinate delays that the
Government or State authorities coming before
us must pay for wastage of judicial time which
has its own value. Such costs can be recovered
from the officers responsible.' (Emphasis
supplied)
258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be condoned
or not. From the tenor of the approach of the
respondents, it appears that they want to fix their
own period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a period
of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to
plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the
bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
259. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the principles of
sound public policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging
over the head of the respondent for indefinite
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period of time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is
abundantly clear that the High Court has
erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days
on account of certain lapses at the administrative
levels and of there being no follow-ups in the
proceedings, along with finding certain merits in
the case of the respondent no. 1 against the
maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that
of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court.
We have no hesitation in stating that such grounds
are nowhere near to being "sufficient cause" as per
Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight
of the fact that the precedents and authorities it
relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even
that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in
those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The
present case, however, stands on a very different
footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence,
we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the
delay by the High Court.
261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned
order of the High Court deserves to be set aside.
Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem
it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand
as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and
we want to convey an emphatic message to all the
High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on
frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper
case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the
State-machinery is able to establish that it acted
with bona fides and remained vigilant all
throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as
is famously said. But courts, and more particularly
the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the
procedure for a litigating State agency, who also
equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing
litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
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262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing
effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or
its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay
is a State-authority. They should not become
surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The
constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants
cannot be placed in situations of perpetual
litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or
favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We
are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and
put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen
matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause
exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to
the injury, more particularly in appeals under
Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is
already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More
than the importance of judicial time, what worries
us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who
is to contest against an enormous State, and its
elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very
threshold, because, say if a party litigating against
the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest
the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the
present case, it reopens the lis for another round of
litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again.
As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we
assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post
to seek justice."
12. In another judgment in the case of State of Odisha &
Ors. Vs Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High
Schools 2026 INSC 148, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after
referring to various authorities on the subject matter in paras
18, 19 and 21 are held as under :-
"18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed
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in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and
Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is
the exasperation and consequent lament expressed
by none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah,
CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur
Riders Club, Bombays and admonishing officers of
the "revenue" in not acting with promptitude. This
order was made within six years of the decision in
Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than
quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned
senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November
16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some
time in the past, this Court has been making
observations as to the grave prejudice caused to
public interest by appeals brought on behalf of
the Government being lost on the point of
limitation, Such observations have been made
for over a few years in the past. But there seems
to be no conspicuous improvement as is
apparerit in the present petition which is flied in
November 1993. The explanation for the delay,
had better be set out In petitioner's own words:
"(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special
leave petition drafted from the drafting
Advocate and sent the same for approval to the
Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file.
(h) The Board returned the case file to the
Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent
the same to the Board on September 20, 1993
requesting that draft SLP was not approved. by
the Board. The Board after approving the draft
SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993."
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a
judicially acceptable ground for condonation of
delay. After the earlier observations of this
Court made in several cases in the past, we
hoped that the matters might Improve. There
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seems to be no visible support for this optimism,
There is a point beyond which even the courts
cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is
Government which is itself under the shackles of
bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the
law of limitation which binds everybody, we
cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true
that Government should not be treated as any
other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of
the former the decisions to
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in
doubt that it did not take much time for this Court
to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was
laid down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji
(supra), with much optimism that matters would
improve. Their Lordships, however, found no
visible support for such optimism and the Court's
patience having been tested to the extreme limit,
held that there is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant
labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference is the Government.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the
Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all
the latitude that is shown to a "State", we are of
the clear opinion that the cause sought to be
shown here by the State of Odisha is not an
explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise
of discretion has been set up."
13. Thus in the facts and in circumstances, this Court is of
the opinion that applicants were not diligent in availing
remedy of appeal / application. The averments made in the
application seeking condonation of delay in filing application
do not inspire any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause
to exercise discretion in its favour.
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14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and upon a
meticulous application of the ratio decidendi adverted to
hereinabove, this Court finds that, in absence whereof, the
very foundation of the allegations crumbles, there is no cogent
or credible explanation forthcoming for the inordinate and
colossal delay of 2945 days. The application, being sans
merits, inexorably merits dismissal and is, accordingly,
DISMISSED.
15. Consequently, the prayer for registration of the First
Appeal also stands rejected.
16. Consequently, CA/s, if any, does not survive and stands
disposed of accordingly.
(J. C. DOSHI,J)
SHEKHAR P. BARVE
