Ramnarayan vs Vishal Ram
2026 Latest Caselaw 1769 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Ramnarayan vs Vishal Ram on 17 April, 2026

                                                   1




                                                                      2026:CGHC:17559



                                                                               NAFR

                          HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                                          SA No. 103 of 2017

                    1. Ramnarayan S/o Sukhram, Aged About 55 Years Caste Teli, R/o
                    Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker,
       Digitally
                    Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh
       signed by
       JYOTI
JYOTI  SHARMA
SHARMA Date:

                    2. Rukhmani Bai W/o Shri Ramnarayan, Aged About 51 Years R/o
       2026.04.17
       17:17:55
       +0530


                    Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker,
                    Chhattisgarh
                                                                    ... Appellant(s)
                                                versus
                    1. Vishal Ram S/o Late Sukhram, Aged About 65 Years Caste Teli,
                    R/o Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker,
                    Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

                    2. Khileshwari @ Ahilya W/o Vishal Ram, Aged About 60 Years
                    Caste Teli, R/o Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North
                    Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh, District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh

                    3. Bimla Bai W/o Vishal Ram, Aged About 57 Years Caste Teli, R/o
                    Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker,
                    Chhattisgarh, District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh

                    4. The State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector, District North
                    Baster Kanker, Chhattisgarh
                                                             ... Respondent(s)

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rajkumar Pali, Advocate

For Respondent/ : Mr. Lekhram Dhruv, P.L. State

Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

Judgment on Board

17.04.2026

1. Perusal of the earlier order sheets reveals that the appeal

was referred to the Mediation Centre, however, the mediation

failed on account of non-participation of the parties.

Accordingly, with the consent of learned counsel for the

parties, the appeal is heard on admission.

2. The plaintiffs/appellants, who are the husband and wife, have

preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the

judgment & decree dated 14.12.2016 passed by the Learned

Additional District Judge, Bhanupratapur, District North

Bastar Kanker, C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 14-A/2016

(Ramnarayan & Anr. Vs. Vishal Ram & Ors.) arising out of the

judgment and decree dated 28.04.2016 passed by the Trial

Court in Civil Suit No. 24-A/2013 (Ramnarayan & Anr. Vs.

Vishal Ram & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has

dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs/ appellants. For the sake of

convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status

before the learned trial Court.

3. The plaintiffs instituted a Civil suit seeking declaration,

partition, possession, and other consequential reliefs in

respect of ancestral and joint family properties pleading inter

alia that one Sukhram, father of plaintiff No.1 and defendant

No.1, was the original owner of agricultural lands situated at

Village Ghodda, Tahsil Bhanupratappur, District Uttar Bastar

Kanker. Sukhram had two wives. From his first wife Bhagwati,

a daughter namely Ghurai Bai was born, and from his second

wife Leelabai, plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 were born.

The family was governed by Hindu Law and Mitakshara

School, and all properties were treated as joint Hindu family

properties. It is pleaded that during his lifetime, Sukhram

executed a registered gift deed dated 05.12.1975 in favour of

plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 in respect of certain

ancestral lands, and after his death on 07.02.1976, the

remaining lands were mutated jointly in the names of plaintiff

No.1, defendant No.1, Leelabai, and Ghurai Bai. Thereafter,

some portion was given to Ghurai Bai and the remaining

lands continued jointly between the plaintiff and defendant

No.1. The plaintiffs further averred that certain additional

lands at Village Jampara were purchased from the income of

the joint family, though the sale deed was executed in the

name of defendant No.1, being the elder brother and karta of

the family. Likewise, an ancestral house situated at Village

Ghodda was also claimed to be joint family property. It is

further stated that an oral/consensual partition took place

between plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 on 22.02.2001.

However, disputes subsequently arose regarding unequal

and improper partition made by the revenue authorities in

proceedings before the Naib Tahsildar, Sub-Divisional

Officer, Additional Commissioner, and Board of Revenue.

According to the plaintiffs, fertile lands and valuable

properties such as the ancestral house and Jampara lands

were allotted entirely to defendant No.1, while the plaintiffs

were given barren and uncultivable lands. The plaintiffs

contend that despite various revenue proceedings and

remand orders, proper equal partition by metes and bounds

was not effected. Therefore, the present suit has been filed

seeking:

1. Equal half share partition of the properties

mentioned in Schedules 'A' and 'B';

2. Declaration of half ownership in the Schedule

'C' property at Village Jampara as joint family

property;

3. Half share in the ancestral house described in

Schedule 'D';

4. Declaration that the order dated 15.04.2013

passed by the Naib Tahsildar is null and void; and

5. Costs and other appropriate reliefs.

4. Defendants No. 1 to 3 filed joint written statement admitting

the averments made in paragraphs 2 to 11 and 13 of the

plaint, while denying the remaining allegations. The

defendants contended that the land bearing Khasra No.

515/5 admeasuring 600 sq. meters is government land, and

therefore, the State of Chhattisgarh is a necessary party to

the suit. It was further pleaded that the agricultural lands

situated at Village Jampara, bearing Khasra Nos. 546 and

548 admeasuring total area 1.040 hectares, are not joint

family properties but the self-acquired properties of defendant

No.1 Vishalram. According to the defendants, the said lands

were purchased by defendant No.1 through a registered sale

deed dated 29.01.1983 from the income/resources of his

wife's parental family. Hence, the plaintiffs have no right, title,

or interest over the said Jampara lands. It was also pleaded

that the patta relating to Khasra No. 515, Plot No. 16, area

600 sq. meters was granted in favour of defendant No.1 in the

year 2001 on the basis of his exclusive possession for a

period of ten years. Since the same has not been renewed,

the said land presently remains government land. The

defendants further submitted that in earlier revenue partition

proceedings before the Naib Tahsildar, the plaintiffs

themselves sought equal partition, and despite equal partition

having been made by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue),

the plaintiffs remained dissatisfied and continued filing

appeals before higher authorities on varying grounds. It was

specifically denied that there was any unequal partition of

ancestral lands. It was also stated that no prayer for partition

by metes and bounds was made by the plaintiffs before the

appellate revenue authority. The defendants denied that the

Board of Revenue had declared the Schedule 'C' and

Schedule 'D' properties to be joint family properties. They

asserted that the order dated 15.04.2013 passed by the Naib

Tahsildar in Revenue Case No. 4/A-27/11-12 was legal,

proper, and passed with the consent of the plaintiffs. It was

further contended that no cause of action had arisen for filing

the present suit. The Schedule 'C' property was claimed to be

the self-acquired property of defendant No.1, and the

Schedule 'D' property was stated to be government land. The

defendants also objected that the suit had not been properly

valued and adequate court fees had not been paid,

particularly in respect of the Jampara lands over which title

was claimed. Accordingly, the defendants prayed for

dismissal of the suit with costs.

5. After framing the issues and the Trial Court, upon

appreciation of the pleadings, oral evidence and

documentary records, dismissed the suit filed for declaration

of title, partition and possession. It held that the properties

described in Schedules 'A' and 'B' had already been

partitioned between the plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1,

who are the real brothers, through a mutual partition deed

dated 22.02.2001 (Ex.D/1), which was executed with consent

of the parties. The plaintiff himself admitted such partition and

challenged the same only after several years. The Trial Court

further held that any challenge to the said partition deed was

barred by limitation, as it was not questioned within the

prescribed period, and therefore the partition had attained

finality and the plaintiff was estopped from disputing it. So far

as the property described in Schedule 'C' (Jampara land) is

concerned, the Trial Court found that the same was

purchased under a registered sale deed exclusively in the

name of defendant No.1 and the plaintiff failed to prove any

financial contribution towards its purchase or that it was

acquired from joint family funds. Accordingly, the said

property was held to be the self-acquired property of

defendant No.1. With regard to Schedule 'D' property, the

Trial Court recorded that the land was government land in

respect of which a temporary patta had been granted to

defendant No.1 for a limited period and, in absence of

renewal, the land continued to be government property.

Consequently, neither party could claim partition or

declaration of ownership over the said land without

establishing any legal right therein. On these findings, the

Trial Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish

joint ownership, entitlement to equal partition, or any right to

declaration and possession. Consequently, the suit was

dismissed with costs.

6. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated

24.04.2016, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under

Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned

First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on

re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the

findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal

by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal.

7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that both the

Courts erred in dismissing the suit despite clear evidence that

the parties were living jointly and that defendant No.1, being

the elder brother, was managing the ancestral agricultural

lands admeasuring about 21 acres. It is contended that the

property described in Schedule 'C', having been purchased

during the continuance of the joint family, ought to have been

treated as joint family property. He further submits that a

specific plea was taken in the plaint that the said property was

purchased from the joint family income, and therefore the

burden lay upon defendant No.1 to establish by cogent and

reliable evidence that the same was his self-acquired

property, which he failed to discharge.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants on the

question of admission, and the impugned judgments and

decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned

First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.

9. This Court is not inclined to accept the aforesaid submission.

Mere averments made in the plaint that the parties

constituted a joint family and that the suit properties were joint

family properties are not sufficient in law. The plaintiff was

required to lay foundational evidence to establish the

existence of a joint family nucleus and that the property

described in Schedule 'C' was acquired from such joint family

income. Only upon discharge of such initial burden would the

onus shift upon defendant No.1 to prove that the property was

his self-acquired property.

10. In the present case, the plaintiff failed to adduce cogent and

reliable evidence to establish that the Schedule 'C' property

was purchased from joint family funds or that there existed

sufficient ancestral nucleus from which the acquisition could

have been made. In absence of such proof, no presumption

of joint family property could be drawn merely because the

parties were related or residing jointly. Therefore, the

submission advanced on behalf of the appellants does not

merit acceptance.

11. The First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree

of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal holding that no

infirmity was made out in the findings recorded by the Trial

Court. It held that the plaintiffs failed to establish by reliable

evidence that the property described in Schedule 'C' was

purchased from the income of the joint family. Mere assertion

that the family was joint or that defendant No.1, being the

elder brother, managed the family properties was held

insufficient in absence of documentary proof showing

contribution of the plaintiff or availability of surplus joint family

nucleus. The Court further found contradictions in the

plaintiffs' own evidence regarding the source of funds and the

financial condition of the family in the year of purchase,

whereas the defence version that defendant No.1 purchased

the property from funds received from his wife's parental side

remained unshaken in cross-examination. With regard to the

properties in Schedules 'A' and 'B', the Appellate Court held

that they had already been partitioned through a mutual

partition deed dated 22.02.2001, which had been acted upon,

and the challenge thereto was belated and barred by

limitation. As regards Schedule 'D', the Court held that the

land was government land granted on temporary patta, the

renewal of which was not proved, and therefore no

declaration of joint ownership or partition could be granted in

favour of the plaintiffs. On the overall appreciation of the

evidence, the Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiffs

failed to prove any subsisting joint title or right of partition in

the suit properties and therefore upheld dismissal of the suit.

12. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal

under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely

limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal

involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of

fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with

unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no

evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

13. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First

Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the

basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/

plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and

sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate

any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the

findings so recorded.

14. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second

Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and

challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do

not give rise to any substantial question of law within the

meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

15. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of

fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not

ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

16. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv

Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating

the settled proposition, it has been held that when any

concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the

appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it

was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading

of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against

any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no

Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

17. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel

for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be

regarded as satisfying the test of being 'substantial question

of law' within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These

questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The

appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law

which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event,

the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of

law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case

is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments

impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by

the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and

there is no illegality and infirmity at all.

18. On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above

settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this

appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial

question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC.

In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the

Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings

recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence

available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in

the same and they does not call for any interference.

19. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby

dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree

passed by the learned Appellate Court.

SD/-

(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti