Ram Das (Died) Through Lrs vs Bisani And Another
2026 Latest Caselaw 1390 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Ram Das (Died) Through Lrs vs Bisani And Another on 7 April, 2026

                                                            1




                                                                             2026:CGHC:15903


                                                                                           NAFR

                               HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
       Digitally
       signed by



                                                SA No. 415 of 2016
       SHOAIB
SHOAIB ANWAR
ANWAR Date:
       2026.04.08
       10:39:04
       +0530




                    1 - Ram Das (Died) Through LRs

                    1.1 - Kamlesh Kumar Yadav S/o Ram Das Aged About 46 Years R/o

                    Village Patwahi P.S. Janakpur Tehsil Bharatpur District- Koriya (Now

                    M.C.B.) (C.G.)

                    1.2 - Brijesh Yadav S/o Ram Das Aged About 39 Years R/o Village

                    Patwahi P.S. Janakpur Tehsil Bharatpur District- Koriya (Now M.C.B.)

                    (C.G.)

                    1.3 - Shanti Yadav W/o Bhagwan Das Yadav D/o Ram Das Aged

                    About 44 Years R/o Village Kuthali, Tehsil Jaisinghnagar District-

                    Shahdol (M.P.)

                    2 - Jamuna (Deleted) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 02/03/2026



                                                                                     ... Appellant

                                                          versus



                    1 - Bisani And Another S/o Ramkhilawan, Aged About 63 Years R/o

                    Village      Janakpur        Tehsil         Bharatpur,      District       Korea,

                    Chhattisgarh .................Plaintiff, Chhattisgarh



                    2 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector Korea Baikunthpur,
                                    2

District Korea, Chhattisgarh .................Defendant No.3, District :

Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh

                                                     ... Respondent(s)

(Cause title taken from CIS)

For Appellant : Shri Pavas Sharma, Advocate For Respondent No. 1 : Shri Manjul Pal, Advocate appears on

behalf of Shri Jai Prakash Shukla,

Advocate For Respondent No. 2 : Shri Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate.

Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

Judgment on Board

07.04.2026

1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the

appellant/defendant challenging the impugned judgment and

decree dated 20.06.2016 passed by the Learned First

Additional District Judge Manendragarh District Korea (C.G.) in

Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2014 arising out of the judgment and

decree dated 28.06.2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge,

Class- II, Janakpur, District Korea (C.G.), in Civil Suit No.

75-A/2009 (Bisani vs. Ramdas & Others). For the sake of

convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status

before the learned trial Court.

2. (a) The civil suit has been instituted in respect of agricultural

lands situated at Village Patwahi, Tehsil Bharatpur, District

Korea (C.G.), bearing various Khasra numbers, as detailed in

the plaint. The suit has been filed seeking declaration of title

over half share (1/2) of the suit lands, permanent injunction,

and for declaring the sale deed dated 30.11.1992/01.01.1993

executed in favour of defendant No.1 as illegal, null and void.

(b) It is an admitted position that plaintiff is a resident of

Janakpur. Defendant No.2 and deceased Ganga are the

children of late Ramkhilawan and Jagta. The plaintiff was

brought up by Jagta. Ramkhilawan died in 1952; Raghuvar

died in 1953; Ganga died issueless in 1958-59; and Smt. Jagta

died in 1993. It is also admitted that no partition of the

properties of late Ramkhilawan had taken place during the

lifetime of Ganga.

(c) The plaintiff has set up a genealogical tree stating that

Ramkhilawan had two brothers namely; Sampat and Nachkau.

Jagta was initially married to Sampat and, after his death, to

Nachkau, from whom a son Bhullu was born. After Nachkau's

death, Jagta started residing with Ramkhilawan. The plaintiff

claims to be the son of Ramkhilawan and his legally wedded

wife Raghuvar and asserts that the suit lands are ancestral

and coparcenary properties recorded in the name of

Ramkhilawan.

(d) It is further pleaded that after the death of Ramkhilawan,

the names of the plaintiff and defendant No.2 were recorded

in the revenue records. The plaintiff claims possession and

cultivation over half share of the suit lands. Though a partition

order was passed by the Tahsildar, the same was set aside by

the Sub-Divisional Officer, Manendragarh, vide order dated

26.10.2007. Thereafter, defendant No.2 allegedly started

denying the plaintiff's title and attempting to dispossess him.

(e) The plaintiff has also alleged that with respect to certain

Khasra numbers, defendants No.1 and 2, in collusion, got a

fraudulent sale deed executed in the name of Jagta. It is

contended that Jagta was not the legally wedded wife of

Ramkhilawan and had no right or title over the suit lands, and

thus no valid title could pass to defendant No.1. The sale deed

is further challenged on the ground that Jagta, being about 90

years of age at the time, was not in a sound disposing state of

mind.

(f) According to the plaintiff, the cause of action arose on

26.10.2007 when the Sub-Divisional Officer set aside the

partition order and defendant No.2 denied the plaintiff's title.

Accordingly, the suit has been filed seeking declaration,

permanent injunction, and cancellation of the impugned sale

deed.

3. (A) The Defendants No.1 and 2 have jointly filed their written

statement and pleaded that late Ramkhilawan had brought

Jagta as his wife according to customary rites, and they lived

together as husband and wife throughout their lives. It is

denied that Raghuvar was the legally wedded wife of

Ramkhilawan, and it is further denied that the plaintiff is his

son. It is alleged that the plaintiff, by illegal means, got his

name recorded in the revenue records along with Jagta and

Jamuna without their knowledge. It is further pleaded that the

plaintiff had earlier filed a partition application in the year

1988, which was dismissed by the Tahsildar holding that the

plaintiff was not the son of Ramkhilawan. Thereafter,

suppressing the said order, the plaintiff again filed a partition

application in 2006, in which the Tahsildar passed a partition

order without proper hearing, which was subsequently set

aside by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Manendragarh, vide order

dated 20.10.2007.

(B) It is further pleaded by defendants No.1 and 2 that the sale

deed executed by Smt. Jagta is valid, as she was the wife of

late Ramkhilawan and had a share in the suit lands. On the

basis of the said sale deed, defendant No.1 is the lawful owner

of Khasra Nos. 421, 447 and 448. It is contended that the

plaintiff has no right, title or possession over the suit lands

and is not entitled to institute the suit. It is also pleaded that

the suit is barred by limitation. Hence, it is prayed that the suit

be dismissed with costs.

4. After appreciating the evidence available on record and after

framing the issues, the learned trial Court by the judgment

and decree dated 28.06.2014 allowed the suit of the plaintiff

holding that the plaintiff successfully proved that he is the son

of late Ramkhilawan on the basis of old revenue records and

school documents, which remained unrebutted. It further

held that the suit property is ancestral in nature, and

therefore the plaintiff is entitled to half share along with

defendant No.2. The impugned sale deed dated 01.03.1993

was held to be illegal and not binding, and accordingly the

suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. Thereagainst, the

Civil Appeal preferred by the defendant, which has been

dismissed vide the impugned judgment and decree by the

learned First Appellate Court. Thus, this appeal by the

defendant.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned

judgments and decrees passed by the learned Trial Court as

well as the learned First Appellate Court are contrary to law

and facts on record. It is contended that the suit filed by the

plaintiff for declaration and permanent injunction was barred

by limitation, as the cause of action had arisen in the year

1989 when the Tahsildar dismissed the plaintiff's application

for partition and directed him to approach the competent civil

court, whereas the suit was instituted only in the year 2008. It

is further submitted that the plaintiff has failed to prove by

any admissible evidence that he is the son of late

Ramkhilawan, and the learned courts have erred in placing

reliance upon revenue entries, which do not constitute proof

of relationship or paternity. It is also argued that the learned

Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court erred in

holding the sale deed dated 01.03.1993 to be illegal on the

ground of fraud, in absence of any specific pleading or

evidence, ignoring that a registered sale deed carries a

presumption of validity. Hence, it is prayed that the impugned

judgments and decrees be set aside.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the

material available on record.

7. Upon hearing learned counsel for the appellant and on

perusal of the record, this Court finds that the learned Trial

Court, on proper appreciation of oral and documentary

evidence, has rightly held that the plaintiff has proved that he

is the son of late Ramkhilawan. The finding is based on the

school certificate, admission register and the old revenue

records of the year 1954-55, which carry a presumption of

correctness, and the defendants have failed to rebut the same

by any cogent evidence. The learned Trial Court has also

correctly observed that the finding of the revenue authorities

regarding paternity is not binding, as they lack jurisdiction to

decide such issues.

8. The learned Trial Court further held that the suit properties

are ancestral and coparcenary in nature and that the plaintiff,

being the son of late Ramkhilawan, is entitled to half share

therein along with defendant No.2. Though there was

material to show that Jagta was residing with Ramkhilawan,

the learned trial Court as well as learned first appellate Court

have not accepted that she had any enforceable legal right in

the coparcenary property so as to alienate the same.

Consequently, it has been held that Jagta had no valid

authority to execute the sale deed in respect of the suit lands.

9. With regard to the sale deed dated 01.03.1993, the learned

Trial Court has rightly held that the same was not proved in

accordance with law, as the original document was not

produced, there were apparent discrepancies in the certified

copy, and no attesting witness was examined. The

surrounding circumstances, including the advanced age of the

executant, further cast doubt on its genuineness. Therefore, it

was held that no valid title passed to defendant No.1.

10. The learned First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the

entire evidence on record, has affirmed the findings recorded

by the learned Trial Court and has dismissed the appeal filed

by the defendants. The concurrent findings so recorded are

based on proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer

from any perversity, illegality or material irregularity.

11. The submissions advanced by learned counsel for the

appellant with regard to limitation, lack of proof of paternity,

and invalidity of the findings concerning the sale deed are

essentially questions of fact, which have been concurrently

decided by both the courts below. No substantial question of

law arises for consideration in the present case within the

meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

12. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal

under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely

limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal

involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of

fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with

unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no

evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

13. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First

Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the

basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant failed

to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient

material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any

perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so

recorded.

14. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second

Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and

challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do

not give rise to any substantial question of law within the

meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

15. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of

fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not

ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

16. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal

and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the

settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent

finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is

entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was

recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of

material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any

provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge

acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

17. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel

for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be

regarded as satisfying the test of being 'substantial question

of law' within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These

questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The

appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law

which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any

event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial

question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the

CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The

judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well

as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no

illegality and infirmity at all.

18. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby

dismissed at the motion stage itself.

Sd/-

(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib/Gowri