Mahesh Chand Sharma vs T.P. Jalpura Khurja Power Transmission ...
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Allahabad High Court

Mahesh Chand Sharma vs T.P. Jalpura Khurja Power Transmission ... on 28 July, 2025

Author: Shekhar Kumar Yadav

Bench: Shekhar Kumar Yadav

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:125351
 
Court No. - 36
 

 
Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 671 of 2025
 

 
Appellant :- Mahesh Chand Sharma
 
Respondent :- T.P. Jalpura Khurja Power Transmission Limited
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Rahul Sahai
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Varad Nath
 

 
Hon'ble Shekhar Kumar Yadav,J.
 

1. Heard Mr. Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Varad Nath, learned counsel for the respondent at the admission stage. Perused the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Trial Court and the learned First Appellate Court.

2. This Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter, "CPC"), challenging the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the learned District Judge, Bulandshahr, vide judgment and decree dated 29.05.2025 in Civil Appeal No. 188 of 2025, arising out of the judgment and decree dated 20.05.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bulandshahr, in Civil Suit No. 1360 of 2024 (Mahesh Chand Sharma Vs. T.P. Jalpura).

3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant- Mahesh Chand Sharma (plaintiff in the original suit), instituted Civil Suit No. 1360 of 2024 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bulandshahr, seeking a decree of permanent injunction against the respondent- T.P. Jalpura Khurja Power Transmission Limited (defendant), restraining it from interfering with his peaceful possession over the property in question. The appellant claimed possession over Farm No. 240, measuring 1.1380 hectares, situated in Village- Dhanora, Pargana and Tehsil- Sikandrabad, District- Bulandshahr (hereinafter, "the disputed property"). It was alleged that the respondent was attempting to lay transmission lines over the said land, thereby interfering with his possession.

4. On 11.12.2024, the trial Court initially granted a temporary injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the property. Subsequently, the respondent filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC (Paper No. 23 A2) seeking rejection of the plaint, contending that the plaintiff had failed to disclose any cause of action and had approached the court with unclean hands by suppressing material facts. It was submitted that the plaintiff had bypassed the procedure prescribed under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, which provides an efficacious remedy in such cases. The project in question was an infrastructure project, duly approved by the State of U.P. and U.P.E.R.C., and therefore, the suit was barred under Sections 20A and 41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It was also contended that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction in view of the special remedy available under the Telegraph Act.

5.The trial Court, vide its judgment and decree dated 20.05.2025, allowed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, holding that the suit was barred under Section 10 read with Sections 16 and 17 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, and Sections 20A and 41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Consequently, the plaint was rejected.

6. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred Civil Appeal No. 188 of 2025 before the learned District Judge, Bulandshahr, who, by judgment dated 31.05.2025, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court's order. Hence this second appeal.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was erroneous and premature. It was contended that Section 10 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, does not completely oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, and the question of jurisdiction involved mixed questions of fact and law, which could only be adjudicated upon full trial and evidence. It was further submitted that at the stage of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only the averments in the plaint are to be looked into, and not the defence raised in the written statement or reply.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant asserted that the plaint disclosed a valid cause of action, and the injunction was sought to protect possession. It was further argued that in the absence of the plaintiff's written consent, the provisions of the Telegraph Act would not apply. Reliance was placed on M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur vs. M/s. Vijaya Timber Co. (AIR 1997 SC 2364) and Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Ram Naresh Singh (AIR 2011 Patna 83), in support of the maintainability of the suit.

9. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the concurrent findings of the Courts below, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to disclose any sustainable cause of action and had approached the Court while suppressing crucial statutory facts. It was emphasized that the transmission project in question is an infrastructure project under the Electricity Act, 2003, read with Section 164, which grants the authority the powers of the Telegraph Authority. The provisions of the Specific Relief Act, particularly Sections 20A and 41(ha), explicitly bar courts from granting injunctions that impede or delay infrastructure projects.

10. It was submitted that the proper remedy lies under the Telegraph Act, particularly before the District Magistrate under Section 17(2), and that the Civil Court's jurisdiction stood impliedly barred. Reliance was placed on Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (AIR 2020 SC 3310) and Medanuri Shri Ram Chandra Murti vs. Sayyad Jalal (2017) 13 SCC 174, to argue for the rejection of frivolous or barred suits at the threshold.

11. The central issue in this Second Appeal is whether the concurrent findings of the courts below rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC give rise to any substantial question of law, as contemplated under Section 100 CPC.

12. A substantial question of law must be one that is debatable, has not been finally settled by authoritative precedent, or has a direct and material bearing on the outcome of the case. It must arise from the judgment under challenge and involve more than mere error in applying settled principles of law to facts.

13. Both the trial Court and Appellate Court recorded a clear finding that the suit, as framed, was barred by Sections 10, 16, and 17 of the Indian Telegraph Act, and by Sections 20A and 41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act. It is well settled that Section 164 of the Electricity Act, 2003, empowers transmission licensees with the powers of the Telegraph Authority, thereby attracting the mechanism under the Telegraph Act for laying electric lines.

14. Sections 16 and 17 of the Telegraph Act provide the appropriate remedy in case of resistance or obstruction, including a mechanism for adjudicating compensation claims through the District Magistrate. In light of this, and particularly in view of the express bar under Sections 20A and 41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act?both introduced by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018?any injunction which hampers or delays an infrastructure project is expressly prohibited.

15. Though, learned counsel for the appellant rightly argued that only the averments in the plaint are to be considered for Order VII Rule 11 CPC, even a plain reading of the plaint reveals that the relief sought?injunction against the execution of a transmission line?is barred by law. The courts below correctly applied the test laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dahiben and Medanuri Shri Ram Chandra Murti (supra) that clever drafting cannot circumvent statutory bars.

16. As regards the decision in Ganga Sagar Yadav and another Vs. Smt. Dulari and others, 2024 (162) ALR 610, cited by the appellant, this Court finds that the same is distinguishable. That case related to Civil Court jurisdiction in the context of the Electricity Act, 2003, specifically in relation to Section 145. However, the present case involves a statutory bar under the Specific Relief Act against injunctions restraining infrastructure projects, an entirely different legal framework.

17. Even assuming that the Civil Court retains a limited jurisdiction to examine procedural non-compliance or to grant compensation, the specific relief sought in this case?a perpetual injunction?is explicitly barred. When a plaint, on its very face, seeks a relief which is prohibited by law, it is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.

18. The trial Court rightly applied the principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhruv Green Field Ltd. Vs. Hukam Singh & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 416, wherein it was held that Civil Courts have no jurisdiction where a special statute provides a complete mechanism along with an express or implied bar.

19. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no perversity or illegality in the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the learned Courts below. The findings are based on a proper appreciation of the pleadings, statutory provisions, and judicial precedents. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in this Second Appeal within the meaning of Section 100 CPC.

20. Accordingly, this Second Appeal is dismissed at the admission stage. There shall be no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 28.7.2025

Krishna*