A lease of immoveable property determines—
(a) by efflux of the time limited thereby;
(b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some
event—by the happening of such event;
(c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event—by the happening of such event;
(d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right;
(e) by express surrender; that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease to the lessor, by mutual agreement between them;
(f) by implied surrender;
(g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter 1[* * *]; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; 2[or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event]; and in3[any of these cases] the lessor or his transferee4[gives notice in writing to the lessee of] his intention to determine the lease;
(h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other.
Illustration to clause (f)
A lessee accepts from his lessor a new lease of the property leased, to take effect during the continuance of the existing lease. This is an implied surrender of the former lease, and such lease determines thereupon.
COMMENTS
Doctrine of merger
The doctrine of merger is attracted when a leasehold and revision coincide. If the lessee purchases the lessor’s interest, the lease is relinquished as the same person cannot at the same time be both landlord and tenant. The doctrine of merger is based on the principle of union of two conflicting interests which cannot be held by one person at the same time. Therefore, the leasehold rights in favour of the appellants stand extinguished; Ramesh Kumar Jhambh v. Official Assignee, High Court Bombay, AIR 1993 Bom 374.
Implied surrender
There can be implied surrender, if the lessor grants a new lease to a third person with the assent of the lessee under the existing lease who delivers the possession to such person or where the lessee directs his sub-tenant to pay the rent directly to the lessor. Since the respondents had by executing the agreement impliedly surrendered their leasehold rights, they were no longer lessees; P.M.C. Kunhiraman Nair v. C.R. Nagaratha Iyer, AIR 1993 SC 307.
Clause (1) of section 111(g) has no application as there was no covenant prohibiting sale or on its breach, of the right of re-entry. Clause (2) of section 111(g) is also of no avail to the landlord for forfeiture because there is no unequivocal and clear disclaimer of title of the landlord. Therefore neither clause (1) nor (2) of section 111(g) are of any avail for forfeiture; Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand, AIR 1994 SC 227.
The statement by the tenant that he was not aware of as to who was his landlord cannot be held to be denial of title of landlord and no eviction decree by forfeiture was granted; Munisami Naidu v. C. Ranganathan, AIR 1991 SC 492.
It has been held that the Board was entitled to institute proceedings against the tenant as the notice period had expired; Vasant Kumar Radhakishan Vora v. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1991 SC 14.
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1. The words “or the lease shall become void” omitted by Act 20 of 1929, sec. 57.
2. Ins. by Act 20 of 1929, sec. 57.
3. Subs. by Act 20 of 1929, sec. 57, for “either case”.
4. Subs. by Act 20 of 1929, sec. 57, for “does some act showing”.
