Tripura High Court
Sri Pradip Kumar Ghosh vs The State Of Tripura on 20 November, 2025
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) No.306 of 2025
1. Sri Pradip Kumar Ghosh
S/O Late Paresh Chandra Ghosh,
resident of Bordowali, NBRC Para, opposite of NBRC Club,
PO: AD Nagar, Pin-799003, Agartala, District: West Tripura.
------ Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Tripura,
Represented by the Secretary,
Health & Family Welfare Department
Government of Tripura, Agartala, PO: New Secretariat,
Pin:799010, Agartala, District: West Tripura.
2. The Secretary, GA(AR) Department,
Government of Tripura, PO:New Secretariat,
PIN:799010 Agartala, District: West Tripura.
3. The Director of Health Services,
Government of Tripura,
P.O: Kunjaban, PIN:799006, Agartala,
PIN:799001, District-West Tripura.
4. The I/C Director of Health Services,
[Prof. (Dr.) Sanjib Kumar Debbarma]
Disciplinary authority Government of Tripura,
P.O- Kunjaban, PIN:799006, Agartala,
PIN:799001, District-West Tripura.
5. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Sadar, PO:Agartala, PIN:799001, District: West Tripura.
------ Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Debalay Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Agniva Chakrabarti, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Dipankar Sarma, Addl. G. A.,
Mr. Prabir Saha, Adv.
Date of hearing : 17.11.2025
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order : 20.11.2025
Whether fit for
reporting : YES
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking the following
reliefs:
i) admit this petition;
ii) call for the records.
iii) issue writ in the nature of Certiorari calling upon the
respondents to how cause as to why the suspension order dated
14-04-2024, should not be revoked and the petitioner be
reinstated in no time.
iv) issue writ in the nature of Certiorari calling upon the
respondents to how cause as to why the disciplinary proceeding
initiated vide Memorandum dated 07-03-2025 and the alleged
charges therein should not be set aside and quashed.
v) Pass an interim order staying the operation of suspension
order as well as the disciplinary proceeding initiated vide
Memorandum dated 07-03-2025 pending disposal of the writ
petition.
vi) Pass any other order/orders which your Lordship may deem
fit and proper;
2. Heard Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Debalay Bhattacharya
assisted by Learned Counsel Mr. Agniva Chakraborty appearing on
behalf of the petitioner. Also heard Learned Addl. G.A., Mr. Dipankar
Sarma appearing on behalf of the State-respondents and further
heard Learned Counsel, Mr. Prabir Saha appearing on behalf of the
respondent-Chief Electoral Officer.
3. Taking part in the hearing, Learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court that
the present petitioner has filed the writ petition seeking two reliefs-
one for revoking the suspension order and another for quashing of the
initiation of Departmental Proceeding vide memorandum dated
07.03.2025 issued by the State-respondents but during pendency of
the writ petition, the respondent-authority has revoked the
suspension order and as such, the petitioner is now only seeking relief
for quashing the initiation of Departmental proceeding vide
memorandum dated 07.03.2025.
In support of his contention, Learned Counsel first of all
drawn the attention of the Court that by memo dated 07.03.2025
(Annexure-IV), the respondent-authority drawn up Departmental
Proceeding against the present petitioner. Learned Senior Counsel
also drawn the attention of the Court referring the connected
documents of Annexure-4 i.e. Annexure-I, Annexure-II, Annexure-III
and Annexure-IV and submitted that in the memo dated 07.03.2025,
it was specifically mentioned by the respondent-authority that an
inquiry will be held in respect of Articles of Charge framed against the
petitioner based upon the Facebook posts as described in the
complaint have been found in the Facebook account in the name of
Pradip Kumar Ghosh i.e. the present petitioner but surprisingly no
complaint filed against the petitioner was supplied to the petitioner by
the respondent-authority at any time. Even the name of the
complainant was not disclosed and as such in absence of the name of
the complainant or in absence of citing the said alleged complainant
as witness in the charge-sheet, no proceeding can lie against the
present petitioner. Learned Senior Counsel further drawn the
attention of the Court that the suspension order has been issued by
the In-charge, Director of Health Services, Tripura and but the said
In-charge had no authority as Disciplinary Authority to issue any
suspension order and furthermore from the annexed documents it will
transpire that Dr. Sanjib Kumar Debbarma, In-charge, Director has
been cited as witness in the charge-sheet by the respondent-
authority, as such, the disciplinary authority cannot be cited as
witness to substantiate the alleged charge levelled against the
petitioner. So, Learned Counsel drawn the attention of the Court that
based on the vague charge-sheet which has got no legal basis the
proceeding cannot be continued against the petitioner and asked for
setting aside the Departmental Proceeding initiated against the
petitioner.
For the sake of convenience, the relevant Articles of Charge
are mentioned herein below:
Statement of articles of charges framed against Shri.
Pradip Kumar Ghosh, Pharmacist (Allo), IGM Hospital,
Agartala.
ARTICLE-I
That the said Shri. Pradip Kumar Ghosh, Pharmacist
(Allo), IGM Hospital, Agatala., while he is functioning as
Pharmacist (Allo), IGM Hospital, Agatala violation of Model
Code of Conduct (MCC) & the provisions of the Tripura Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules 1988, because Shri. Pradip Kumar
Ghosh, Pharmacist (Allo), IGM Hospital, Agatala was
involved in political campaign in the year of 2024 during
Look Sabha Election as per inquiry report submitted by the
Assistant Returning Officer (Sub-Divisional Magistrate), 8
Town Bordowali A/S, Sadar, West Tripura vide.
No.F.17(37)-SDM/DSR/ELECT/COMPT/2024/964-67,
date13-04-2024 and also Facebook Posts as described in
the complaint have been found in the Facebook account in
the name of one Pradip Kumar Ghosh.
Through the above activities, Shri. Pradip Kumar Ghosh,
Pharmacist (Allo), IGM Hospital, Agartala, like his status,
has shown a lack of integrity and also gross negligence for
performing government duty, which is most unbecoming on
his part and thus violated Rule-5 of TSCS (Conduct) Rules,
1988.
In support of his contention, Learned Senior Counsel relied
upon one judgment of the Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India
reported in (2010) 10 SCC 539 [titled as Mohd. Yunus Khan V.
State of Uttar Pradesh and others] wherein in para No.33, Hon'ble
the Apex Court observed as under:
"33. We are of the considered opinion that the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and the
conclusion thereof by the imposition of the punishment by
the Commandant, who had himself been a witness, was in
flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and
thus, stood vitiated. "Principles of natural justice are to
some minds burdensome but this price-a small price
indeed-has to be paid if we desire a society governed by
the rule of law." All other consequential orders passed in
appeal, etc. remained inconsequential. More so, a
protest/disobedience against an illegal order may not be
termed as misconduct in every case. In an appropriate
case, it may be termed as revolting to one's sense of
justice. In view of the above, we are of the considered
opinion that the protest raised by the appellant against the
punishment imposed for his absence could not give rise to
a cause of action for initiating the disciplinary
proceedings."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in
the present case at hand the Disciplinary Authority has been cited as
witness of the proceeding and as such in view of the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, this present proceeding cannot be
sustained against the petitioner and urged for quashing of the
proceeding.
Reliance was further placed upon another citation of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78
[titled as Union of India and other V. Gyan Chand Chattar]
wherein in para No.35, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"35. In view of the above, law can be summarised that an
enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict
adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of
natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and
giving details of the incident which formed the basis of
charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.
Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not
subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or
unreasonable, nor the same should be based on
conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof
and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the
delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must
record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the
context of the statute defining the misconduct."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in
view of the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the
present proceeding cannot lie against the present petitioner on vague
charge.
Reliance was again placed upon another citation of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (1979) 4 SCC 289
[titled as Krishna Kumar V. Divisional Assistant Electrical
Engineer and others], wherein in para No.5, Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
"5. In defence of the legality of the order of removal,
counsel for the respondents relies on paragraph 2 of
respondent 1's affidavit, dated January 7, 1978, wherein he
has stated that the power to make appointments to the
post of the Train Lighting Inspector was delegated to
certain other officers including the Divisional Assistant
Electrical Engineer. It is urged that since the Divisional
Assistant Electrical Engineer has been given the power to
make appointments to the post of the Train Lighting
Inspector, he would have the power to remove any person
from that post. We cannot accept this contention. Whether
or not an authority is subordinate in rank to another has to
be determined with reference to the state of affairs
existing on the date of appointment. It is at that point of
time that the constitutional guarantee under Article 311(1)
becomes available to the person holding, for example, a
civil post under the Union Government that he shall not be
removed or dismissed by an authority subordinate to that
which appointed him. The subsequent authorization made
in favour of respondent 1 in regard to making
appointments to the post held by the appellant cannot
confer upon respondent 1 to power to remove him. On the
date of the appellant's appointment as a Train Lighting
Inspector, respondent 1 had no power to make that
appointment. He cannot have, therefore, the power to
remove him."
Referring the same Learned Senior Counsel has drawn the
attention of the Court that the ratio of the said citation can be applied
in this case.
Finally, Learned Counsel again relied upon another citation
reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 [titled as Roop Singh Negi V.
Punjab National Bank and others] wherein in para No.18, Hon'ble
the Apex Court observed as under:
"18. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd.:(2006) 4 SCC 713 whereupon both the learned counsel
relied, this Court held: (SCC p. 724, para 26)
"26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and
consequently the Division Bench of the High Court
did not pose unto themselves the correct question.
The matter can be viewed from two angles. Despite
limited jurisdiction a civil court, it was entitled to
interfere in a case where the report of the enquiry
officer is based on no evidence. In a suit filed by a
delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ
court, in the event the findings arrived at in the
departmental proceedings are questioned before it, it
should keep in mind the following: (1) the enquiry
officer is not permitted to collect any material from
outside sources during the conduct of the enquiry.
(See State of Assam v. Mahendra Kumar Das:(1970)
1 SCC 709.) (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the
procedure is a part of the principles of natural
justice. (See Khem Chand v. Union of India:AIR 1958
SC 300 and State of U.P. v. Om Prakash
Gupta:(1969) 3 SCC 775.) (3) Exercise of
discretionary power involves two elements-(i)
objective, and (ii) subjective and existence of the
exercise of an objective element is a condition
precedent for exercise of the subjective element.
(See K.L. Tripathi v. SBI:(1984) 1 SCC 43) (4) It is
not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the
principles of natural justice which depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case but the concept
of fair play in action is the basis. (See Sawai Singh v.
State of Rajasthan:(1986) 3 SCC 454.) (5) The
enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the
charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of
a finding which was not the subject-matter of the
charges is wholly illegal. (See Export Inspection
Council of India v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra:(1987) 2 Cal
LJ 344) (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take
the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The
writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of
the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain
circumstances. (See Central Bank of India Ltd. v.
Prakash Chand Jain:AIR 1969 SC 983 and Kuldeep
Singh v. Commr. of Police:(1999) 2 SCC 10)""
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel drawn the
attention of the Court that if the proceeding is allowed to be continued
in that case the inquiry officer could not be permitted to travel beyond
the charges and as such on the basis of vague charge the proceeding
cannot continue against the present petitioner.
Learned Senior Counsel also referred another office
memorandum dated 18.10.2013 issued by the Government of India
wherein in para No.3(i), the Government of India observed as under:
"3. In view of the fact that complainants who desire to
protect their identity now have the protection of the Public
Interest Disclosure & Protection of Informers' Resolution-
2004(PIDPI), the following procedure is laid down for
handling anonymous and pseudonymous complaints, in
supersession of instructions contained in DoP&T's OM
No.321/4/91-AVD.III dated 29th September, 1992:
(i) No action is required to be taken on anonymous
complaints, irrespective of the nature of allegations
and such complaints need to be simply filed."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that
based upon anonymous complaint there is no scope to proceed
further in a case of this nature and as such the present case is
squarely covered by the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Apex
Court and the said notification of the Government of India and urged
for allowing this writ petition.
Learned Senior Counsel also drawn the attention of the Court
referring the Counter Affidavit filed by the State-respondents and
submitted that save and except denial nothing has been projected by
the respondent-authority countering the case of the present petitioner
and as such, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Counter
Objection cannot be accepted and the writ petition be allowed
imposing cost.
4. On the other hand, Learned Addl. G.A., Mr. D. Sarma,
appearing on behalf of the State-respondents submitted that the
suspension order issued against the petitioner by this time has been
revoked. It was further submitted by Learned Addl. G.A. that the case
is at the very nescent stage and at this stage, there is very limited
scope on the part of writ Court to issue any mandamus or certiorari
against the State-respondents. It was further submitted that since the
Departmental Proceeding is pending for adjudication and the present
petitioner shall have enough opportunity to contest the proceeding,
so, at this preliminary stage, there is no scope to challenge the
memorandum issued by the respondent-Authority. It was further
submitted by Learned Addl. G.A. referring Annexure-E and submitted
that based upon the recommendation of Chief Electoral Officer dated
29.04.2024, the Departmental Proceeding was initiated against the
present petitioner and there was no infirmity to the proceeding
initiated and further submitted that there is no merit in the petition
filed by the present petitioner and urged for dismissal of this writ
petition.
Learned Addl. G.A., Mr. D. Sarma, also pointed out that there
is no legal bar regarding citing of the In-charge Director, Mr. Sanjib
Kumar Debbarma as witness in the departmental proceeding because
according to Learned Addl. G.A. for the State-respondent, the
suspension order was issued by said Sanjib Kumar Debbarma as the
Disciplinary authority being the Director In-charge but he has been
cited as witness to substantiate the prosecution charge and in this
regard, the role of in-charge Director and Sanjib Kumar Debbarma will
be different and there is no legal bar that said Sanjib Kumar
Debbarma could not have made as witness in the charge-sheet or in
the departmental proceeding.
5. Learned Counsel Mr. Prabir Saha appearing on behalf of the
Chief Electoral Officer drawn the attention of the Court that by this
time suspension order issued against the petitioner has been revoked
and he relied upon Annexure-R/1 i.e. the order dated 23.09.2025
issued by In-charge, Director of Health Services, Government of
Tripura and it was further submitted that based upon the report of
authority the action was taken and the Election authority has got no
role in this matter because the Disciplinary proceeding has been
initiated by the State authority and Chief Electoral authority has got
no role in this subject matter and as such according to Learned
Counsel the Election Department has been falsely implicated as party
in this case and urged for striking out the name of Chief Electoral
Officer from this case.
6. I have perused the writ petition supported by the documents
on record as well as the counter affidavit filed by the respondents
annexed with the documents. Admittedly, by this time the suspension
order issued against the petitioner has been revoked by the authority
but the Disciplinary Proceeding is still pending against the petitioner.
Based upon the report of Returning Officer, 1-Tripura West
Parliamentary constituency (District Magistrate & Collectors) which
was further based upon the inquiry report submitted by Assistant
Returning Office(sub-Divisional Magistrate), 8-Town Bordowali
Assembly Constituency, Sadar, West Tripura, the present petitioner
was put under suspension by the authority and by the memo dated
07.03.2025, Departmental proceeding has been ordered to be drawn
up against him which is still pending for adjudication. It is not known
to this Court that what would be the ultimate result of the proceeding.
At the time of hearing, Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has
drawn the attention of the Court that the In-charge, Director of Health
Services being the Disciplinary authority cannot be cited as witness in
the charge-sheet. In this regard it is submitted that the order of
suspension was issued by the In-charge, Director of Health Services
being the Disciplinary Authority and in the charge-sheet, Sanjib
Kumar Debbarma has been cited as witness having separate entity. In
this regard in course of hearing, Learned Counsel although took the
plea but failed to show any law that the In-charge, Director cannot be
cited as witness in the charge-sheet.
It was also argued that no complaint was furnished and the
name of the complainant was not mentioned in the list of witnesses
but on perusal of the relevant documents annexed with the petition, it
appears that based upon facebook post the matter was inquired and
report was submitted by Sub-Divisional Magistrate to the appropriate
authority. Now, in course of Departmental Proceeding if the authority
fails to adduce the relevant documents to substantiate the charge
then law will proceed in accordance with law but simply on the basis
of that contention there is very ample scope to quash any
Departmental Proceeding.
7. The citations referred by Learned Counsel are no doubt
relevant but it appears that all the citations were based upon the final
order of the authority not against any initiation of proceeding. So,
those citations as relied upon in this case cannot be applied.
8. It is settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of writ court
is very limited to interfere with the departmental proceeding under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Until and unless the
Departmental proceeding is concluded it is very difficult on the part of
this Court to give any specific verdict regarding anomalies that have
been urged in course of hearing by Learned Counsel representing the
petitioner.
In this regard, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in a case
reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 [titled as Union of India and
another V. Kunisetty Satyanarayana] in para No.13, 14, 15 and
16, observed as under:
"13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court
that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-
cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing
Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh:(1996) 1 SCC 327, Special
Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse:(2004) 3 SCC 440
Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr., Mysore:(2001) 10 SCC 639,
State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma:(1987) 2 SCC 179, etc,
14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be
entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-
sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to
be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice
does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does
not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of
any party unless the same has been issued by a person
having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that
after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or
after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop
the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not
established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when
some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause
notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of
anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some
punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is
passed, that the said party can be said to have any
grievance.
15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence
such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be
exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-
sheet.
16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the
High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice
if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some
other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the
High Court should not interfere in such a matter."
Again, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India reported in
(2012) 11 SCC 565 [titled as Secretary, Ministry of Defence
and others V. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha] in para No.10 observed
as under:
"10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a
charge-sheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it
does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not
amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any
party unless the same has been issued by a person having
no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some
right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge-sheet does not
infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order
imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting
a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of
action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in
disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed
by the court. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt
Sharma:(1987) 2 SCC 179, Bihar State Housing Board v.
Ramesh Kumar Singh:(1996) 1 SCC 327, Ulagappa v.
Commr.:(2001) 10 SCC 639, Special Director v. Mohd.
Ghulam Ghouse:(2004) 3 SCC 440 and Union of India v.
Kunisetty Satyanarayana:(2006) 12 SCC 28.)"
Further, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 676 [titled as State of Jharkhand and others V.
Rukma Kesh Mishra] in para No.11 observed as under:
"11. A coordinate bench of this Court in Union of India v.
Kunisetty Satyanarayana:(2006) 12 SCC 28 has held that
ordinarily no writ lies against a show cause notice or
charge-sheet. The reason is that a mere show-cause notice
or charge-sheet does not give rise to any cause of action,
because it does not amount to an adverse order affecting
the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by
a person having no jurisdiction to do so (emphasis
supplied). Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and
hence such discretion under Article 226 should not
ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or
charge-sheet. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional
cases the High Court can quash a show cause notice or
charge-sheet if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction
or for some other reason it is wholly illegal (emphasis
supplied). However, ordinarily the High Court should not
interfere in such a matter."
From the aforesaid citations and also the observation made
by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the aforenoted cases, it appears that no
writ petition lies against any charge-sheet or show-cause notice as
the same does not give any cause of action because it does not
amount to any adverse order which effects the right of party unless
the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so.
Here in the case at hand in course of hearing Learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioner drawn the attention of the Court certain points that
the In-charge Director had no authority to issue suspension order and
he has been citated as witness in the Departmental Proceeding
although in this regard the petitioner could not satisfy the Court
showing any law to substantiate that contention. Furthermore,
according to Learned Senior Counsel the complaint was not supplied
and the name of the complainant was not disclosed in the list of
witnesses of the Departmental Proceeding. The inquiry proceeding is
still subjudiced for disposal before the competent authority. So,
considering the materials on record, it appears to this Court that this
case is prematured one which does not warrant interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. So, considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the aforenoted cases in the considered opinion of this Court the
present petitioner is not entitled to get any relief in this writ petition
at this stage till conclusion of the proceeding pending against him.
9. In the result, the writ petition filed by the present petitioner
stands dismissed being devoid of merit at this stage. The petitioner is
not entitled to the relief as prayed for i.e. quashing of the
Departmental Proceeding initiated against him by memo dated
07.03.2025. However, it is made clear that the respondent-authority
shall make all endeavour to dispose of the Departmental Proceeding
pending against the petitioner within a period of 6(six) months from
the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment failing which the
Departmental Proceeding initiated against the petitioner shall be
deemed to have been cancelled/abated.
With the above observation, this writ petition stands disposed
of.
Pending applications(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
MOUMITA Digitally signed by
MOUMITA DATTA
DATTA Date: 2025.11.24
12:56:56 -08'00'
Deepshikha
