Md. Saif Ali Ansari vs The State Of Bihar
2026 Latest Caselaw 35 Patna

Patna High Court

Md. Saif Ali Ansari vs The State Of Bihar on 12 January, 2026

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                     CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No. 3303 of 2022
        Arising Out of PS. Case No.-121 Year-2019 Thana- JAGDISHPUR District- Bhagalpur
     ======================================================
     MD. SAIF ALI ANSARI Son of Shakil Ansari Resident of Village - Momin Tola,
     Uttari Puraini, P.S.- Jagdishpur, Distt.- Bhagalpur.

                                                                      ... ... Petitioner/s
                                           Versus
1.   The State of Bihar
2.   RAVINA TABASSUM D/o Md. Sohail Resident of Village - Ahmad Khani,
     Puraini, P.S.- Jagdishpur, Distt.- Bhagalpur.

                                            ... ... Opposite Party/s
     ======================================================
     Appearance :
     For the Petitioner/s    :        Mr. Syed Masleh Uddin Ashraf, Sr. Advocate
                                      Mr. Shehan Ashraf, Advocate
     For the State           :        Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, APP
     ======================================================
     CORAM: HONOURABLE JUSTICE SMT. SONI SHRIVASTAVA
                      ORAL JUDGMENT
      Date : 12-01-2026

                        Heard Mr. S.M. Ashraf, learned Senior counsel for

      the petitioner assisted by Mr. Shehan Ashraf, learned Advocate

      and Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, learned APP for the State.

                      2. Despite valid service of notice, none appears on

      behalf of opposite party no.2.

                      3. The present application has been filed for quashing

      of the order dated 17.11.2021 passed by the learned Additional

      Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in S.Tr. No. 161 of 2021 (arising

      out of Jagdispur P.S. Case No.121 of 2019) whereby and

      whereunder the petition dated 26.10.2021 filed by the petitioner

      under Section 227 Cr.P.C. to discharge the petitioner under

      Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as

      IPC) has been rejected.

                        4. The brief facts leading to the impugned order
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         emanates from an F.I.R bearing Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 121 of

         2019 dated 26.04.2019, registered under Section 341, 376,

         379/34 of the IPC on the written statement of the informant

         Rabina Tabassum aged about 25 years, alleging inter alia that

         on the allurement and pretext of marriage, the informant was

         subjected to sexual exploitation by the petitioner for the last one

         year. The F.I.R further discloses that on 22.04.2019, on being

         asked by the petitioner to come along with him for getting

         married, she left her home along with cash and jewellery and

         went along with the petitioner to his maternal uncle's house

         where they stayed in a room where the father of the petitioner

         had arrived and upon his assurance for marriage, she, along with

         the petitioner, came back to her village whereafter the mother of

         the petitioner also assured the informant's parents about

         marriage which never happened. Hence, the present case was

         instituted stating in the F.I.R that other members of the family

         are also preventing the marriage to happen.

                         5. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted

         against the petitioner and others and cognizance was taken

         thereupon under Section 376, 341 read with Section 34 of the

         IPC and after commitment of the case to the Court of Sessions,

         the petitioner filed the discharge application under Section 227
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         of Cr.P.C. which stood rejected vide the impugned order dated

         17.11.2021.

                         6

. A report with regard to the stage of the case has

been called for which reveals that charges have not been framed

as yet.

7. Mr. S.M. Ashraf, learned Senior counsel

appearing on behalf of petitioner has assailed the impugned

order primarily on the ground that no offence is made out

against the petitioner, much less an offence under Section 376 of

the IPC. He has substantiated his submission on account of the

fact that a bare perusal of the allegations made in the F.I.R itself

would disclose that the petitioner and the informant/victim were

having a relationship which was continuing for the past one year

and the informant being a 25 years old adult, as she herself

claims in the F.I.R, had entered into physical relationship with

the petitioner with open eyes and there is no allegation of any

threat perception or any force or coercion exercised upon her.

He has thus submitted that a relationship between two

consenting adults would not bring the case within the ambit of

Section 376 of IPC. Learned Senior Counsel has further

submitted that even in the statement of the informant/victim

recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she has not whispered a Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

single word with regard to any sexual assault by the petitioner

and has rather narrated the story in a different manner making

reference to assurance given by the petitioner's parents,

specifically her mother about getting her married to the

petitioner which is a definite pointer to the fact that there was a

bona fide intention of marriage with the opposite party no.2 and

there was no misconception of fact. The medical examination of

the informant/victim has also been referred to by the learned

Senior counsel to submit that the informant was an adult and

upon vaginal swab examination, no spermatozoa was found,

which is further indicative of the fact that medical evidence also

did not corroborate the allegations made in the F.I.R by the

informant. To buttress his submissions with respect to the

offence under Section 376 of IPC not being made out, the

learned Senior counsel has relied upon some recent judgments

of the Hon'ble Apex Court which are as follows:-

(a) Jaspal Singh Kaural Vs. The State (NCT of

Delhi) & Anr. reported in (2025) 5 SCC 756.

(b) Surendra Khawse Vs. State of Madhya

Pradesh & Anr. (2025 INSC 1143)

(c) Prashant Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in

(2025) 5 SCC 764 Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

8. Per contra, the learned APP for the State has

opposed the present application on the ground that the

allegations made in the F.I.R along with the materials collected

during course of investigation constitute an offence under the

aforementioned provisions of Section 376 of IPC as the

informant was sexually exploited upon a false promise to marry

which is indicative of the fact that she had entered into a

physical relationship upon a misconception of fact and as such

the consent given by the informant would be no consent in the

eyes of law. The learned APP has thus defended the impugned

order by stating that there are sufficient grounds to proceed

against the petitioner and the order impugned requires no

interference.

9. After having heard the rival contentions of the

parties and having considered the impugned order as also the

material on record, the moot question which falls for

consideration before this Court is as to whether there is

sufficient material on record and grounds for proceeding against

the petitioner, prosecuting him under Section 376 of the IPC.

10. Upon examining the contents of the F.I.R and the

other materials on record, it is clear that the prosecutrix is a 25

years old adult and had entered into a relationship with the Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

petitioner, which was continuing for the past one year leading to

the inference that there was a consensual relationship between

two adults. However, there is an allegation that sexual

exploitation of the informant was done on the pretext of

marriage. At this stage, it needs to be considered that there can

be several reasons for developing physical intimacy between

two consenting partners and the question of entering into a

relationship under a misconception of fact needs to be

established by way of specific assertion and material to show

that the informant was made to enter into such relationship upon

a false promise to marry and that she would not have done so in

absence of such promise and assurance, coupled with the fact

that the petitioner, in fact, never had any intention to marry the

informant right from the inception.

11. The facts and materials disclosed in the present

case, in no way, point towards any such intention of the

petitioner to have sexually exploited her without intending to

marry her. The prosecutrix has rather herself stated that it was

due to the interference by the family members, including the

parents of the petitioner, that impediments were caused in the

marriage which could not fructify as a consequence of the same.

It has to be kept in mind that there is a clear cut distinction Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

between a 'false promise' to marry, which would come under

the purview of misconception of fact as envisaged under Section

90 of the IPC and a 'breach of promise' which is a result of

some supervening circumstances on account of which a promise

earlier made has not been honored. In this regard, it would be

apt to refer to a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Naim Ahmed Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)

reported in (2023) 15 SCC 385 wherein the distinction between

a false promise to marry and a breach of promise has been

clarified in paragraph 21 of the said judgment which is being

quoted hereunder:-

"21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court."

12. The aforesaid issue of a woman engaging in

sexual relations on the basis of misconception of fact amounting

to rape and a breach of promise being distinct from a false

promise has also been dealt with in several other judicial

pronouncements rendered by this Court as also the Hon'ble

Apex Court and such grounds have led to quashing of the entire

prosecution.

13. In the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court summarized the legal position with

regard to "consent" of a woman vis-a-vis "mis-conception of

fact" arising out of a false promise to marry. Paragraph 18 of the

said judgment is being quoted hereunder:-

"18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."

14. Upon analysis of the facts of the present case, it

can be safely concluded that there is nothing on record to

indicate that it is only on account of a false promise to marry

that the prosecutrix had engaged herself in a physical

relationship with the petitioner and thus, existence of any such Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

assurance or promise to marry cannot be said to bear a direct

nexus with the decision of the informant to engage in any sexual

act.

15. This Court cannot also loose sight of the fact

that the informant, who by virtue of her age and maturity, was

capable enough to take her independent decisions and engaging

in a sexual relationship with the petitioner was a conscious and

informed choice made by the informant, being in a position to

assess the morality or immorality attached to the act in which

she indulged with the petitioner without there being any force or

coercion upon her. Such a willful conduct would lead to only an

inevitable conclusion of her willingness in carrying a

relationship, including physical intimacy with the petitioner, as

such, her consent was totally voluntary. A criminal prosecution

under Section 376 of IPC cannot be permitted to be initiated and

to continue merely on account of the reason that a cordial and

consensual relationship between a consenting couple does not

materialize and fructify into a marital relationship. This

proposition has been clearly laid down in the recent judgment

rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prashant

Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2025) 5 SCC 764 and

paragraph 19 of the said judgment is being quoted hereunder:-

Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

"19. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-

sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017.

Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship.......................... ...............................................]."

16. It has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Samadhan Vs. State of Maharashtra &

Anr. reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 2528 that the Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

continuation of prosecution in case of a voluntary and

consensual relationship devoid of any coercion, fraud or mis-

representation, would amount to an abuse of the Court

machinery. Paragraph 40 of the said judgment is being quoted

hereunder:-

"40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of respondent No. 2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In our opinion, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained of in the present case occurred within the contours of a relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing short of an abuse of the court machinery."

17. The impugned order rejecting the application

for discharge suffers from illegality as it was well within its

jurisdiction to sift and weigh the evidence available on record to Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

assess as to whether there was sufficient grounds to proceed or

not against the petitioner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

case of Kanchan Kumar Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2022)

9 SCC 577, has clearly enunciated the legal position with regard

to discharge that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court

concerned is not to act as a mere post office. It is true that there

can be no meticulous sifting of evidence at this stage but the

satisfaction of the Court with the materials available to see

whether the case is made out for trial, has to be reached. A

roving inquiry is not to be undertaken but a simple and

necessary inquiry for proper adjudication of an application for

discharge is required to be undertaken by the concerned Court.

In any view of the matter, there is a duty cast on the Court to

provide protection against vexatious and unwanted prosecution

and in the process of granting such protection, this Court would

choose to exercise the inherent jurisdiction provided under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground of abuse of process of law

and the parameters and guidelines of such power under Section

482 Cr.P.C. has been clearly formulated in the case of State of

Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., [1992 Supp (1)

SCC335] and the relevant parameters for quashing are being

quoted hereunder:-

Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

"102.............................................

...................................................

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

......................................................... ........................................................ (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

18. Taking into consideration both the factual

conspectus of the case as also the settled legal position as

discussed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that Patna High Court CR. MISC. No. 3303 of 2022 dt.12-01-2026

the present prosecution against the petitioner is not only

frivolous and vexatious, but the necessary ingredients of the

offence under Section 375 of the IPC in order to prosecute the

petitioner particularly for an offence under Section 376 of IPC is

clearly and visibly not made out. In such view of the matter

continuance of prosecution would amount to abuse of process of

the Court, hence, the impugned order dated 17.11.2021 passed

by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in S.Tr.

No. 161 of 2021 (arising out of Jagdispur P.S. Case No.121 of

2019) is hereby quashed.

19. Accordingly, the present application filed by the

petitioner is allowed.

(Soni Shrivastava, J)

Harsh/-

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