Munnulal Warkade Urf Lakki vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 April, 2026

                                                               1                          MCRC-14717-2026
                              IN        THE    HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                     AT JABALPUR
                                                          BEFORE
                                           HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
                                                     ON THE 2 nd OF APRIL, 2026
                                              MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 14717 of 2026
                                               MUNNULAL WARKADE URF LAKKI
                                                           Versus
                                               THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
                           Appearance:
                                   Shri Mansoori Shakeel Ahmad - Advocate for the petitioner.

                                   Shri Tapan Bathre - Panel Lawyer appeared for respondent.

                                                                   ORDER

This is first application filed by the applicant under Section 483 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for grant of regular bail relating to FIR/Crime No.95/2026 registered at Police Station - Bargi, District - Jabalpur for the offence punishable under Sections 64 (2) (f), 64 (2) (m) and 69 of the BNS. Applicant is in detention since 15.02.2026.

2. As per prosecution story, allegation against the present applicant is that on the pretext of marriage he has committed rape with the

prosecutrix.

3. Counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is innocent and he has falsely been implicated in crime in question. The applicant and the prosecutrix both are major aged about 24 years and 21 years, respectively and they are known to each other. They remained in physical relationship for a long period of seven months with the consent of each other. No forceful

2 MCRC-14717-2026 act is attributed to the present applicant. It is vehemently contended that no ingredient under Section 69 of the BNS is satisfied. The applicant is a young boy having no criminal antecedent. He will be available and cooperate in the process of investigation. There is no need of custodial interrogation of the present applicant. Conclusion of trial will take considerable time. In these circumstances, the applicant may be granted bail.

4. Learned counsel for the State has vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of bail and submits that from the statement of the prosecutrix prima facie offence is made out and therefore, application for bail is liable to be rejected.

5. I have considered the submissions made at the Bar. It is appropriate to refer to section 69 of BNS, which is reproduced as under:-

"Section 69 - Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means etc. Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, and has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine."

6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Samadhan Vs. State if Maharashtra in Cr.A. No.5001/2025, in para 34 to 40 has held as under:

"34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled

3 MCRC-14717-2026 respondent No.2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No.2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No.2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No.2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.

35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under:

"33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure

whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a

4 MCRC-14717-2026 police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship.

34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception.

35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident.

However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage

5 MCRC-14717-2026 must be stopped.

39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused." (underlining by us)

36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278, wherein this Court had stated that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred.

37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No.2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the

6 MCRC-14717-2026 marriage of respondent No.2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned.

38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made:

"29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , in which it was held as follows: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) "21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or

misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear

7 MCRC-14717-2026 distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives xxx

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to

8 MCRC-14717-2026 marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The 'failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance'. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her."

39. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all these parameters, a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out. The Court held that quashing may be appropriate: "102. xxx (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose

9 MCRC-14717-2026 a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. xxx"

40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of respondent No.2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In our opinion, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained of in the present case occurred within the contours of a relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing short of an abuse of the court machinery."

7. Considering the judgments and facts of the present case as there is no coercion is found even in the material available on record and keeping in view conduct of the parties as well as status and age of the parties, and also considering the principle 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' as well as Article 21 of the Constitution of India, without expressing any view on the merits of the case, I deem it a fit case to release the applicant on bail. Therefore, the application is allowed.

8 . It is directed that applicant be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) with

10 MCRC-14717-2026 one solvent surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court, for his regular appearance before the trial Court during trial with a condition that he shall remain present before the concerned Court on all the dates fixed by it during trial and shall co-operate in trial. He shall abide by all the conditions enumerated under Section 480(3) of BNSS, 2023.

9 . This order shall be effective till the end of the trial. However, in case of bail jump and breach of any of the conditions of bail, it shall become ineffective.

Certified copy as per rules.

(SANDEEP N. BHATT) JUDGE