Madhya Pradesh High Court
Radharaman Mishra vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 11 September, 2025
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1 WP. No. 6160 of 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
WRIT PETITION No. 6160 of 2014
RADHARAMAN MISHRA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Girija Shankar Sharma and Shri Satendra Singh Rawat- Advocates for
petitioner.
Shri Rohit Shrivastava- Panel Lawyer for respondent/State.
Reserved on : 05.08.2025
Pronounced on : 11.09.2025
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
The petitioner has approached this Court, under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, seeking redressal against the rejection of his repeated
representations for reinstatement to the post of Constable in the Madhya Pradesh
Police vide order dated 23.08.2007 (Annexure P-1) & 31.10.2012 (Annexure P-
1A), subsequent to his acquittal by this Court in a criminal appeal. The reliefs
sought by petitioner are:
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"(1). Hence, it is humbly prayed that the petition of the petitioner
may kindly be allowed and the writ of certiorari or any other
suitable writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit
in the facts and circumstances of the case whereby, quashing the
orders dated 23.8.2007, 31.10.2012 and 25.1.1996 Annexures P/1,
P/1A and P/4 passed by the respondents directing them to reinstate
petitioner in service back with all consequential benefits including
the back wages since the date of his initial illegal suspension.
(2) Any other relief which is just and proper including the costs
throughout may also be allowed."
2. The essential facts, as culled from the pleadings and not substantially
disputed, reveal that petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the Police
Department on 14.04.1976 and had rendered over a decade of service. By the time,
he was made accused in a criminal case under Sections 302 and 394 of the Indian
Penal Code in the year 1988. By order dated 27.05.1989, services of petitioner
were suspended. The trial resulted in his conviction with a sentence to life and 5
Years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine, whereupon, by order dated 25.01.1996,
the petitioner was dismissed from service by respondent No.5. Aggrieved from
conviction, he preferred Criminal Appeal No.48/1996 before the Division Bench
of this Court. Vide judgment dated 17.05.2005, the Division Bench of this Court,
upon critical appreciation of the entire evidence, acquitted the petitioner extending
him the benefit of doubt and observing that the prosecution had failed to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the conviction having been
judicially annulled, the legal substratum of the dismissal order stands vitiated. It is
further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that to justify the meaning
of "acquittal" Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered in case of Commissioner of
Police, New Delhi And Another Vs. Mehar Singh reported in (2013) 7 SCC 685
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and held that when court has acquitted the accused after full consideration of
prosecution case and prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge leveled
against the accused then it can possibly be said that the accused was "honorably
acquitted", and similar proposition has been decided in the case of Smt. Panna
Mehta Vs State of M.P. reported in 2002 (4) M.P.H.T. 226, Para-11 and Para 12
of which read as under:
"11-In the Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Penal Code, Evidence
Act or any other enactment, the word "acquittal" has not been
defined. As per the Law Lexicon, the Encyclopedic Law Dictionary
(Edn. 1992) "Acquittal" defined, Act X of 1882, Section 403, "the
word acquittal is verbum equivoque, and may in ordinary language
be used to express either the verdict of a jury or the formal judgment
of the Court, that the prisoner is not guilty". (Per Tindal, C.J.,
Burgess v. Boetefeur, 13 LJMC 126: 135 ER 193). It is generally said
that a party is acquitted by the jury, but in fact, the acquittal is by the
judgment of the Court (ibid). According to the Oxford Dictionary,
"acquittal" means that a person is not guilty of a crime, with which he
has been charged. So in a Criminal Jurisprudence there is no
difference between "clean acquittal", "honorable acquittal" or
"acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt". When the accused is
acquitted by giving benefit of doubt means the prosecution was not
able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
12. As Ruled by the Supreme Court in case of Manni Lal v. Parmai
Lal (AIR 1971 SC 330) and Dilip Kumar Sharma and Ors. Vs State
of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1976 SC 133), order of acquittal means a
person concerned, has not committed the offence for which he was
charged and tried. Criminal Courts are recording acquittal when the
prosecution fails to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and
benefit of doubt given to the accused does not mean that the accused
was involved in the case but the same could not be proved by the
prosecution. In Criminal Law, words "beyond reasonable doubt"
cannot be termed as stigma or proof of any criminal charge against
acquitted accused."
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4. It is submitted that it is undisputed that petitioner has been dismissed from
the service on the basis of conviction of criminal case registered against him under
Sections 302, 394 IPC and learned trial court has convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment, but subsequently in a Criminal Appeal No.48/1996 this Court
acquitted the petitioner after consideration of full evidence and set aside
conviction order, therefore, in such circumstances petitioner is liable to be
reinstated in service with full back wages. It is further submitted that against the
acquittal order State has not filed any proceeding before the Apex court and any
other competent Court, however, respondents are applying the proposition
mentioned in the order impugned which is not applicable in termination case. That
proposition is applicable in fresh recruitment or if appointment order has been
obtained by suppressing the criminal antecedents. Thus, it is submitted by learned
counsel for petitioner that petitioner is entitled to reinstatement.
5. Despite this judicial exoneration, the petitioner's subsequent representations
seeking reinstatement were met with either apathy or rejection. The authorities, in
their impugned orders dated 23.08.2007 and 31.10.2012, denied relief solely on
the ground that the acquittal was not "honourable" but one granted on the basis of
benefit of doubt. Though in General Manager (Operations) State Bank of India
And Another Vs. R. Periyasamy reported in (2015) 3 SCC 101, it was held as
under :-
"13. ............An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand
on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial,
where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. ..........."
but the same could have been considered at a stage when departmental enquiry
was conducted by the respondents or petitioner be given a reasonable opportunity
of being heard.
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6. Per contra, learned Government Advocate while supporting the impugned
order submitted that after conviction of petitioner in Sessions Trial No.90/1989,
respondent No.5 issued the termination order of petitioner dated 25.01.1996
according to the provision under Section 238 of M.P. Police Regulations. Since
conviction order has been passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shivpuri,
therefore separate departmental enquiry is not required. It is submitted that the
acquittal of petitioner was based on 'benefit of doubt'. It does not come in the
preview of 'honorable acquittal'. Therefore, the respondents turned down the
application of petitioner for reinstatement in service vide their office order dated
23.08.2007 and 31.10.2012. Learned counsel for the State placed reliance on
judgment dated 14/03/2019 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Bunty in Civil Appeal No(S).
3046/2019 in which it is held as under:-
"13. The law laid down in the aforesaid decisions makes it clear that
in case acquittal in a criminal case is based on the benefit of doubt or
any other technical reason the employer can take into consideration
all relevant facts to take an appropriate decision as to the fitness of an
incumbent for appointment/continuance in service. The decision taken
by the Screening Committee in the instant case could not have been
faulted by the Division Bench."
7. It is further submitted by learned counsel for respondents that Police
Department is a disciplined force having primary duty to maintain law and order.
Therefore, it is necessary that the employees working in the police department
must be of honest character having high values. They are required to deal with not
only the general public but are also required to check the activities of the criminals
and to ensure that no wrong-doer goes scotfree and is brought to the Court for trial.
If any person who is having criminal tendency is working in the police department,
then because of his inclination towards the crime and criminals, he may not
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discharge his duties with utmost honesty and may protect the criminals which
would be certainly detrimental to the civilized society and because of this reason,
services of petitioner were terminated by respondent No.5. It is submitted that
departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the
acquittal is other than honourable.
8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. It is a matter of record that the State has not challenged the judgment of
acquittal before any superior forum. The conviction having been judicially
annulled, the legal substratum of the dismissal order stands vitiated. It is trite that
once the conviction is set aside, unless a separate departmental proceeding is
initiated to establish independent misconduct or unsuitability for service, the
employee becomes entitled to reinstatement. This principle stands fortified by the
law laid down in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Sharif Khan reported in
2006 (4) M.P.H.T. 140 (DB), and reiterated in Brahma Chandra Gupta v. Union
of India, AIR 1984 SC 380, where the Apex Court held that an acquittal --
whether by benefit of doubt or otherwise -- erases the basis of punitive action,
unless the department proves undesirability of retention through an independent
inquiry.
10. The continued denial of reinstatement, without the protective safeguard of a
regular inquiry, is arbitrary and suffers from application of mind. The rejection of
the petitioner's representations on the basis of a legally non-existent conviction is
patently perverse. That the petitioner had rendered long and meritorious service,
receiving 86 commendations, is a relevant consideration that has been
conveniently ignored by the respondents. Moreover, the State has not
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demonstrated any material that would justify a finding of unsuitability or
misconduct independent of the criminal case.
11. It also bears mention that while the impugned orders are dated 23.08.2007
and 31.10.2012 respectively, the petitioner has placed on record voluminous
correspondence and representations made from time to time, including to the
Superintendent of Police, the Home Minister, etc., thereby evidencing a continuing
cause and active pursuit of his remedy. In light of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Union of India And Others v. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC
648, delay in such matters can be condoned where injustice is continuing.
12. Rules 238, 239, 240 and 241 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations read
as under:
**238- QkStnkjh vijk/kksa esa naM & tc iqfyl vf/kdkjh nkafMd vijk/k dh nks"kflf)
ij lJe dkjkokl ds naM ls nafMr fd;k x;k gks vkSj vihy esa naM ;Fkkor j[kk x;k
gks ;k dksbZ vihy u dh xbZ gks rc og cy ls c[kkZLr dj fn;k tk,xkA
ijUrq 'krZ ;g gS fd ;fn mldk vijk/k xaHkhj ;k viekutud ç--fr dk ugha Fkk vkSj
dkjkokl bruk yEck ugha jgk gS fd og [kqn viekutud gks] rc ;g egkfujh{kd ds
foosd ij gksxk fd cy esa mldks j[ks jgus dh vuqefr nh tk, A
239- lkns dkjkokl ls naM & tc dksbZ iqfyl vf/kdkjh nkafMd vijk/k dk nks"kfl)
fd;k x;k gks vkSj lkns dkjkokl ;k vFkZnaM ls nafMr fd;k x;k gks rc vko';d :i
ls mls c[kkZLr ugha fd;k tk,xk] fdUrq ;fn mldk cy esa j[kuk mfpr fn[krk gks rks
egkfujh{kd dh Loh--fr ls cy esa cuk, j[kk tk ldrk gSA
240- vihy Lohdkj fd, tkus ij iquLFkkZiu& ;fn nafMr djus okys U;k;ky; ds
naMkns'k ds fo#) vihy gksrh gks vkSj ,slh vihy tks lEcfU/kr iqfyl vf/kdkjh }kjk
is'k dh xbZ gks mlds ifj.kkeLo:i mldh nks"kflf) fujLr dh tkrh gS vkSj mldh
mlds iwoZ in esa iqu% inLFk djuk vko';d çrhr gks rc mldh c[kkZLrxh ¼inP;qfr½
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ij fd;k x;k çcU/k myVuk iM+sxkA bl çdkj gqbZ fjfä esa ;FkklaHko dksbZ ewyHkwr
inksUufr;ka ;k çcU/k rc rd ugha fd;k tk,xk tc rd fd&
¼i½ ;fn dksbZ vihy is'k ugha dh xbZ gks rc frfFk ftl ij vihy ds fy,
Loh--r vof/k lekIr gks tk, A
¼ii½ ;fn vihy is'k dh tkrh gS] rc mPpre vihyh; çkf/kdkjh ds vkns'k ds
fnukad lekIr u gks tk, A
241- nks"k eqfä ds ekeys& tc nkafMd U;k;ky; }kjk fdlh iqfyl vf/kdkjh dk
fopkj.k fd;k x;k gks vkSj nks"keqä fd;k x;k gks rc fu;er% mls iqu% inLFk fd;k
tkuk pkfg,A tc vijk/k ftlds fy, mldk fopkj.k fd;k x;k ;k ogh naM ds
fy, ,dek= vk/kkj cukrk Fkk rc mls foHkkxh; :i ls nafMr ugha fd;k tkuk pkfg,A
fQj Hkh ;fn nks"keqfä] pkgs ewy {ks=kf/kdkj ds U;k;ky; }kjk gks ;k vihyh;
U;k;ky; }kjk gkss] rduhdh vk/kkj ij vk/kkfjr Fkk ;k fopkj.k esa fl) rF; çnf'kZr
djrs gSa fd mldk 'kkldh; lsok esa jksddj j[kk tkuk vokaNuh; gS rc egkfujh{kd
dh Loh--fr çkIr djus ds ckn ofj"B v/kh{kd@v/kh{kd mlds vkpj.k dk foHkkxh;
laKku ys ldrk gSA**
13. The provisions contained in Rules 238, 239, 240 and particularly Rule 241
of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations categorically prescribe that an acquitted
police officer shall not be departmentally punished unless the competent authority
independently comes to the conclusion that his retention is undesirable and such a
conclusion must be based on cogent material established through a separate
enquiry. In the case at hand, the respondents neither initiated any departmental
enquiry post-acquittal nor afforded the petitioner an opportunity to refute any
charge of misconduct. The action, therefore, stands vitiated by gross violation of
natural justice.
14. As per judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Kanhaiyalal Parmar
Vs. State of M.P. and others reported in [2006 (2) MPLJ 522], after acquittal of
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the delinquent, he is entitled to full pay and allowance. This Court in the case of
Mansingh s/o Laxman Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. and others
reported in [2006 (3) MPLJ 182] has held that a Show Cause Notice should be
given in case the employer arrives at a conclusion that no payment of salary has to
be done towards suspension period. In the case of Y.S. Sachan Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh and others reported in [2003 (4) MPLJ 219] a minor
punishment was inflicted upon the employee and this Court had directed the
payment of full salary to the employee therein. In the case of Deena Nath Tiwari
Vs. Dr. Hari Singh Gour Vishwavidyalaya, Sagar reported in [2004 (1)
M.P.H.T. 419], this Court has again held that in case a minor punishment has been
inflicted upon an employee, he is entitled for full pay and allowances.
15. The criminal proceedings which were initiated against the petitioner were
resulted into acquittal by the order of Division Bench of this Court. Thereafter,
neither any criminal offence was under investigation, enquiry or trial against the
petitioner. Therefore, it is to be held that after acquittal of the petitioner keeping
the petitioner under suspension is undesirable and not permissible as per the
provisions enumerated under Rule 9 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1966. In such circumstances, action of the respondents to keep
petitioner under suspension is illegal, arbitrary and against the Rule 9(4) of M.P.
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.
16. Now, it is to be seen whether the petitioner is entitled for the benefit of full
salary from 27.05.1989 or not. The petitioner was placed under suspension on
account of registration of a criminal case and to keep him under detention in that
criminal case. The order of suspension was passed on 27.05.1989 and such
criminal case has resulted into acquittal vide order dated 17.05.2005. However,
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such a period of suspension ought to have been dealt with in accordance with the
provisions as enumerated in F.R.54-B(3)(4). Provisions of F.R. 54-B(3) and (4)
read as under:
(3) Where the authority competent to order re-instatement is of the
opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government
servant, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8), be paid the full
pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not
been suspended :
Provided that, where such authority is of the opinion that the termination
of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been
delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it
may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within
60 days from the date on which the communication in this regard is
served on him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted
by him direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing that the Government
servant shall be paid for the period of such delay, only such amount (not
being the whole) of such pay and allowances, as it may determine.
(4) In a case falling under sub-rule (3), the period of suspension, shall be
treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes."
17. Even after an order of acquittal by the competent Court, respondents have
continued him under termination. However, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was not willing to work; but it was the employer, who had not permitted the
employee to perform his duties due to termination order. Therefore, the application
of principle of 'no work no pay' in the facts of present case is arbitrary and denial
of arrears of the salary for this reason is also arbitrary. In this context, I may
profitably refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of
India and others Vs. K.V. Jankiraman and others reported in (1991) 4 SCC
109 while discussing the application of principle of 'no work no pay'.
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18. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation
during the pendency of these proceedings. However, that fact by itself cannot
extinguish his right to service benefits. An employee cannot be denied post-
retirement benefits solely on account of wrongful dismissal/termination that stands
judicially discredited. In such cases, the only logical consequence is to grant
notional reinstatement for the purpose of computing pensionary benefits and to
restore all consequential entitlements flowing from continuity of service.
19. In view of the above discussion, this Court is satisfied that the impugned
action of the respondents is legally unsustainable and cannot be countenanced.
20. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed in terms of the following
order:
A. The impugned orders dated 25.01.1996, 23.08.2007 and
31.10.2012 are hereby quashed.
B. The respondents are directed to treat the petitioner as deemed to
be in continuous service from the date of his dismissal till the date of
his superannuation, with all consequential service benefits, including
pension, gratuity, and other retiral dues.
C. Respondents are directed to pass an order for the period from
27.05.1989 (date of passing of suspension order) to the date of
retirement of petitioner (attaining the age of superannuation) in
accordance with FR 54-B(3) & (4). The petitioner is entitled to the
salary & backwages, therefore, respondents are directed to release the
benefit of salary & backwages accordingly.
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D. The entire exercise be completed within a period of three months
from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
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