Madhya Pradesh High Court
Brasang Dev Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 4 September, 2025
1 WP-297-2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
WRIT PETITION No. 297 of 2021
BRASANG DEV SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
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Appearance:
Shri MPS Raghuvanshi learned Senior Counsel with Shri D.S.
Raghuvanshi - Advocates for the petitioner.
Shri Jitesh Sharma - Govt. Advocate for the respondents/State.
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Whether approved for reporting: Yes/No.
Reserved for order on: 14/08/2025
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ORDER
(Passed on 04/09/2025)
The petitioner has invoked Article 226 of the Constitution of India
challenging the order, dated 12.10.2011 (Annexure P/4), whereby
respondent no.4 has imposed punishment of stoppage of one increment
with non-cumulative effect on petitioner on account of certain misconduct
found proved against the petitioner. He has also challenged the order, dated
12.12.2012, (Annexure P/3), order dated 13.02.2017 (Annexure P/2) and
order, dated 20.05.2020, (Annexure P/1) whereby his appeals and mercy
appeal have been dismissed by the respondents no.1, 2 & 3.
[2]. The facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner at
the relevant time was working as Sub-Inspector and was posted at Police
Station Civil Lines, Vidisha. One Sanabbar Khan S/o Anwar Khan was
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arrested in connection with Crime No.158 of 2010 for the offence
punishable under Section 379 of IPC. He was on police remand for one
day. In the night of 23.06.2010, while the petitioner was interrogating him,
the accused ran away from his custody. Accordingly, a separate criminal
case was registered against Sanabbar Khan under Section 224 of IPC.
Later on, on 20.07.2010, the petitioner again arrested him.
[3]. Taking cognizance of the incident, the respondent no.5 issued a
notice to the petitioner asking him to explain as to why the action be not
taken against him. The petitioner submitted his reply to the notice stating
that there was power cut in the Police Station due to heavy rains. It was his
submission that taking advantage of the power cut and heavy rains, the
accused ran away from his custody. He also stated that there were other
staffs present in the Police Station including T.I. and Guards, therefore, he
alone cannot be held responsible for the incident. He further stated that he
again arrested the accused on 20.07.2010 and, therefore, no negligence can
be attributed on his part. The respondent no.5 considered the petitioner's
explanation and passed the order, dated 04.11.2010, (Annexure P/6)
whereby though he recorded the finding of negligence on the part of
petitioner, accepting his explanation and particularly the fact that the
petitioner himself arrested the accused again on 20.07.2010, he was let of
by imposing fine of Rs.100/- with warning to be careful in future.
[4]. The respondent no.4, while periodical scrutiny of disciplinary
matters, came across the order passed by the respondent no.5. He was
prima facie of the opinion that, looking to the act alleged against the
petitioner, the punishment imposed by respondent no.5 is not adequate.
The respondent no.4, therefore, took the matter in suo motu revision
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exercising powers under Regulation 270(4) of M.P. Police Regulations Act.
Accordingly, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on
20.02.2011, (Annexure P/5) asking him to explain as to why the
punishment of stoppage of one increment with non-cumulative effect be
not imposed on him. The petitioner submitted his reply on 19.08.2011
reiterating the same explanation which was given by him before the
respondent no.5. Considering the entire matter again, the respondent no.4
passed the order, dated 12.10.2011, (Annexure P/4) thereby imposing
punishment of stoppage of one increment for one year without cumulative
effect. The respondent no.4 recorded his satisfaction that there was gross
negligence on the part of petitioner while the accused ran away from his
custody and punishment of Rs.100/- imposed by respondent no.5 was not
adequate.
[5]. Being aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the order of punishment
in appeal before the respondent no.3 which came to be dismissed vide
order, dated 12.12.2012, (Annexure P/3). Further the mercy appeals filed
by petitioner before the respondent no.2 and again before the respondent
no.1 were dismissed vide order, dated 13.02.2017, (Annexure P/2) and
20.05.2020 (Annexure P/1) respectively. Challenging these orders of
punishment, the petitioner is before this Court.
[6]. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
exercise of power under Section 270(4) of M.P. Police Regulation Act is
illegal inasmuch as no such power could have been exercised after expiry
of period of six months from the date of imposition of punishment passed
by respondent no.5. He submitted that the respondent no.5 passed the order
of punishment on 04.11.2010 while the impugned show cause notice was
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issued to the petitioner on 20.02.2011 and ultimately the punishment order
was passed on 22.10.2011. In support of his submission, he placed reliance
upon the Coordinate Bench judgment passed by this Court in the case of
Angad Singh Rathore Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. reported in 2010(1)
MPLJ 171 as also in the case of Brasang Dev Singh Vs. State of M.P. &
Ors. (W.P. No.1379 of 2009).
[7]. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the respondent no.4
unilaterally cancelled the order of punishment passed by respondent no.5
and then issued notice to the petitioner asking him to show cause as to why
the proposed punishment be not imposed upon him. It is his submission
that the respondent no.4 was required to issue notice before cancellation of
order passed by respondent no.5. The fact that respondent no.4 first
cancelled the order, dated 04.11.2010, and then issued notice to the
petitioner on the proposed punishment, shows his pre-determined mind. He
thus submitted that the impugned orders of punishment are liable to be set-
aside.
[8]. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supported the
impugned orders and submitted that the negligence on the part of petitioner
is not in dispute. Even the respondent no.5 also recorded a finding of guilt
against the petitioner. The matter is all about punishment to be imposed
upon the petitioner. He further submitted that the provisions of Regulation
270(4) of M.P. Police Regulation empowers the respondent no.4 to suo
motu revise the order if he is of the opinion that the punishment imposed is
not adequate and commensurate with the nature of allegation made against
the petitioner. The learned counsel also submitted that the notice was
issued to the petitioner on 20.02.2011 which was well within the period of
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six months from the date of punishment order issued by respondent no.5.
However, the petitioner did not submit his reply to the show cause notice
within the time granted to him for the said purpose. In order to afford him
opportunity, a reminder was issued to him on 14.06.2011 (Annexure R/1).
He thereafter submitted his reply on 19.08.2011 immediately thereafter the
punishment order was passed on 12.10.2011. It is his submission that the
petitioner cannot be allowed to take benefit of his own tactics in gaining
time by not submitting reply. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted
that the impugned orders do not call for any interference by this Court in
limited scope of jurisdiction of judicial review.
[9]. Considered the arguments and perused the record.
[10]. The facts of the case are not in dispute. Admittedly, the accused ran
away from the petitioner's custody while interrogation on 23.06.2010. The
petitioner tried to justify the aforesaid act taking shelter of power cut in the
police station and the heavy rains. However, the same was not found
justified by the respondent no.5. The finding of guilt was recorded by
respondent no.5 also in his order dated 04.11.2010 which is not challenged
by petitioner. However, he imposed fine of Rs.100/- only taking into
account the fact that the petitioner himself arrested the accused again. The
matter is taken in suo-moto revision only on the aspect of quantum of
punishment. Thus, the issue is only about imposition of punishment based
upon the act attributed to the petitioner.
[11]. Running away of an accused from the police custody that too from
the police premises, is a serious lapse. The respondent no.5 took a lenient
view and imposed fine of Rs.100/- only on the basis of fact that the
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petitioner himself re-arrested the accused on 20.07.2010. However, the
respondent no.4 did not accept his justification and was of the opinion that
negligence on the part of petitioner cannot be diluted by his subsequent act
of re-arresting the accused. He thus imposed a minor punishment of
stoppage of one increment with non-cumulative effect.
[12]. The scope of interference by this Court in the matter of punishment
in disciplinary matters, that too in case of minor punishment, is very
limited. This Court can interfere in the matter of imposition of punishment
only when the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate.
However, in facts of the present case, this Court does not find that the
minor punishment imposed upon the petitioner is shockingly
disproportionate looking to the gravity of allegation levelled against the
petitioner.
[13]. The petitioner has raised a singular ground in the writ petition
regarding non-compliance of principles of natural justice. It is his
submission that the respondent no.4 vide notice, dated 20.02.2011,
cancelled the order, dated 04.11.2010, passed by respondent no.5 and
thereafter issued notice proposing punishment. He submitted that the
respondent no.4 ought to have first issued notice to the petitioner before
cancelling the order passed by respondent no.5. He thus submitted that
serious prejudice has been caused to the petitioner and the respondent no.4
was pre-determined to impose punishment on him.
[14]. The objection so raised by the petitioner is found to be factually
incorrect. A bare perusal of notice, dated 20.02.2011, (Annexure P/5)
reflects that the order, dated 04.11.2010, was not cancelled in the said
7 WP-297-2021
notice. In fact the respondent no.4 asked the petitioner to show cause as to
why the order, dated 04.11.2010, be not cancelled and punishment of
stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect be imposed upon the
petitioner. Thus, the objection raised by petitioner in the writ petition is
non-existence and is accordingly rejected.
[15]. During the course of arguments, learned Senior Counsel challenged
the impugned orders also on the ground that the impugned action initiated
by respondent no.4 ought to have been initiated and concluded within a
period of six months from the date of issuance of order by respondent no.5.
He submitted that since the impugned order of punishment is passed
beyond the period of six months, the same is unsustainable in law. He
placed reliance upon the Coordinate Bench order of this Court in the case
of Brasang Dev Singh (supra) and the order in the case of Angad Singh
Rathore (supra).
[16]. While considering the objections raised by learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioner, the provisions of Regulation 270(4) of M.P. Police
Regulations needs to be examined viz-a-viz the provisions of Madhya
Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966.
[17]. Regulation 270(4) of Police Regulation provides as under:
"270(4) The revising authority may for reason to be
recorded in writing exonerate or may remit vary or
enhance the punishment imposed or may order a fresh
enquiry of the taking of further evidence in the case:
Provided that it shall not vary or reverse any order unless
notice has been served on the parties interested and
opportunity given to them for being heard."
[18]. Perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it evident firstly that the
respondent no.4 was competent to take the matter in suo-motu revision and
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secondly there is no limitation prescribed for exercising this power. This
Court in the case of Angad Singh Rathore (supra) and Brasang Dev
Singh (supra) has held that the action initiated under Section 270(4) of
M.P. Police Regulation should be concluded within a period of six months
taking aid of provisions of Rule 29(1)(iii) of CCA Rules. It has been held
that since there is no specific limitation prescribed under Section 270(4) of
M.P. Police Regulations, the limitation as prescribed under Rule 29(1)(iii)
of CCA Rules would be applicable. The similar view has been taken by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Brasang Dev Singh (supra).
[19]. In the aforesaid two cases, the Coordinate Bench has barrowed the
provisions of Rule 29(1)(iii) of CCA Rules solely on the ground that there
is no limitation prescribed under Regulation 270(4) of M.P. Police
Regulations. However, the provisions of schedule appended to CCA Rules
was not brought to the notice of this Court in both the aforesaid cases. In
fact the schedule appended to CCA Rules excludes applicability of CCA
Rules on Class-III non-ministerial post in the Police Department. The
relevant portion of the scheduled is reproduced hereunder:
"Class III (Non-Ministerial) posts in the Police
Department are governed by the Madhya Pradesh Police
Regulations framed under the provisions of the Indian
Police Act. The control and Appeal Rules, will, therefore,
not apply to them."
[20]. The petitioner was working as Sub-Inspector. The post of Sub-
Inspector is an executive cadre post, meaning thereby it is a non-
ministerial post as per Regulation 6(b) of M.P. Police Regulations. Further,
as per Schedule I of Police Executive (Non-Gazetted) Service Recruitment
Rules, 1997, the post of Sub-Inspector is a Class-III post. Thus, by virtue
of the aforesaid exclusion clause in M.P. Police Regulations, the provisions
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of CCA Rules are not attracted in the facts of the present case.
Accordingly, the judgments rendered in the case of Angad Singh Rathore
(supra) & Brasang Dev Singh (supra) are not applicable in the facts of
present case.
[21]. The aforesaid view taken by this Court finds support by the
judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court rendered in the case of
Ramkrishna Mishra Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. reported in 2011(5)
M.P.H.T. 476 wherein this Court held as under:
"16. In this cases also reliance was placed on the decision
rendered in Premchand Dhapuria (supra), however, it is to
be noted that in these two cases in Premchand Dhapuria
(supra) and Krishna Narayan Dixit (supra), a provision as
now appears in the schedule appended with Rules of 1966
regarding exclusion of applicability of Rules of 1966 in
respect of Class III (Non Ministerial) posts in the Police
Department are governed by the Madhya Pradesh Police
Regulations framed under the provisions of Indian Police
Act.
17. Though these decisions are taken note of in Sushil
Kumar Shrivastava (supra), the exclusion clause as it
appear in the Rules of 1966 seems to have escaped, the
notice in these two cases, therefore, the principle laid
down therein will be of no help to the petitioner. Because
it is Police Regulation 270 which would be applicable in
case of the petitioner, a Sub-ordinate Police Officer
belonging to Class III Non-Ministerial Cadre.
18. The said Regulation since nowhere prescribe the
limitation period, the exercise of revisional power even
after the expiry of six months from the date of order to be
reviewed does not get vitiated."
[22]. The argument regarding limitation of six months for passing order
under Regulation 270(4) of M.P. Police Regulations, is not acceptable also
in view of the recent Division Bench judgment of this Court at Gwalior
Bench wherein it has been held that the period of six months can be
10 WP-297-2021
accepted for initiating proceedings under Regulation 270(4), however,
there cannot be any limitation for concluding such proceedings inasmuch
as conclusion of proceedings would be dependent upon various uncertain
circumstances. This has been so held by Division Bench of this Court in
the case of Kamla Krishna Sharma vs. State of M.P. & others passed in
W.A. No.1874/2024. The observations made by Division Bench in para 11
to 17 being relevant are reproduced hereunder:
11. If this analogy is accepted then the purpose of
legislative intent appears to be defeated. Proviso attached to
rule 29 of the CCA Rules contemplates a situation whereby
a Government servant concerned has to be given a
reasonable opportunity of making a representation against
the penalty proposed and if the review authority proposed
to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to
(ix) of Rule 10 or to enhance the penalty order sought to be
reviewed to any of the penalties specified in those clauses,
enquiry under rule 14 of the CCA Rules is to be held and
consultation with Public Service Commission is to be
carried out where such consultation is necessary.
12. It means that review authority first has to take decision
within six months for review of the order. Thereafter,
authority has to issue show cause to the delinquent
employee who in turn would submit his representation and
thereafter review authority would go to the conclusion
whether minor penalty or major penalty as per clause (v) to
(ix) of rule 10 of the CCA Rules is to be imposed. If
enquiry is required then such enquiry would also consume
time. All these procedures can not be completed within six
months because these proceedings require time.
13. Even otherwise if a delinquent employee delays the
matter and does not cooperate in the proceedings then he
cannot be given premium over his mischief by holding that
the review proceedings are to be necessarily concluded
within six months. This would be nothing but a travesty of
justice. Delay in proceedings would deny the opportunity to
the review authority to punish the delinquent. Said
perspective cannot be the legislative intent. Therefore, this
contention deserves rejection.
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14. Even otherwise, present petitioner is a Head Constable
and he was governed by the M.P. Police Regulations.
Regulation 270 deals in respect of suo motu revision by any
competent authority superior to the authority making the
order. As such no time limit has been prescribed in taking
suo motu revision and service condition of Head Constable
(Police) are governed by the M.P. Police Regulations.
Nonetheless, period of limitation even if borrowed from
rule 29 of the CCA Rules even then the said period of
limitation does not come to the rescue of present petitioner.
15. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of
Madhya Pradesh and another Vs. Om Prakash Gupta
and another, 2001(2) MPLJ 690 while interpreting rule 29
of the CCA Rules held that power of review could be
exercised within a period of six months and not thereafter.
In the said case, review authority taken the decision to
review the order dated 04-02-1998 on 12-01-2012. Since it
was the period exceeding period of six months as stipulated
under rule 29 of the CCA Rules, therefore, in the fact
situation it is held that after six months power of review
cannot be exercised. Here, the order under challenge was
passed on 22-03-2016 and matter has been taken under
review jurisdiction on 05-05-2016 hence proceedings were
initiated within six months. Although, final order was
passed on 28-07-2017 but as discussed earlier the said order
dated 28-07-2017 cannot be interfered with on the ground
that the said proceeding of review ought to have been
completed within six months. In the present case when
review authority initiated the proceedings within six
months, then conclusion of proceeding is immaterial.
16. This view is supported by the earlier Division Bench
judgment of this Court in the case of State of Madhya
Pradesh and others Vs. Brijesh Niboria, 2007(2) MPLJ
273 wherein the Division Bench held in following manner:
"7. In the case of State of M.P. v. Prahlad, 1988
(1) MPWN 113, this High Court has also held
that plain reading of the rule indicates that it
fixes outer limit of six months to be calculated
from the date of the order of the disciplinary
authority when the power may be exercised by
the Appellate Authority. The use of word "may"
only indicates that it is not compulsory for him
to exercise this power even within the period of
six months. The Court has held that the Rule
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does not vest in him any power after the expiry
of period of six months. Therefore, the question
before the Single Judge of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh was that whether the order can
be reviewed under Rule 29(1) of the Rules of
1966 within a period of six months. Therefore,
from the aforesaid judgment it is clear that the
Appellate Authority may take decision and order
proposed to be reviewed can be done within a
period of six months and not beyond that, but
that does not mean that after the review the
entire exercise about the enhancement or
confirmation, modification or setting aside the
order should be completed within six months for
that S.C. and Full Bench of CAT has held that it
should be in reasonable time.
8.We have also considered the Division Bench
decision of this Court in the case of State of M.P.
v. Om Prakash Gupta, 2001 (2) MPLJ 690, in
which the similar question was involved before
the Division Bench of this Court and it was held
that a perusal of the aforesaid Rule clearly
indicates that the provision relating to limitation
of 6 months is in respect of the authorities
referred to the Rule 29(1)(i)(ii) and (iii) of the
Rules. The use of word "or" in the aforesaid
rule is indicative of the fact that the power of
review could be exercised by any of the
authorities referred to in the Rule 29(1)(i)(ii)
and (iii) of the Rules within a period of 6 months
and not thereafter. This clearly indicates that
decision regarding review of the order should be
taken within a period of six months and that is
the outer limit for that. Though the question
before the Division Bench was not whether the
final order should be passed within a period of
six months, but after considering the provisions
of Rule 29 of the Rules of 1966, we are of the
view that Rule does not envisage that final
decision should be taken within a period of six
months as has been held by the Tribunal in the
impugned order dated 16-11-2001 and argued
by learned counsel for the respondent because
once the decision is taken to review the order,
then a detailed procedure is required to be
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followed, which has been mentioned in Rule
29(1)(iv), (a), (b), (c), (d). After review, the
authority may confirm, modify or set aside the
order; or, confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside
the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any
penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or
remit the case to the authority which made the
order or to any other authority directing such
authority to make such further inquiry as it may
consider proper in the circumstances of the case;
or pass such other order as it may deem fit. If
after the review of the order, case is remitted for
further enquiry, then certainly the same cannot
be completed within a period of six months.
Therefore, the aforesaid rider of six months
cannot be made applicable for passing the final
order after review. It can only be held that the
Appellate Authority shall take a decision within
a period of six months about reviewing the order.
In this case the decision was taken by the State
Government on 7-4-1994. In the order dated 7-
4- 1994 it has been mentioned that the State
Government exercising powers under Rule 29
proposed to review the order dated 27-10-1993
by which the penalty of censure was imposed on
the incumbent. This order indicates that clear
decision was taken by the authority on 7-4-1994
about reviewing the earlier order dated 27-10-
1993, which was within a period of six months.
But the learned Tribunal considering the period
of six months has neither considered the order
dated 7-4-1994 nor assigned any reason whether
the whole exercise till imposing the final
punishment is to be completed within a period of
six months, therefore we find that the order
passed by the Tribunal is not a reasoned order
and the same has been passed without
considering the effect of Rule 29(1)(iii) of Rule
of 1966 and also without considering the effect
of order dated 7-4-1999 by which the decision
was taken by the State Government (Appellate
Authority) to review the order."
17. Logically also, it is to be seen that initiation of
proceeding can be prescribed but not conclusion of it
because of various factors including Opportunity of
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hearing, Nature of allegations, Enquiry if required to be
initiated for imposing penalty and Non-cooperation of
delinquent employee. All these factors (which are
illustrative and not exhaustive in nature) contribute to
conclusion of proceedings, therefore, these proceedings
may prolong and go beyond six months. Therefore,
prescription of six months period for conclusion of
proceedings may lead to Injustice and Absurdity. Both are
required to be avoided and be kept at bay.
[23]. Thus, in view of the discussion made above, the orders passed by
respondents no.1 to 4 are found to be legal and justified in the facts and
circumstances of the case and the same does not warrant any interference
by this Court in the present writ petition. The petition is accordingly,
dismissed.
(ASHISH SHROTI)
JUDGE
Vpn/-
