Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Guddi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 4 March, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 W.P. No. 7278 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 4th OF MARCH, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 7278 of 2025
SMT. GUDDI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri D.P.Singh, Advocate for petitioner.
Shri G.K.Agrawal, Government Advocate for respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been
filed seeking the following reliefs:-
"i) That, the order dated 26.05.2017 passed by the respondent no.
2 may kindly be quashed with all consequential effects so far as it
relates to cancellation of permanent classification of the petitioner
in the interest of justice.
ii) That, the respondents be further directed to keep intact the
permanent classification order no. 525 dated 27.11.2004 with a
further direction to extend the benefits of permanent classification
with a further to pay difference of arrears alongwith interest @
12% per annum, in the interest of justice.
iii) That, a direction may kindly be given to the respondent to give
the service benefit and pay scale of the permanent classified Pump
Driver from the date of his classification mum of pay scale as
directed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Naresh Rawat
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Vs. Ashwini Ray and others reported in (2017) 3 SCC 436.
iv) That, the respondents be commanded to take cognizance over
representation preferred by the petitioner contained in Annexure -
P/4 with a further direction to release the service benefits to the
petitioner payable to her decease husband Late Shri Chunnlal
Goswami, in the interest of justice
v) That, the respondents be commanded to extend all the financial
benefits to the petitioner as per entitlement of her deceased
husband, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, in the
interest of justice.
vi) Cost of the petition be awarded or any other order or direction
deemed fit in the circumstances of the case be issued in the favour
of the petitioner."
2. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that husband of petitioner was
working as Pump Operator. Since husband of petitioner was not given the
regular pay scale on account of his classification, therefore, he filed W.P.
No.3977/2016, which was disposed of with direction to decide the
representation. It is submitted that thereafter by the impugned order dated
26/5/2017, classification of husband of petitioner, itself, was cancelled.
Challenging the aforesaid order, it is submitted by counsel for petitioner
that cancellation of classification of late husband of petitioner is bad in law in
the light of judgment passed by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Kamta Prasad Vs. State of M.P. & Others decided on 26/8/2021 in W.P.
No.4018/2020.
3. Heard, learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. Paragraph 4 of the writ petition reads as under:-
"4. Delay, if any, in filling the petition and explanation
therefore:
That, the order impugned dated 26.05.2017 (Annexure -P/1) passed
by the respondent no. 2 whereby the permanent classification dated
23.03.1989 has been ordered to be cancelled though controversy
with regard to the same has put to an end by the Hon'ble High
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Court while deciding the case of Kamta Prasad -V/s. State of M.P.
& Ors. [in W.P. No. 4018/2020.] and the same has been affirmed
by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court despite of that
ignoring the same order impugned dated 26.05.2017 (Annexure -
P/1) is not yet cancelled which is illegal, arbitrary. Therefore, after
the death of the husband petitioner has represented the matter
before the respondents, and the petitioner was not aware with
regard to take legal course of action. Therefore, the petitioner who
is wife of late Shri Chunnalal Goswami, invoking the writ
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court seeking quashement of order
impugned Annexure - P/1 with a further to restore/intact the
classification order passed in favour of her husband. It is pertinent
to mention here that the petitioner while going through the order
impugned dated 26.05.2017 (Annexure - P/1), it is found that the
order of permanent classification issued in favour of her husband
has been revoked/ cancelled by the respondent department due to
which the benefits of minimum pay scale from the date of
permanent classification, when the husband of the petitioner was
posted as in the department, could not been extended, which
amounting to recurring cause of action, therefore, if any delay is
occurred in filling this petition, the same is based on bonafide and
the same deserves to be condoned and the petition deserves to be
entertained and heard on its own merits."
5. Although it is the submission of petitioner that her husband had
represented the matter before the respondents and petitioner was not aware
with regard to the legal course of action which may be available to her, but
petitioner has not filed copy of any representation which was ever made by her
husband against the order of cancellation. Petitioner has filed the copy of
representation which was made on 7/6/2024, whereas her husband has expired
on 8/4/2024. Thus, it is clear that after the order dated 26/5/2017 was passed,
husband of petitioner did not challenge the same during his lifetime for long 7
years.
6. Now the only question for consideration is as to whether this Court can
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refuse to grant discretionary relief to a fence-sitter or not ?
7. Delay defeats equity and in the name of parity, this Court is not bound to
open old and stale cases. It is true that in service matters, similarly situated
employees should be granted relief and they should not be compelled to
approach this Court, but in the present case, petition filed by husband of
petitioner was allowed by order dated 17/6/2016 and respondents were directed
to extend the benefit of judgment passed by this Court in the case of Kaluram
Narwariya Vs. State of M.P. & others decided on 6/4/2015 in W.P.
No.2000/2015. Thereafter the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Naresh
Rawat Vs. Ashwini Ray reported in (2017) 3 SCC 436 has held that a
classified employee is entitled for minimum of regular payscale without any
increment. Furthermore, classification of husband of petitioner was cancelled
on 26/5/2017 on the ground that there was no sanctioned post of Pump
Operator and the Executive Engineer, PHE had no right to appoint any person
on daily wages.
8. Thus, when appointment of husband of petitioner itself was found to be
contrary to law and not against any sanctioned vacant post, coupled with the
fact that order of cancellation of classification was passed on 26/5/2017,
whereas this petition has been filed by wife of late employee on 25/2/2025 i.e.
after approximately 8 years, this Court is of considered opinion that petition
suffers from delay and latches which have not been explained.
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewarage Board and others Vs. T.T.Murali Babu reported in
(2014)4 SCC 108 has held as under:-
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
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brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction.
As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the
citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary
principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason,
approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would
be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated
stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the
way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be
fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite
disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay
reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant
who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the
greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep
and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury
to the lis."
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon.Ltd. Vs. K.
Thangappan reported in ((2006)4 SCC 322) has held as under :
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in
mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case
the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if
there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to
assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even
where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the
discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to
be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay
Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (PC at p. 239) was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir
Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an
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arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving
that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every
case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of
course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation,
the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances always
important in such cases are, the length of the delay and
the nature of the acts done during the interval which
might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it
relates to the remedy."
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in
which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the
Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that
article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India that no relief can be given to
the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches
this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that
though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from
this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this
Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions
filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High
Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy
and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene
and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that
this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does
not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and
bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised
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after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay
coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an
important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
11. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of
T.N. Reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under :
"11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In
the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-1996 an
order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed
by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for
consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat
tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This
on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit
tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be given
any benefit."
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India reported
in (2007) 9 SCC 274 has held as under :
"6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to be
dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind
by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case
the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if
there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to
assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even
where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the
discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to
be exercised judicially and reasonably.
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7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay
Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at p. 239 was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes
had stated:
"Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an
arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving
that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every
case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of
course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation,
the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances always
important in such cases are, the length of the delay and
the nature of the acts done during the interval which
might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as
relates to the remedy."
8. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High
Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy
and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene
and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that
this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does
not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and
bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised
after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay
coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an
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important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
13. The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School Council
Vs. Sristidhar Biswar reported in (2007) 12 SCC 779 has held as under :
"11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the
petitioners approached the court in 1989 after the decision ** in
Dibakar Pal. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the
court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is
very significant in matters of granting relief and courts cannot come
to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their rights.
Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the delay of
nine years cannot be countenanced."
14. The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Jaswant Singh
reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 has held as under :
"12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's
Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:
"In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to
laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the
violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has
been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust
to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done
that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or
where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy,
he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material.
Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.""
15. The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana
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reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under :
"18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay
disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or
Article 32 of the Constitution..."
16. The Supreme Court in the case of NDMC Vs. Pan Singh reported in
(2007) 9 SCC 278 has held as under :
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight
of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They
did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed
herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest
possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties
even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial
Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have
been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore,
the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may
not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a
long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal
Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K.
Thangappan.)
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time.
(See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India and M.R. Gupta v. Union of
India.)
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 277,
paras 9-10)
"9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases
that representations would not be adequate explanation to take
care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v.
State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which can be
considered reasonable for making representations and if the
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Government had turned down one representation the making of
another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay.
In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated
representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of
the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay
alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik.)
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually
continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a
ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend
upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable
period say three years normally the Court would reject the same
or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable
period of about three years. The High Court did not examine
whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would
have found that there was no scope for interference, it would
have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.""
17. Accordingly, petition fails and is, hereby, dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches.
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
(and)
