Chattisgarh High Court
Ramin Bai vs Tikeshwar Singh on 16 September, 2025
1
2025:CGHC:47461
NAFR
NIRMALA HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
RAO
MAC No. 670 of 2020
1 - Ramin Bai, W/o Shri Kaushal Prasad Sahu, Aged About 55 Years R/o
Village Suloni, Police Station Masturi, Post And Tehsil Masturi, District
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
... Appellant(s)
versus
1 - Tikeshwar Singh, S/o Bishat Singh, Aged About 22 Years R/o Village
Bhuigaon (Bhatapara), Police Station Pamgarh, Tehsil Pamgarh, District
Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. (Driver Of Tractor Bearing Reg. No. C G11 -D
A- 1680), District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
2 - Sonau Ram, S/o Chhatram Suryavanshi, R/o Village Bhuigaon
( Bhatapara), Police Station Pamgarh, Tehsil Pamgarh, District Janjgir -
Champa Chhattisgarh. (Owner Of Tractor Bearing Reg. No. C G11 -D A-
1680), District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
3 - The Oriental Assurance Comapany Limited, Through Branch Manager,
Branch Office Opposite Rajiv Plaza, Near Bus Stand, Bilaspur (C.G.) Tahsil
And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. (Insurer Of Tractor Bearing Reg. No. C
G11 -D A- 1680), District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant : Shri Vivek Sharma, Advocate.
For Respondents : Shri Mohd. Azad Siddiqui, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
16.09.2025
1. Heard on I.A. No.1 of 2019, an application for condonation of delay in
filing the instant appeal.
2. The appellant has filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act seeking enhancement of compensation against the award
dated 3.11.2015, passed in Claim Case No.281 of 2014 by the learned
Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, whereby the
learned Tribunal passed an award to the tune of Rs.3,10,000/- and
directed the Insurance Company to make payment with interest @
7.5% per annum.
3. There is a delay of 1509 days in filing the instant appeal. In the
application for condonation of delay, the appellant/ claimant has stated
that the award was passed on 3.11.2015. She is a poor and rustic
villager and after getting amount of compensation, she repaid the loan
amount taken for her treatment. Thereafter, she arranged funds in
order to prefer an appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that as the appellant is
a poor lady residing in a rural area, she could not prefer an appeal
within the period of limitation. He would pray to allow this application
taking a lenient view.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/ Insurance
Company would oppose. He would submit that the claimant has not
properly explained the delay, which is 1509 days. He would contend
that after passing of award by the Tribunal, amount of compensation
was deposited with the concerned Tribunal and it was disbursed to the
claimant. Therefore, the reasons assigned in the application for
condonation of delay are not satisfactory, and the delay remains
unexplained.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents present on record.
7. A perusal of the application would reveal that the claimant has not
explained the delay on a day-to-day basis. She has not specified when
she collected the relevant documents, when she arranged the
necessary funds, or when she approached her counsel.
8. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba
Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector
(LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024
INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11,
the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were
considered and it was observed thus:-
"10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of
convenience, is reproduced herein-below:
3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made
after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit,
appeal and application but since in this case we are
concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be
mentioning about the appeal only in context with the
limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the
delay in its filing is liable to be condoned."
9. The Hon'ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of
Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which
are reproduced herein-below:-
"19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap
Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been
held that the court cannot grant an exemption from
limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of
hardship. The court has time and again repeated that
when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay
is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it
ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds
alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to
Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors,
2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above,
this Court further laid down that if some person has
obtained a relief approaching the court just or
immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other
persons cannot take the benefit of the same by
approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the
ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363,
where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation
for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications
for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High
Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and
objective manner. High Court should have exercised the
discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The
liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for
delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of
limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as
'liberal approach', 'justice- oriented approach' and
'substantial justice' cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand &
Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC
1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered
while dealing with the application for condonation of delay
in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC
81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the
delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. The expression
'sufficient cause' as occurring in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also
observed that even though limitation may harshly affect
rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its
rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have
no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have
no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds."
10. In para 26, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati
Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above
stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:-
"26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of
the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to
remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease
to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in
nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause
is established for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the
cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered
in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on
the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision."
11. In para 30, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the
delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of
the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case
for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is
reproduced herein-below:-
"30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as
imposition of conditions are not warranted when
sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the
delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned
merely because some persons have been granted relief
on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in
such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent
or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the
delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been
deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that
they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not
a correct approach, particularly when both the above
decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier
pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra)."
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy
(supra) further held that the phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented
approach' and 'cause for the advancement of substantial justice'
cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale
matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-
opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
13. Considering the contents of the application for condonation of delay
and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I do not find any
sufficient ground to allow the application. Accordingly, I.A. No.1 is
hereby rejected and subsequently, the appeal is also dismissed.
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Nimmi
