The High Court held that overseas travel, even for familial visits, is a matter of volition and cannot form the basis for condoning delay under limitation law.
In a judgment defining the limits of judicial indulgence under the Limitation Act, the Bombay High Court at Goa has dismissed a writ petition filed by a 78-year-old litigant seeking condonation of a 73-day delay in challenging proceedings related to alleged unauthorized construction. The Court ruled that foreign travel, regardless of its personal relevance, does not constitute “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The petition arose out of a dispute concerning alleged illegal construction initiated by the petitioner, which had been challenged by respondent Antonio Jose D’Souza. After the Deputy Director of Panchayats ruled in favour of the complainant and the appeal was dismissed by the Additional Director of Panchayats, Nazareth filed a delayed revision application before the District Court, Panaji, which too declined to condone the delay.
Justice Nivedita P. Mehta, while affirming the District Court’s refusal, rejected the petitioner’s explanation that his foreign travel to visit family, coupled with other factors such as jet lag, old age, rains, and document misplacement, amounted to a legitimate impediment. The High Court observed that such justifications failed to satisfy the legal threshold for condonation of delay.
In its ruling, the Court held:
“Relief under section 5 of the Act is only available to parties that have, out of events or otherwise, circumstances been restrained from agitating their cause in time as prescribed by the applicable law. To travel abroad, notwithstanding whether it may be for reasons of vacation or to visit family or whether synonymous construction of the terms is symptomatic of prejudice, is a matter of conscious decision making that would necessitate, inter alia, booking of flights and grant of visa. If one chooses to act on one of two possible courses of action as a matter of deliberate decision making, it cannot be stated to be difficulty in approaching the Courts.”
Rejecting the plea for leniency on account of the petitioner’s age or physical limitations, the Court noted that no material had been brought on record to show that his counsel was unable to file the application during the interregnum. The Court also expressed concern over the prolonged inaction post-court vacation, stating that the petitioner’s explanation lacked cogency or documentary support.
Addressing the broader implications of condoning delays absent genuine constraint, the Court remarked:
“Law of limitation is founded on public policy to ensure that actions are brought within a reasonable time. It seeks to prevent prolonged uncertainty and avoid opening settled matters unless compelling reasons are demonstrated.”
The Court also affirmed the reasoning of the District Court that the petitioner’s conduct did not reflect the diligence expected of a prudent litigant. As noted by the lower court and endorsed by Justice Mehta, “this is not the conduct of a prudent man.”
Senior counsel appearing for the respondent had submitted that the petitioner had “slept on his rights” and permitting the revision at this stage would not only reopen settled issues but potentially render part of the already executed demolition nugatory.
While emphasizing that technical objections should not defeat substantive justice, the High Court was unequivocal in its position that discretionary relief under limitation law cannot be invoked to legitimize avoidable procedural lapses arising from elective conduct.
Case Title: Adolf Olegario Nazareth v. The Sarpanch/Secretary, Village Panchayat of Uccassaim-Paliem-Punola & Anr.
Case no: WP No. 437/2025
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