Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Hans Raj @ Hans Raj Singh vs State (2023:Rj-Jd:40366) on 23 November, 2023

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

[2023:RJ-JD:40366]

       HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                        JODHPUR
             S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 919/2003

Hans Raj @ Hans Raj Singh S/o Shri Rohla Singh, byc aste Jat
Sikh,    R/o    Ward      No.4,       Ganeshgarh,           Tehsil     and    District
Sriganganagar
                                                                        ----Petitioner
                                      Versus
State of Rajasthan
                                                                      ----Respondent


For Petitioner(s)           :     Mr. Suresh Nehra
For Respondent(s)           :     Mr. Mukesh Trivedi, PP



          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG

Judgment

23/11/2023

By this revision, the petitioner-convict is challenging the

judgment and order dated 17.09.2003 passed by the learned

Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases,

Srigangangar whereby, the learned Judge partly allowed the

appeal filed by the petitioner and while upholding the conviction of

the petitioner for offence under Sections 420 and 471 IPC,

reduced the sentence awarded under Section 471 IPC to one year

simple imprisonment and thus, the petitioner has been sentenced

as under:-

Under Section 471 IPC = One year simple imprisonment and

fine of Rs.2000/- in default of payment of fine to further undergo

three months S.I.

Under Section 420 IPC = One year's simple imprisonment and fine

of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine, to undergo one month's

S.I.

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Briefly stated, the prosecution case as set up is that on

21.03.1991, the office of Superintendent of Police, Sriganganagar

received a complaint to the effect that the petitioner has

submitted a transfer certification of Baba Haridwari Public School,

2 ML, Sriganganagar on the basis of which, he got selected as

Driver in RSRTC. On verification of the education certificate, the

said certificate was found to be forged.

On the basis of the above report, FIR No. 136/1991 was

registered by the police for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468,

471 IPC and the police started investigation. On completion of

investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the present

petitioner. Thereafter, charges of the case were framed against

the petitioner for offence under Sections 420, 468, 471 IPC. He

denied the charges and claimed trial.

During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many

as six witnesses and got exhibited various documents. After

examining the accused petitioner under Sec. 313 Cr.P.C.,

opportunity was also given to him to lead defence evidence but he

did not produce any evidence.

After considering the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses and the material available on record, the trial court

acquitted the petitioner for offence under Section 468 IPC but

convicted him for offence under Section 420 IPC and 471 IPC vide

judgment dated 30.10.2001.

Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 30.10.2001,

passed by the learned Judicial Additional Chief Judicial magistrate,

Sriganganagar, an appeal was preferred before the learned

Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases,

[2023:RJ-JD:40366] (3 of 8) [CRLR-919/2003]

Sriganganagar whereby, the conviction and sentence of the

petitioner-convict under Section 420 IPC was upheld but reduced

the sentence awarded for offence under Section 471 IPC from

three years simple imprisonment to one year simple imprisonment

with defalt stipulation.

At the outset, learned counsel for the accused-petitioner

makes a submission that the incident relates back to year 1991

and he is now aged about 60 years. Further the petitioner has

remained behind the bars for a period of 13 days, therefore,

without making any interference on merits/conviction, the

sentence awarded to the present petitioner may be substituted

with the period of sentence already undergone by him.

Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the

respondent-State vehemently opposed the prayer made by

learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that there is no

reason to disbelieve the prosecution evidence and learned Trial

Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused-petitioner.

He prayed that the impugned judgment and order passed by the

Court below may be sustained and sentence awarded to the

accused-petitioner by the Court below be maintained by this

Court.

I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for

the accused-petitioner as well as learned Public Prosecutor and

also gone through the entire record.

From the findings recorded by the trial Court, I am satisfied

that learned counsel for the accused-petitioner is right in not

pressing this appeal on merits. So far as reduction of sentence of

imprisonment awarded to the accused-petitioner is concerned, it is

[2023:RJ-JD:40366] (4 of 8) [CRLR-919/2003]

not disputed that the petitioner remained behind the bars for

some time and has also suffered the agony and trauma of

protracted trial as the occurrence relates back to the year 1991.

Since the petitioner has remained behind the bars for some time

so also undergone mental as well as physical agony of protracted

trial for last thirty three years, leniency can be shown to some

extent.

Thus, looking to the over-all circumstances and the fact that

the petitioner has remained behind the bars for considerable time,

it will be just and proper if the sentence awarded by the trial court

for offence under Section 420 and 471 IPC is reduced to the

period already undergone by him while maintaining the amount of

fine to sum of Rs. 2,000/- & Rs.500/- respectively.

Hon'ble Apex Court in Surinder Singh Vs. State (Union

Territory of Chandigarh) : 2022 (1) BLJ 366 wherein it was

observed as under:-

"Appellant-Surinder Singh has laid challenge to the judgment dated 19th May 2010 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, whereby, the order of his conviction and sentence dated 25th July 2006 passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh was confirmed. The Appellant has been convicted Under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter 'IPC') and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter, 'Arms Act'), and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 3 years for both the offences, with a direction that sentences will run concurrently.

[2023:RJ-JD:40366] (5 of 8) [CRLR-919/2003]

We are thus of the considered opinion that whilst motive is infallibly a crucial factor, and is a substantial aid for evincing the commission of an offence but the absence thereof is, however, not such a quintessential component which can be construed as fatal to the case of the prosecution, especially when all other factors point towards the guilt of the Accused and testaments of eye-witnesses to the occurrence of a malfeasance are on record.

The Appellant was admittedly a police official at the time of the incidence and the arms and ammunitions used for the commission of the offence, were placed in his possession under the sanction accorded by the Competent Authority. The Appellant being in authorised possession of the weapon, cannot be said to have used an unlicensed weapon, as prohibited Under Section 5 of the Arms Act. It appears that the Trial Court was swayed by irrelevant considerations such as illegal use of the weapon, and lost track of the objective of the Statute, which has been enacted to provide a licensing/regulatory regime, to enable law- abiding citizens to carry arms, and also to prohibit the possession, acquisition, manufacture, etc. of certain categories of firearms, unless authorized by the Central Government. In other words, illegal use of a licensed or sanctioned weapon per se does not constitute an offence Under Section 27, without proving the misdemeanour Under Section 5 or 7 of the Arms Act. At best, it could be a 'misconduct' under the service rules, the determination of which was not the subject of the trial. 31. In light of the afore-stated discussion, we find that the order of the Trial Court in convicting the Appellant or of the High Court in maintaining such conviction Under Section 27 of the

[2023:RJ-JD:40366] (6 of 8) [CRLR-919/2003]

Arms Act, is unwarranted and unjust. Accordingly, the Appellant is acquitted of the charge Under Section 27 of the Arms Act.

..... Adverting to the facts of the case, in hand, we are of the considered view that at this stage, the sentence awarded to the Appellant is no longer in degree to the crime which he has committed. Remitting the Appellant to the rigors of imprisonment at this juncture of his life would not serve the ends of justice due to following mitigating factors:

a. No motive or element of planning has been proved by the Prosecution in the present case which indicates the possibility that the offense could have been committed on impulse by the Appellant. Hence, the culpability of the offender in such situations is less than that which is ascribed in premeditated offenses as the commission of planned illegal acts denotes an attack on societal values with greater commitment and continuity in comparison to spontaneous illegal acts.

b. Even though the factum of injury may not have a direct bearing on a conviction Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code, the same may be considered by a Court at the time of sentencing. No doubt, the offence committed by the Appellant squarely falls within the four corners of Section 307 Indian Penal Code, but fortunately neither the complainant nor any other person was hurt by the untoward act of the Appellant.

c. Appellant has already undergone a sentence of 3 months and 19 days. Additionally, despite the occurrence taking place in 1999, there is no indication that Appellant has been involved in any untoward activity before or after the

[2023:RJ-JD:40366] (7 of 8) [CRLR-919/2003]

incident. This highlights the Appellant's good character and indicates that the incident can be interpreted as an isolated lapse of judgment. Further, the Appellant's clean post- incident behaviour suggests that he is rational individual who is capable of responding to the social censure associated with the offence. Hence, the passage of a long time period coupled with a clean record, both before and after the incident is definitely a factor that calls for mitigation of sentence.

d. Barring this particular incident wherein he was under the influence of alcohol, the Appellant had an unblemished service record with sixteen good citations in his favour. This indicates that he was a valuable member of society than the present criminal incident might lead one to assume. This is not to say that courts should draw up a social balance sheet when sentencing, but only to take these positive social contributions as a factor for mitigation of sentence.

e. Lastly, it is to be noted that the Appellant was suspended in the year 1999 and has also been subsequently dismissed from service in the year 2007. Hence, this should also be considered as a reasonable factor for mitigation because the dismissal and the consequent loss of social security benefits such as pension, also construes as a form of social sanction."

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'Haripada Das Vs. State of

W.B. : (1998) 9 SCC 678 has observed as under:-

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"considering the fact that the respondent had already undergone detention for some period and the case is pending for a pretty long time for which he had suffered both financial hardship and mental agony and also considering the fact that he had been released on bail as far back as on 17-1-1986, we feel that the ends of justice will be met in the facts of the case if the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone"

Accordingly, the revision petition is partly allowed. While

maintaining the petitioner's conviction for offence under Section

471 and 420 IPC, the sentence awarded to him is hereby reduced

to the period already undergone, however the amount of fine is

hereby maintained. Two month's time is granted to deposit the

fine before the trial court. Petitioner is on bail. His bail bonds

stand discharged on deposition of fine.