Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mandhir Singh vs State Of Punjab on 20 November, 2025
Author: Sudeepti Sharma
Bench: Sudeepti Sharma
RSA-5070-1999
-1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-5070-1999
Reserved on: 01.10.2025
Pronounced on : 20.11.2025
Uploaded On: 20.11.2025
Mandhir Singh ... Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab ... Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA
Present: Mr. Kanwal Jit Singh, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Muskan Sharma, Advocate
for the appellant.
Mr. Ravneet Singh Joshi, DAG, Punjab
****
SUDEEPTI SHARMA, J. (Oral)
1. The present regular second appeal is preferred against judgment
and decree dated 21.04.1997, passed by Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Patiala
whereby, the civil suit filed by the appellant was partly allowed and
judgment and decree dated 09.09.1999 passed by Additional District Judge,
Patiala, whereby, the appeal filed by the appellant against judgment and
decree dated 21.04.1997 was dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant joined his services
in August, 1953 in the Erstwhile State of Pepsu in Tubewell Division,
Malerkotla and on 01.11.1956 he was serving as Store Keeper under the
XEN Drainage, Patiala. He proceeded on leave in the year 1977-97 and after
the expiry of the leave, he was not allowed to join his duties. The efficiency
bar of the appellant was not sanctioned which was due on 16.06.1959 and
the pension and gratuity etc. was not paid despite appellant crossed the age
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of superannuation. Therefore, he filed civil suit for pensionary benefits,
gratuity, GP/EP Fund etc. and for not allowing appellant to cross efficiency
bar on 16.06.1959 and non-payment of pension, gratuity, GP Fund/EP Fund
etc. which was partly allowed vide judgment and decree dated 21.04.1997.
The appellant then filed appeal against judgment and decree dated
21.04.1997 which was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated
09.09.1999. Hence, the present regular second appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant contends as under:-
i) That pension cannot be restricted to 38 months prior to the
filing of civil suit.
ii) That trial court could not confine the pension for 38 months.
iii) That interest upto date should have been granted on GP
Fund/EP Fund etc.
iv) That both the Courts wrongly declined gratuity as barred by
limitation.
v) That First Appellate Court has also wrongly dismissed the
appeal filed by the appellant and upheld the findings of the trial
Court.
vi) That pension and gratuity are not bounties and cause of action is
recurring in nature. Neither the gratuity can be declined as
barred by limitation, nor the payment of pension can be
restricted to 38 months prior to the filing of civil suit even if the
suit is filed nearly six years after the retirement.
He, therefore, prays that the present regular second appeal be
allowed.
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4. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon the following
judgments to support his arguments:-
i) Des Raj Bhagat Vs. State of Punjab and others; Law
Finder Doc Id #763985
ii) Mahinder Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others;
2024:PHHC:043750
iii) State of Jharkhand and others Vs. Jitendra Kumar
Srivastava and another; 2013(5) MPHT 212
iv) Gorakhpur University Vs. Dr. Shitla Prasad
Nagendra; 2001(3) CLR 262
v) Starpayal Natarajan Iyer Vs. The State of Gujarat
and another; SLP(c) No.19195/2022
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents contend that
judgment passed by learned Trial Court and First Appellate Court are well
reasoned, therefore, the present regular second appeal be dismissed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
whole record with their able assistance.
7. A perusal of the record shows that appellant joined in Tubewell
Division, Malerkotla in 1953 and worked at various places till 14.08.1977
i.e. for 24 years. Thereafter, he applied for leave in the year 1977-78 and
after expiry of the leave he was not allowed to join. He superannuated on
30.09.1985. Learned Trial Court held appellant entitled to pensionary
benefits by observing that appellant continued in service upto the date of
superannuation and would be entitled to pensionary benefits but confined the
same to a period of 38 months prior to the filing of suit which was filed on
03.05.1991. Respondents also did not dispute the entitlement to pension. So
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far as the absence period is concerned, no departmental proceedings were
initiated against the appellant.
8. With respect to the claim regarding GP Funds/EP Funds, the
Trial Court held that same belongs to an employee, as it is money deducted
from the salary and hence will not be barred by limitation but confined the
interest upto 30.09.1985. Respondent state never filed any appeal.
9. Learned trial Court has held that so far as the claim with regard
to gratuity, pension and GPS is concerned, this is an admitted fact that
appellant rendered service for a long period of about 24 years on the date of
his becoming absent from duty w.e.f. 1977-78. It further observed that
respondent authorities did not proceed against appellant for his long absence,
therefore, appellant would be deemed to be in service upto the date of his
actually attaining the age of superannuation on 30.09.1985. It is further
observed by learned Trial Court that once appellant was never terminated
from service and has already rendered more than 20 years of service even on
the date of his becoming absent from duty, therefore, becomes entitled to
pensionary benefits like gratuity and pension which is to be worked out in
view of qualifying service of appellant in accordance with rules.
10. It is further held that so far as the claim with regard to GPF is
concerned, the amount of GPF/EPF belongs to an employee and lies as trust
with the employer. Once it is held that the money was lying as trust with
employer, the interest should have been ordered till the actual payment is
released. Further that once the money belongs to appellant with regard to the
subscription of GPF deduction from his salary, appellant is certainly entitled
to claim the same from the respondents, whereas, on the other hand held that
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his claim to get the gratuity is barred by limitation. Therefore, findings of
learned Trial Court are contradictory and are not acceptable to this Court.
11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand and others Vs.
Jitendra Kumar Srivastava and another; 2013(5) MPHT 212 held as
under:-
"7. It is an accepted position that gratuity and pension are not
the bounties. An employee earns these benefits by dint of his long,
continuous, faithful and un-blemished service. Conceptually it is so
lucidly described in D.S. Nakara and Ors. v. Union of India, (1983) 1
SCC 305 by Justice D.A. Desai, who spoke for the Bench, in his
inimitable style, in the following words:
"The approach of the respondents raises a vital and none too
easy of answer, question as to why pension is paid. And why was it
required to be liberalised? Is the employer, which expression will
include even the State, bound to pay pension? Is there any obligation
on the employer to provide for the erstwhile employee even after the
contract of employment has come to an end and the employee has
ceased to render service? What is a pension? What are the goals of
pension? What public interest or purpose, if any, it seeks to serve? If it
does seek to serve some public purpose, is it thwarted by such
artificial division of retirement pre and post a certain date? We need
seek answer to these and incidental questions so as to render just
justice between parties to this petition.
The antiquated notion of pension being a bounty a gratituous
payment depending upon the sweet will or grace of the employer not
claimable as a right and, therefore, no right to pension can be
enforced through Court has been swept under the carpet by the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Deoki Nandan Prasad v. State
of Bihar and Ors., [1971] Su. S.C.R. 634 wherein this Court
authoritatively ruled that pension is a right and the payment of it does
not depend upon the discretion of the Government but is governed by
the rules and a Government servant coming within those rules is
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entitled to claim pension. It was further held that the grant of pension
does not depend upon any one's discretion. It is only for the purpose
of quantifying the amount having regard to service and other allied
matters that it may be necessary for the authority to pass an order to
that effect but the right to receive pension flows to the officer not
because of any such order but by virtue of the rules. This view was
reaffirmed in State of Punjab and Anr. v. Iqbal Singh, (1976) IILLJ
377 SC'.
8. It is thus hard earned benefit which accrues to an employee and is
in the nature of property. This right to property cannot be taken away
without the due process of law as per the provisions of Article 300A of
the Constitution of India.
XXXX
12. Right to receive pension was recognised as right to property
by the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Court in Deokinandan
Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1971) 2 SCC 330, as is apparent from the
following discussion:
"29. The last question to be considered, is, whether the
right to receive pension by a Government servant is property, so
as to attract Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. This
question falls to be decided in order to consider whether the
writ petition is maintainable under Article 32. To this aspect, we
have already adverted to earlier and we now proceed to
consider the same.
30. According to the petitioner the right to receive
pension is property and the respondents by an executive order
dated June 12, 1968 have wrongfully withheld his pension. That
order affects his fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and
31(1) of the Constitution. The respondents, as we have already
indicated, do not dispute the right of the petitioner to get
pension, but for the order passed on August 5, 1966. There is
only a bald averment in the counter-affidavit that no question of
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any fundamental right arises for consideration. Mr. Jha,
learned counsel for the respondents, was not prepared to take
up the position that the right to receive pension cannot be
considered to be property under any circumstances. According
to him, in this case, no order has been passed by the State
granting pension. We understood the learned counsel to urge
that if the State had passed an order granting pension and later
on resiles from that order, the latter order may be considered to
affect the petitioner's right regarding property so as to attract
Articles 19(1) (f) and 31(1) of the Constitution.
31. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the
learned counsel for the respondents. By a reference to the
material provisions in the Pension Rules, we have already
indicated that the grant of pension does not depend upon an
order being passed by the authorities to that effect. It may be
that for the purposes of quantifying the amount having regard to
the period of service and other allied matters, it may be
necessary for the authorities to pass an order to that effect, but
the right to receive pension flows to an officer not because of
the said order but by virtue of the Rules. The Rules, we have
already pointed out, clearly recognise the right of persons like
the petitioner to receive pension under the circumstances
mentioned therein.
32. The question whether the pension granted to a public
servant is property attracting Article 31(1) came up for
consideration before the Punjab High Court in Bhagwant
Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1962 Pun 503. It was held that
such a right constitutes "property" and any interference will be
a breach of Article 31(1) of the Constitution. It was further held
that the State cannot by an executive order curtail or abolish
altogether the right of the public servant to receive pension.
This decision was given by a learned Single Judge. This
decision was taken up in Letters Patent Appeal by the Union of
India. The Letters Patent Bench in its decision in Union of
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India v. Bhagwant Singh I.L.R. 1965 Pun 1 approved the
decision of the learned Single Judge. The Letters Patent Bench
held that the pension granted to a public servant on his
retirement is "property" within the meaning of Article 31(1) of
the Constitution and he could be deprived of the same only by
an authority of law and that pension does not cease to be
property on the mere denial or cancellation of it. It was further
held that the character of pension as "property" cannot possibly
undergo such mutation at the whim of a particular person or
authority.
33. The matter again came up before a Full Bench of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in K.R. Erry v. The State of
Punjab, I.L.R. 1967 P & H 278. The High Court had to
consider the nature of the right of an officer to get pension. The
majority quoted with approval the principles laid down in the
two earlier decisions of the same High Court, referred to above,
and held that the pension is not to be treated as a bounty
payable on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and
that the right to superannuation pension including its amount is
a valuable right vesting in a Government servant. It was further
held by the majority that even though an opportunity had
already been afforded to the officer on an earlier occasion for
showing cause against the imposition of penalty for lapse or
misconduct on his part and he has been found guilty,
nevertheless, when a cut is sought to be imposed in the quantum
of pension payable to an officer on the basis of misconduct
already proved against him, a further opportunity to show cause
in that regard must be given to the officer. This view regarding
the giving of further opportunity was expressed by the learned
Judges on the basis of the relevant Punjab Civil Service Rules.
But the learned Chief Justice in his dissenting judgment was not
prepared to agree with the majority that under such
circumstances a further opportunity should be given to an
officer when a reduction in the amount of pension payable is
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made by the State. It is not necessary for us in the case on hand,
to consider the question whether before taking action by way of
reducing or denying the pension on the basis of disciplinary
action already taken, a further notice to show cause should be
given to an officer. That question does not arise for
consideration before us. Nor are we concerned with the further
question regarding the procedure, if any, to be adopted by the
authorities before reducing or withholding the pension for the
first time after the retirement of an officer. Hence we express no
opinion regarding the views expressed by the majority and the
minority Judges in the above Punjab High Court decision, on
this aspect. But we agree with the view of the majority when it
has approved its earlier decision that pension is not a bounty
payable on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and
that, on the other hand, the right to pension is a valuable right
vesting in a Government servant.
34. This Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranojirao
Shinde and Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 489 had to consider the
question whether a "cash grant" is "property" within the
meaning of that expression in Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the
Constitution. This Court held that it was property, observing "it
is obvious that a right to sum of money is property".
35. Having due regard to the above decisions, we are of the
opinion that the right of the petitioner to receive pension is
property under Article 31(1) and by a mere executive order the
State had no power to withhold the same. Similarly, the said
claim is also property under Article 19(1)(f) and it is not saved
by Sub-article (5) of Article 19. Therefore, it follows that the
order dated June 12, 1968 denying the petitioner right to
receive pension affects the fundamental right of the petitioner
under Articles 19(1) (f) and 31(1)of the Constitution, and as
such the writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable. It may
be that under the Pension Act (Act 23 of 1871) there is a bar
against a civil court entertaining any suit relating to the matters
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mentioned therein. That does not stand in the way of a Writ of
Mandamus being issued to the State to properly consider the
claim of the petitioner for payment of pension according to
law"."
12. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gorakhpur University Vs. Dr. Shitla
Prasad Nagendra; 2001(3) CLR 262 held as under:-
"5. We have carefully considered the submissions on
behalf of the respective parties before us. The earlier decision
pertaining to this very university reported in 1996(2) ESC 211
(All.) (supra) is that of a Division Bench rendered after
considering the principles laid down and also placing reliance
upon the decisions of this Court reported in 1994(6) SCC 589
(supra) which, in turn, relied upon earlier decisions in State of
Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair, 1985(1) SCC 429 and AIR
1981 SC page 212 (supra). This court has been repeatedly
emphasising the position that pension and gratuity are no
longer matters of any bounty to be distributed by Government
but are valuable rights acquired and property in their hands
and any delay in settlement and disbursement whereof should
be viewed seriously and dealt with severely by imposing penalty
in the form of payment of interest. Withholding of quarters
allotted, while in service, even after retirement without vacating
the same has been viewed to be not a valid ground to withhold
the disbursement of the terminal benefits. Such is the position
with reference to amounts due towards Provident Fund, which
is rendered immune from attachment and deduction or
adjustment as against any other dues from the employee."
13. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Starpayal Natarajan Iyer Vs. The
State of Gujarat and another; SLP(c) No.19195/2022 held as under:-
"We have considered the arguments advanced at the Bar in
light of the impugned order(s) and the material on record. We find that
the payment of pension is not a bounty but a recurring occurrence as
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stated by D.A. Desai, J. in D.S. Nakara and Ors. Vs. Union of India:
(1983) 1 SCC 305: AIR 1983 SC 130. For ease of reference, the
relevant paragraphs may be quoted as under:
"31. From the discussion three things emerge:
(i) that pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace
depending upon the sweet will of the employer and that it
creates a vested right subject to 1972 Rules which are
statutory in character because they are enacted in exercise of
powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 and clause (5)
of Article 148 of the Constitution; (ii) that the pension is not
an ex gratia payment but it is a payment for the past service
rendered; and (iii) it is a social welfare measure rendering
socio-economic justice to those who in the hey-day of their life
ceaselessly toiled for the employer on an assurance that in
their old age they would not be left in lurch."
In the circumstances, we find that the High Court was not right
in dismissing the Special Civil Application on the ground of delay and
laches. Instead, the High Court ought to have considered the case of
the appellant on merits and on the basis of the applicable rules and
decided the matter on the entitlement of the appellant towards pension
and other terminal benefits."
14. A bare perusal of the above referred to judgments shows that
payment of pension is not bounty but a recurring occurrence. Therefore, it
cannot be restricted to 38 months. Further, it is held by Hon'ble Supreme
Court that gratuity and pension are not bounties and an employee earn these
benefits by dint of his long, continuous, faithful and unblemished service
which cannot be denied. The same is the position with respect to all other
retiral benefits including provident fund etc.
15. In view of the above discussion and law laid down by Hon'ble
Supreme Court as referred to above, the present regular second appeal is
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allowed. Judgment and decree dated 21.04.1997 passed by Civil Judge (Sr.
Division), Patiala to the extent of partly rejecting the claim of the appellant
is set aside. Judgment and decree dated 09.09.1999 passed by Additional
District Judge, Patiala, whereby, the appeal filed by the appellant is
dismissed is also set aside.
16. Accordingly, civil suit filed by the appellant is decreed in his
favour. He is held entitled to the reitral benefits, pension, gratuity, EP Funds/
GP Funds etc. from the date these benefits become due along with interest @
9% per annum. It is made clear that the amount of pension, if already
granted to the appellant for 38 months, interest of 9% per annum would not
be granted on the pension already granted to him.
17. Civil suit was filed by the appellant in the year 1991 for
pensionary/retiral benefits etc. Present regular second appeal pertains to the
year 1999 and decided in the year 2025. Appellant has been waiting for the
relief since 26 years, therefore, respondents are directed to deposit the
amount due in favour of the appellant in the account of appellant along with
interest @9% per annum within a period of six months from the date of
receipt of copy of this judgment. Appellant is directed to furnish his bank
account details to the respondents.
18. Since, the present regular second appeal is decided almost after
26 years, therefore, this Court does not want the petitioner to further run
after the respondent by way of filing execution for the relief granted to him
by allowing the present regular second appeal. To avoid further harassment
to the appellant, respondents are therefore, expected to comply with the
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directions of this Court and deposit the amount due in the account of the
appellant and not to force the appellant to file execution.
19. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
20.11.2025 (SUDEEPTI SHARMA)
Sahil JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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