Punjab-Haryana High Court
State Of Punjab vs Jarnail Singh on 1 December, 2023
Author: Anil Kshetarpal
Bench: Anil Kshetarpal
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:153333
2023:PHHC:153333
101 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-1389-1992 (O&M)
Date of decision: 01.12.2023
State of Punjab
....Appellant
Versus
Jarnail Singh
..Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
Present:- Mr. Gurpreet Singh, Addl. AG, Punjab
Mr. P.S.Guliani, Advocate for the respondent
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J (Oral)
1. In this Regular Second Appeal, the State of Punjab
(defendants in the trial court) assailed the correctness of the
concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. Although,
the First Appellate Court has slightly modified the relief granted to
the plaintiff.
2. In order to comprehend the issue involved in the
present case, some relevant facts, in brief, are required to be noticed.
3. The plaintiff (respondent herein) filed a suit for grant of
decree of declaration to the effect that he is entitled to the benefit of
the period of service from the date of his appointment on account of
annual increment and other service benefits and is also entitled to
leave of the kind due for the period of strike during the month of
February, 1968. It is the case of the plaintiff that he was appointed
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on 30th October, 1967 and continued to work for a period of nearly
1 year and eight days, when on account of strike announced by the
workers his services were discontinued by the reasons of his
absence vide order dated 5th March, 1968. Subsequently, the
respondent was appointed afresh on temporary basis as a Conductor
for a period of three months vide order dated 9th March, 1970,
whereas the respondent joined on 10th March, 1970.
4. The respondent filed the suit on 19th April, 1988.
Learned trial court decreed the suit on the ground that in 1967 the
respondent was appointed as a Conductor in the place of one Sh.
Ram Lubhaya, Conductor, who was placed under suspension.
Subsequently, Sh. Ram Lubhaya was removed from service and
therefore, the plaintiff was allowed to continue. The court
concluded that the plaintiff became regular employee of the Punjab
Roadways against the post available by removal of Sh. Ram
Lubhaya from service. Thereafter, the court relied upon circular
issued on 21st October, 1969 by the Director, State Transport to hold
that the employees who were on strike and having less than 240
days of service and had been removed from service for participation
in the strike should be reinstated. Thus, the court held that the
respondent is entitled to condonation of break in service from 5th
March, 1968 to 9th March, 1968.
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5. The State of Punjab filed the first appeal. The First
Appellate Court has held that there is no prescribed period of
limitation for filing such suit and the plaintiff has a recurring cause
of action. The court held that the respondent is not entitled to claim
grant of increment for the period during which he remained out of
job due to his participation in the strike for the period prior to
January, 1985. With the aforesaid modification, the First Appellate
Court also upheld the judgment of the trial court.
6. Heard the learned counsel representing the parties at
length and with their able assistance perused the paper book
alongwith the requisitioned record.
7. Learned counsel representing the appellant contends
that on 9th March, 1970, the respondent was given a fresh
appointment for a period of three months. He submits that the
plaintiff pursuant to the aforesaid appointment letter joined and
continued to serve the Department. Hence, the suit filed by him on
19th April, 1988 has been filed beyond the period of limitation. He
further submits that in the year 1967 as well as on 10th March, 1970
the plaintiff was appointed on a temporary basis. Hence, he could
not claim continuity of service from 30th October, 1967.
8. On the other hand, the learned counsel representing the
respondent submitted that this Court should not interfere after a
passage of nearly 31 years.
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9. It may be noted here that on 12th April, 1994 the
interim order passed on 31st January 1994 was directed to continue
further. This Court has been informed that the judgment and decree
passed by the courts below has not been implemented.
10. First of all, the suit filed by the plaintiff on 19th April,
1988 to challenge the correctness of terms of appointment letter
dated 10th March, 1970 is clearly beyond the prescribed period of
limitation. If the plaintiff decided to challenge the terms of the
appointment letter dated 10th March, 1970, the period of limitation
will begin to run from 9th March, 1970 itself. Hence, the suit filed
after a period of 18 years is beyond the prescribed period of
limitation.
11. Moreover, the First Appellate Court has erred in
overlooking the fact that the services of the respondent were
dispensed with on 5th March, 1968 and he was appointed afresh on
10th March, 1970. Thus, there was a gap of more than two years.
The instructions Ex P-3 dated 21st October, 1969 does not help the
respondent, particularly when he joined the services pursuant to the
appointment letter issued on 9th March, 1978. At the cost of
repetition, it may be noted here that on 30th October, 1967, the
appellant was appointed on a temporary basis and within a period of
one year of his joining he opted to go on a strike. His services were
dispensed with on account of participation in the strike.
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12. Still further, the judgment passed by the First Appellate
Court suffers from multiple factual errors. The courts have also
erred in assuming that the respondent was appointed on a regular
basis, although, the appointment letter dated 30th October, 1967 as
well as 10th March, 1970 prove that the respondent was appointed
on a temporary basis.
13. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and discussion, the
judgment and decree passed by the courts below are set aside. The
Regular Second Appeal stands allowed.
14. All the pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are
also disposed of.
01.12.2023 (ANIL KSHETARPAL)
rekha JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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