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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dr. Jithin K. Sebastian vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 13 March, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE HIMANSHU JOSHI
ON THE 13 th OF MARCH, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 13266 of 2025
DR. JITHIN K. SEBASTIAN
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Surendra Singh - Senior Advocate with Shri Arnav Tiwari - Advocate
for the petitioner.
Shri Anuj Singh - P.L. for the respondent/State .
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure/528 of
BNSS, 2023 has been preferred by the accused/petitioner for quashing the
impugned FIR No.701/2023 dated 28.12.2023, registered at Police Station
Gohalpur, District Jabalpur (M.P.) for offences punishable under Sections 376,
376(2)(n), 450 and 506 of IPC as well as all consequential proceedings arising out
of Crime No.701/2023.
2. As per the prosecution, the complainant lodged a written complaint in
which she states that she is a resident of District Satna, though she is temporarily
residing in Jabalpur in rented accommodation. The complainant further avers that
she has completed her education at a renowned university, having obtained a
degree in Bachelors in Dental Surgery. In the year 2021, she traveled to the city
of Cambridge, United Kingdom, to pursue a Master of Science (M.Sc.) course.
During her stay, she was employed on a part-time basis by a company named
Trinity Care, where she met the present Applicant, who was also employed at the
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same company. Over the time, the complainant and the applicant grew close and
subsequently, they developed mutual affection for each other. The complainant
claims that on 15.08.2021, the applicant allegedly coerced her into engaging in
sexual intercourse by taking undue advantage of their friendship, which the
complainant expressly disapproved. The complainant further alleges that,
following her refusal to consent, the applicant repeatedly engaged in sexual
intercourse with her under the false pretext of marriage. As a result of this sexual
relationship, the complainant became pregnant. Upon disclosing this fact to the
applicant, he reportedly refused to marry her and denied responsibility for the
child. Thereafter on 27.02.2023, she gave birth to a female child. After the child's
birth, the complainant allegedly once again requested the applicant to marry her.
However, the Applicant is said to have not only refused her proposal but also
assaulted her physically with kicks and fists. On 28.12.2023, she contacted the
applicant via mobile phone to request marriage again, but the applicant again
denied the request. Therefore, she lodged an FIR against the present applicant
under Section 376, 376(2)(N), 323, 450 and 506 of I.P.C.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that being aggrieved by the
registration of the aforesaid false and fallacious F.I.R., the Applicant was
constrained to file an application for grant of bail before this Hon'ble Court,
which was registered as M.C.R.C. No. 8950/2025. This Hon'ble Court, after
considering the material available on record, was pleased to enlarge the Applicant
on bail vide order dated 13.03.2025. A copy of the said order is annexed herewith
as ANNEXURE A/2. The Police Station Gohalpur, Jabalpur had no jurisdiction to
register the impugned F.I.R., as no part of the alleged cause of action arose within
Jabalpur. As per the complainant's own averments in the F.I.R., the alleged
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incident occurred in the United Kingdom. For that matter learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon Section 177 Cr.P.C. which clearly stipulates that "every
offence shall be tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed." Further, Section 178 Cr.P.C. provides for cases where an offence is
committed in more than one jurisdiction, but there is no contention in the present
case that the alleged incident occurred within Indian jurisdiction or within the
jurisdiction of the Police Station of Gohalpur, Jabalpur. Therefore, it is
abundantly clear that the Jabalpur Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon this matter. The applicant has never visited Jabalpur, which is
evident from the affidavit executed by him. A copy of the said affidavit is annexed
herewith as ANNEXURE A/3 . It is further crucial to bring to the attention of this
Hon'ble Court that there exists an explicit legal bar under Section 188 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure regarding the initiation of an inquiry or trial for an offence
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of India. Section 188 Cr.P.C. clearly
stipulates that "no inquiry or trial shall be conducted in India in relation to any
offence committed outside India, except with the prior sanction of the Central
Government." That, in the present case, it is undisputed that the alleged offence,
as per the complainant's own statement, occurred outside the territorial boundaries
of India, specifically in the United Kingdom. However, it is important to note that
no sanction or permission has been obtained from the Central Government in
accordance with the requirements laid down under Section 188 of the Cr.P.C. In
the absence of such sanction, the entire process of investigation and subsequent
proceedings in India becomes inherently flawed and without legal foundation.
Section 188 of Cr.P.C. is quoted herein below for the feady reference of
this Hon'ble Court.
Section 188 - Offence committed outside India
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When an offence is committed outside India-
1. by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or
2. by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India,
he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any
place within India at which he may be found:
Provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this
Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or tried
in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that it is crucial to note
that the complainant did not file any complaint before the authorities in the United
Kingdom, despite the alleged incident occurring there. Abhorrently, following an
inexplicable delay of over two years, the complainant has suddenly registered an
FIR in Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, without any reasonable or justifiable
explanation. Any potential cause of action, if it exists, arose in the United
Kingdom and not in Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh. He submits that the applicant is a
graduate from Kerala and has completed his post-graduation from a reputed
institution in Cambridge, United Kingdom. The present criminal proceedings have
been initiated on false allegations with the intent to malign the Applicant's
reputation and jeopardize his professional career as a doctor. A copy of the
Applicant's graduation certificate is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE A/4 . It is
submitted that the applicant and the complainant were in a consensual
relationship. The allegations of sexual intercourse under the false promise of
marriage are baseless and unsupported by the material on record. Notably, the
complainant herself, in whatsapp communications, has acknowledged that the
applicant was not responsible for her pregnancy. Copies of the whatsapp
conversations along with the certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act
are annexed herewith as ANNEXURE A/5. It is also submitted that complainant
herself has not been a resident of Jabalpur. She has created a false and fabricated
rent agreement in order to establish a territorial jurisdiction and facilitate the filing
of present complaint in Jabalpur. She herself is a resident of Satna and presently
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living in abroad. The present case is a case of consent as applicant and
complainant had taken several pictures with each other together during the course
of their relationship. The pictures clearly paint different picture than what has
being alleged/portrayed by the complainant. Hence, it leads to an irretrievable
conclusion that present case is nothing but a clear case of consent and the
allegations leveled against the applicant. It is further submitted that the applicant
had submitted a detailed representation dated 03.02.2025 before the
Superintendent of Police, Jabalpur, placing the true facts on record and
highlighting his false implication in the present case. A copy of the said
representation is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE A/6 . To bolster his argument,
counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court
in Maheshwar Tigga Vs. State of Jharkhand, 2020 10 SCC 108, Sonu @ Subhash
Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and Another, passed in Criminal Appeal No.223 of 2021
(arising out of SLP (Crl) No.11218 of 2019, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State
of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, Uday Vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State has strongly
opposed the prayer and have submitted that from the allegations as leveled
against the accused by the prosecutrix it is apparent that the same do constitute
offence of rape having been committed by him. The accused firstly committed
rape upon the prosecutrix and thereafter promised to marry her which was
believed by her. The consent of the prosecutrix for physical relationship was
obtained by the accused by false statement, knowing it to be false since the very
inception. It is hence submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed.
5. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties
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and have perused the record.
6. To appreciate the allegations as leveled by the prosecutrix against the
accused it would be apt to take note of the relevant judgments applicable to the
facts of the case. In Shambhu Kharwar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another in
Cr.A. No.1231/2022 decided on 12.08.2022, it was held by the Supreme Court as
under:-
"13. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in the complaint as they
stand, it is impossible to find in the FIR or in the chargesheet, the
essential ingredients of an offence under Section 376 IPC. The crucial
issue which is to be considered is whether the allegations indicate that
the appellant had given a promise to the second respondent to marry
which at the inception was false and on the basis of which the second
respondent was induced into a sexual relationship. Taking the
allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial
ingredients of the offence under Section 375 IPC are absent. The
relationship between the parties was purely of a consensual nature. The
relationship, as noted above, was in existence prior to the marriage of
the second respondent and continued to subsist during the term of
the marriage and after the second respondent was granted a divorce by
mutual consent."
7. In the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar V/s. State of Maharashtra and
Another (2019) 9 SCC 608 it was held that mere refusal to honor the promise of
marriage and having sexual relationship on such promise by itself would not
amount to commission of rape. It was held as under :-
"14. In the present case, the "misconception of fact" alleged by the
complainant is the appellant's promise to marry her. Specifically in the
context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a
distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the
maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made
in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of
Chhattisgarh [Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 13 SCC 1 :
2019 SCC OnLine SC 509] , this Court held : (SCC para 12).
"37. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that
if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who
gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any
intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual
intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would
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marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a
misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC and, in such a case, such a
consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said
to have committed the rape as defined under Sections 375 IPC and can
be convicted for the offence under Section 376 IPC."
Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v.
State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC
675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] (Deepak Gulati) : (SCC p. 682, para 21)
"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused;"
15. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. [Yedla Srinivasa Rao v.
State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 615 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 557] the
accused forcibly established sexual relations with the complainant.
When she asked the accused why he had spoiled her life, he promised
to marry her. On this premise, the accused repeatedly had sexual
intercourse with the complainant. When the complainant became
pregnant, the accused refused to marry her. When the matter was
brought to the panchayat, the accused admitted to having had sexual
intercourse with the complainant but subsequently absconded. Given
this factual background, the Court observed : (SCC pp. 620-21, para
10)
"10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the testimony
of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on
promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of
consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent
because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused
intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse
with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had
committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of
PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of the village. It is
more than clear that the accused made a false promise that he would
marry her. Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the
beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of
the accused, completely being misled by the accused who held out the
promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with
clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to
believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the
sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot be treated to be a
consent."
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker
at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to
deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there
is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the
other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise.
To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had
no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The
"consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
"misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for
her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati [Deepak
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Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) SCC (Cri) 660]
this Court observed : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)
"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise,
and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine
whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage
by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the
accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he
could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable
to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must
be treated differently.
xxxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to
show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused
had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the
victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having
the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various
unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with
respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception
of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term
"misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance".
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon
the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other."
(emphasis supplied)
17. In Uday v. State of Karnataka [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003)
4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] the complainant was a college-going
student when the accused promised to marry her. In the complainant's
statement, she admitted that she was aware that there would be
significant opposition from both the complainant's and accused's
families to the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse
with the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her
family. The Court observed that in these circumstances the accused's
promise to marry the complainant was not of immediate relevance to
the complainant's decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the
accused, which was motivated by other factors : (SCC p. 58, para 25)
"25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in
this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for
the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the
consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be
proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to
believe that the consent was given in consequence of such
misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry
induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the
appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her
marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of
caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with
stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a
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distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the
marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant.
The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant
knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to
having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief,
based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is
hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the
circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the
appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the
prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not
disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does
appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are
permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not
without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the
appellant to a lonely place at 12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens
in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they
promise to each other several times that comewhat may, they will get
married."
(emphasis supplied)
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases,
the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an
active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish
whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising
out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The
promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith
and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The
false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct
nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."
8. The facts of the present case are to be seen in the light of the aforesaid
dictum for ascertaining as to whether the promise of marriage given by the
accused was a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being
adhered to at the time it was given. She had not stated that accused had answered
to marry her or promised that he would marry her and thereafter they had
developed physical relations. On the contrary she has stated that the accused had
firstly committed rape upon her and had thereafter promised to marry her. In any
case, whether the accused first committed rape upon the prosecutrix and thereafter
promised to marry her or whether he first promised to marry the prosecutrix
and thereafter had physical relationship with her loses significance for the fact that
the prosecutrix continued to have physical relationship with the accused for a
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period of more than 7 years despite him not marrying her. If the accused had
promised the prosecutrix that he would marry her but did not do so, the natural
conduct of the prosecutrix would have been to stop having physical relationship
with him. However, she did not do so for a period of 7 years. This conduct of the
prosecutrix leads to an irresistible inference that she was always a consenting
party to her physical relationship with the accused. This is more so when
the prosecutrix had herself stated that she had physical relationship with
the accused on several occasions. From the facts which are available on record, it
is apparent that the relationship between the accused and the prosecutrix was
purely consensual in nature, and the same continued for more than 7 years. There
was no bad faith on part of the accused in promising the prosecutrix that he would
marry her, with the intention of not adhering to it. The accused and the prosecutrix
met regularly at various places on several occasions and engaged in sexual
intercourse over a course of more than 7 years. The promise made by the accused
of marrying the prosecutrix cannot, in the facts and circumstances of the case be
said to have been made with no intention of honoring.
9. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition deserves to be
and is hereby allowed FIR No.701/2023 dated 28.12.2023, registered at Police
Station Gohalpur, District Jabalpur (M.P.) and other consequential proceedings
arising thereof are hereby quashed.
10. This petition is disposed of accordingly.
(HIMANSHU JOSHI)
JUDGE
Jasleen
