[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Nihal Yadav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 April, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GAJENDRA SINGH
ON THE 9 th OF APRIL, 2026
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2926 of 2026
NIHAL YADAV
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Shreyash Atlasia - Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. Ambuj Patel - GA for the respondent/State.
ORDER
This third (repeat) criminal appeal under section 14A (2) of the SC &
ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 r/w 482 of the BNS, 2023 is
preferred against the order dated 17.03.2026 (Annexure-A/1) in BA
No.280/2026 by the Special Judge, SC & ST (POA) Act, 1989, Dewas,
whereby application for anticipatory bail of the appellant on apprehension of
arrest in Crime No.652/2025 registered at police station- Civil Lines, Dewas
(MP), for the offence punishable under sections 69,351(3), 115(2) of the
BNS, 2023 and sections 3(1)(w)(ii) and 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act, 1989 has been
rejected.
02. Earlier, first criminal appeal was dismissed as withdrawn vide
order dated 02.02.2026 passed in Criminal Appeal No.12280/2026 and
second criminal appeal was dismissed as not maintainable vide order dated
09.03.2026 in Criminal Appeal No.1909/2026.
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03. Prosecution rests its case on the facts that the appellant/accused,
who does not belong to the SC/ST community, met the victim/prosecutrix
belonging to the SC community in the month of March 2023. At that time,
the prosecutrix was living with her two daughters and her mother after
separation from her husband through customary divorce. She was earning her
livelihood by working in a company situated within the territorial jurisdiction
of Police Station Industrial Area, Dewas. The appellant promised to marry
the prosecutrix and persuaded her to live with him. He stated that they would
marry after the marriage of his sister and established physical relations with
the prosecutrix, as a result of which she became pregnant in the year 2024.
The appellant got the pregnancy of the prosecutrix terminated, reiterating
that he would marry her after the marriage of his sister. However, the
appellant/accused subsequently initiated marriage process with another
girl. The sister of the appellant/accused intimated the ring ceremony of
appellant/accused to the prosecutrix. Prosecutrix asked regarding this from
the appellant and appellant physically assaulted the prosecutrix and caused
injuries voluntarily, and continued the physical relationship by assaulting the
prosecutrix and also put a knife on the neck of the daughter of the
proseuctrix to fulfil his lust. Appellant/accused referred the prosecutrix to her
fiancé as a prostitute. When the engagement with another girl broke down
then the appellant came to the house of the prosecutrix and thrashed the
mother of the prosecutrix. He also threatened that if prosecutrix got pregnant,
he would kill the child. Appellant again caused injuries to the prosecutrix
voluntarily and threatened that if she lodged the report, then he would kill the
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daughters of the proseuctrix and will put the prosecutrix in the profession of
prostitution, then finding no way prosecutrix lodged the F.I.R. on
07.012.2025 registered as Crime No.652/2025 at Police Station Civil Lines,
Dewas.
04. The trial Court rejected the application assigning the reason that
the Bar under section 18 of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is
attracted in the case and no case for anticipatory bail is made out. Otherwise
also in the light of Sushila Aggarwal and Others vs State (NCT Of Delhi)
and another; AIR 2020 SC 831 , the case of the appellant is not fit to be
extended the benefit of anticipatory bail, referring to in details the allegations
against the appellant/accused including the threats extended by the
appellant/accused.
05. Challenging the order, this appeal has been preferred on the
ground that the F.I.R. has been lodged with delay. It is nowhere mentioned in
the F.I.R. that the offence was committed with knowledge that the victim
belongs to the SC community. The victim was married twice earlier, and her
earlier marriages had not been dissolved. The appellant is a resident of
Dewas and undertakes to cooperate in the investigation. Learned counsel for
the appellant, in support of the appeal, placed reliance on the cases of Victim
X vs. State of M.P. & others, Order dated 03.09.2025 passed in
Cr.A.No.1021/2025 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at
Jabalpur [NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025 MPHC JBP 42390], Virendra
Yadav vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh; Order dated 10.02.2025 passed in
Cr.A.No.48783/2024 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at
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Jabalpur [NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-JBP:6370], Deepak
Gulati vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675, Prathvi Raj Chauhan vs.
Union of India and Ors., [(2020) 4 SCC 727].
Heard.
06. Learned counsel for the respondent/State has opposed the appeal
on the ground that in the F.I.R. it is mentioned that the appellant was aware
about the caste identity of the prosecutrix and the offence also was registered
under Sections 3(1)(w)(ii) and 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act, 1989. This is not a case
of a broken promise of marriage; rather, it is a case involving the exploitation
of a woman belonging to a marginalized section. During the course of this
exploitation, not only was the prosecutrix subjected to abuse, but her mother
was also brutally thrashed, voluntarily caused injuries to her, and even the
minor children of the victim were threatened in case she takes recourse to
law. The defence of a "live-in relationship" may be raised only when consent
is free and where there is a disparity in the social status of the parties and the
woman of a marginalized section is made a prey to lust under the garb of a
promise and thereafter under the fear of threat, there is no consent and the
defence of consent based on "live-in relationship" plea is not applicable.
Perused the record.
07. In Kiran vs. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain and Anr.; 2025 INSC 1067 ,
Hon'ble Apex Cout has laid down the parameters in relation to the
applicability of Section 18 of SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 in para no.6, 6.1 and
6.2 as below:-
"6. In light of the parameters in relation to the
applicability of Section 18 of the Act emanating from
afore-discussed various decisions of this Court, the
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proposition could be summarised that as the provision
of Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribes, Act, 1989 with express language excludes the
applicability of Section 438, Cr.PC, it creates a bar
against grant of anticipatory bail in absolute terms in
relations to the arrest of a person who faces specific
accusations of having committed the offence under the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act. The benefit
of anticipatory bail for such an accused is taken off.
6.1 The absolute nature of bar, however, could be read
and has to be applied with a rider. In a given case where
on the face of it the offence under Section 3 of the Act
is found to have not been made out and that the
accusations relating to the commission of such offence
are devoid of prima facie merits, the Court has a room
to exercise the discretion to grant anticipatory bail to
the accused under Section 438 of the Code.
6.2 Non-making of prima facie case about the
commission of offence is perceived to be such a
situation where the Court can arrive at such a
conclusion in the first blush itself or by way of the first
impression upon very reading of the averments in the
FIR. The contents and the allegations in the FIR would
be decisive in this regard. Furthermore, in reaching a
conclusion as to whether a prima facie offence is made
out or not, it would not be permissible for the Court to
travel into the evidentiary realm or to consider other
materials, nor the Court could advert to conduct a mini
trial."
08. Perusal of the statement of the prosecutrix, belonging to the SC
community, recorded on 01.04.2026 under Section 183 of the BNS, 2023,
along with the statements of her mother and other family members and the
contents of the F.I.R., it cannot be said that the allegations are false or
baseless. It is not a case where the allegations relating to the commission of
the offence are devoid of promise of marriage so as to provide any scope for
exercise of discretion in granting anticipatory bail to the accused. The
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concept of "live-in relationship" in India was recognised in Indra Sarma v.
VKV Sarma [(2013) 15 SCC 755] primarily to ensure protection for women
from domestic violence in relationships outside marriage - an implied
international obligation under the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
09. The above concept of "live-in relationship" adopted in India for
protecting the woman, cannot be used as a tool of exploitation of women of
marginal section facing double intersectionality, first being a woman and
second being a woman of marginal section. There is a distinction between
"protection" and "exploitation". Both run counter to each other. Referred
cases in para 5 have no application to the facts of the present case.
Accordingly, the trial Court did not commit any illegality in rejecting the
application. Hence, criminal appeal under Section 14A(2) of the SC & ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, read with Section 482 of the BNS,
2023 for grant of anticipatory bail is dismissed.
(GAJENDRA SINGH)
JUDGE
VS
