[Cites 20, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Govind Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 December, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:62296
1 MCRC-44579-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRAMOD KUMAR AGRAWAL
ON THE 2 nd OF DECEMBER, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 44579 of 2025
GOVIND SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Alok Kumar Gupta - Advocate for the petitioner.
Smt. Ranjana Agnihotri - Dy. G.A. for the respondent/State.
ORDER
This is second bail application filed by the applicant under Section 483 of
BNSS/ 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of regular bail relating to
Crime No.300/2025 registered at Police Station - Kotwali Dindori, District
Dindori (M.P.) for the offence punishable under Sections 126(2), 70(1), 87 of IPC.
The applicant has been arrested on 08.05.2025.
2. As per the prosecution story, the allegation against the applicant is that
the applicant and other co-accused committed gang-rape on the prosecutrix, on the
basis of which the case has been registered against the present applicant under the
aforesaid sections.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant is innocent and
has been falsely implicated in this case. In this case, charge sheet was not filed
within stipulated period, therefore the applicant is entitled for default bail under
Section 187(3) of BNSS. It is further submitted that co-accused Rajendra Maravi
has been granted default bail by the learned trial court vide order dated 7.8.2025.
The case of the present applicant is similar to the co-accused, but the learned trial
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court has refused to enlarge the applicant on the ground of default bail, therefore,
prayed for granting bail to the applicant. It is submitted that the right of default
bail is indeafisible right. He is in custody since 08.05.2025. The conclusion of
the trial will take considerable time, therefore, it has been prayed that the applicant
may be released on bail. He has placed reliance on the Judgment of Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of M. Ravindran vs The Intelligence Officer Directorate reported
in (2021) 2 SCC 485 , wherein it has been held as under :-
6.1. It is also relevant to note Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act for the purpose of this matter:
"36-A. Offences triable by Special Courts.--(1)-(3) * * *
(4) In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under Section 19 or Section 24 or
Section 27-A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in sub-section (2) of
Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), thereof to "ninety days", where
they occur, shall be construed as reference to "one hundred and eighty days":
Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one
hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report
of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the
detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days."
6.2. Section 36-A of the NDPS Act prescribes modified application of the CrPC as indicated
therein. The effect of sub-section (4) of Section 36-A, NDPS Act is to require that investigation
into certain offences under the NDPS Act be completed within a period of 180 days instead of 90
days as provided under Section 167(2) CrPC. Hence the benefit of additional time-limit is given
for investigating a more serious category of offences. This is augmented by a further proviso that
the Special Court may extend time prescribed for investigation up to one year if the Public
Prosecutor submits a report indicating the progress of investigation and giving specific reasons for
requiring the detention of the accused beyond the prescribed period of 180 days. In the matter on
hand, it is admitted that the Public Prosecutor had not filed any such report within the 180-day
period for seeking extension of time up to one year for filing final report/additional complaint
before the trial court.
7. From the aforementioned, it is clear that in the appellant's case, the final report was required to
be filed within 180 days from the first date of remand.
8 . This Court in a catena of judgments including Ravi Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar [ Ravi
Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2015) 8 SCC 340 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 605] , has ruled that
while computing the period under Section 167(2), the day on which accused was remanded to
judicial custody has to be excluded and the day on which challan/charge-sheet is filed in the court
has to be included.
18.5. Having considered both opinions, we have arrived at the conclusion that the majority opinion
in Uday Mohanlal Acharya [ Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC 453 :
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2001 SCC (Cri) 760] is the correct interpretation of the decision rendered by the Constitution
Bench in Sanjay Dutt [ Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] . The
decision in Sanjay Dutt [ Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] merely
casts a positive corresponding obligation upon the accused to promptly apply for default bail as
soon as the prescribed period of investigation expires. As the decision in Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur [ Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri)
1087] expressly cautions, the court cannot suo motu grant bail without considering whether the
accused is ready to furnish bail or not. This is an in-built safeguard within Section 167(2) to ensure
that the accused is not automatically released from custody without obtaining the satisfaction of
the court that he is able to guarantee his presence for further investigation, or for trial, as the case
may be. Further, as the majority opinion in Rakesh Kumar Paul [ Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of
Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 401] pointed out, there could be rare occasions
where the accused voluntarily forfeits his right to bail on account of threat to his personal security
outside of remand or for some other reasons. The decision in Sanjay Dutt [ Sanjay Dutt v. State,
(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] clarifies that once a charge-sheet is filed, such waiver
of the right by the accused becomes final and Section 167(2) ceases to apply.
25.2. The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has
applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the
charge-sheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the court; or filing of
the charge-sheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is
pending before a higher court.
25.3. However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and
subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred
before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at
liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as
the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the
CrPC.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for State has opposed the grant of bail
to the applicant and submitted that in this case, after stipulated period but before
the filing of charge sheet, application was not filed by the present applicant before
the competent court, whereas in the case of co-accused he has filed a default bail
application before filing of charge sheet, therefore, his application on the ground
of default bail was allowed by the learned trial court. But the case of the present
applicant is distinguishable, because before filing of charge sheet he has not filed
default bail application.
5. Heard arguments of learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
6. In the case the applicant was arrested on 8.5.2025. Charge Sheet was
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filed on 7.8.2025. In this case, the charge-sheet was not filed in stipulated
period. It is pertinent to mention here that the applicant has filed the application
for default bail in the trial court after filing the charge-sheet, therefore, he is not
entitled for the default bail as mentioned in the case of M. Ravindran vs The
Intelligence Officer Directorate reported in (2021) 2 SCC 485 . In the aforesaid
Ruling, it has been mentioned by the Apex Court that if bail application on the
ground of default bail is filed after filing of Charge-sheet, then his right to default
bail could be extinguished. This view is reiterated by the Apex court in the
Judgment of Enforcement Directorate, Government of India Vs. Kapil Wadhawan
& Another reported in (2024) 7 SCC 147 . It is also pertinent to mention here
that co-accused Rajendra Kumar Maravi has filed the application for the default
bail before filing of Charge-sheet, therefore, his application was allowed by the
Magisterial Court, but the present applicant has filed the application of default bail
after filing of Charge-sheet, therefore, he is not entitled for default bail.
7. Looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case as well as
seriousness of offence, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the applicant.
8. Accordingly, this MCRC stands dismissed.
(PRAMOD KUMAR AGRAWAL)
JUDGE
nd
