M/S Alembic Pharmaceuticals Limited vs Jay Prakash Singh
2025 Latest Caselaw 6678 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

M/S Alembic Pharmaceuticals Limited vs Jay Prakash Singh on 4 November, 2025

Author: Deepak Roshan

Bench: Deepak Roshan

                                                   2025:JHHC:33112


   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
              W.P. (L) No. 2457 of 2025
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M/s Alembic Pharmaceuticals Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, through Santoush Kadam, aged about 48 years, Son of Shri. Shahoo Kadam, resident of 8/303 Amrut Aangan Phase II, Old Mumbai-Pune Road, Parsik Nagar, Kalwa, P.O. & P.S. Kalwa, West Thane, Mumbai 400605, Maharashtra, working as the Chief Manager (HR), at the Corporate Office situated at 2nd Floor, Prime Corporate Park, Sahar Road, Andheri (East) P.O. & P.S. Andheri (East) District. Mumbai, 400099, Maharashtra.

....Petitioners

Versus Jay Prakash Singh, Son of Late Ram Dev, BSSRU Rest House, G1-G2, Madhusudan, Kalpona, Dimna Road, Mango, P.O. & P.S. Mango, Town Jamshedpur, District-East Singbhum- 831012. ....Respondent

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

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For the Petitioners: Mr. Nipun Bakshi, Advocate Mr. Shubham Sinha, Adv Mr. Raunak Sahay, Adv For the Respondent : In Person

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C.A.V. ON: 30.10.2025 PRONOUNCED ON: 04/11/2025

1. The instant writ application has been preferred by

the Petitioner assailing the Order dated 27.02.2025, passed

by the Ld. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur, in

I.D. Case No. 4 of 2024. This order allowed the application

preferred by the Respondent-workman under Section 36(3)

and (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, debarring the

Petitioner's advocate from representing it in the Reference

Case (I.D. Case No. 4/2024).

2. Briefly stated, the Respondent workman instituted a

case under Section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, challenging his

removal from service. The case was registered as I.D. Case

No. 4 of 2024 on 08.08.2024.

On 16.08.2024, the workman filed a preliminary

objection under Section 36(3) and (4) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947. This application is annexed to the Writ

Petition as Annexure 6/1, and a bare glance reveals that it is

addressed to the Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-

Conciliation Officer. In the body of this petition, the error is

rectified by mentioning that he raises a preliminary objection

to the appearance of advocate for the Management. No

reasons are assigned in this petition.

The Management appeared on 12.11.2024 through its

advocate and filed an application seeking adjournment. The

petition seeking time for filing reply/show cause petition was

allowed by the Labour Court on this date. Thereafter, the

Management filed a reply asserting its right to be represented

through an advocate. The Management pleaded that there

was implied consent as well as deemed leave being granted by

the Labour Court in allowing the adjournment application

filed on 12.11.2024.

The Respondent workman filed his rejoinder and

referred to various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,

including the leading case of Paradip Port Trust vs. Their

Workman; (1977) 2 SCC 339 and Thyssen Krupp Industries

India Private Limited and Others vs. Suresh Maruti Chougule

and Others; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1770).

The Labour Court by its order dated 27.02.2025 has

debarred the advocate of the Management relying on the

provisions in Section 36(3) & (4) of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947. This order is under challenge in the writ petition.

3. On the basis of the claims and documents filed by the

Parties the following issues arise for determination:

Issues:

 Whether the Petitioner Management can be represented by an Advocate/legal practitioner under Section 36(3) and (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court ?  Whether the Learned Labour Court had granted leave and whether there was implied consent from the workman to the appearance of the Petitioner Management by its Advocate ?

4. The Management, in support of its contention, has

referred to the entire order sheet annexed to the Writ Petition.

The Management specifically refers to the order dated

04.10.2024, on which date the workman had filed attendance

through counsel. For brevity, the order passed on this date is

reproduced below:

"4.10.24. Workman file attendance through counsel. Record put up on 12.11.24 for S/R".

5. Mr. Nipun Bakshi, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner-

Management submits that even though the workman had

initially filed a preliminary objection petition under Section

36(3) and (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he

subsequently, appeared through counsel on this later date,

which amounts to a waiver of his objection. On the very next

date fixed in the case, which was 12.11.2024, the

Management's Advocate appeared and filed an adjournment

application, which was allowed by the Labour Court,

Jamshedpur. On this date also, there was no objection

recorded by the Ld. Labour Court.

6. He further argued that the sequence of events, therefore,

prima-facie suggests that any preliminary objection filed

earlier was either waived or deemed to have been waived by

the workman by appearing through counsel himself on

04.10.2024. Moreover, the Labour Court, by allowing the time

petition, has also granted implied leave to the Management

for being represented through its counsel.

Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner-Management contended

that the order dated 27.02.2025, debarring it from appearing

through an advocate, is misconceived, as the Presiding

Officer, Labour Court has glossed over the records which

show that the workman had also appeared through an

advocate and, therefore, the preliminary objection was

deemed to be waived.

7. The Respondent workman appeared in person and

opposes the stand of the Management and has filed his

counter-affidavit in this case. In Para 11 of his counter-

affidavit, he states that the order dated 04.10.2024

erroneously and wrongly recorded the attendance of the

workman through counsel. He again reiterates in paragraph

12 of his counter-affidavit that the order dated 04.10.2024

wrongly records his attendance through counsel.

The sole-respondent vehemently relies on the order

dated 29.07.2025, which has been passed by the Presiding

Officer, Labour Court while this case was pending, and

submits that the Labour Court has also accepted his

contention that the order dated 04.10.2024 was erroneous.

8. The representation of parties in industrial adjudication

under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is governed by

Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 36

reads as under:-

36. Representation of parties.--

(1) A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by--

(a) any member of the executive or office bearer] of a registered trade union of which he is a member:

(b) any member of the executive or other office bearer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated;

(c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by any member of the executive or other office bearer of any trade union connected with, or by any other workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed.

(2) An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by--

(a) an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member;

(b) an officer of a federation of association of employers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is affiliated;

(c) where the employer is not a member of any association of employers, by an officer of any association of employers connected with, or by any other employer engaged in, the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed.

(3) No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Act or in any proceedings before a Court.

(4) In any proceeding before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceedings and with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be.

9. Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which

governs the representation of parties in disputes, primarily

allows workers to be represented by members of a registered

trade union and employers by an officer of an employers'

association. A key restriction is in Section 36(3), which

prohibits legal practitioners from representing parties in

conciliation proceedings or before the Court.

However, Section 36(4) permits legal representation

before a Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal with

the consent of the opposing party and the leave of that

judicial body.

10. Thus, though Section 36(3) of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, imposes a complete embargo on representation of

parties through advocates/legal practitioners before the

Conciliation Officer and the Labour Court/Tribunals;

however, Section 36(4) of the Act of 1947, permits

representation through a legal practitioner before Labour

Courts and Tribunals with the consent of the other parties

and the leave of the Court.

It is, therefore, evident that the complete embargo on

the appearance of Advocates in Industrial adjudication is

confined to conciliation proceedings alone. A party to a

proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 can be

represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the

other parties and the leave of the Court.

11. At this stage it is pertinent to indicate that the law is

well settled that consent can be either express or implied.

Leave can also be granted directly by the Labour Court, or it

can be inferred when the Labour Court permits an advocate

to appear and allows any application filed by an advocate.

In this case, though the workman filed a preliminary

objection on 16.08.2024, he subsequently, appeared through

an advocate on 04.10.2024. His subsequent conduct

amounts to a waiver of his preliminary objection filed earlier

in this case and amounts to deemed consent. Once the

workman has appeared through an advocate on one of the

dates fixed in the case, he cannot prevent the other side from

being represented by an Advocate.

12. The Respondent's allegation that the order dated

04.10.2024 has wrongly recorded his appearance through

counsel is misconceived and cannot be accepted as he has

not filed any rectification application before the Labour Court.

His reliance on the subsequent order dated 21.07.2025 also

does not support his case, as the Labour Court only records

his submission that there was an error in the order dated

04.10.2024. As a matter of fact, there is no finding to that

effect that there was any error in the order which is available

on record.

13. Even otherwise, an order sheet drawn by a Court is

conclusive of the proceedings transacted and the happenings

of the Court. The Respondent, who appears in person, cannot

be permitted to discredit the order recorded in the order sheet

dated 04.10.2024 without filing any application for

rectification/modification of the order.

14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Paradip Port

Trust vs. Their Workman (1977) 2 SCC 339 has

exhaustively dealt with the scope of Section 36(3) and (4) and

has held under:-

20. The Solicitor General contends that "and" in Section 36(4) should be read as "or" in which case refusal to consent by a party would not be decisive in the matter. The tribunal will then be able to decide in each case by exercising its judicial discretion whether leave, in a given case, should be given to a party to be represented by a lawyer notwithstanding the objection of the other party. It is pointed out by the Solicitor General that great hardship will be caused to public corporations if the union is given a carte blanche to finally decide about the matter of representation by refusing to accord its consent to representation of the employer through a legal practitioner. It is pointed out that public corporations, and even Government running a transport organisation like the State transport, cannot be expected to be members of any employers' association. In their case Section 36(2) will be of no avail. To deny them legal representation would be tantamount to denial of reasonable opportunity to represent their cases before the tribunal. It is submitted that since such injustice or hardship cannot be intended by law the final word with regard to representation by legal practitioners before the tribunal should rest with the tribunal and this will be effectively implemented if the word "and" in Section 36(4) is read as "or". This, it is said, will also achieve the object of the Act in having a fair adjudication of disputes.

21. We have given anxious consideration to the above submission. It is true that "and" in a particular context and in view of the object and purpose of a particular legislation may be read as "or" to give effect to the intent of the legislature. However, having regard to the history of the present legislation, recognition by law of the unequal strength of the parties in adjudication proceedings before a tribunal, intention of the law being to discourage representation by legal practitioners as such, and the need for expeditious disposal of cases, we are unable to hold that "and" in Section 36(4) can be read as "or".

22. Consent of the opposite party is not an idle alternative but a ruling factor in Section 36(4). The question of hardship, pointed out by the Solicitor General, is a matter for the legislature to deal with and it is not for the courts to invoke the theory of injustice and other consequences to choose a rather strained interpretation when the language of Section 36 is clear and unambiguous.

23. Besides, it is also urged by the appellant that under Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, every advocate shall be entitled "as of right" to practise in all courts and before any tribunal [Section 30(i) and (ii)]. This right conferred upon the advocates by a later law will be properly safeguarded by reading the word "and" as "or" in Section 36(4), says counsel. We do not fail to see some difference in language in Section 30(ii) from the provision in Section 14(1)(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, relating to the right of advocates to appear before courts and tribunals. For example, under Section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act, an advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise save as otherwise provided by or under any other law in any courts (other than High Court) and tribunal. There is, however, no reference to "any other law" in Section 30(ii) of the Advocates Act. This need not detain us. We are informed that Section 30 has not yet come into force. Even otherwise, we are not to be trammelled by Section 30 of the Advocates Act for more than one reason.

First, the Industrial Disputes Act is a special piece of legislation with the avowed aim of labour welfare and representation before adjudicatory

authorities therein has been specifically provided for with a clear object in view. This special Act will prevail over the Advocates Act which is a general piece of legislation with regard to the subject-matter of appearance of lawyers before all courts, tribunals and other authorities. The Industrial Disputes Act is concerned with representation by legal practitioners under certain conditions only before the authorities mentioned under the Act. Generalia specialibus non derogdnt. As Maxwell puts it:

"Having already given its attention to the particular subject and provided for it, the legislature is reasonably presumed not to intend to alter that special provision by a subsequent general enactment unless that intention be manifested in explicit language ... or there be something in the nature of the general one making it unlikely that an exception was intended as regards the special Act. In the absence of these conditions, the general statute is read as silently excluding from its operation the cases which have been provided for by the special one [ Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn, p. 169] ."

24. Second, the matter is not to be viewed from the point of view of legal practitioners but from that of the employer and workmen who are the principal contestants in an industrial dispute. It is only when a party engages a legal practitioner as such that the latter is enabled to enter appearance before courts or tribunals. Here, under the Act, the restriction is upon a party as such and the occasion to consider the right of the legal practitioner may not arise.

The Hon'ble Apex Court has thus, emphatically held

that both consent of the opposite party and leave of the Court

are required before any legal practitioner is permitted to

represent either party in such proceedings. This view has

recently been reaffirmed in Thyssen Krupp Industries India

Private Limited and Others vs. Suresh Maruti Chougule

and Others 2023 SCC Online SC 1707.

15. It is thus, necessary to examine the factual matrix in

this case keeping in mind the twin tests of "consent of the

other party" and the "leave of the Court." The Patna High

Court in CWJC No. 10760 of 1999, titled M/s Key's Brake

Hoses and another vs. State of Bihar has examined the

scope of implied consent in the context of Section 36 of the

Industrial Disputes Act in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the

Judgment, which are extracted below:

"11. The test, in my opinion, is whether the party was aware of the fact that the other party is being represented by an advocate. Where such ignorance is established, he cannot be said to have acquiesced or impliedly consented to the appearance, but where the party is aware of the fact that the other party is being represented by an advocate but does not object and instead of objecting, in fact accepts his appearance by serving a copy of his statement (Reply to the Show Cause) on him, he cannot turn around later and say that the advocate be not allowed to represent the other party. In the application which Respondent No. 2 filed before the Labour Court under Section 36, vide Annexure 5, he did not say that he was not aware of the appearance of the advocate prior to 5.5.99. Once on facts it is held that Respondent No. 2 was aware of the appearance of the advocates but did not object to their appearance, it must be held that he impliedly consented to their appearance, and the court having accepted the Vakalatnama, it must also be held that the conditions of Section 36(4) were satisfied. That being so, at a later stage, neither Respondent No. 2 could withdraw the consent nor the Court could recall its acceptance of the Vakalatnama. In the above premises, the impugned order of the Labour Court cannot be said to be in accordance with law.

12. The so-called objection contained in the prayer portion of the main application under Section 33C(2) is of no significance. The occasion to object, or not, arises only when a party to the proceeding engages an advocate to represent him in the case. Such a blanket so-called objection was out of context and meaningless. The proper stage to object to the appearance in the present case, according to me, was the stage when Respondent No. 2 filed his reply to the show cause. Therein, he should have raised the objection."

On these lines, the Bombay High Court in T.K.

Varghese vs. Nichimen Corporation 2001 (4) L.L.N. 187

has also taken the view that consent cannot be withheld

without any reasons or justification. Paragraphs no. 9, 10 &

11 of this decision may be usefully reproduced below:

"9. Moreover, if we consider the history of industrial litigation the legal fraternity has its major contribution to the development of this branch of law. It would be totally unjust to deny the legal community access to this field and the Courts and the Tribunals would face great handicap if they do not get proper assistance from the legally trained persons in their decisions which finally land in the higher Courts. The judgments of the lower Courts do reflect the kind of assistance received by them. It facilitates even the higher Courts if the decisions are written after good assistance from the bar. The foundation of the justice is the fair and equal fight between the parties. Ultimately, if the Court/Tribunal grants "Leave" to a legal practitioner to represent a party before it such leave by the Court/Tribunal would be in the interest of justice and fair-play while the

"consent" of the other party very often is actuated by malice or mala fides or motivated to try to get upper hand in the litigation.

10. At the same time, we cannot forget that under section 7(3)(d-1) of the Act an advocate or attorney is permitted to practise before the Industrial Court or Tribunal or Labour Court to become eligible for appointment as a presiding officer of a Labour Court. In the light of this provision what is more important for a legal practitioner to be able to appear before the Labour Courts/Tribunal is the unbiased leave of such forum than the interested and motivated denial of consent by the other party. The grant of "leave" would be more decisive rather than the "consent" of the party. In view of the above discussion, according to me, the leave granted by the Labour Court/Tribunal will have overriding effect as a party cannot be represented by a legal practitioner even when the other side consents without the leave of the Labour Court/Tribunal. Considering the vast development of law and the complications which arise in the litigation the Labour Court/Tribunal has an inherent right in the interest of justice to seek proper assistance in resolving the Industrial dispute to the satisfaction of both the parties and in accordance with law and grant "leave" to a party before it to be represented by a legal practitioner.

11. There is no absolute bar for the legal practitioner to appear before the Labour Court/Tribunal as it is under section 36(3) in the Conciliation proceedings. No party can withhold appearance of a legal practitioner by denying "consent" without any justification and arbitrarily for no rhyme or reason. If a party is represented by an office bearer etc. of a Trade Union or an Association, it cannot refuse to grant consent to the other side without any reasonable cause and justification to engage a legal practitioner and the Labour Court/Tribunal can always consider the bona fides of such a party withholding consent and can always grant "leave" to the other parties to be represented by a legal practitioner in the interest of justice notwithstanding the refusal of consent by the other side. No party to the proceedings has an unbridled and absolute right to refuse to give consent to other party. No party can adopt unreasonable attitude to exploit the situation arising out of section 36(4) of the Act to the deliberate disadvantage of the other side. This provision was enacted to help the budding Trade Union movement and it was never intended for them to take wrongful advantage of the same even after the Trade Unions have become capable of defending themselves and their workmen. The provision is always subject to the scrutiny of the Labour Court/Tribunal and it can always decide the question of refusal of consent by the other party and can overrule the refusal of the consent on merits independently while considering to grant or refuse the "leave" contemplated under section 36(4) of the Act."

16. As stated hereinabove, in this case, the workman had

filed an objection petition even before the Management was

given notice for appearance. He appeared through an

advocate himself on 04.10.2024. The Advocate representing

the Management appeared immediately thereafter on the next

date which was 12.11.2024, and his application for

adjournment was also considered and allowed, as recorded in

the order sheet of the Labour Court. On the first date of

appearance, there was no objection from the workman. His

failure to object is obvious, as on the immediately preceding

date i.e. on 04.10.2024, he himself appeared through

counsel.

Further, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court not only

permitted the legal practitioner to file Vakalatnama but also

allowed his adjournment application on 12.11.2024. It is

obvious that there was implied consent and implied leave of

the Court. The subsequent withdrawal or allegation of wrong

order is unsustainable. The Labour Court's order-sheet

reflects the factual developments which suggest implied

consent as well as waiver of the objection by the workman

who himself appeared through a legal practitioner on

04.10.2024.

17. Therefore, both the issues are decided in favour of the

Petitioner-Management, inasmuch as, there is no absolute

prohibition on representation of any party before the Labour

Court. The restriction is confined to Conciliation proceedings

only. The second issue relating to implied consent and leave

of the Court is also decided in favour of the Petitioner.

18. In the above facts and circumstances of the case and on

close examination of the applicable law, there was no

justification in debarring the Advocate/legal practitioner

representing the Management. The order dated 27.02.2025 is

unsustainable on facts and the law and, is hereby, set aside.

19. Before parting, it is necessary to indicate that the

framework of legal services has been strengthened and

effective legal representation is readily available to any person

in need. The Respondent-workman can also be offered legal

assistance through the District Legal Services Authority,

Jamshedpur (East Singhbhum).

The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur,

should apprise the workman of his right to take legal

assistance before proceeding any further in the case. It goes

without saying that the Labour Court shall also decide the

dispute expeditiously.

20. As a result, the instant writ application stands allowed.

Pending I.A., if any, also stands closed.

(Deepak Roshan, J.) November 04, 2025 Amardeep/-

A.F.R.

Uploaded

06/11/2025