Delhi High Court
Dheeraj Singh Rana vs State (Nct Of Delhi) & Anr. on 4 February, 2013
Author: G.P. Mittal
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 4th February, 2013
+ CRL. M.C. 3348/2012
DHEERAJ SINGH RANA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Bankim K. Kulshrestha, Adv.
versus
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Jasbsir Kaur, APP for the State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P.MITTAL
JUDGMENT
G. P. MITTAL, J. (ORAL)
1. By virtue of this Petition, the Petitioner, who is one of the accused in a
case under Sections 302/307/201 of the IPC read with Section 120-B IPC
invokes inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) for setting aside of the order dated
13.08.2012 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge ('ASJ')
whereby the Petitioner's application dated 17.05.2012 under Section 340
Cr.P.C. was kept pending with the direction that the same shall be
considered at the final stage.
2. Another application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. seeking production of some
documents was disposed of with the direction that the documents were
not required to be put in cross-examination to any prosecution witnesses.
The Petitioner was given liberty to summon these documents in his
defence.
3. The thrust of the arguments raised on behalf of the Petitioner is that there
were contradictory versions coming during investigation. A report was
sent by the senior police officers to the Joint Secretary (Home) that
Phoolan Devi's assailants were masked, whereas in the report under
Section173 Cr.P.C. as also in the evidence produced by the prosecution, it
was sought to be proved that the two assailants were seen by the eye
witnesses.
4. It is urged that every accused is entitled to a fair trial. My attention is
drawn to Para 13 of the report of a judgment passed by the learned Single
Jude of this Court in Ajay Kumar v. State and Anr. 1986 Crl.L.J. 932.
Para 13 of the report is extracted hereunder:-
"13. It the concept of a fair trial a mere flight of a philosophic
mind, a utopia or a reality? Does the concept merely embody an
ideal to be attempted even though not necessarily capable of being
achieved within our lifetimes? All fair trials are necessarily legally
valid, but is the reverse necessarily true? If the concept of a fair
trial is perhaps an ideal, a legally valid trial must perhaps be its
nearest approximation. Does a legally valid trial merely satisfy
the minimum requirements, though not all the attributes, of a fair
trial? Take the requi8rement of a speedy trial. Have we ever
heard of a speedy trial during the last many decades? Having
regard, therefore, to a variety of constraints, there is a real
distinction between a "fair trial" and a trail which is "legally
valid", though not necessarily fair by ideal standard. An average
trial in this country may not be as bad as a Kafkan trial, but every
trial has some Kafkan shade or the other, even though that does
not prevent it from being considered a legally valid trial."
5. It is urged that in order to give fair opportunity and trial to the Petitioner,
it was incumbent to decide the application under Section 340 C.P.C.
before conclusion of the trial and the documents sought to be produced
should have been summoned by the Court.
6. A letter dated 25.07.2001 written by the Joint Commissioner of Police to
Mr. P.K. Jalali, Joint Secretary (UT), Ministry of Home Affairs was
provided to one Kuldeep Kumar, under the Right to Information Act by
the Additional Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters Delhi.
Admittedly, in the letter dated 25.07.2001, the Joint Commissioner of
Police reported to the Joint Secretary that three masked man
indiscriminately opened fire on Smt. Phoolan Devi, Member of
Parliament, who suffered serious injuries. Admittedly, the prosecution
witnesses including the Investigating Officer were cross-examined on the
basis of information transmitted to the Joint Secretary, MHA, the
statement made by Shri L.K. Adwani, the then Minister of Home Affairs
on the Floor of the House stating that the three attackers were masked, as
per the information received from the Commissioner of Police.
7. The Petitioner's plea is that these two stands taken by the Delhi Police
would show that the IO had committed the offence of perjury and the
application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. should have been decided before
conclusion of the trial and the IO be punished accordingly.
8. I am not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the Petitioner. The
Petitioner had an opportunity to cross examine the IO and he did cross
examine him on this aspect. The learned 'ASJ' in the facts and
circumstances of the case, felt that it would be appropriate to decide the
application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. at the final stage. In my view, the
discretion exercised by the learned 'ASJ' cannot be faulted because
deciding the application may materially prejudice the case of either of the
parties.
9. Similarly, with regard to the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C., the
learned 'ASJ' observed that the documents sought to be produced were
not required for cross examination of the witnesses. In fact, the
prosecution evidence is already over and the case is listed for
examination of the accused persons including the Petitioner under Section
313 Cr.P.C. The learned 'ASJ' did give fair opportunity to the Petitioner
to prove his defence by permitting him to summon these documents in
defence, although the authenticity of these documents and their contents,
particularly, of the letter written by the Joint Commissioner of the police
to the Joint Secretary (Home) and the statement made by the Home
Minister in relation to the murder of Smt. Phoolan Devi, Member of
Parliament have not been disputed by the prosecution.
10. In view of the above discussion, the order dated 13.08.2012 does not call
for any interference. The Petition is devoid of any merit; it is accordingly
dismissed.
11. Pending application also stands disposed of.
(G.P. MITTAL)
JUDGE
FEBRUARY 04, 2013
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