Allahabad High Court
Om Prakash Singh vs Kalawati Devi And 12 Others on 6 November, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
A.F.R.
Reserved On: 25.09.2025
Delivered On: 06.11.2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 11806 of 2025
Om Prakash Singh
..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Kalawati Devi and 12 others
..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
Arvind Pandey, Satish Kumar Pandey
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Court No. - 5
HON'BLE MANISH KUMAR NIGAM, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
2. This petition has been filed challenging the judgment and order dated 13.08.2025 passed by District Judge, Varanasi in Civil Appeal No. 80 of 2025 (Kalawati Devi and others Vs. Dhanpati Devi and others).
3. Brief facts of the case are that predecessor in interest (Mantora wife of Mannar) of respondent No. 11, Dhanpatti Devi daughter of Mannar instituted Original Suit No. 843 of 2000 for cancellation of will deed executed by Mannar in favour of defendants in the suit. During pendency of the suit, The Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 was passed by the Parliament which came in force on 02.10.2009 vide notification dated 11.09.2009. The District Judge by order dated 05.09.2023 transferred the Original Suit No. 843 of 2000 to Gram Nyayalaya Village Pindara, Varanasi (hereinafter referred as "Gram Nyayalaya"). The Gram Nyayalaya vide judgment and decree dated 07.05.2025 declared the will deed dated 29.05.2000 to be null and void. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree dated 07.05.2025 passed by Gram Nyayalaya, Appeal No. 80 of 2025 was filed by the defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/3, 2/1, 2/2, 3/1, 3/2, 4 and defendant Nos. 6/1 and 6/2 in the suit. Defendant Nos. 5, 7 and 8 were arrayed as respondents in the appeal. The petitioner, who was the defendant No. 8 in the suit and supported the plaintiff in the suit filed an application/ objection before the District Judge, Varanasi regarding maintainability of the appeal filed by the other defendants on the ground that in view of Section 34 (2) (b) of Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, an appeal will not lie where the amount or value of subject matter of the suit, claim or dispute does not exceed Rs. 1,000/-. According to the petitioner, the valuation of the suit was Rs. 200/- as valued by the plaintiff and the appellants have also filed appeal valuing the same to be Rs. 200/- and therefore, the appeal is not maintainable. The District Judge by order dated 13.08.2025 rejected the objection filed by the petitioner on the ground that though, the valuation of the suit is less than Rs. 500/- but as the appeal involves the question of law, the same is maintainable. Hence the present writ petition.
4. It has been contended by counsel for the petitioner that in view of Section 23 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, the provisions of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 will have overriding affect in civil proceedings. It has been further contended that Section 34 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 prohibits an appeal where the valuation is less than Rs. 1,000/-. According to the petitioner, because of the provisions of Section 34(2)(b), the appeal was not cognizable by the District Judge and District Judge has wrongly rejected the objections filed by the petitioner holding that the appeal involves a question of law.
5. Before considering the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be appropriate to look into the relevant provisions of Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008.
6. Section 11 of the Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 defines the jurisdiction of Gram Nyaylayas as under:-
"11. Jurisdiction of Gram Nyayalaya. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other law for the time being in force, the Gram Nyayalaya shall exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction in the manner and to the extent provided under this Act."
7. Section 13 of the Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 deals with civil jurisdiction and the same is quoted as under:-
"13. Civil jurisdiction. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other law for the time being in force, and subject to sub-section (2), the Gram Nyayalaya shall have jurisdiction to
(a) try all suits or proceedings of a civil nature falling under the classes of disputes specified in Part I of the Second Schedule;
(b) try all classes of claims and disputes which may be notified by the Central Government under sub-section (1) of section 14 and by the State Government under sub-section (3) of the said section.
(2) The pecuniary limits of the Gram Nyayalaya shall be such as may be specified by the High Court, in consultation with the State Government, by notification, from time to time."
8. Section 16 of the Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 provides for transfer of pending proceedings and the same is quoted as under:-
"16. Transfer of pending proceedings. (1) The District Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, with effect from such date as may be notified by the High Court, may transfer all the civil or criminal cases, pending before the courts subordinate to it, to the Gram Nyayalaya competent to try or dispose of such cases.
(2) The Gram Nyayalaya may, in its discretion, either retry the cases or proceed from the stage at which it was transferred to it."
9. Chapter V of the Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 provides for procedure in civil cases and Section 23 of the Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 provides overriding effect of the Act in civil proceedings. Section 23 of the Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 is quoted as under:-
"23. Overriding effect of Act in civil proceedings. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other law, but save as expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, apply to the proceedings before a Gram Nyayalaya; and for the purpose of the said provisions of the Code, the Gram Nyayalaya shall be deemed to be a civil court."
10. Chapter VII of the Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 provides for appeal. Section 34 of the Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 provides for appeal in civil cases and the same is quoted as under:-
"34. Appeal in civil cases. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other law, and subject to sub-section (2), an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Gram Nyayalaya to the District Court.
(2) No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order passed by the Gram Nyayalaya
(a) with the consent of the parties;
(b) where the amount or value of the subject matter of a suit, claim or dispute does not exceed rupees one thousand;
(c) except on a question of law, where the amount or value of the subject matter of such suit, claim or dispute does not exceed rupees five thousand.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or order of a Gram Nyayalaya:
Provided that the District Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the said period.
(4) An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be heard and disposed of by the District Court within six months from the date of filing of the appeal.
(5) The District Court may, pending disposal of the appeal, stay execution of the judgment or order appealed against.
(6) The decision of the District Court under sub-section (4) shall be final and no appeal or revision shall lie from the decision of the District Court:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall preclude any person from availing of the judicial remedies available under articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution."
11. Second Schedule of the Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 provides for jurisdiction of civil suits before the Gram Nyaylaya. Second Schedule of Gram Nyaylayas Act, 2008 is quoted as under:-
"SUITS OF A CIVIL NATURE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF GRAM NYAYALAYAS
(i) Civil Disputes:
(a) right to purchase of property;
(b) use of common pasture;
(c) regulation and timing of taking water from irrigation channel.
(ii) Property Disputes:
(a) village and farm houses (Possession);
(b) water channels;
(c) right to draw water from a well or tube well.
(iii) Other Disputes:
(a) claims under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936);
(b) claims under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948);
(c) money suits either arising from trade transaction or money lending;
(d) disputes arising out of the partnership in cultivation of land;
(e) disputes as to the use of forest produce by inhabitants of Gram Panchayats."
12. Before considering question as to whether an appeal will lie in the facts of the present case before the District Judge, it would be appropriate to consider right of appeal of a litigant.
13. The expression of 'appeal' has not been defined in the Code. According to dictionary meaning, however, 'appeal' is an application or petition to a higher authority or a court of law for reconsideration of decision of a lower authority or an inferior court of law. (Chambers 21st Century Dictionary, (1997))
14. In Nagendra Nath Vs. Suresh Chandra; AIR 1932 PC 165: 59 IA 283, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Sir Dinshaw Mulla stated:
There is no definition of appeal in the Code of Civil Procedure, but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term..
15. M. Ramanarain Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Trading Corporation of India Ltd.; (1983) 3 SCC 75, the Supreme Court stated:-
The right to prefer an appeal is a right created by Statute. No party can file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order as a matter of course in the absence of a suitable provisions of some law conferring on the party concerned the right to file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order.
16. The right of appeal is a substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure. It is a vested right and accrues in favour of the litigant on the date lis commences and although, it may be actually exercised when an adverse judgment is pronounced, such a right is governed by the law prevailing at the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of filing of appeal. It is well settled that right of appeal arises when a proceeding is commenced and cannot be taken away by a subsequent legislation except by express provision or by necessary intendment to the contrary.
17. The leading case of the subject i.e. whether right of appeal is a substantive right or is only a matter or procedure and further whether the right of appeal could be curtailed by a subsequent legislation or not was considered in leading judgment in case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. Vs. Irving (1905) A.C. 369. In Colonial Sugar Refining Company (supra) an action was brought in Supreme Court of Queensland in October, 1902. At that time, the Order in Council of 1860, gave right of appeal to his Majesty in Council from the judgment of Supreme Court. The judgment in the case was delivered by the Supreme Court on September 4, 1903. About ten days before this judgment the Judiciary Act, 1903 came in force, the affect of which was that his Majesty in Council cease to be a court of appeal from decisions of Supreme Court and the only appeal under this Act lay to the High Court of Australia. Despite of this fact an appeal was taken to the Privy Counsel against the judgment of the Supreme Court and the question, therefore, arose whether the Judiciary Act, 1903 was retrospective so as to take away the right of appeal to the Privy Council in an action brought before coming into force of this Act. Their Lordships of the Privy Council dismissed the respondent's petition praying that the appeal might be dismissed on the ground that the right of appeal to his Majesty in Council given by the Order in Council of June 30, 1860, under which the leave had been granted, had been taken away by the Judiciary Act, 1903 and that the only appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland lay to the High Court of Australia and observed as follows:-
" As regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversy. On the one hand, it was not disputed that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only, the petition is well founded, On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure ? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested."
18. The Full Bench judgment of this Court in case of Ram Singha Vs. Shankar Dayal (1928) I.L.R. 50 All. 965 (F.B.) is very important. In Ram Singha (supra) suit for rent was filed on 12 July, 1926. At that time the North-Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901 (U.P. Act II of 1901) was in force. Section 177 of that Act gave a right of appeal from the decision of the Assistant Collector to the District Judge when the amount or value of the subject matter of suit exceeded Rs. 100. On September 7, 1926, Agra Tenancy Act (U. P. Act III of 1926) came into force. It repealed the old Act of 1901. Section 240 of the new Act reproduced s. 175 of the old Act providing that no appeal would lie from any decree' or order passed by any court under this Act except as provided in this Act. The material portion of s. 242, which corresponded to s. 177 of the old Act provided as follows:-
"242 (1). An appeal shall lie to the 'district judge from the decree of an assistant collector of the first class or of a collector in any of the suits included in group A of the Fourth Schedule in which-
(a) the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds rupees two hundred; or
(b)...........................................................
19. On December 23, 1926 i.e., after the new Act came into force, the suit was decreed by the assistant collector. The defendant presented an appeal to the district judge. The district judge returned the memorandum of appeal. The defendant presented the memorandum before the Collector of Etawah and that officer was of opinion that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and referred the case to the High Court under s. 207 of the Agra Tenancy Act. The reference came up before a Bench of the Allahabad High Court which referred the following question to a Full Bench:
" Whether the filing of an appeal is governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of a suit or by the law that may prevail at the date of the decision of it, or at the date of the filing of the appeal ?"
20. A Full Bench of three Judges presided over by Mr. Justice Sulaiman, then Acting Chief Justice of Allahabad, expressed the following opinion:
" In our opinion the point is concluded by the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving [(1905) A.C. 369]. In that case, ordinarily an appeal lay to their Lordships of the Privy Council from an order of the Supreme Court. While the matter was pending in that court, the law was amended so as to allow an appeal to the High Court. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the new Act could not deprive the party of his right to appeal to the Privy Council. Lord Macnaghten remarked at page 372: ' To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure'."
"That principle was reaffirmed by their Lordships it the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner; [(1927) I.L.R. 9 Lah. 284]. The principle has been followed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Daivanayaga Reddiar v. Renukamba, Ammal; [(1927) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 857]. Dalal J. has taken the same view in the case of Bala Prasad v. Shyam Behari Lal; [(1928) 26 A.L.J 406]. "
21. The Full Bench answered the question as follows:
" Our answer to the reference is that the right to appeal to the court of the District Judge was governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit, and not by the law that prevailed at the date of its decision, or at the date of the filing of the appeal."
22. After considering various judgments of Privy Council, this Court and various other High Courts and of the Supreme Court, the five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Garikapatti Veeraya vs N. Subbiah Choudhury; 1957 AIR 540; MANU/SC/0008/1957 in paragraph No. 28 has laid down as under:-
"28. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge:
(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.
(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved, to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.
(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.
(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise."
23. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mukund Deo (Dead) represented by his legal representatives Kasibai and others vs. Mahadeo and others reported in AIR1965 SC 703 held that it is true that as a general rule, alteration in the law of procedure are retrospective, but a right of appeal to a particular forum is a substantive right and is not lost by alteration in the law unless, provision is made expressly in that behalf, or a necessary implication arises.
24. In the present case, the suit was filed in the year 2000 which was transferred to the Gram Nyayalaya in the year 2023 by order of the District Judge and was decided by Gram Nyayalaya by judgment and decree passed on 07.05.2025. In view of the law discussed above, the right of appeal will be governed by the law prevailing at the time of institution of suit and not the law prevailing at the time of decision of the suit unless the provisions of Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 are held to be retrospective. From the provisions of Gram Nyayalaya Act, 2008 as quoted by me, especially Section 34 of the Act which provides for an appeal, it cannot be held that either expressly or by necessary intendment that the provisions of Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 are retrospective.
25. Further sub-Section (c) of Section 34(2) of Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 provides an exception that an appeal can be filed on a question of law where the amount or the value of the subject matter of such suit, claim or dispute does not exceed Rs. 500/-. The District Judge relied upon judgment passed by this Court in case of Smt Siya Dulari Vs. Awadh Naresh reported in 2024 (4) ADJ 210 and held that present appeal involves the question of law. In case of Smt. Siya Dulari (supra) this court held that a suit for cancellation of a sale deed will not lie before the Gram Nyayalaya.
26. In the present case, the suit has been filed for cancellation of Will and prima facie considering the Second Schedule of Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, I am also of the view that such suits are not maintainable before Gram Nyayalaya but however, I am not deciding this issue in the present petition and the same is left to be decided by the appellate court which is seized of the matter to consider and decide whether the suit for cancellation of Will was maintainable before the Gram Nyayalayas or not.
27. In my view, no illegality has been committed by the appellate court in rejecting the objections filed by the petitioner. Hence the present writ petition fails and is dismissed.
(Manish Kumar Nigam,J.)
November 06, 2025
Nitika Sri.
