Devendra Pal Singh And 16 Others vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others
2022 Latest Caselaw 22407 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Reserved on 06.12.2022
 
A.F.R.						        Delivered on 22.12.2022
 
Court No. - 34
 
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 4533 of 2022
 
Petitioner :- Devendra Pal Singh And 16 Others
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Shivendu Ojha,Akhilesh Kumar Singh,Sneh Pandey,Sr. Advocate
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ashish Mishra,Namit Srivastava,Parul Srivastava,Parvez Alam
 

 
Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia,J.

1. Heard Shri Radha Kant Ojha, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Shivendu Ojha, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Sameer Sharma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mrs. Busra Mariyam, learned counsel for respondent nos. 2 and 3, Shri Namit Srivastava, who appears for the selected candidates and whose impleadment application was allowed on 05.12.2022, Shri Akhilesh Kumar Singh, who appears for the Intervener who had also appeared in the written examination and Shri Parvez Alam, who appears and has filed an impleadment application on behalf of candidates who had not been selected, however, their marks have not been disclosed only on account of the pendency of the writ petition.

2. The issue that arises for consideration is confined to the interpretation of Rule 8 of the Allahabad High Court Officer and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules 1976 as amened in the year 2021 notified on 27.03.2021.

3. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioners claimed to be working as Class-IV employees in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and claim that their service conditions are governed by the 1976 Rules. It is claimed that in pursuance to the amendment carried out in Rule 8 of the 1976 Rules, the petitioners were entitled for being considered for promotion and the petitioners ought to have been given the benefit of their having the CCC Certificate prior to consideration of the candidature and prior to finalization of the results.

4. It is argued that the High Court by means of a notification dated 21st December, 2020 had issued an advertisement calling for applications for appointment to 17 posts of Computer Assistant by way of promotion amongst Class-IV employees. The said advertisement is annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. In terms of the said advertisement, it was incumbent upon the the candidate who desirous for consideration to file an application on or before 16.01.2021. The advertisement, as issued, is quoted hereinbelow:-

"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

ESTABLISHMENT SECTION

NOTICE

No. 6127/Establishment: Dated: Allahabad: December, 21, 2020

Applications are invited from Class IV employees of the High Court, Allahabad & Lucknow Bench having minimum qualification of High School or equivalent examination recognized by the U.P. Government and five years continuous satisfactory service in Class IV on or before 01.07.2020 for filling up 17 vacant posts in the cadre of Computer Assistant.

The promotion shall be made on the basis of merit through competitive examination. The Mode, Date and Venue of examination shall be notified later on.

The desirous candidates are required to fill up Application Form as per enclosed format and submit the same before the Registrar (J) (S&A/Establishment) through the Nazarat Section on or before 16.01.2021. Applications received after the last date will not be entertained.

Sd

Registrar General

Enclosure- As Above"

5. It is argued that the advertisement was in pursuance to the conditions as prescribed in the Amendment Rules of 2021. The amended Rules of 2021 particularly Rule 8 is concerned, is quoted hereinbelow:-

"The Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) (Amendment Rules, 2021)

1. Short title and commencement :- (1) These rules may be called the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) (Amendment) Rules, 2021.

(2) These Rules shall come into force from the date of publication in the official Gazette.

2. Definition :- In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires, "Rules" mean the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976.

3. Amendment of Rule 8 :- Clause (ii) of Rule 8 (a) (i) of the Rules shall be amended as follows :-

Existing Provision

Amendment

(ii) 40% by promotion from Class IV employees who have completed five years continuous satisfactory service as on 1st July of the year of recruitment on merit through competitive examination.

(ii) 40% by promotion on merit through competitive examination from Class IV employees who have completed five years continuous satisfactory service as on 1st July of the year of recruitment and possess the minimum educational qualification of Intermediate along with CCC Certificate/ Diploma / Degree of Computer Science from recognized Institute established by law in India.

6. It is stated that the petitioners moved a representation on 27.09.2021 before the Registrar General, High Court, stating that they had attained the qualification of CCC subsequent to the dates specified in the advertisement and they should be permitted to appear in the departmental examination on the basis of seniority. The said representation did not find favour and the names of the petitioners do not appear in the list of candidates, who are eligible for departmental examination, which lead to the petitioner to file present writ petition being Writ-A No. 4533 of 2022.

7. When the writ petition was filed, one of the averments made by the petitioners is that they were entitled to appear in the departmental examination by virtue of their seniority and they have been acquired the CCC qualification with the permission of the High Court and thus they should be permitted to appear in the departmental examination.

8. In the present writ petition, an interim order came to be passed by this Court on 08.04.2022, whereby 11 candidates out of the total petitioners were permitted to appear in the written examination on their producing the CCC Certificates. The writ petition in respect of petitioner nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 13 and 14 was dismissed by this Court and the interim order was confined to the other petitioners.

9. Aggrieved against the said interim order, a Special Appeal came to be preferred, which was heard and decided by judgment dated 27.04.2022, whereby the order passed by the learned Single Judge was modified with a further direction that in respect of the petitioners, who were permitted to undergo the examination on 10.04.2022 in pursuance to the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 08.04.2022, the result shall not be declared and shall abide by the outcome of the writ petition. The other results to be declared were also be subject to the outcome of the writ petition. A request was made for disposal of the writ petition on merits. While deciding the appeal, the Appellate Court had made reference to the judgments as referred in the said order.

10. It is on record that subsequent to the decision of the Special Appeal Court on 27.04.2022, applications were moved for review of the said order, which was decided on 24.05.2022 holding that the observations made in the writ petition would not influence the learned Single Judge, who shall to proceed to decide the writ petition without being influenced by any observations made by the Special Appeal Court in its judgment dated 27.04.2022.

11. In the light of the said, Shri Radha Kant Ojha, learned Senior Advocate argues that the observations made in the Special Appeal Court have lost their relevance and this Court is to decide the issue on merits without being influenced by any of the observations made by the Special Appeal Court.

12. Shri Sameer Sharma, learned Senior Advocate informs that in pursuance to the advertisement, the selections have already been made and the appointment letters have issued to as many as 17 persons.

13. The said selected candidates are represented by Shri Namit Srivastava, Advocate, who argues that in terms of the selection, the candidates have also joined w.e.f. 25.05.2022.

14. Shri A.K. Singh, Advocate who has filed an intervener application argues on behalf of candidates, who are similar to the one who have filed the petition that they were also permitted to appear in the departmental examination by the High Court itself without there being any order in their favour by the Court and as such outcome of the writ petition could have an effect on their candidature also.

15. Considering the submissions made at the bar, the main submission for consideration is as to whether the candidates who had the qualification as was prescribed in the Amended Rules would be from the year of recruitment i.e. 01.07.2020 or on the date when the advertisement was issued.

16. The said issue basically arises on account of submission of Shri Ojha that with regard to the recruitment by promotion, the law is well settled that the eligibility should be crystallized on the date of the year of recruitment when the vacancies are ascertained and no leverage can be exercised by the Appointing Authority to take a different view from the year of recruitment. He further argues that if the said benefit is granted to the persons who have acquired the qualification subsequent to the date of recruitment i.e. 1st July, 2020, the same benefit ought to have been extended to the petitioners also, who had acquired the qualification of CCC before the date of written examination although subsequent to date of advertisement. Shri Ojha places reliance on the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Sadhna Vs. State of U.P. and Others; 2017 6 ADJ 418.

17. Shri Sameer Sharma, Senior Advocate on the basis of the interpretation of the Rules argues that the date of year of recruitment have only relevance only in respect of the eligibility of the eligible candidates and it has nothing to do with the acquisition of the CCC Certificate. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh & Others Vs. Raj Kumar and Others, Civil Appeal No. 9746 of 2011, decided on 20th May, 2022 and particularly emphasises paragraph no. 36, which is quoted hereinbelow:-

"36. A review of the fifteen cases that have distinguished Rangaiah would demonstrate that this Court has been consistently carving out exceptions to the broad proposition formulated in Rangaiah. The findings in these judgments, that have a direct bearing on the proposition formulated by Rangaiah are as under:

1. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must be necessarily filled on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose, Rangaiah's case must be understood in the context of the rules involved therein.

2. It is now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has a right to be considered in the light of the existed rules, which implies the "rule in force" as on the date consideration takes place. The right to be considered for promotion occurs on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates.

3. The Government is entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up the vacancies arising prior to the amendment of the rules. The employee does not acquire any vested right to being considered for promotion in accordance with the repealed rules in view of the policy decision taken by the Government. There is no obligation for the Government to make appointments as per the old rules in the event of restructuring of the cadre is intended for efficient working of the unit. The only requirement is that the policy decisions of the Government must be fair and reasonable and must be justified on the touchstone of Article 14.

4. The principle in Rangaiah need not be applied merely because posts were created, as it is not obligatory for the appointing authority to fill up the posts immediately.

5. When there is no statutory duty cast upon the State to consider appointments to vacancies that existed prior to the amendment, the State cannot be directed to consider the cases."

18. Shri Sameer Sharma next proceeds to argue that the Rule in question being Rule 8 has to be interpreted by taking recourse to the ''Rule of last antecedents' as was interpreted by the Kerala High Court in its judgment dated 12.01.2017 in the case of Anoop M.S. Manelil House, Valayanchirangara Po, Perumbavoor Vs. State of Kerala represented by Principal Secretary, Department of Taxes, Secretariat, and Others. He particularly places reliance on para 50 of the said judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow:-

"50. The Rule of the Last Antecedent, as per the Black's Law Dictionary, is an interpretative principle by which a court determines that qualifying words or phrases modify the words or phrases immediately preceding them and not words or phrases more remote, unless the extension is necessary from the context or the spirit of the entire writing. The lexicon exemplifies the canon: in the phrase 'Texas courts, New Mexico courts, and New York courts in the federal system,' the words 'in the federal system' might be held to modify only New York courts and not Texas courts or New Mexico courts. This canon is variably termed 'the doctrine of the last antecedent'; 'the doctrine of the last preceding antecedent."

19. He also places reliance on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others; (2013) 11 SCC 58 and draws my attention to the judgment considered by the Supreme Court in the said judgment to argue that the requisite qualification required can be on the date as specified in the advertisement.

20. Shri Ojha, learned Senior Advocate, on rejoinder argues that the judgment cited by Shri Sameer Sharma relates to direct recruitment and not to recruitment through promotion and as such there is no relevance of the said judgments. He again emphasis on the Full Bench judgement in the case of Smt. Sadhna (Supra).

21. Shri Sameer Sharma further argues that the Rule has to be interpreted on its plain and grammatical reading unless it leads to inference. For the said proposition, he places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Linde India Limited (Formerly BOC India Limited); (2020) 16 SCC 335 and emphasis on paragraph nos. 18 to 21 of the said judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow:

"18. Similarly, Craies on Statute Law states:

"One of the basic principles of interpretation of statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. He must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity."

19. The words of a statute should be first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences should be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. Where a word has a secondary meaning, the assessment is whether the natural, ordinary or popular meaning flows from the context in which the word has been employed. In such cases, the distinction disappears and courts must adopt the meaning which flows as a matter of plain interpretation and the context in which the word appears.

20. In State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar, it was contended that the safeguards provided in Section 50 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 regarding search of any person would also apply to any bag, briefcase or any such article or container, which is being carried by the person. The word "person" was not defined in the Act. A three judge Bench of this Court, having regard to the scheme of the Act and the context in which the word ― "person" has been used, rejected the contention and held thus:

"8. One of the basic principles of interpretation of statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. He must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity."

The above canon of statutory interpretation has been consistently followed by this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v Pawan Kumar, State of Haryana v Suresh, State of Rajasthan v Babu Ram and Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v Dilip Kumar and Company.

21. The word "medicine" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary thus:

"Medicine - the science and art dealing with the prevention, cure and alleviation of diseases; in a narrower sense that part of science and art of restoring and preserving health which is the province of the physician as distinguished from the surgeon and obstetrician."

Collins Dictionary for Advanced Learners defines "medicine" thus:

"Medicine is the treatment of illness and injuries by doctors and nurses; is a substance that you drink or swallow to cure an illness"

Cambridge Dictionary defines "medicine" as:

"A drug that is used to treat illness or injury; the science dealing with the preserving of health and with preventing and treating disease or injury." The ordinary or popular understanding of the term medicine is characterized by its curative properties in general andspecifically, its use for or in diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of any disease or disorder."

22. Shri Ojha controverts the same by saying that interpretation of Rules in service jurisprudence cannot be the same as interpretation of statute relating to taxation where the interpretation has to be strict whereas in the case of service jurisprudence the Court has to adopt purposive interpretation.

23. On the basis of the argument raised at the bar, as recorded above, this Court is to interpret the Rules and the points for determination that arises is as to what qualification should be possessed by the candidates eligible for being considered for promotion in terms of Rule 8 of the Rules 1976 and what would be the cut-off date fixed for consideration. It is relevant to quote Rule 2 (m) of the Rules of 1976, which defines year of recruitment, which is as under:-

"(m)''Year of Recruitment' means the period of twelve months commencing from the first day of July of a calendar year;"

24. Rule 3 which provides for strength of establishment is also relevant for the present case and is quoted hereinbelow:-

"3. Strength of the establishment (I) The strength of the service and of each category of posts therein shall be such as may be determined by the Chief Justice from time to time with the approval of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh.

(II) The ratio between the number of posts in various categories shall be such as prevailing in the corresponding categories of officers and subordinates in the Uttar Pradesh Civil Secretariat.

(III) The strength of the service and of each category of posts therein shall, until ordersvarying the same are passed under subrule (I), be as given below

Name of Post

No. of Post

Computer Assistant

Assistant Review Officer

Review Officer

Section Officer

Assistant Registrar

Deputy Registrar

Joint Registrar

Registrar

(IV) Provided that:

I. The appointing authority may leave unfilled or the Chief Justice may hold in abeyance any vacant post without thereby entitling any person to compensation; or

II. The Chief Justice may create such additional permanent or temporary posts as he may consider proper with the approval of the Governor."

25. Rule 8 of the said Rules is already quoted hereinabove.

26. To interpret Rule 8, which provides for the necessary qualification to be possessed for being considered for promotion, Rule 8 (ii) clearly stipulates that the persons eligible for being promoted should have completed five years continuous satisfactory service as on 1st July of the year of recruitment and should also possess the minimum educational qualification of Intermediate alongwith CCC certificate/Diploma/Degree in Computer Science from recognized Institute established by law in India. The use of the word ''and' as used, on its plain interpretation would clearly mean that the candidate should have completed five years of continuous satisfactory service ''and' should possess the minimum educational qualification.

27. The submission of Shri Ojha that the possession of minimum educational qualification should also be on 1st July of the year of recruitment merits rejection as on the plain meaning of the Rule, it does not transpire that the possession of minimum educational qualification should also be on the 1st July of the year of recruitment. It is well settled that a Rule should be interpreted on its plain meaning unless the same results in absurdity. On a plain reading of the said Rules, as recorded, I have no hesitation in holding that the requirement stipulated in the Rules is that the persons should have completed five years of continuous satisfactory service as on 1st July of the year of recruitment and/plus should also possess the minimum educational qualification as specified under the Rules.

28. The next question for determination is as to whether the possession of minimum educational qualification as prescribed in Rule 8 (2) should be on the date of year of recruitment i.e. 1st July or the same can be date when the advertisement is issued.

29. Shri Ojha would argue that the prescription of minimum qualification in terms of Rule 8 (2) should be interpreted to mean that the additional minimum educational qualification should be possessed by the candidate on the 1st July of the year of recruitment is based upon the interpretation of Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sadhna (Supra).

30. The Full Bench in the said case by majority of 4 to 1 decided that the qualification should be possessed from the 1st day of the year of recruitment. While interpreting the provisions of U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Rules 1998, the Full Bench was interpreted the Rules in view of there being specific mandate cast upon the Management of the Institutions to notify the vacancy in the proforma given in Appendix-A. The Full Bench recorded the following in paragraph no. 34:-

"34. The Commission was conferred powers to require the Inspector to notify the vacancies, where the Management has failed to do so."

31. The Full Court noticed the mandate cast upon the Management for notifying the vacancy and while interpreting the Rules, the Court was swayed by the fact that the Management of an Institution is bound to determine the number of vacancy in terms of Section 15 (1) of the Act and to notify them through the Inspector to the Commission for appointment. The Court was of the view that any leverage given to the Management can lead to misuse of power by the Management. The Full Court recorded in paragraph nos. 44 and 48 as under:-

"44.The amendments, which had been made in the Act, 1982 and the Rules from time to time had following effect:

Under Section 10 of the Parent Act, the Management had to notify the vacancies to the Commission for making appointment of teachers specified in Schedule while in respect of teachers other than those specified in Schedule, the Management had to notify the vacancies to the Selection Board as is clear from Section 15 of the Parent Act.

For the first time under the U.P. Act 1 of 1993 the concept of determination of vacancies by the Management of the institution, was provided for, with a direction that the vacancies likely to fall vacant during year of recruitment shall be included in such determination.

48. This determination by the management in respect of direct recruitment is to be made under Rule 11 of the 1998 Rules quoted herein above. The statement of the vacancies so determined by the management has to be sent to the District Inspector of Schools by 15th of July of the year of recruitment in proforma given in Appendix "A", and the Inspector, after verifying it from the records of his office, has to prepare a consolidated statement of the vacancies of all the institutions in the district subject-wise and group-wise in respect of Trained Graduate Grade posts. The statement so prepared by the Inspector must be sent by 31st of July of the year of recruitment with a copy thereof to the Joint Director of Education. The State Government has however, been given the power to fix other dates for notification in respect of any particular year of recruitment."

32. The reasoning which weighed in the mind of the Court for interpreting the said Rules are indicated in paragraph nos. 68 and 74, which are quoted as under:-

"68. We are also of the opinion that the view of the Full Bench in the case of Raeesul Hasan (Supra), while holding that the purpose for deletion of the words "by promotion" in Rule 11 of Rules 1998 in juxtaposition with Rule 11 (2) of Rules, 1995, is that no time limit has been fixed in the matter of intimation of vacancies for which promotion is to be made, is not correct. Rule 10 provides for two sources of appointment only i.e by direct recruitment and promotion only, determination of number of vacancies for direct recruitment in a recruitment year would necessarily entail the determination of the vacancies which would fall for promotion in the same recruitment year. Once the vacancies for direct recruitment are determined, remaining vacancies, if any, would fall within the promotion quota.

It has escaped the attention of Full Bench that there had been a departure in the matter of procedure to be adopted for direct recruitment/promotion as per Rules of 1995, vis-a-vis, the procedure for promotion under Rule 12 of Rules, 1998. This change was necessitated because of amendments made in Section 10 and addition of Chapter III which includes Section 12 by the Act, 1998. Under Rule 11 (2) of Rules, 1998 intimation of the vacancies is to be ultimately communicated to the Selection Board for advertisement for direct recruitment in the proforma given in Appendix 'A' while list of teachers eligible for promotion is to be communicated to the Joint Director of Education in the proforma given in Appendix 'A'. It is for this reason that the determination and intimation of vacancies for promotion quota to the Selection Board, as provided under Rule 11 (2) of Rules, 1995 was done away. The authority for promotion has been identified as Regional Selection Committee of which the Joint Director of Education is the Chairman in place of Selection Board as provided earlier.

So far as the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Balbir Singh & Another versus U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board, Allahabad & Others reported in 2008 (3) ESC 409 (SC) relied upon by the Full Bench in the case of Raeesul Hasan (Supra) is concerned, it may be noticed that in the judgment of the High Court in the case of Anand Narain Singh versus Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Service, Selection Board reported in 2003 (2) UPLBEC 899, giving rise to the appeal before the Apex Court itself in the case of Balbir Singh (Supra), there is a specific recital in paragraph nos. 64 and 129 (iv) to the following effect:

"64. The facts here are different than the two cases previously mentioned in paragraph 58. These cases are of direct appointment unlike cases cited by the petitioners (paragraph 58) on this point. Those cases related to promotion. The vacancies in case of direct appointments are notified by an advertisement and all the vacancies as mentioned in the advertisement have to be filled up. They are not required to be filled up year-wise: at least there is nothing in the Act or in the Rules to warrant this.

.........

129. My conclusions and directions are as follows:

..............

(iv) In the present case, the appointments are being made by direct recruitment and not by promotion:

Vacancies need not be marked separately for any particular recruitment year;

They could be clubbed together.

While filling these vacancies, the law as applicable on the occurrence of vacancy need not be applied.

..............."

74.Even otherwise fixation of a particular date i.e. when a candidate from feeding cadre is to be judged to be eligible or not has to be fixed rather than being kept fluid at the whims and fancies of the private Management."

33. In the present case, the judgment of the Full Court may not have any relevance in interpreting the Rules at hand as there is no peri materia provisions in the 1976 Rules and such requirement mandates the Chief Justice or any one to inform the number of vacancies, which fall due, a mischief that was apprehended to be played by the Management of the Institution in the judgment of the Full Bench in the Case of Sadhna (Supra), I take the said view also in view of the provisions of Rule 3 (iv) of the 1976 Rules, which leave to the discretion of the Chief Justice to hold the post in abeyance and also to create additional permanent or temporary post as may be considered by the Chief Justice to be proper with the approval of the Governor.

34. That being the case, the submission of Shri Ojha deserves to be rejected.

35. In the present case the requirement of possession of additional qualification in terms of Rule 8 (iii) was within the discretion of the High Court and the High Court in its discretion permitted the candidates who had completed five years of continuous satisfactory service as on 1st July of the year of recruitment and possess the minimum education qualification of having a CCC certificate/Diploma/Degree in Computer Science on the date of issuance of the advertisement.

36. That being the case, no fault can be found with the High Court in permitting the eligible candidates, who possessed the requisite qualification on the date of advertisement. The petitioners and the intervenors who have filed an intervention application, admittedly did not possess the additional educational qualification on the date of advertisement, thus they had no claim to be considered for consideration for appointment through promotion.

37. The second argument of Shri Ojha that the petitioners as well as the intervenors should be granted the benefit as was granted to the candidates who were found to be eligible is misfounded as the persons who were found eligible possessed the qualification on the date of advertisement whereas the petitioners and intervenors admittedly did not possess the qualification on the date of advertisement. Thus, they have no right to be considered for promotion clearly because they did not possess the minimum qualification on the date of advertisement. Thus, to that extent the claim of the petitioners as well as the intervenors deserves to be rejected and is, accordingly, rejected.

38. The mere fact that the petitioners and the intervenors were permitted to appear in the examination by virtue of order of learned Single Judge passed on 08.04.2022 in the case of the petitioners and the intervenors being permitted to appear in the examination despite there being no order in their favour would not confer any rights upon the petitioners and intervenors.

39. The writ petition is dismissed for all the reasonings as recorded above. However, the respondents are directed to declare the results of all the candidates who had appeared in the examination and had the requisite qualification on the date of advertisement.

40. To further clarify the results of all candidates other than the petitioners and intervenors shall be declared.

Order Date :- 22.12.2022

Shafique