Stateof U.P. Vs. Boota Singh & Ors [1978] INSC 142 (22 August 1978)
1978 Latest Caselaw 142 SC

State of U.P. Vs. Boota Singh & Ors [1978] INSC 142 (22 August 1978)

FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION: 1978 AIR 1770 1979 SCR (1) 298 1979 SCC (1) 31

CITATOR INFO :

F 1989 SC1205 (18)

ACT:

Appeal against acquitlal-Interference-Scope of-High Court misreading evidence, reversing, judgement of Sessions Court-Important conclusion arrived at by Sessions Court not displaced-High Court overlooking important circumstances which fully prove the case.

Code of Criminal Procedure 1898-Sec. 288-Confession of accused-Use of-Corroboration by other independent evidence- Necessity of-Satisfaction and support in extrinsic evidence- Use of.

Identification Parade-Necessity of keeping accused baparda explained-evidence of identification-When of weak character.

HEADNOTE:

Three of the four accused persons were related to one another and the fourth was a, friend. One of them entered into a deal for the purchase of land but found it difficult to finance the transaction. The prosecution alleged that all of them entered into a conspiracy to obtain money by means fair and foul and in pursuance of that they hit upon a plan to hire a taxi, take possession of it, do away with the driver and utilities the sale proceeds for payment of the purchase money. By giving a false reason they hired a taxi in Dehra Dun, drove it by a forest road and after killing the driver they changed the number plate and reached Bombay.

When they tried to sell the taxi in Bombay a discrepancy was noticed in the chassis number whereupon respondent No. I made good his escape. Eventually respondent no. I was caught. He made a confessional statement before a magistrate detailing various parts played by each of the accused. The Session Judge convicted all the respondents under ss. 30:2 read with s. 34 IPC (Indian Penal code, 1860) and also under s. 120B. All the accused were convicted of various other offences.

On appeal She High Court reversed the judgment of the Sessions Judge and acquitted all the respondents on the ground that (i) since the confession of respondent No. 1 was not voluntary no reliance could be placed on it; (ii) the evidence of identification is a very weak type of evidence and should be closely scrutinised before reliance could be placed on it; and (iii) the statements of P. Ws. S and 7 before the trial court were inconsistent with their statements made before the committing magistrate.

After special leave to appeal to this Court was granted to the State three respondents surrendered while one remained absconding. One of the three later died.

HELD: ( 1 ) The High Court committed errors of law and fact on most vital points. It refused to draw interences from proved facts and has laid down legally erroneous principles on such vital and crucial evidence as that of identification which is a valuable piece of evidence. On the question of identification it has laid down wrong law on the basis of which it failed to consider 299 that evidence. Regarding the confession of the respondent it has not made a correct approach which is to take the confession and then to find out how much of it is corroborated by other independent evidence. The confession was discarded on irrelevant grounds based on pure speculation. Normally this Court does not interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court but in this case the High Court has, on the one hand misread the evidence and completely overlooked some of the important circumstances which proved the prosecution case and on the other while setting aside the judgment of the Session Judge has failed to displace the important reasons given and circumstances relied on by the Sessions Judge. There are substantial and compelling reasons for setting aside the order of acquittal passed in favour of respondent No. 1. [333 G-H, 334 A-D] (2)(a) The High Court was not justified in rejecting the confession or doubting its veracity on the supposed belief that respondent No. 1 was in police custody from the time he was produced before the magistrate to the time when the statement was recorded. Before recording the confessional statement the magistrate put a number of questions to the accused to satisfy himself that the confession was being made voluntarily and without any coercion or undue influence. The respondent stated that he was making the confession to speak the truth. The magistrate took care to see that there was no Police officer present in the court when the confession was recorded. The magistrate, after warning the respondent that he was not bound to make the statement, gave him more than three hours' time for reflection. The High Court's conjecture that the respondent must have been sent to police custody after being produced before the magistrate is contrary to the evidence of the magistrate. [305H, 306 A-D] (b) As the confession of the accused was a retracted one it could be acted upon only if it is substantially corroborated by independent circumstances. It is not necessary that a retracted confession should be corroborated in each material particular, it is sufficient that there is a general corroboration of the important incidents mentioned in the confession. [308 E] In the instant case the circumstances proved by the prosecution not only amounted to a complete corroboration of the confession but provided additional circumstantial evidence against the respondent which are of a conclusive nature. [308 F] (c) 'I he High Court has made a wrong approach to the whole case by not taking the confessional statement first and then finding,, out whether there are other circumstances corroborating the various parts of the statement made in the confession. This may be due to the fact that the High Court found that the confession was not voluntary and, therefore, should be excluded from scintillation [305 E-F] (d) In the confessional statement the respondent narrated the motive for the incident leading to the murder of the deceased and this has been clearly corroborated by the evidence of the vendor of the land. 'I he finding of the High Court on the question of motive is against the weight of evidence on record. The trial court rightly pointed out that the prosecution had proved the motive for the offence by clear evidence. [309 H-310 B] (e) The facts mentioned in the receipt of the taxi- stand fully corroborate the confessional statement of the respondent. The High Court rejected this important document mainly on the ground that it was not mentioned in the report filed with the police by the taxi-stand owner. If he did not mention 3-526 SCI/78 300 in this report about the receipt as having been given by the respondent, that by itself would no throw suspicion on the authenticity of the receipt. Moreover, the. report was not really the report of murder. containing a detailed narration of all facts. The witnesses who identified the accused were independent witnesses and were not known to him nor did they bear any animus against him. [310 F-G, 311 A-B, 311 G-H] (f) Although there is no direct corroboration of the actual t assault on the deceased the circumstantial evidence admitted in the confession and corroborated by other evidence is a clear pointer to the fact that the deceased had accompanied the respondent from the place. they hired the taxi to the place of murder. 'The respondents were last seen with the deceased before the murder. Taking the circumstances before and after the death of the deceased the murder could not be explained by any other. reasonable hypothesis then the guilty of the respondent [324 B-C] (g) There is enough evidence to show that the respondent deliberately changed the number plate of the car to conceal its identity and this was done after the deceased had been put to death. This fully corroborates his statement made in his confession. This important document which demonstrates the incriminating conduct of the respondent.

apart from corroborating his statement in the confessional statement. has been completely overlooked by the High Court.

[325 C] (h) The High Court has taken an artificial and incorrect view in holding that the confession was completely disproved by the medical evidence. The statement of respondent No. I regarding the death of the deceased was the only manner in which he was murdered. The Sessions Judge has rightly explained that since only two shots were fired it may be that no shot hit the bones but remained in the flesh and no trace could be found because the flash had peeled off. Secondly the postmortem report revealed that the head was served from the body and this could have been only possible if the injury was inflicted by a gandasa. Here too since the flesh had peeled off no trace of the injury could be found. The skeleton had been identified hyp good and cogent evidence. This finding of the Session Judge had not been displace(l by the High Court.[330 E-H, 331 A-B] (i) The dead body had been found at the instance of one of the accused and this evidence is clearly admissible under s. 27 of the Evidence Act. This has Bsc proved by independent witnesses. 'This clearly established the identity of the corpus delecti. [331 E, G] (3) l`he High Court was wrong in laying down a universal rule of application that the evidence of identification is a weak type of evidence. Where a witness correctly identifies the accused at a test identification parade held by a magistrate after observing all the essential formalities and taking the necessary precautions and also identifies the accused in court, the evidence of identification can be believed unless the evidence of the witness suffers from some other infirmity. The evidence of identification becomes strong if the witness has an opportunity of seeing the accused not for a few minutes but for. some length OT time in broad daylight. [317 C, 318 C-D] In the present case the respondent`s confession was proved by the evidence of witnesses who saw him at the taxi- stand for quite some timer These evidences were in a position to notice the features of the respondent as closely as possible. Their evidence fully corroborates the confessional statement of the respondent. [318 E-F] 301 Budh Sen & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 1970 SC ]321 explained. - Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1978] 3 S.C.R. 694, followed.

State of Rajashan v. Ravitha, AIR 1962 Raj. 78 FB approved.

Dhokal Singh & Anr. v. The State, ILR (1953) 3 Raj. 762 disapproved.

(4) It is well-established that where a person makes a statement before the trial court which is inconsistent with his statement made before the committing magistrate, it is unsafe to place implicit reliance on his evidence. Before a judge decides to accept the evidence brought in under.s.288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as true and reliable he has to satisfy himself that this is really so. 'This satisfaction in most cases can come in only if there is such support in extrinsic evidence as to give a reasonable indication that not only what is said about the occurrence in general but also what is said against the particular accused sought to be implicated in the crime is true. But where even without any extrinsic evidence the judge is satisfied that the evidence is true and can be safely relied upon, the Judge will be failing in his duty in not doing so.

[321 A-E] In the instant case the evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 7 fully supported the prosecution case that the accused were seen in a hotel. P.W. 5 categorically stated that what he had stated before the committing court was not true and thus certified that what he stated in the trtial court was not the correct version. In his confession statement respondent No. 1 had stated that he, along with the other accused. had taken food in a hotel. Thus there are cogent reason and extrinsic circumstances to lend support to the inference that the statements given by these two witnesses before the committing magistrate were in fact true and correct and the Sessions Judge therefore we. right in relying on those statements. On the other hand while rejecting their statements the High Court made no effort to find out whether the prior statements made by them before the committing court was in fact true having regard to the facts and circumstance of the ease. The High Court was clearly in error in rejecting the evidence of the two witness.[321 F- H,322 C-E] Shranappa Mutyappal Halke v. State of Maharastra.

[1964] 4 SCR 589 followed.

Harprasad & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra. [1971] 3 SCC 455 applied.

(5, Acceding. to the Confessional statement of respondent No. 2. was not present in the forest at the time of murder. Nor was there any evidence to show that he was with the respondent No. 1 later. There is some force in the contention that since at the time when the respondent was identified at the parade he had shaved off his beard and that it would be difficult for the witnesses to identify such a person. The possibility of mistake in identification cannot be excluded. Even the trial court has not accepted the evidence of identification against him. In all probability respondent No. 2 was a co- conspirator but it is unsafe to convict him when he had been acquitted by the High Court. 1332 E-G] 302

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDlCTlON: Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1972.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 29-9-1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 151] /69.

D. P. Uniyal and o. P. Rana for the Appellant.

A. N. Mulla, Yogeswar Pd., S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Allahabad High Court dated 29th September, 1970 by which the High Court acquitted the respondents of the charges framed against them by the Sessions Judge Dehra Dun.

The Sessions Judge, Dehra Dun by his order dated 16th July, 1969 convicted the respondents Boota Singh, Asa Singh, Trilok Singh and Raghubir Singh under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. and also under section 120-B I.P.C. Boota Singh, Trilok Singh and Asa Singh were sentenced to death under section 302 read with section 34 and section 120-B I.P.C. while Raghubir Singh was sentenced to imprisonment for life for the offence under section 302 read with section 34 and section 120-B I.P.C. The four respondents mentioned above were also convicted under section 364 read with section 34 and section 120-B I.P.C. and section 394 read with section 34 and section 120-B I.P.C. and each of them were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years under each count. Boota Singh was further convicted of the offence under section 419, I.P.C. and section 471 read with section 465 T.P.C. and section 47] read with section 466 T.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years, one year and four years respectively. As three of the respondents, viz., Boota Singh, Trilok Singh and Asa Singh were sentenced to death, the Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court of Allahabad for confirmation of the sentence of death. The respondents who have been convicted by the Sessions Judge also filed appeals against their convictions and sentences. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which reversed the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and acquitted all the respondents of the charges framed against them.

Thereafter. the State of U.P. preferred an appeal to this Court and after special leave was granted by this Court the appeal has been placed before us for hearing. At the time when the special leave was granted, the Court issued non-bailable warrants against the four respondents in pursuance of which Boota Singh. Trilok Singh and Raghubir Singh surrendered hut Asa Singh remained absconding.

303 During the pendency of the appeal the respondent Trilok Singh died and it is, therefore, manifest that the appeal so far as this respondent is concerned has abated. Before we took up the appeal for hearing we segregated the appeal of Asa Singh as he was absconding and directed that the appeal against other respondents will be heard but the appeal of Asa Singh will be kept pending.

Briefly the prosecution case may be summarised as follows: Respondent Asa Singh and his brother Bal Singh had entered into an agreement with Ram Lal P.W. 16 and his father Kaka Ram for purchasing 68 bighas of land at the rate of Rs. 225 per bigha and an earnest money of Rs. 3200/- had been paid by Asa Singh and Bal Singh at the time of the agreement and the balance of the amount was agreed to be paid on the 25th December, 1963. The respondent Trilok Singh had accompanied Asa Singh and the latter went to Ram Lal for negotiating the aforesaid purchase. The prosecution alleged that Asa Singh and Boota Singh respondents were first cousins and were residents of Chhidarwala. Boota Singh was also related to Trilok Singh inasmuch as Trilok sister is wedded to the cousin of Boota Singh. After the agreement, Asa Singh appears to have found some difficulties in arranging for the money to be paid to the vendee P.W. 16 Ram Lal and under the terms of the agreement if the money was not paid by the due date the entire amount of earnest money of Rs. 3200/- was liable to be forfeited. In such a situation the four respondents entered into a conspiracy to obtain money by means fair or foul. They accordingly hit upon a plan to obtain a taxi on hire and after taking possession of it to do away with the driver and sell the taxi at some other place and utilise the consideration of the sale for payment to Ram Lal towards the balance of the purchase money. In execution of this common plan Asa Singh remained at Doiwala while Boota Singh, Trilok Singh and Raghubir Singh went to Dehra Dun and contacted Inder Singh P.W. 2 at Punjab Taxi Service, Dehra Dun. Trilok Singh and Raghubir Singh remained standing at the petrol pump a few paces away from the office of the Punjab Taxi Service. Boota Singh respondent went in and approached Inder Singh P.W. 2 and introduced himself as K. Sharma of the Indian Army and gave out that he was on a round for recruiting girls for the military and for this purpose he needed the taxi on hire.

The bargain was finally struck and Inder Singh P.W.2 agreed to provide Boota Singh with his taxi at the rate of Rs. 30 per day. Boota Singh thereafter executed a document Ex. Ka-4 in proof of the receipt of the car and paid Rs. 50/- as advance. Lal Singh, the deceased son of Inder Singh was the driver of the taxi and in fact the virtual owner of the taxi. The taxi given to Boota Singh bore number UPS-6679.

Inder Singh directed Lal Singh to take the taxi 304 with Boota Singh and his companions. Raghubir Singh and Trilok Singh boarded the taxi when it reached the petrol pump. From Dehra Dun the taxi came to Doiwala where the party of Boota Singh was joined by Asa Singh. Thereafter all the members of the party took their meals at the hotel of Khem Singh P.W. 5 and Boota Singh had purchased a cake of soap from the shop of Jaidev Singh P.W. 7. Thus all the four respondents were last seen together at Doiwala by P.W.s S and 7. From there the respondents proceeded to Chhidarwala by forest road and after crossing some forest barriers ultimately reached Chiddarwala where it was decided to murder Lal Singh and take complete possession of the taxi.

In pursuance of this conspiracy Lal Singh was taken to the forest and killed by the respondents. According to the prosecution, as disclosed in the confession of respondent Boota Singh Ex. Ka-81, Trilok Singh first fired two shots at the deceased and then Asa Singh dealt a gandasa blow on the neck of the deceased.

After having accomplished this nefarious feat the respondents took the precaution of removing the number plate of the car and substituted a new plate bearing number UPM- 3236. Thereafter, the respondents Boota Singh and Raghubir Singh went to Ambala where they tried to get the car with the new number insured, and finally landed at Bombay and negotiated for the sale of the car through a broker and in this connection contacted P.W. 62 Raja Ram Narain Rane who offered to buy the car Al Rs. 16,000 out of which a sum of Rs. 500 was to, be given to Raja Ram Narain Rane P.W. 62.

This happened on 16th December, 1963. At the time of negotiations with Raja Ram Narain Rane, Boota Singh gave out his name as J.P. Singh and represented that he was son of S.P., Bareilly. It appears however that some discrepency in the chassis number and the number of the engine was found out which raised a serious suspicion regarding the genuineness of the car and the matter was reported to the C.I.D. by P.W. 62. On the 18th February 1963 respondent Boota Singh along with Anand Singh P.W. 9 went to the office of the R.T.O. at Bombay and contacted P.W. 35 Rati Lal Chhotu Bhai Desai who was a Motor Vehicles Inspector and who was shown various papers by Boota Singh. Desai then saw the car and discovered some tampering with the chassis number.

The papers were? Therefore, placed before the Police officer and Boota Singh sensing some trouble made good his escape.

Meanwhile as Lal Singh did not return for quite a number of days, his brother Harcharan Singh got worried and filed a missing report before the Police Station Dalanwala, district Dehra Dun on 31st December, 1963 wherein he expressed his apprehension that the person who had hired the taxi may have killed Lal Singh and driven away the 305 car This report was treated by the Police as F.I.R. and investigation was started in the course of which the blanket of deceased Lal Singh was recovered from the forest and the respondent Boota Singh soon after his arrest made the confession Ex. Ka-81 before a Magistrate making a clean breast of the whole affair. Subsequently, the respondents were identified by some of the witnesses at T.I. parades held at Nainital and Dehra Dun. After the usual investigation, the Police submitted a charge against all the four respondents on the basis of which they were committed to the Court of SESSIONS and convicted and sentenced LI indicated above.

The central evidence against the respondents consists of the confessional statement made by Boota Singh on 16th March, 1964 before Mr. M. L. Sharma, Magistrate First-class who has been examined as P.W 23 and in the confession Boota Singh appears to have made a clean breast of the entire story detailing the various parts played by him and his other companions. The confession was sought to be corroborated by a large number of circumstances proved by the prosecution at the trial and which will be discussed hereafter. In fact, the motive for the murder of the deceased has been clearly indicated in the confession and was also corroborated by the oral evidence led by the prosecution as also the statement of Respondent Asa Singh recorded under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure .

The High Court does not appear to have made a correct approach to the present case inasmuch as it first tried to deal with the various circumstances which went to corroborate the confession and dealt with the confession in the last and held that as the confession was not voluntary no reliance could be placed on the same. We should have expected the High Court to have dealt with the confession first because that was the sheet anchor of the prosecution case. The other circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution went to corroborate dk important facts and incidents mentioned in the confession. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial Judge and the High Court and we are constrained to observe-that the High Court has neither marshalled the evidence correctly nor has it considered the effect of some of the most important and vital circumstances which clinched some of the basic issues arising in the case. A major part of the judgment or the High Court is based on pure speculations and some of the reasons given by the High Court for rejecting the prosecution evidence are based on conjectures and surmises.

We would, therefore, like to start with the confession of respondent Boota Singh which is the pivot of the prosecution case. It would appear that before reloading the confessional statement of the respon 306 dent Boota Singh the Magistrate had put a number of questions to satisfy himself that the confession was being made voluntarily and without any coercion or undue influence. The respondent Boota Singh on being asked as to why he was making the confession, clearly stated that he was doing so because he wanted to speak the truth. Boota Singh further testified that he was in police custody only for two days before making the confession and where his treatment was good. The Magistrate also took care to see that there was no police officer present in the court when the confession was recorded. In his deposition, the Magistrate stated that Boota Singh was produced before him at 1.30 p.m.

On the 16th March and thereafter having warned him he sent the respondent back in court custody and recorded the statement at about 4.45 p.m. Thus, the respondent Boota Singh was given more than three hours for reflection. The High Court conjectures that the respondent Boota Singh must have been sent to police custody after being produced before the Magistrate on 16th March at .30 p.m. his finding of the High Court is contrary to the evidence of the Magistrate who clearly deposed thus:- "At the time when the statement was recorded, the accused was produced by the Court Moharrir. No Sub- Inspector was present there. There was no constable as well. When the Court Moharrir came with the accused the accused was already in handcuffs. I got the same removed when he came inside. The Moharrir went outside with the handcuffs".

This statement clearly shows that after 1.30 p.m. respondent Boota Singh was in the custody of the Court Moharrir and it was from his custody that the respondent Boota Singh was produced before the Magistrate at 4.45 p.m. for recording the confession. For these reasons, therefore, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the confession or doubting its veracity on the supposed belief that the respondent Boota Singh was in police custody from the time he was produced before the Magistrate to the time when the statement was recorded.

Another ground on which the High Court rejected the confession was that the respondent Boota Singh was taken by K. N. Sharma, S.I. in police custody from 10-3-64 to ]2-3-64 and the High Court thought that this period must have been utilised for coercing the respondent Boota Singh to make a confession which he ultimately made four days later.

The High Court further found that Vikram Singh P.W. 59 interrogated the respondent Boota Singh as far back as 9-1- 1964 and it is not explained by the prosecution as to why there was a delay of two months on the part of the respondent Boota Singh for making the con 307 fessional statement. The High Court further found that immediately after the S.I. sent the respondent Boota Singh to jail custody on 12-3-64, he submitted a report for the confession of the respondent being recorded which throws doubt on the voluntary nature of the confession. The High Court further conjectured that from these circumstances a reasonable inference can be drawn that third degrees methods must have been used by the police. With very great respect we are constrained to say that the High Court indulged in pure speculation on this aspect of the matter. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the respondent Boota Singh was tortured or beaten while in police custody.

In fact, D.W. 1 N. S. David, Assistant Jailor District Jail Dehra Dun who was examined on behalf of the defence categorically stated that on 12-2-1964 K. N. Sharma, S.I.

admitted the respondent Boota Singh in jail. The witness testified that at the time when he was admitted to jail he had no injury on his person at that time. The witness further states that there was an entry in the relevant registers to show that Boota Singh was sent to the Court on 16-3-1964 and there was no injury on the person of Boota Singh when he was sent to Court. Furthermore, on his return from court to jail, there was also no entry with respect to any injury on his person. This circumstance, therefore, completely rules out the possibility of Boota Singh having been assaulted, beaten or tortured by the police while in their custody. Moreover, the High Court completely overlooked a very important fact which went to show that the confessional statement was true and voluntary. The respondent Boota Singh in his statement under section 342 Cr. P.C. before the committing Magistrate which is Exhibit Ka. 113 in answer to question No. 22 stated thus :- "Bikram Singh, Sub-Inspector and Kundan Lal Sharma, C.I.D. Inspector, took us to P.S. Dalanwala and locked up us separately from each other. They beat me severely and pressed and threatened me that if I did not make a statement as desired by them, they would kill me." "There they beat me to unconsciousness and then brought me and then pressed me to make a statement. I was not at all in my senses, when they brought me back to the lock-up, the court had departed." This statement was completely falsified by the circumstances indicated above yet Boota Singh gave a complete go by to this plea taken by him before the committing Magistrate and in his statement before the Sessions Judge he categorically stated that he made no statement before the Magistrate, but his signature was taken on a blank paper which was 308 converted into a confession. In answer to question No. 21 regarding the confession having been read out to the respondent Boota Singh, he stated thus:- "No I did not make any statement. He obtained my signature on a blank paper" Thus, the two statements were wholly inconsistent with each other and conclusively show that the stand taken by the respondent which differed from court to court was absolutely false and incredible. This circumstance goes a long way to demolish the case of the respondent Boota Singh that the confession was extorted. We are sure that if the High Court had noticed this glaring inconsistency in the statement of the Respondent regarding the manner in which the confession was made it would not have thrown out the confession as it did. On the other than hand we have carefully perused the confession of the respondent which seem, to have a ring of truth in it and in which the respondent has ill a very straight-forward manner narrated the various incidents in their logical sequence. The Magistrate has also testified on oath that he was fully satisfied that the statement of the respondent Boota Singh was true and voluntary. The learned Sessions Judge after considering the circumstances gave a clear finding that the confession was true and voluntary and there was no reason to distrust it. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in brushing aside the well reasoned finding of the Session Judge on this point merely on the basis of speculation and the circumstances which were in fact not proved. As however the confession was a retracted one it could be acted upon only if substantially corroborated by independent circumstances. It is not necessary that a refracted confession should be corroborated in each material particular, but it is sufficient that there is a general corroboration of the important incidents mentioned in the confession. In the instant case, we find that the circumstances proved by the prosecution not only amount to a complete corroboration of the confession but provide additional circumstantial evidence against the respondent which are of a conclusive nature. We would now deal with the confession in the light of the observations made above.

To begin with, Boota Singh states in his confession that he was a resident of Churkana in the District of Sheikhupur and at the relevant time he was residing at Kichha in the District of Nainital. Asa Singh and Trilok Singh were cousins, the sons of Chacha and Tau of each other and live together at Chhidderwala. The sister of Trilok Singh was married to Piara Singh, the respondent's father's sister's son at village Moonak, as a result of which Asa Singh and Trilok Singh used to visit the respondent at Kichha off and on. The respondent then goes 309 on to state that Trilok Singh wanted to purchase land at Chidderwala and had paid Rs. 1200/- as earnest money to Hans Raj. The whole transaction was for Rs. 16,000/- or Rs. 17,000/-? but as the purchaser was short of money. Asa Singh. Trilok Singh, Raghubir Singh and Gopi Goojar along with Boota Singh conspired together to bring some taxi from Dehra Dun and sell the same, so that the balance of the consideration money for the land might be paid and the sale- deed got registered. This really constituted the motive for the incident leading to the murder of the deceased, Lal Singh. The gist of the motive mentioned in the confession is clearly corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 16 Ram Lal who has deposed that during the time of the occurrence Asa Singh and his brother Bal Singh wanted to purchase his land and the transaction was settled at the rate of Rs. 225 per bigha, and 68 bighas of land were to be sold. The purchasers had given an advance of Rs. 3200/- which was to be forfeited if the balance of the amount was not paid. The witness further stated that as the balance of the amount was eventually not paid, the vendor did not deliver possession of the land. Thus, shorn of the details Ram Lal corroborates the statement of the respondent Boota Singh in the confession regarding the transaction, whether the earnest money was Rs. 1600/- or the consideration was more than Rs.

16,000 is a matter of detail on which even if there is some discrepancy that will not put the prosecution case out of court, so far as the motive is concerned. It may be mentioned here that the Respondent Asa Singh in his statement before the Sessions Court admitted the purchase of the land from Ram Lal and merely denied the knowledge as to whether Rs. 3200/- had been paid as earnest money. The respondent Asa Singh statement that the land was to be purchased by Bal Singh and not by him really makes no difference as Ram Lal who was admittedly the purchaser was an independent witness and he testified on oath to the transaction relating to the sale-deed which provided the immediate motive for the murder. The High Court seems to have brushed aside the evidence or Ram Lal merely on the ground that there was no documentary evidence to show that there was any negotiation between the parties before the sale-deed was executed and held that the evidence of Ram Lal was not sufficient proof of the fact that Asa Singh was in any manner concerned with the land purchased by Bal Singh.

In coming to this finding the High Court completely overlooked the fact that the nature of the transaction was clearly mentioned in the confession which has been held by us to be true and voluntary. Once the motive mentioned in the confession was corroborated by an independent witnesses like P.W. 16 Ram Lal whose evidence was and could not be disbelieved by the High Court, that was sufficient to corroborate the 310 part of the confession which related to motive. The finding of the High Court on the question of motive appears to be against the weight of the evidence on the record. The trial court rightly pointed out that the prosecution had proved the motive for the offence by clear evidence.

The next circumstance mentioned in the confession was that on 8th December, ]963 Asa Singh, Trilok Singh, Raghubir Singh, Gopi Goojar and respondent Boota Singh started in the tractor of Asa Singh and on reaching Doiwala Asa Singh and Gopi stopped there but the other three, namely, Trilok Singh, Raghubir Singh and Boota Singh proceeded to, Dehra Dun by bus. Boota Singh went to the Punjab Taxi Stand and had a talk with Inder Singh for hiring a taxi and was ultimately successful in persuading Inder Singh to give the taxi to him on hire at the rate of Rs. 30/- per day. The respondent further mentioned in the confession that he paid an advance of Rs. 50/- and gave a receipt to Inder Singh.

Thereafter, three of them proceeded to Doiwala in the taxi hired by Boota Singh which was driven by the deceased Lal Singh who was the son of Inder Singh. This part of the confessional statement is fully corroborated not only by oral but also by documentary evidence. In the first place, there is Exhibit Ka-4 which is a receipt granted by the respondent Boota Singh to Inder Singh for the advance of Rs.

50/- which he had paid to Inder Singh for hiring the taxi.

The receipt appears to have been signed by the respondent as K. Sharma. The signature of the Respondent was sent to the expert along with his admitted specimen signatures and the expert P.W. 32 Shiv Ram Singh found that it completely tallied with the signature of the respondent Boota Singh.

The expert had marked the signature of the respondent Boota Singh at Exhibit Ka-4 as S-3894. Thus, the facts mentioned in the receipt fully corroborate the statement of the respondent Boota Singh mentioned above and the fact that the signature of the respondent Boota Singh tallied with the signature which he had made on this document is an intrinsic proof of the genuineness of Exhibit Ka-4. The High Court seems to have rejected this important document mainly on the ground that it was not mentioned in the report filed by P.W.

1 Harcharan Singh, brother of the deceased who had lodged a written report at the Police Station Dalanwala, Dehra Dun stating therein that the respondent had hired the taxi at the rate of Rs. 30/- per day on the ground that he had to visit several places like Hardwar, Roorkee, Saharanpur, Meerut, Moradabad, Mathura, Brindaban, Aligarh, Agra etc.

The description oil the car is given in the report and the witness has expressed the apprehension that the respondent may have killed the driver and driven away the car. By the time the report was lodged Harcharan Singh was not in possession 311 of full facts, and therefore, he gave a very brief report.

If he did not mention the receipt given by the respondent in this report that by itself would not throw any suspicion on the authenticity of the receipt more particularly when the conclusive circumstance that the receipt contained the signature of the respondent as found by the expert had been established. Moreover, the report was not really the report of murder containing a detailed narration of the facts. The brother of the deceased was naturally upset because the taxi having been taken on the 8th December had not returned for 23 days but he did not know what had happened. In these circumstances, there was no occasion for Harcharan Singh to mention every possible detail in this report. Furthermore, what the High Court completely overlooked was that the respondent Boota Singh himself clearly mentioned in his confession that he had paid an advance of Rs. 50/- and executed a receipt.

Apart from this, there is the oral evidence of P.W. 2 Inder Singh, P.W. 8. Pritam Singh and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh that the respondent had approached them for hiring the taxi and he himself executed the receipt Exhibit Ka-4 and affixed his signature in their presence. The respondent had given out his name as one K. Sharma. Apart from the question as to whether these witnesses correctly identified the respondent or not, there was sufficient proof of the execution of Exhibit Ka-4. For these reasons, therefore, we are not in a position to support the finding of the High Court that Exhibit Ka-4 was not a genuine document. Thus, Exhibit Ka-4 being proved must be held to the strongest possible circumstance to corroborate the confession of Boota Singh regarding the first stage of the prosecution case, namely, the hiring of the taxi.

Apart from Exhibit Ka-4 there is independent and reliable evidence to show that Boota Singh and others had approached P.W. 2 Inder Singh for living the taxi on hire to respondent Boota Singh and the deal was struck as a result of which Rs. 50/- was paid in advance. In this connection the witnesses examined by the prosecution arc P.W. 2 Inder Singh, P.W. 8 Pritam Singh and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh. At a T.I. parade held on 9-3-1964 at Dehra Dun Boota Singh was identified by P.W. 2 Inder Singh and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh as the person who had approached him for taking the taxi on hire. At the same parade the respondent Trilok Singh was identified by P.W. 8 Pritam Singh and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh.

All these witnesses were undoubtedly independent witnesses and were not known to Boota Singh at all, nor they bore any animus against him. There was thus no reason for them to depose falsely against the respondents.

312 P.W. 2 Inder Singh deposes that on 9-12-63 which he was in his office along with Pritam Singh and Jagir Singh an unbearded gentleman came to him at about 4 to 4.30 p.m. and represented that he wanted to have a taxi car on hire. the witness goes on to say that the driver the car was his son Lal Singh the deceased and the number of the car was UPS- 6679 and it was of Fiat make. The respondent Boota Singh whom the witness i(identified later at a T.I.. parade settled the hiring charges at Rs. 30 per day and paid an advance of Rs. SO/-. The respondent further gave his name as K. Sharma and wanted the taxi for 20 clays. The witness further stated that Apart from the respondent Boota Singh who masqueraded as one K. Sharma there were two more Sardars near the petrol pump where the car was standing. To the same effect is the evidence of P.W. 14 Jagir Singh an(l P.W. 2, Pritam Singh. The learned Sessions Judge has carefully considered the evidence of these witnesses and has accepted the same.

The High Court appears to have brushed aside the evidence of these independent witnesses on trivial and speculative grounds. In the first place, the High Court found that there were tell tale circumstances in the ease which did not exclude the possibility of the respondent Boota Singh and others having been shown to the witnesses at police station Moonak and Dalanwala before the T.I. parade was held at Dehradun. The circumstances relied upon by the High Court may be summarised thus: P.W. 20 Sri Ram Bajaj admits that he had arrested Boota Singh and Trilok Singh at Moonak and kept both of them look cd up at Police Station Moonak.

P.W. 59 Vikram Singh deposes as follows founded Boota Singh and Trilok Singh at P.S. Moonak. They had been under custody of the Punjab Police and they were Bapurdah." (Emphasis supplied(l).

On the basis of the evidence of these witnesses the High Court suspected that the respondents must have been shown to the witnesses at Police Station Moonak. In coming to this finding, however, the High Court completely overlooked the evidence of these very witnesses which completely excluded the possibility of the respondent having been shown to the witnesses. P.W. 20 who had arrested Boota Singh and Trilok Singh categorically stated thus:- "I arrested Boota Singh and Trilok Singh accused at Moonak in connection with that case. I made them Bapurdah and told them that they were to Be identified.

I shut Both of them at P.S. Moonak in a Bapurdah state". (Emphasis ours) .

313 The evidence of these two witnesses clearly shows that every possible precaution was taken to keep the respondent Bapurdah throughout and even at the Police Station Moonak so that the respondent may not be able to see the witnesses.

Similarly, P.W. 59 Vikram Singh clearly stated that although he found Boota Singh and Trilok Singh at P.S. Moonak they were in police custody and they were Bapurdah. In the face of this clear and specific evidence where was the question for the High Court to conjecture or speculate that the witness must have been shown to the. respondent at the police station Moonak. the High Court ought to have decided this question on the direct evidence of the witnesses concerned rather than on pure surmises and conjectures.

The High Court particularly relied on the evidence of P.W. 3 Amir Ahmad who had stated that he had arrested the respondent Asa Singh on 6-1-1964 and taken him to police station Dalanwala. The witness goes on to state that on 8-]- 1964 the Station officer took him to Moonak and he went along with him. The witness further state(l that there. were three Sardars with them and one of them was known as Gyani and there were two drivers, one of them was Jagir Singh and the other was Pritam Singh. Thus, the inference the High Court draws from this evidence is that the respondent Asa Singh was shown to the witnesses Pritam Singh and Jagir Singh who were brought together from Dalanwala to Moonak.

The trial Court discussed the evidence of this witness and gave cogent reasons for rejecting the testimony of the witness particularly when the witness was a disgruntled one having been suspended on a criminal charge and therefore, would be ready to oblige the defence. Moreover, the Sessions Judge while criticising the evidence of this witness observed as follows:- "The defence examined Amir Ahmad (P.W. 3) who was posted as a Head Constable, Karanpur outpost, Dehra Dun. He stated that Asa Singh was arrested by him on 6- 1-64 near Roadways Stand, Dehradun and that he took him to P.S. Dalanwala. In cross-examination he admitted that he did not make any entry as to the arrest of Asa Singh on 6-1-64 in the General Diary, that he left the accused at the Police Station without getting any entry made because it was the work of the officers. He admitted that he used to get entries of arrival and departure of accused made at the. Police Station and he signed the same. He was unable to explain why he did not ll adopt the same procedure in this instance. The alleged explanation that he did not get an entry made because he had no 314 warrant does not appeal to reason.......... He also admitted that he was being prosecuted for murder by Meerut C.I.D. and that Meerut C.I.D. was responsible for his arrest. He has, therefore, a grudge with the Meerut C.I.D. He did not know Asa Singh before he arrested him. He had no warrant for his arrest. He was not given any direction for the arrest of the accused.

He merely knew that the Station officer had left for his arrest. In the circumstances it was not expected of him to have arrested accused Asa Singh. The entire statement of the witness is untrustworthy and unconvincing." None of the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge appear to have been displaced by the High Court and were not even noticed by it. In view of the admission made by this witness it is extremely doubtful if the witness in fact had arrested Asa Singh and his entire story appears to be a pure fabrication. For these reasons, therefore, the High Court was not at all justified in relying on the evidence of P.W. 3 at its face value.

Reliance was also placed on the evidence of P.W. 27 Mahendra Singh who states thus:

"On 6-1-64 S.O. Vikram Singh Head Constable Amir.

Ahmad, Constables Raja Ram, Pritam Singh, Tej Ram, Mathma Singh and I reached Manak. There was none from the public from us. We started from Dehradun on 8-1-64.

I do not remember the time when we started from there.

We reached Mannak in the Right of 8th and 9th. We did not go to Police Station Manak. We stayed at Mannak in the night of 8th and 9th. We had gone there to arrest Boota Singh and "others".

The High Court appears to have made much of the alleged admission of the witness in the case that P.W. 3 Pritam Singh had accompanied the police party to Moonak where Boota Singh was arrested, and there fore, there is a possibility that Pritam Singh might have been shown to Boota Singh. In the first place, the witness says nothing of the sort and the High Court appears to have misread the evidence of this witness. The words used by the witness are "Constables Raja Ram, Pritam Singh, Tej Ram, Mathma Singh and I reached Mannak`' which clearly indicate that he refers to Pritam Singh Constable and not to Pritam Singh witness. The witness has further clarified this fact by making a categorical statement "that there was none from the public with us." Merely because there was a constable by the name of Pritam Singh it could not be inferred that P.W. 27 had referred to the witness 315 and not to the constable. Even so, the evidence discussed above clearly shows that the respondents were kept Bapurdah and concealed from the view of the witnesses. We are, therefore , unable to agree with the finding of the High Court on this point which is not based on proper appreciation of the evidence of P.W. 27.

Apart from this in a recent judgment in Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu(1) this Court approving the decision of the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ranjita(2) and disapproving an earlier decision of the same High Court in Dhokal Singh and Anr. v. The State(::) observed as follows:- "It appears however that the Learned counsel was not aware of a later decision of the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in State of Rajsthan v. Ranjita in which Dhokal Singh's case was referred for the purpose of laying down the correct law on the following matters:- (1) Whether it is necessary that entries should be made in the various Police records of the precautions that were to be taken for keeping the accused persons ba-parda while under Police custody.

(2) Whether it should be specified in the warrant of commitment of the accused, when he is sent to the judicial custody that he is to be kept ba- parda till the identification parade takes place, and what precautions should the jail authorities take for keeping the accused ba-parda.

(3) Whether necessarily entries should be made in the jail records for keeping the accused ba-parda while he is in the judicial lock up".

The Full Bench of the High Court examined the matter and held that the propositions laid down in Dhakol Singh's case could not be regarded as a rule of law and had been far too broadly laid down to merit acceptance even as practical propositions and could only lead to the accentuation of the difficulties of honest investigating officers and truthful witnesses.

The Full Bench answered the questions as follows:- "(1 ) It is not necessary that entry should be made in the various police records of the precautions that were taken for keeping the accused persons ba- parda while under police custody.

(l) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 694.

(2) A.I.R.. 1962 Raj. 78.

(3) I.L.R. (1953) 3 Rajasthan 762.

4-.526 SCI/78 316 (2) It is also not necessary to specify in the warrant of commitment of the accused when he is sent to judicial custody that he is to be kept ba-parda till The identification parade takes place, nor it is necessary to specify the precautions that the jail authorities are to take for keeping the accused ba- parda.

(3) It is also not necessary that entries should be made in the jail records for keeping the accused ba- parda while he is in the judicial lock up." In the instant case we have already pointed out that there is positive and definite evidence that the respondent was kept ba-parda wherever he was.

Finally, the High Court relied on the circumstance that Boota Singh was taken from Moonak to Sangrur and thence to Delhi for a T.I. parade but the T.I. parade ultimately never took place. In this connection, the High Court relies on the affidavit of Vikram Singh where the deponent states in para 2 as follows:- "In the present case, I took the witnesses to Delhi Jail on 24.2.64 for the purpose of identification of the accused Boota Singh and Trilok Singh. On 26.2.64 at about 8 A.M. I came back to Dehradun along with the witnesses".

The High Court infers that as the respondents Boota Singh and Trilok Singh were brought for identification at Delhi and the witnesses were also there, there is a possibility of the witnesses having been shown to the respondents at Delhi on the 25th or 26th February, 1964. The High Court however completely overlooked para 4 of the affidavit of this very witness where he stated thus:- "I and the witnesses remained together and during that period the accused Trilok Singh and Boota Singh did not meet and the witnesses nor did they see us anywhere".

Thus, from the affidavit of this witness it is clear that although the respondents were brought to Delhi they were not at all allowed to meet or see the witnesses. In view of this clear statement there was absolutely no reason for the High Court to have conjectured that the respondents must have been shown to the witnesses at Delhi. This finding of the High Court is based on no evidence.

Apart from this, there is another intrinsic circumstance which shows that the respondents were never shown to the witnesses. Even though, according to the High Court, Pritam Singh was one. Of the witnesses who had an opportunity to see respondent Boota Singh yet it appears 317 when the T.I. parade took place at Dehra Dun on 9th March, 1964 Pritam Singh was not able to identify Boota Singh who was identified only by law. 2 Inder Singh and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh. This completely negatives the suggestion that Pritam Singh could have seen the respondents either at Moonak or Delhi in which case he would have felt no difficulty in identifying the respondent Boota Singh. In view of this circumstance, therefore, we are unable to sustain the finding of the High Court on this point and we are of the opinion that the High Court appears to have reversed the well considered finding of the Sessions Judge without any legal justification.

Another ground on which the High Court rejected the identification of P. Ws. 2, 8 and 14 was by laying down an extra ordinary principle of law, viz., that the evidence of identification is a very weak type of evidence and should be closely scrutinised before reliance is placed on it. The High Court observed as follows:- "There can be no two opinions about the fact that the evidence of identification is a very weak type of evidence and should be closely scrutinised before reliance is placed on it. Reliance can in this connection be also made to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Budh Sen and Anr. v. State of U.P."(1) In support of its view the High Court relied on a decision of this Court in Budh Sen & Anr. v. State of U.P.

(supra). We feel that the High Court has completely misdirected itself on this point. In the first place, the decision of this Court relied upon by the High Court does not at all apply to the facts of the present case. In Budh Sen & Anr. v. State of V.P. (supra) what was held by this Court was that where an accused is not known to the witness from before and there is no T.I. parade, but the witness identifies the accused for the first time in court suck an identification is valueless. In this connection, this Court has observed as follows:- "As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is a statement made in court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The evidence in order to carry conviction should ordinarily clarify as to how and under what circumstances he came to pick out the particular accused person and the details of the part which the accused played in the crime in question with reasonable particularity. The purpose of a prior test identi- (1) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1321.

318 fication , therefore, seems to be to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity or the accused who ar`e strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceeding." When this Court held that evidence of identification for the first time at the trial was of a weak character, it merely meant that where the evidence of a witness in court is not tested by prior identification parade held in jail not much reliance can be placed on such a evidence. This is however not the case here, nor can we take the aforesaid said decision to lay down a rule of universal appellation that the identification evidence is a very weak type of evidence. Where the witness correctly identifies the accused at a T.I. parade held by a Magistrate after observing all the essential formalities and taking the necessary precautions and then identifies the accused also in court the evidence of identification can be believed unless the evidence of witness suffers from some other infirmity.

Moreover, the evidence of identification becomes stronger if the witness has an opportunity of seeing the accused not for a few minutes but for some length of time, in broad day light, when he would be able to note the features of the accused more carefully than on seeing the accused in a dark night for a few minutes. In the present case, it is mentioned in the confession of Boota Singh and is proved by the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 8 and 14 that the respondent the a talk with P.W. 2 Inder Singh in the presence of other witnesses for quite some time and struck a deal regarding the taxi and gave a receipt to Inder Singh. These witnesses, therefore, were in a position to notice the features of the respondent Boota Singh as closely as possible. In the circumstances therefore, we are unable to agree with the High Court that the evidence of identification of these witnesses is a weak type of evidence. We also disapprove the universal rule of application laid down by the High Court that the evidence of identification is a weak type of evidence. For the reasons given above we see no reasons to distrust the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 8 and 14 arid we hold that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent Boota Singh had approached Inder Singh for hiring the taxi and Inder Singh allowed Boota Singh to take the taxi along with his son Lal Singh, deceased. In view of the fact that Inder Singh and Jagir Singh identified Boota Singh at T. I. Parade which has been proved by Magistrate M. L.

Sharma, P.W. 23 there was no reason to distrust the evidence of identification of these two witnesses as against Boota Singh. For the same reasons there was no reason to distrust the evidence of P.W. 8 Pritam Singh and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh when 319 they had identified the respondent Trilok Singh at a r. 1.

parade and also in court. The finding of the High Court on this point is, therefore, wholly incorrect both in law and on facts.

Thus, the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses fully corroborates the confessional statement of Boota Singh in regard to the first stage of the prosecution case, namely, the circumstances relating to the hiring of the taxi.

The next circumstance mentioned in the confession is that after hiring the taxi the party of the respondent went to Doiwala where they were found by Asa Singh and Gopi. All of them took tea in a hotel. This fact is also corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 5 Khem Singh and P.W. 7 Jaideo Singh which appears to have been rejected by the which Court on grounds which are not legally sound. To begin with, the respondent Boota Singh made a clear admission that he, Asa Singh and Lal Singh and others had tea at the hotel in Doiwala. P.W. 5 Khem Singh deposed in court that he knew Lal Singh. Two years ago Lal Singh had taken food in his hotel along with 4 or 5 persons who were not known to him. He further gays that he knew Asa Singh and he does not remember whether Asa Singh was among the persons who had taken food at his hotel. Although the witness had made quite a different statement before the committing court even in his statement before the Sessions Court he does not disprove the prosecution case because he admits that Lal Singh and 4 or 5 others had taken food in the hotel and he does not know whether Asa Singh had taken the food there or not. Before the committing Court, the witness had stated that Lal Singh and others had taken food in his hotel in the beginning of the month of December and the payments was made by all of them collectively. He had also stated that of these persons who had taken food at the hotel had come out of the taxi of Lal Singh and stayed there for about 10 to 15 minutes. He has also stated that Asa Singh and Trilok Singh had also' come to take food. The witness, was, however, declared hostile because he resiled from the statement made before the committing court and after his attention was drawn to the statement, the aforesaid statement was transferred under Section 288 and in law became substantive evidence. His statement before the committing court is Exhibit Ka-72. In this statement he deposed as follows:- "My hotel is at the Chaurrah Bazar in Doiwala. In the beginning of the month of December, 1963 it was the time of 6 p.m. I was at my hotel. On the evening of that day these men came by a car to take food. The shop of Jaideo Singh is in front of my shop. These men took food at my 320 shop. Dola Singh is called Jaideo Singh as well. He is present in the Court. He came to take his tea when these men were eating their food. Then he went back to his shop out of these men Trilok Singh and Asa Singh accused pre sent in Court were known to me from before.

The car belonged to Lal Singh. He too was known to me from before. After taking their food these four men along with Lal Singh went away by the car towards Rishikesh. Out of those four men, two men were not known to me".

In his statement in court the witness categorically stated that the statement he had made before the committing court was correct. But in cross examination he made out a new case that the statement before the committing court was made at the instance of the police. Indeed, if it was so, he would have at once complained to the committing Magistrate.

Similarly, P. W. 7 Jaideo Singh completely resiled from his statement which he made before the committing court which was also transferred under section 288 Cr. P.C. Before the Committing Court the witness had stated that he had gone to take tea in the hotel of Khem Singh and found Asa Singh.

Trilok Singh and Lal Singh were taking food together. He knew these persons from before except respondent Boota Singh whom he identified at a validly held T.I. parade and thereafter in the court of the committing Magistrate. The witness tried to explain in court that counsel for the respondent dictated the report to the reader who took down the same and thereafter he affixed his signature. He further Admitted that he did not tell the Magistrate that he would like to read the statement made by him. He further admitted that he did not say anything to the Magistrate in regard to pressure. It is, therefore, clear that the statement of the witness be fore the committing court was true and he is falsely resiling from the same in order to protect the respondent. lt passes one's comprehension that the committing Magistrate would allow counsel for the plaintiff to dictate the statement to the reader when in law the Magistrate has to record the statement`himself. The witness further admits that whatever he said before the Committing Magi