Telangana High Court
M/S.Kesari Marine Service vs The Indian Oil Corporation Limited on 7 November, 2025
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 16559 OF 2025
O R D E R:
The case of petitioner is that pursuant to the
Tender Notice issued by the 1st respondent for Bunker supply of
black oil and white oil through tanker barges to the
coastal/foreign run sea going vessels berthed at inner harbor,
outer harbor, and outer anchorage of Vizag Port, Petitioner
along with others submitted tenders. The name of Petitioner's
barge is CAPSTAR-1. After getting fully satisfied about
Petitioner's barge, the 1st Respondent accepted the tender
submitted by them. Petitioner tendered for 30% transportation
of the Oil and it stood as L2 among the Tenderers, L1 being for
50% transportation. It is submitted that the 1st Respondent
issued Letter of Acceptance (LOA) dated 20.02.2025, as per
which, the period of contract is three years from the date of the
LoA, extendable for a further period of 9 months on mutual
consent, in line, with GeM conditions. It is stated Petitioner had
complied with all the formalities for clearance of its berth from
Kakinada Port to Vizag Port for transporting the black oil/white
oil, as per the requirement and the work orders of the 1st
Respondent in accordance with the LOA.
1.1. It is stated, the 1st Respondent issued Petitioner
Work Order dated 12.03.2025 for transporting white oil and
black oil to coastal and foreign-run vessels stationed at Vizag
Port through tanker barges (small category barges). Under the
relevant Rules and Regulations governing the movement of
barges, petitioner applied on 03.03.2025 for clearance of its
Barge from Kakinada port; the said port delayed issuance of
clearance. Thereafter, on 12.03.2025, the 1st Respondent issued
work order which should be followed by due execution of the
prescribed Contract and issuance of LOA. As Kakinada port was
delaying clearance, petitioner re-submitted its Application on
22.03.2025. As there was no response, petitioner filed Writ
Petition No. 8234 of 2025 and Kakinada Port issued clearance.
By an e mail, petitioner informed the 1st Respondent that its
Barge would be ready in all respects at Vizag port by
27.03.2025.
1.2. As per normal practice and procedure in vogue, the
1st Respondent has to follow up the said LOA with a written
prescribed contract and issuance of LOA for transportation of
the oil, pursuant to the said work order. The 1st Respondent did
not get the prescribed contract duly executed by Petitioner and
no LOA was issued to petitioner. Petitioner received an e mail
dated 21.03.2025 from the 1st Respondent to position the Barge
within 30 days from the date of LOA i.e by 21.03.2025 failing
which, the said LOA is liable for cancellation. According to
petitioner, this communication is illegal and impermissible, as,
by 21.03.2025, 30 days did not expire from the date of the LOA.
The 1st Respondent failed to notice that February has only 28
days.
1.3. Petitioner sent e mail dated 28.03.2025 informing
that its Barge arrived at Vizag port on 28.03.2025 and is ready
for the procedural inspections by the 1st Respondent, followed
by e mail dated 29.03.2025 informing the 1st Respondent that
survey of its Barge by Vizag port was completed and that VPT
Harbour Craft license was also issued by the said port. Again,
on 01.04.2025 at 12.58 hours, by another e mail all these
aspects were communicated to the 1st Respondent requesting
them to issue Letter of Intent for transportation of oil, as per the
said work order given to petitioner. However, Petitioner received
an e-mail dated 01.04.2025 (at 19.25 hours) from one of the
officials of the 1st Respondent stating that as per the earlier
e mail dated 21.03.2025, the said LOA issued to petitioner
stands cancelled, as, by 21.03.2025, they did not keep its barge
ready. It referred to "Point 4 in the Tender conditions" which has
no application at the stage of LOA. The 1st Respondent did not
notice that February month has only 28 days and that even 30
days did not expire by 21.03.2025 from the date of LOA which is
dated 20.02.2025. It failed to bear in mind that LOA was
received by petitioner on 22.02.2025. In law, under the General
Clauses Act the day on which any communication was received
has to be excluded for computation of any period prescribed.
1.4. It is also stated, the action of the 1st Respondent in
cancelling the LOA is arbitrary, illegal and is in gross violation of
the principles of natural justice. Challenging the e mail dated
01-04-2025, petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 15034 of 2025
which was disposed of on 07.05.2025 observing that in view of
the fact that LOA dated 20-02-2025 issued by the 1st
respondent in favour of petitioner indicated the period of
contract as three years from the date of LOA with a clear
stipulation that the said period is extendable for a further period
of nine months on mutual consent in line with GeM conditions
and the same had been cancelled unilaterally without following
the principles of natural justice, this Court was of the opinion
that Respondents 1 and 2 had acted hastily in dealing with the
subject issue and passed the order impugned mechanically,
erroneously, without application of mind mala fidely. Hence,
the 1st Respondent was directed to reconsider the impugned
decision dated 01.04.2025, within four weeks from the date of
the order and further directed that till then, no coercive steps
shall be taken against petitioner and against its Barge.
1.5. Pursuant to the said direction, petitioner made a
detailed representation dated 11-05-2025, however, the 1st
respondent issued the impugned order on 06-06-2025 declining
their request. Challenging the said order, this Writ Petition is
filed.
2. This Court by order dated 01.07.2025, granted
status quo existing as on date till filing the counter-affidavit and
the said order was extended from time to time.
3. The 1st respondent filed counter stating that Barge
of petitioner was at Kakinada Port and was required to be
placed at Vizag with all Clearances and Permissions. As per the
mail of petitioner dated 29-03-2025, they informed that Barge
would be ready in all aspects by 27-03-2025 whereas it was
supposed to be produced for inspection within 30 days of LOA
i.e. by 21-03-2025 (both days inclusive). Hence, the contention
of petitioner that February has 28 days and 30 days did not
expire on 21-03-2025 from the date of LOA 20-02-2025 is
baseless and petitioner is again and again bringing the same
into the matter. The fact mentioned in the mail of the petitioner
dated 28-03-2025 that their barge has arrived at
Visakhapatnam Port and berthed at GREEN CHANNEL berth on
28-03-2025, therefore the constant repetition by the petitioner
that February has 28 days has no significance since 28-03-2025
is well beyond 30 days. Looked from any angle, petitioner could
not produce the barge for inspection within 30 days. It was also
mentioned that the licenses applied/submitted by paying all
necessary fees and documents required for them on 12-03-2025
and it is still under process. Only on 29-03-2025 afternoon,
petitioner had informed that survey by Visakhapatnam port is
completed and VPT Harbour craft license is received. LOA
clearly states that "All tender documents including NIT, offer,
special terms and conditions of contract, specifications, general
description of works and relevant drawings, subsequent
negotiations and all other correspondences connected with the
above referred tender including this letter shall form part of the
Work Order/Contract". Hence the contention of the petitioner
that point-4 in the tender conditions is not applicable at the
stage of the LOA is wrong and mis-understood.
3.1. It is stated, the contract would commence after
work is undertaken complying with the conditions of LOA in
accordance with tender terms and conditions. The Work Order
was issued only to acknowledge the Security Deposit submitted,
but the contract is deemed to commence only after inspection of
Barge which is ready in all aspects. Barge was supposed to be
produced for inspection ready in all aspects within 30 days of
issuance of LOA which petitioner could not do. Hence, LOA was
cancelled. It is also stated, based on the direction in Writ
Petition No. 15034 of 2025, opportunity of personal hearing was
provided to petitioner on 29-05-2025 and speaking order was
passed by the competent authority on 06-06-2025.
3.2. It is stated, the entire tendering process is done in a
transparent manner within the set terms & conditions.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner selection for placement of LOA
was based on the higher annual turnover criteria and hence
contrary to their own statement of being a small contractor. For
all the aforesaid reasons, this respondent prays that Writ
Petition may be dismissed.
4. The 2nd respondent filed the counter stating that
Writ Petition is not maintainable as the issues raised are
contractual disputes involving disputed questions of facts,
which cannot be decided in a Writ Petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India and the parties be relegated to the Civil
Courts of competent jurisdiction to seek appropriate reliefs.
4.1. It is stated, the 2nd Respondent is a Registered
Partnership firm constituted for the purpose of bunker
transportation and its allied activities and has been established
in 1997 and since then has been serving all its industrial
customers with quality service in the field of Marine/Industrial
lubricants market operating and gained immense expertise and
experience in supplying and trading of servo industrial trade
lubricants. The 1st respondent issued tender notification and
one day before the last date of submission of bids (thereafter the
last date was extended to January, 2025), the 1st Respondent
had issued a Corrigendum dated 26.12.2024 stating that in
case of tie at L-1 position, GeM shall select the successful L1
bidder through 'system determined vendor selection'. It was also
added that in case of tie at other than L-1 position, Bidder with
the highest turnover in any of the last three years as submitted
against turnover criteria shall be considered for selection of L-2
and L-3 bidders. In exceptional cases, where turnover is also the
same, the bid submitted earlier in the Portal in terms of both
date and time, shall be considered for selection of L-2 and L-3
bidders. It is pertinent to mention that Clause No 23 (xxiii) of
the Tender Notification stated that in case of tie between two or
more bidders at L-1 position, GeM Modalities shall be
applicable. If the price bid of the parties is one and the same, it
is meaning thereby that under the said system, randomly
somebody would be selected. It is submitted that the price bids
of the five technically-qualified bidders were opened on
17.02.2025 and it was found that all the five have quoted the
same price for Lot-1, therefore, all of them were shown as L-1
and the tendering authority had selected Supreme Marine
Services as L-1 as per GeM system selection. Be that as it may,
bearing the nature of work, which requires bulk supply of Oil to
be made at Visakhapatnam Port, the notification also stated
that contract would also be awarded to two more persons who
are L2 and L3 in the ratio of 50 : 30 : 20, being L-1: L-2: L-3
respectively Accordingly, Petitioner was selected as L-2 and this
Respondent has been selected as L-4. The 1st respondent issued
LoA to Petitioner on 20.02.2025. It is relevant to mention,
under Clause 14 (17)(d) of the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT),
bidder is required to give an undertaking on notarized 100/-
Non Judicial stamp paper that he shall position the offered
barrage ready in all aspects along with required licences within
30 days of issuance of LOI/LOA at Vizag Port. Further, Clause 4
under Condition B Requirements of Barrage of Special Terms &
Conditions (STC)/Special Condition of Contract (SCC)
specifically states that barge should be inspected by IOC or
authorized surveyors and be ready in all aspects for effecting
bunker supplies within 30 days of LOI and that the LOA/LOI is
liable to be cancelled in case any party fails to comply the said
condition. Therefore, the said clauses goes to show that it is a
mandatory requirement for the bidders in whose favour LOA has
been issued that the barge shall be ready in all aspects at the
Vizag port within 30 days from the date of issuance of LOA.
4.2. Though LOA was issued on 20.02.2025, Petitioner
failed to berth the barge within 30 days therefrom, therefore in
terms of the Condition B clause 4 of the STC/SCC, the LOA was
cancelled and the same was communicated to Petitioner vide
email dated 01.04.2025. Thereafter, LOA dated 06.06.2025 was
issued in favour of this Respondent for carrying out the subject
work and requested to deposit security deposit as per the tender
conditions. Accordingly, they paid Rs. 12,77,747/- as Bank
Guarantee for the said work as per the tender conditions.
4.3. As the matter stood thus, the present Writ Petition
came to be filed with frivolous grounds and vexatious claim and
this Court by order dated 01.07.2025 directed to maintain
status as on that day. As a result of the same, it is stated,
respondents have been facing heavy pecuniary losses, therefore,
it is prayed to vacate the interim order.
5. The 3rd respondent filed counter stating that
petitioner (L2) was issued LOA on 20.02.2025 and worked order
on 12.03.2025 . It is stated, L3 was awarded to M/s KK Marine
Service (20%), Letter of Acceptance (LOA) was issued on
20.02.2025 and work order issued on 12.03.2025. Both L2 and
L3 have not placed their barge in Visakhapatnam Port and not
obtained any 'No Objection Certificate' from Visakhapatnam
Port within the stipulated time as per Tender Norms of Indian
Oil Corporation Limited. As such the 1st Respondent cancelled
their work orders and further allocated the Work of 30% to L4-
KAN Enterprises (Respondent No.2) and 20% to L5 Gayatri
Marine Services (Respondent No.3) through Letter of Acceptance
dated 06.06.2025. Subsequently, Respondent No.1 sent e mail
on 07.06.2025 to Respondent No.3 to submit all necessary
documents along with PBG (Performance Bank Guarantee) &
Security Deposit for a total amount of Rs 8,51,131/-. Pursuant
thereto, Respondent No.3 submitted all documents along with
Performance Bank Guarantee & Security deposit on 17.06.2025
and offered Barge 'VASPARI' for inspection to Respondent Indian
Oil Corporation Limited on 20.06.2025.
5.1. Respondent No.1 Officers inspected the barge on
23.06.2025 and Respondent No.3 has been waiting for orders
and also sent an e mail on 28.06.2025 requesting for allowing
them to commence the work allotted and again on 04.07.2025,
apart from that, a representation was submitted on 14.07 2025
at IOCL Terminal Vizag and also a copy of the representation
was sent to IOCL Hyderabad Office by post on 14.07.2025.
Aggrieved by the inaction, Respondent No.3 preferred Writ
Petition No. 21780 of 2025, wherein this Court by order dated
25.07.2025, disposed of the Writ Petition directing respondent
authorities to consider representation dated 13.07.2025 and
after giving a fair opportunity of hearing to petitioner therein,
respondent shall pass appropriate orders in accordance to law,
within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order
and communicate the same to Petitioner therein.
5.2. It is stated, while issuing the LOA to Respondent
No.3, Respondent No. 1 mentioned therein that LOA is subject
to outcome of Writ Petition No.13863 of 2025 filed by M/s K.K.
Marine Services, and the said Writ Petition was disposed of by
order dated 30.06.2025 directing respondent authorities to
consider representation dated 27.06.2025 and after giving a fair
opportunity of hearing pass appropriate orders in accordance to
law within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of
Order. It is stated, Petitioner is not a party to Writ Petition No.
13863 of 2025. Petitioner who is L2 filed this Writ Petition and
Respondent No.3 has been made a party in the present Writ
Petition, although the Respondent No.3/L5 (20% work allottee)
has been allotted the work from a separate component, which is
not concerned with Petitioner, and by suppressing the facts has
got interim stay order, as a result, the Respondent No.3 is facing
lots of financial hardships.
5.3. It is stated, Respondent No.3 is a successful
financial and technical bidder and submitted all documents to
Respondent No.1 and also furnished Performance Bank
Guarantee and Security Deposit, even then, Respondent No.1
delayed permitting Respondent No.3 to start work in pursuance
of LOA dt.06.06.2025. Respondent No.3 had already incurred
Rs.28.00 (Twenty-Eight Lakhs) for the work, and the same has
been informed to Respondent No.1 also. The work originally
allotted to Petitioner (30% work) was subsequently allotted to
Respondent No.2, but it was not allotted to Respondent No.3.
The alleged component of work allotted to Petitioner does not
pertain to Respondent No.3. Even then, Petitioner made them as
a party, by suppressing the facts and got stay order. If at all,
there is any grievance, it ought to be against Respondents 1 and
2 and not wit the Respondent No.3.
5.4. The work component of 20% allotted to Respondent
No.3 is from a separate component of work and nothing to do
with the allegations of Petitioner. Except naming Gayatri Marine
Services as Respondent No.3, no specific allegations are made
by Petitioner.
6. Petitioner filed reply stating that the impugned
order is in violation of the orders in Writ Petition No. 15034 of
2025 dated 07-05-2025. In view of this, the counter affidavit
filed by the deponent of the counter affidavit, is neither proper
nor permissible. The deponent has no authority to represent the
1st respondent. It is for the competent officer of the 1st
respondent to depose and answer the averments made in the
affidavit filed in support of the above writ petition. It is for the
signatory of the impugned order to explain as to how the
impugned order is in compliance with or in conformity with the
order dated 07-05-2025 in Writ Petition No. 15034 of 2025.
Petitioner reiterated the averments in the Writ Petition.
7. Petitioner also filed reply to the counter of the 2nd
respondent almost reiterating his case.
8. Heard Sri S.S. Prasad, learned Senior Counsel
representing Sri S.N. Chidambara Sastry, learned counsel for
petitioner, Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel
representing Sri Dominic Fernandes, learned Standing Counsel
for Respondent No.1, Sri G. Vidya Sagar, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri M. Avinash Reddy, learned
counsel for the 2nd respondent and Sri S. Ravi, learned Senior
Counsel for Sri M.P. Kashyap, learned counsel for Respondent
No.3.
9. From a perusal of the material on record, it is
evident that this is the second round of litigation. Petitioner has
already approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 15034 of
2025 challenging the e mail dated 21.02.2025 at 17.00 hours
and e mail dated 01.04.2025 at 19.25 hours, cancelling the LOA
dated 20.02.2025 issued to them on a wrong premise that by
21.03.2025, 30 days have lapsed from the date of LOA making it
liable for cancellation. This Court by order dated 07.05.2025,
made the following observations in the said Writ Petition:
" This court taken into consideration the fact as borne on
record that the prayer sought for by the petitioner herein in
W.P.No.8234/2025 on the file of the A.P. High Court and the prayer
sought for in the present writ petition i.e. W.P.No.15034/2025 on the
file of the Telangana High Court being different from each other opines
that the present writ petition is maintainable as per Clause 22.7 (b) of
the notice inviting tender.
This Court opines that even though the date of LOA issued
to the petitioner is dated 20-02-2025, fact remains that admittedly, the
work order issued to the petitioner is only on 12-03-2025 and the
petitioner admittedly can commence his work only after receipt of the
work order from the 1st respondent and not earlier than that, and
therefore this court opines that the action of the 1st and 2nd
Respondents in cancelling the work order on the ground that petitioner
failed to offer the barge for inspection by IOC/IOC authorised
Independent Surveyors ready in all respects for effecting bunkers
supplies before the due date 21-03-2025 i.e. within 30 days from the
date of LOA is not only arbitrary, whimsical, mechanical but also highly
unreasonable, unfair and unjust".
c) "It is also borne on record and even admitted by the
learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that
admittedly, prior to the issuance of the impugned proceedings of the 1st
and 2nd respondents dtd.01-04-2025 communicated by e-mail to the
petitioner informing the petitioner that its LOA dtd.20-02-2025 and the
work order stands cancelled, the petitioner was not provided with an
opportunity of personal hearing and admittedly, as borne on record, no
specific Show Cause notice was issued to the petitioner informing the
petitioner about the proposed action contemplated by the respondents 1
and 2 and further calling for explanation from the petitioner".
d) "This court opines that in view of the fact as borne on record that the
LOA dtd 20-02-2025 issued by the 1st respondent in favour of the
petitioner indicated the period of contract as three years from the date of
the LOA with a with a further clear stipulation that the said period is
extendable for a further period of nine months on mutual consent in line
with GeM conditions and the same had been cancelled unilaterally
without even providing an opportunity of personal hearing to the
petitioner and without issuing a prior show cause notice intimating the
petitioner about the proposed cancelation of LOA by the respondent nos.
1 and 2 and calling for explanations from the petitioner specifically
referring to the grounds on which the said action was proposed, this
court opines that the respondents 1 and 2 had acted hastily in dealing
with the subject issue and had passed the order impugned
mechanically, erroneously, without application of mind, malafidely."
13. It is submitted that with the above conclusions this Hon'ble
court, "in the light of the discussion, reasoning and conclusions arrived
at paras 4 to 12" of its order disposed of the said writ petition, inter alia
directing the 1st Respondent to re consider the impugned decision of the
1st and 2nd Respondents, dated 01.04.2025 communicated by email to
the petitioner, informing the petitioner that its LOA dated 20.02.2025
and the work order stands cancelled, in accordance with law....."
10. Having considered the respective contentions and
perused the record, it is to be noted that undisputedly LOA was
issued on 20.02.2025, however, the actual work order was
issued only on 12.03.2025, and when respondent-authorities
cancelled the contract on the ground of delay in readying the
barge by petitioner (which is supposed to be within 30 days
from the date of LOA), this Court has held that work order
having been issued on 12.03.2025, cancellation of contract on
21.03.2025 (i.e., within 10 days) is arbitrary, and illegal;
therefore, directed the authorities to reconsider the decision.
The said order has become final.
11. However, it is curious to note that respondent-
authorities, after the alleged re-consideration of the earlier
cancellation decision, has once again passed the impugned
order upholding their previous decision of cancellation on the
very same ground of delay in readying the barge within 30 days
period. A perusal of the impugned order would not reveal any
other legally-tenable ground, except reiterating the very same
stand of delay that has already been adjudicated and answered
in the earlier Writ Petition. At the cost of repetition, this Court
notes that LOA was dated 20.02.2025 and the period of
calculation adopted under LOA is in "days" and not "months",
therefore, when the period of readying the barge is specified as
"30 days", calculation of 30 days commencing from 20.02.2025
would end by 22.03.2025. Therefore, even on this calculation
aspect, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
12. Further, when once this Court has adjudicated the
earlier cancellation on the ground of delay as illegal and
arbitrary, with a further direction to reconsider the decision,
duly giving petitioner an opportunity of hearing, the action of
the respondent-authority in cancelling the contract of the
petitioner on the very same ground of delay is a blatant violation
of the order of this Court. It is also not the case of respondent
authorities that petitioner is not technically-competent and has
no wherewithal to provide/ready the barge within a stipulated
time. In that view of the matter, the impugned order is liable to
be set aside.
13. Coming to the aspect of maintainability, learned
Senior Counsel Sri G. Vidyasagar contends on behalf of the 2nd
respondent that in matters of contracts / tenders, even if Courts
find that there is total arbitrariness, still Courts should refrain
from interfering and instead relegate the parties to seek damage
and that the attempts by persons / firms such as petitioner
with imaginary grievances wounded pride and business rivalry,
to make mountains out of molehills of some technical /
procedural violation should be resisted. Therefore, balance of
convenience is in favour of the 2nd respondent. In support of his
contention, learned Senior Counsel relied on the renowned
judgment on the subject of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
N.G.Projects Limited v. Vinod Kumar Jain 1, wherein, it has
been held at para 23 as under:
" In view of the above judgments of this Court, the writ court
should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the
employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer. The Court
does not have the expertise to examine the terms and conditions of the
present day economic activities of the State and this limitation should
be kept in view. Courts should be even more reluctant in interfering with
contracts involving technical issues as there is a requirement of the
necessary expertise to adjudicate upon such issues. The approach of the
Court should be not to find fault with magnifying glass in its hands,
(2022) 6 SCC 127
rather the Court should examine as to whether the decision-making
process is after complying with the procedure contemplated by the
tender conditions. If the Court finds that there is total arbitrariness or
that the tender has been granted in a mala fide manner, still the Court
should refrain from interfering in the grant of tender but instead relegate
the parties to seek damages for the wrongful exclusion rather than to
injunct the execution of the contract. The injunction or interference in
the tender leads to additional costs on the State and is also against
public interest. Therefore, the State and its citizens suffer twice, firstly
by paying escalation costs and secondly, by being deprived of the
infrastructure for which the present day Governments are expected to
work."
14. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Vedula Srinivas
appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent also relied on the
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Mandal v.
State of Orissa 2 and Agmatel India (P) Ltd. v. Resoursys
Telecom 3. He contends that when the power of judicial review
is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts,
certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is
a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding
contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of
equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision
relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public
interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review,
(2007) 14 SCC 517
(2022) 5 SCC 362
interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment
or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial
review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private
interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual
disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can
always seek damages in a civil Court. He also submitted that a
Court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in
exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the
following questions: i) whether the process adopted or decision
made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour
someone; ii) whether public interest is affected. According to the
learned Senior Counsel, the technical evaluation or comparison
by the Court is impermissible, and even if the interpretation
given to the tender document by the person inviting offers is not
as such acceptable to the constitutional Court, that, by itself,
would not be a reason for interfering with the interpretation
given.
15. In the light of the above submissions, it is to be
noted that though this Court does not sit in judicial review in
contractual matters, for the reason that respondent-authorities
requiring execution of a certain work are better equipped to
determine and prescribe the eligibility conditions and
qualifications for a contractor to participate in a particular
tender/contract and execute a given task under the contract.
However, in case of any alleged irregularities in the tendering
process itself, or in providing equal opportunity as per law with
regard to participation in the tendering process, or in observing
the principles of natural justice, the powers of this Court are
broad and it can entertain a Writ Petition to strike down any
such illegal action.
16. In this context, it is to be noted that in this Writ
Petition, this Court is not sitting in determining the eligibility of
petitioner per se to execute the work issued under the LOA; and
admittedly, work order was issued to petitioner after
determining his eligibility. However, the same was cancelled on
the ground of delay in readying the barge for inspection (which
was already adjudicated in an earlier writ petition and held to
be illegal). Therefore, the action of the respondent-authority in
passing the impugned Order, cancelling the contract is a
mechanical exercise and the impugned Order herein was passed
without application of mind and in violation of the Orders
passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.15034 of 2025, wherein
it was specifically held that cancellation of contract of petitioner
on the ground of delay was illegal as the 30-day period has not
expired. Further, this Court has also considered the aspect that
LOA was dated 20.02.2025 and the Work Order was dated
12.03.2025, and the cancellation was dated 21.03.2025, and
after adjudicating the issue, held that such cancellation was
illegal and therefore, the decision requires reconsideration.
17. However, interestingly, the respondent-authorities
quote the very same ground of delay in readying the barge
within 30 days and again passed the same order of cancellation
of tender by way of the impugned order. Therefore, the
impugned order is liable to be set aside. Further, the contention
of learned Senior Counsel for Respondent No.2 that their client
has been performing the contract consequent to cancellation of
tender of petitioner, and that there are interim orders (status
quo) in their favour, cannot be countenanced, for the reason
that the very cancellation of contract of petitioner is illegal, and
further they cannot claim equities on the basis of status quo
orders passed by this Court.
18. Insofar as Respondent No.3 is concerned, the
essential contention is that petitioner was awarded 30% of
contractual work and later Respondent No.3 was awarded 20%
of work and there is no overlap between the works allotted to
petitioner and Respondent No.3. This specific submission has
not been disputed by petitioner.
19. This Court desires to place on record its displeasure
over the manner in which Respondent - Indian Oil Corporation
passed the impugned order. The Corporation being an
instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution,
is bound under writ jurisdiction and to comply with the orders
of this Court. It is unexpected from the Corporation to have
passed the impugned proceedings again on the very same
ground that has already been held as untenable in an earlier
Writ Petition.
20. The Writ Petition is therefore, allowed, setting aside
the impugned proceedings dated 06.06.2025. The 1st
respondent is directed to take all the necessary consequential
action to issue the required proceedings permitting petitioner to
carry on its contractual obligations as per LOA and work order
issued as expeditiously as possible, preferably within two weeks
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.
21. Consequently, Miscellaneous Applications, if any
shall stand closed.
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NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J
07th November, 2025
ksld
