Telangana High Court
D Venkateshwara Rao vs State Of Telangana on 3 November, 2025
Author: N. Tukaramji
Bench: N. Tukaramji
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI
WRIT PETITION No.32030 OF 2025
ORDER:
This Writ Petition is filed with the following relief:
"Issue a writ or an order or a direction, more particularly
a Writ in the nature of Mandamus declaring that the
action of respondents more specifically respondent No.2
in issuing Memo bearing Memo No.1686/2025/CPE/
TS/F1 dated 18.10.2025, extending the last date for
receipt of the applications for the Retail Liquor A4 shops
in the State of Telangana (for license period 2025-27) to
23.10.2025 as arbitrary, illegal and violative of Articles 14
and 19 of the Constitution of India and also in violation of
the Telangana Excise (Grant of license of selling by
Shop and Conditions of License) Rules, 2012 and
consequently direct the respondents not to take into
account the applications for the A4 liquor shop licenses
for the year 2025-27, which are submitted before
18.10.2025 (05:00p.m)."
2. Heard Mr Avinash Desai, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for Mr. TPS Harsha, learned Counsel for the petitioners
and Mr. Mohd. Imrankhan, learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for respondents.
Factual Matrix:
3.1. Briefly stated, the relevant facts are as follows: The
Government of Telangana (respondent No. 1), through G.O.Ms.
No. 93, Revenue (Ex.II) Department, dated 14.08.2025, provided
for the allotment of A4 shops for the licence period from
01.12.2025 to 30.11.2027, and authorized the Commissioner of
Prohibition and Excise, Telangana, to supervise and oversee the
entire allotment process. Pursuant thereto, the Commissioner
issued Gazette Notifications and published the schedule for the
selection and allotment process for granting licences for 184 Nos.
A4 shops, vide Memo No. 1686/2025/CPE/TS/F1, dated
24.09.2025.
3.2. In consequence thereof, the respective District Prohibition
and Excise Officers issued notifications in the District Gazettes on
26.09.2025, inviting applications for allotment of shops under
Rules 3, 4, and 5 of the Telangana Excise (Grant of Licence of
Selling by Shop and Conditions of Licence) Rules, 2012 (for
short, "the Telangana Excise Rules, 2012"). The selection
process was to be conducted through a draw of lots, and the
corresponding schedule was duly communicated. The last date
for receipt of applications was fixed as 18.10.2025.
3.3. However, by the impugned Memo dated 18.10.2025, the
Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Telangana (respondent
No. 2), extended the last date for receipt of applications up to
23.10.2025, citing the State-wide Bandh called by the
OBCJAC/Associations, which was supported by various political
and social organizations on 18.10.2025. Aggrieved thereby, the
present writ petition has been filed challenging the said extension.
Petitioners' Submissions:
4.1. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends that
the extension of time for submission of applications beyond
18.10.2025, the date prescribed in the original notification, is
arbitrary, illegal, and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the
Constitution of India. It is urged that the Telangana Excise (Grant
of Licence of Selling by Shop and Conditions of Licence) Rules,
2012 (for short, 'the Telangana Excise Rules, 2012') do not confer
any power upon the authorities to extend the deadline for
submission of applications.
4.2. In particular, it is submitted that Rule 12(4) mandates that
applications must be submitted within the prescribed period, while
Rule 12(5) empowers only the postponement of the selection
process and not the extension of the time for submission of
applications. Further, Rule 12(6) stipulates that the selection
process commences only after the receipt of applications.
Therefore, the extension of the last date for receipt of
applications, in the absence of express statutory authority, is ultra
vires the Rules and constitutes an impermissible alteration of the
selection process midstream. It is contended that such deviation
violates the principle of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the
Constitution, as it confers an undue advantage upon applicants
who submitted their applications after the prescribed date.
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that it is a settled legal
principle that once a selection process has commenced, its terms
and conditions cannot be altered midway to benefit a particular
group of participants.
4.3. The learned Senior Counsel also argues that the
justification offered for the extension, namely the State-wide
Bandh, is factually unfounded, as nearly 80% of the applications
were filed on 18.10.2025, the very date of the Bandh, thereby
demonstrating that there was no substantial disruption. The
impugned decision, it is contended, reflects non-application of
mind and lacks any rational basis. Moreover, permitting
applications during the extended period prejudices the petitioners'
legitimate expectation and adversely affects their prospects of
selection, thereby causing serious detriment to those who
complied with the original schedule. Hence, it is prayed that the
impugned Memo extending the time be set aside and that only
applications submitted on or before 18.10.2025 be considered.
4.4. In support of their contentions, the petitioners place
reliance upon Buddela Suresh v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2020
SCC OnLine AP 136, wherein the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High
Court interpreted Rules 7(3), (4), and (6) of the A.P. Excise Rules,
provisions pari materia with Rules 12(3), (4), and (5) of the
Telangana Excise Rules, 2012 and held that applications must be
submitted strictly within the prescribed period and that any
submission beyond such time is invalid. The Court further held
that once the last date is announced, it cannot be altered by any
authority, and any extension of the deadline is arbitrary, ultra
vires, and violative of Articles 14 and 47 of the Constitution. While
the Rules empower the District Collector to postpone the date of
selection, no such authority exists to extend the time for
submission of applications.
4.5. The petitioners further rely on Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574, wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that when the State permits trade or
business in liquor, it must treat all qualified persons equally and
that no discriminatory treatment is permissible among eligible
applicants.
4.6. Reliance is also placed upon Tata Cellular v. Union of
India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, wherein the Apex Court held that
judicial review of administrative action is confined to examining
the legality of the decision-making process rather than the merits
of the decision itself. The Court emphasized that judicial scrutiny
must ensure that the authority acts within the bounds of law,
adheres to the principles of natural justice, and avoids
arbitrariness or abuse of discretion.
4.7. The learned Senior Counsel further cites Devendra Kumar v.
State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 9 SCC 363, wherein it was held that
an action that is illegal at its inception cannot be validated by
subsequent events, and that no person can derive any legal right
from his own wrongful conduct.
4.8. The petitioners also place reliance upon W.B. State
Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd., (2001) 2 SCC 451,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in public
contracts, fairness and transparency are paramount
considerations, and that a non-compliant bid, even if it is the
lowest, cannot be accepted. The Court emphasized that strict
adherence to procedural norms is essential to maintain public
confidence and to prevent favoritism.
4.9. On the strength of the above authorities, the petitioners
contend that the impugned extension of the last date for
submission of applications is arbitrary, illegal, and discriminatory,
and accordingly pray that the impugned Memo extending the time
be quashed, and that only applications submitted on or before
18.10.2025 be taken into consideration.
Respondents' Submissions:
5.1. Learned Additional Advocate General ("AAG") for the
respondents submits that the challenge to the Commissioner's
Memo is misconceived, inasmuch as the actual extension of time
was effected through District Gazette Notifications issued by the
respective District Prohibition and Excise Officers. Hence, the
relief sought against the Commissioner's Memo is itself
inconsequential.
5.2. The learned AAG further contends that the submission of
applications constitutes an integral part of the overall selection
process, and that Rule 12(5) of the the Telangana Excise Rules,
2012 empowers the District Collector to postpone the selection
process to a future date. Accordingly, the extension of the last
date for submission of applications falls within the scope of this
power and cannot be termed ultra vires the Rules.
5.3. It is further submitted that the extension was necessitated
by the State-wide Bandh and that the decision was taken in the
public interest to ensure that no eligible applicant was deprived of
an opportunity to participate in the process. The action, it is
argued, squarely falls within the administrative powers of the
Commissioner under Section 3 of the Telangana Excise Act,
1968, read with G.O.Ms. No. 93.
5.4. Reliance is placed upon A.P. Public Service Commission v.
Sarath Chandra, (1990) 2 SCC 669, wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the 'selection process' encompasses all
preliminary steps, including the invitation and scrutiny of
applications. Therefore, the Commissioner's exercise of
administrative discretion to extend the deadline in order to
facilitate wider participation cannot be characterized as arbitrary
or illegal.
5.5. The learned AAG further submits that the submission of an
application does not create any vested right in favour of the
applicant. The petitioners cannot claim prejudice at this stage, as
the liquor trade does not constitute a fundamental right but merely
a privilege regulated by statute. The extension of the submission
date was uniformly applied across the State, without any
discrimination, and was undertaken solely to ensure fairness and
transparency. The temporary disruption caused by the Bandh
affected banking operations and consequently impeded payment
of prescribed fees. Hence, the uniform extension of time was
justified and non-discriminatory.
5.6. It is further contended that the petitioners' claim of
prejudice is illusory. Based on the available data, the ratio of
applications per shop increased only marginally, from 1:34.22 to
1:36.31, due to the additional 5,739 applications received during
the extended period. This negligible change does not materially
affect the petitioners' chances of selection. Moreover, several
petitioners themselves submitted applications during the
extended period, which, demonstrates a lack of bona fides.
Consequently, the present writ petition is alleged to be a
motivated attempt to derail the allotment process.
5.7. The learned AAG relies upon National Highways Authority
of India v. Ganga Enterprises, (2020) 16 SCC 489, wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that judicial review in tender or
allotment matters is confined to cases involving mala fides,
arbitrariness, or violation of public interest, and cannot be invoked
to safeguard private commercial interests.
5.8. Further reliance is placed upon State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi
Devi, (2005) 9 SCC 733, wherein it was held that interim or
administrative directions cannot override statutory provisions or
government orders except under compelling circumstances.
5.9. The learned AAG also cites Jagdish Mandal v. State of
Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517, to submit that Courts should refrain
from interfering with transparent administrative processes,
particularly in economic or policy matters, unless arbitrariness,
mala fides, or perversity is clearly established.
5.10. Reliance is further placed upon State of Kerala v. B. Six
Holiday Resorts Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 5 SCC 186, wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that no vested right exists in respect of liquor
licensing, and that the applicable rules are those in force on the
date of the decision, not on the date of application.
5.11. Reference is also made to Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi
Administration, (2001) 3 SCC 635, wherein it was held that
judicial review of executive policy in matters relating to liquor
trade is limited in scope, and that Courts cannot substitute their
judgment for that of the executive unless the policy is found to be
mala fide, arbitrary, or unconstitutional.
5.12. In view of the foregoing, it is contended that the extension
of the last date for submission of applications was a uniform, fair,
and non-discriminatory administrative measure taken in public
interest, without altering any eligibility conditions or selection
criteria. Accordingly, no arbitrariness, illegality, or mala fide intent
can be attributed to the Government or its officers. The learned
AAG, therefore, prays that the writ petition be dismissed.
6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned
counsel and have perused the record.
Analysis:
7. The Government of Telangana, through the Commissioner
of Prohibition and Excise, issued a notification inviting
applications for the grant of A4 liquor shop licences for the licence
period 2025-2026, fixing 18.10.2025 as the last date for
submission of applications. Subsequently, by the impugned
Memo, the Commissioner extended the last date for submission
of applications up to 23.10.2025, citing the State-wide Bandh
called by the OBCJAC/Associations and supported by various
political and social organizations. Consequential Gazette
Notifications were thereafter issued by the respective District
Prohibition and Excise Officers to implement this extension.
These factual aspects are undisputed.
8. The core contention of the petitioners is that the extension
of the deadline for submission of applications lacks statutory
sanction and adversely affects their chances of selection, thereby
causing prejudice and violating their fundamental rights under
Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The principal issue
that therefore arises for consideration is the nature and extent of
the right, if any, that accrues to the petitioners upon submission of
their applications on the originally prescribed date.
9. Under the prevailing system in Telangana, a non-
refundable application fee of Rs.3,00,000/- is prescribed per
application for an A4 liquor shop licence. Payment of this fee
cannot be equated with an earnest money deposit accompanying
a tender, as it merely signifies an expression of intent to
participate in a regulated privilege and does not confer any vested
or contractual right. In legal parlance, submission of an
application in such a process constitutes an offer in response to
an invitation to offer.
10. The petitioners argue that the receipt of applications and
the conduct of the selection process are two distinct and
independent stages. Rule 12(6) of the Telangana Excise (Grant of
Licence of Selling by Shop and Conditions of Licence) Rules,
2012 ("Telangana Excise Rules, 2012") specifies that the
selection process begins only after the receipt of applications.
Thus, according to the petitioners, submission of applications is
an anterior and separate stage, distinct from the selection itself.
11. The State authorities, conversely, contend that the
submission of applications is an integral part of the overall
selection process and that Rule 12(5) empowers the District
Collector to postpone the selection process. They further assert
that, by virtue of Section 3 of the Telangana Excise Act, 1968
("the Act") read with G.O.Ms. No. 93, Revenue (Ex.II)
Department, dated 14.08.2025, the Commissioner possesses
supervisory authority to oversee and regulate the entire allotment
process. Hence, the Commissioner's decision to extend the
deadline for receipt of applications, being ancillary to his
supervisory functions, falls within the scope of his lawful authority.
In this view, the receipt of applications, being inseparable from
the selection process, falls within the ambit of administrative
discretion.
12. Even if the petitioners' distinction is accepted, the extension
of the application deadline, without altering any eligibility
conditions or substantive criteria, cannot be regarded as a
modification of the selection process or as a change in its terms
after commencement. Conversely, the respondents' assertion that
submission of applications forms part of the selection process is
not entirely tenable, since both the notification and the Rules
make it clear that the selection process begins only after the
applications are received. Therefore, the statutory framework
supports the petitioners' stance. Consequently, the extension of
the last date must be viewed as an administrative measure
ancillary to implementation.
13. In A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarath Chandra,
(1990) 2 SCC 669, the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognized that
preliminary administrative steps, such as the receipt and
processing of applications, form part of the overall selection
mechanism, and that limited administrative flexibility at such
stages is permissible, provided fairness and integrity are
maintained.
14. In this context, extending the timeline for submission of
applications due to unforeseen circumstances such as a State-
wide Bandh constitutes a permissible ancillary administrative
measure. Even if viewed as a pre-selection procedural stage,
such action still falls within the broader ambit of the selection
mechanism.
15. The pivotal question, therefore, is whether the
administrative act of extending the deadline from 18.10.2025 to
23.10.2025, in the context of the State-wide Bandh, is arbitrary,
ultra vires, or violative of statutory or constitutional provisions.
16. It is well settled that the power to supervise inherently
includes the authority to take incidental or ancillary measures
necessary to achieve the object of the statute and to ensure a
fair, transparent, and effective process. In Sailesh Dhairyawan v.
Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619, the Supreme Court
held that where a literal interpretation of a rule would defeat its
object, a purposive interpretation consistent with legislative intent
must be adopted.
17. Notably, the petitioners admit that the extension was
applied uniformly across all districts of the State and that there is
no allegation of extension of date confers undue advantage upon
any class of applicants.
18. It is equally well settled that trade or business in liquor does
not constitute a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). In
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574,
and State of Kerala v. B. Six Holiday Resorts Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 5
SCC 186, the Supreme Court held that dealing in liquor is a
State-regulated privilege, subject to absolute control and
regulation, and that no person can claim any vested right or
legitimate expectation in relation thereto.
19. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has limited
application in matters concerning State-regulated privileges. The
petitioners' claim that their "chance" of selection or "probability" of
selection constitutes a legally protected interest is untenable.
Mere participation in such a process does not confer an
enforceable right, particularly in domains governed by statutory
discretion. The only enforceable entitlement is to a process that is
fair, transparent, and non-arbitrary. Unless mala fides,
arbitrariness, or discrimination is established, a mere assertion of
prejudice is insufficient. In the present case, the petitioners have
failed to demonstrate any mala fides, discrimination, or colourable
exercise of power.
20. It is trite law that judicial review under Article 226 is
confined to examining the decision-making process, not the
decision's merits. As held in Tata Cellular v. Union of India,
(1994) 6 SCC 651, courts do not act as appellate authorities but
ensure that administrative decisions are lawful, rational, and free
from arbitrariness or mala fides. The principle was reaffirmed in
Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517,
emphasizing that the courts should refrain from interfering in
administrative or economic policy matters unless illegality,
irrationality, or procedural impropriety is evident.
21. In Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration, (2001) 3
SCC 635, the Supreme Court held that courts must not substitute
their judgment for that of the executive unless mala fides or
patent illegality is demonstrated. Judicial review is limited to
ensuring that administrative power is exercised bona fide, for
legitimate purposes, and in accordance with law. Matters relating
to excise administration, in particular, involve regulatory and
economic considerations within the executive domain.
22. In light of these principles, the justification offered by the
Commissioner, namely, the disruption of normal administrative
and banking operations due to the State-wide Bandh, cannot be
considered perfunctory. The uniform extension of the deadline
across all districts ensured that no prospective applicant was
deprived of participation due to circumstances beyond their
control. The measure maintained transparency, consistency, and
fairness, without altering any eligibility conditions, licensing
criteria, or the prescribed draw-of-lots mechanism. Accordingly,
such a uniform and justified extension cannot be regarded as an
arbitrary or impermissible alteration of the selection criteria.
23. It is therefore evident that the Commissioner's action was
neither arbitrary nor irrational, nor tainted by mala fides. The
record shows that the extension was prompted by administrative
necessity, applied uniformly, and did not modify any substantive
conditions of eligibility or selection. The marginal increase in
applications per shop, from 1:34.22 to 1:36.31, does not
constitute material prejudice. The Commissioner's decision is
traceable to his supervisory powers under Section 3 of the
Telangana Excise Act, 1968, read with G.O.Ms. No. 93, and
therefore cannot be said to be ultra vires.
24. The decision in Buddela Suresh v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, 2020 SCC OnLine AP 136, though superficially similar,
is distinguishable both on facts and in law. In that case, the A.P.
High Court held that an arbitrary extension of the application
deadline was ultra vires the A.P. Excise Rules, 2012, as the
authorities lacked express power to do so. The statutory and
factual contexts, however, are materially different in Telangana.
Here, the extension of the deadline is an administrative step
traceable to the Commissioner's supervisory powers under
Section 3 of the Telangana Excise Act and G.O.Ms. No. 93. and
the disputed extension was fair, without any discrimination.
Hence, the ratio in Buddela Suresh is inapplicable.
Conclusion:
25. Having considered the matter in its entirety, this Court
concludes that the impugned Memo issued by the Commissioner
of Prohibition and Excise, Telangana, and the consequential
Gazette Notifications extending the last date for receipt of
applications to 23.10.2025, constitute a valid exercise of
administrative discretion made in the larger public interest. The
extension was uniform, reasonable, and aimed at preserving
fairness in the selection process. Accordingly, the impugned
action cannot be held ultra vires the statutory scheme or violative
of Articles 14 or 19 of the Constitution of India.
26. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition, being devoid of
merit, is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand
closed.
__________________
N. TUKARAMJI, J
Date: 03.11.2025
MRKR
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI
WRIT PETITION No.32030 OF 2025
03.11.2025
MRKR
