Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Justice Prakash Tatia (Retired) vs The State Of Rajasthan on 20 September, 2025
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7586/2024
Justice Prakash Tatia (Retired) S/o Late Shri Jaswant Raj Sa
Tatia, Aged About 72 Years, Resident Of 754, Tatia Bhawan,
Umaid Hospital Road, Sardarpura, Jodhpur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Additional Chief
Secretary, Department Of Home (Human Rights),
Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Principal Secretary, Department Of Law And Legal Affairs,
Secretariat, Jaipur
3. Director, Directorate Of Pension And Pension Welfare
secretariat, Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. M.S. Singhvi , Sr. Adv.
asssisted by Mr. Abhishek Mehta
Mr. Keshar Singh Chouhan
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajendra Prasad ,
Advocate General assisted by
Mr. Mahaveer Bishnoi, AAG
Mr. Anirudh Singh
Mr.B.L. Bhati,AAG
Mr. Deepak Chandak,AAAG
Mr. Manish Patel
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUROOP SINGHI
Order
Reportable
Order Pronounced On : 20/09/2025
Order Reserved On : 24/07/2025
BY THE COURT:-( Per Hon'ble FARJAND ALI, J.)
Grievance of the Petitioner
1. By way of filing this instant petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner, a retired Chief Justice of
the Jharkhand High Court who later served as Chairperson of
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the Rajasthan State Human Rights Commission from
11.03.2015 to 25.11.2019, has approached this Court
alleging that the respondents have acted illegally and
arbitrarily in denying him pensionary benefits for his tenure
as Chairperson, despite the mandate of Rule 4 of the
Rajasthan State Human Rights Commission (Salaries,
Allowances and Other Conditions of Service of Chairperson
and Members) Rules, 2002, as amended on 28.05.2012
( "hereinafter referred to as - The Rules of 2002") , and in
further rejecting his claim through communications dated
18.02.2020, 26.02.2024, and 15.03.2024 on the ground that
he was already drawing pension for his earlier service as
Chief Justice and that the precedent in Justice Mahendra
Bhushan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (S.B. CWP No.
3890/2000, decided on 13.12.2001) was inapplicable.
Facts in Brief
2. The petitioner was appointed as a permanent Judge of the
Rajasthan High Court in January 2001 and was elevated as
Chief Justice of the Jharkhand High Court in the year 2011.
Upon attaining the age of superannuation, he demitted the
office of Chief Justice of Jharkhand High Court on
03.08.2013. Thereafter, he was appointed as Chairperson of
the Armed Forces Tribunal, New Delhi, and upon demitting
that office, he was appointed as Chairperson of the
Rajasthan State Human Rights Commission on 11.03.2015.
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The petitioner served as Chairperson of the Commission until
25.11.2019, when he submitted his resignation, having held
the post for about three years and eight months.
3. The appointment to the post of Chairperson of the
Commission is governed by the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993,( for short "Act of 1993") and the Rules of 2002
framed by the State Government in exercise of powers under
Section 26 of the Act of 1993. The Rules of 2002 were
amended on 28.05.2012 to provide that the salary,
allowances, facilities and pension payable to the Chairperson
or Members shall respectively be the same as those of the
Chief Justice or a Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan, with
a proviso that such terms shall not be varied to the
disadvantage of the incumbent after appointment.
4. While the petitioner awaited issuance of his Pension Payment
Order for the services rendered as Chairperson of the
Commission, he received a letter dated 18.02.2020 from
respondent No. 1 stating that he was not entitled to pension
for such tenure, as he was already drawing pension as a
retired Chief Justice of a High Court and the pension payable
to the Chairperson of the Commission was equivalent to that
of a retired Chief Justice of the High Court.
5. The petitioner thereafter made several representations to the
authorities on 15.06.2020, 05.10.2020, 06.07.2022,
08.03.2023, and 08.05.2023. Receiving no favourable
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response, he submitted a representation dated 08.06.2023
to the Governor of Rajasthan. By letter dated 28.06.2023,
the Deputy Secretary to the Governor informed the
petitioner that the said representation had been forwarded
on 21.03.2023 to the Principal Law Secretary, Government of
Rajasthan. The Principal Law Secretary in turn referred the
matter to the Registrar General, Rajasthan High Court, who
returned it with the remark that no action was required on
the part of the High Court.
6. On 11.08.2023, the Deputy Secretary to the Governor
informed the petitioner that his representation, along with
the legal opinion dated 13.07.2023 of the Principal Law
Secretary, had been forwarded to the Home Department for
necessary action. On 13.07.2023, respondent No. 2
addressed a letter to the Principal Secretary to the Governor
and to the Home Department, apprising them of the legal
position approved by the competent authority regarding
pension payable to the Chairperson of the Commission, and
as well as the fact that the provisions of the Rajasthan
Lokayukt & Up-Lokayukt Act, 1973 ("hereinafter shall be
referred to as -the Act of 1973") and Rajasthan Lokayukt &
Up-Lokayukt (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974( for short
'the Rules of 1974) were in pari materia with the Rules of
2002 .
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7. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Governor's Secretariat, by
communication dated 15.03.2024, informed the petitioner
that his claim for pensionary benefit for his tenure as
Chairperson was not acceptable. This letter enclosed a
communication dated 26.02.2024 from the Principal
Secretary, Law and Legal Affairs Department, Government of
Rajasthan, which in turn reproduced a Finance Department
noting dated 02.02.2024. The noting recorded that the
petitioner's representation was based on pensionary benefits
granted to Justice Mahendra Bhushan Sharma, Lokayukt, on
retirement on 06.07.1999 in compliance with the judgment
dated 13.12.2001 in SBCWP No. 3890/2000 (Justice
Mahendra Bhushan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan), but
that the said judgment was not applicable to a Chairperson
or Member of the Rajasthan State Human Rights
Commission.
8. At the relevant time of the petitioner's appointment as
Chairperson, the tenure prescribed was five years. Section
26 of the Act of 1993 provides that salaries, allowances, and
other service conditions of the Chairperson and Members
shall be prescribed by the State Government, with the
safeguard that they shall not be varied to the disadvantage
of the incumbent after appointment. In exercise of these
powers, the State Government amended the Rules of 2002
on 28.05.2012, fixing the salary, allowances, facilities, and
pension of the Chairperson and Members at the same level
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as those of the Chief Justice or a Judge of the Rajasthan
High Court.
9. The amendment to the Rules of 2002 in 2012 was made
following discussions at various levels between the Home
Department and the Finance Department. The Finance
Department had noted that the position of Lokayukt and
Chairperson of the State Human Rights Commission was at
par, and that it would be appropriate to allow pension to the
Chairperson and Members of the Commission at the same
rate as the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court,
respectively.
10.The petitioner's claim for pension for his tenure as
Chairperson of the Commission was ultimately rejected
through communications dated 18.02.2020, 26.02.2024, and
15.03.2024. Being aggrieved by these communications, the
petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
Contentions of counsels present for the parties
11.The learned counsels for the petitioner Sr. Adv. Shri. M.S.
Singhvi , asssisted by Shri. Abhishek Mehta, Shri. Kesar
Singh contended that the impugned communications dated
18.02.2020, 26.02.2024, and 15.03.2024 are ex facie illegal,
arbitrary, and violative of Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the
Constitution of India . The rejection of petitoner's claim on
the ground of already receiving pension as a former Chief
Justice is contrary to Rule 4 of the Rules of 2002 , which
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contains no such exception. Rule 4 of the rules of 2002, post
its 2012 amendment, expressly entitles the Chairperson to
pension equivalent to the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High
Court, independent of earlier constitutional pensions. The
analogy sought to distinguish his case from Justice
Mahendra Bhushan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan is
unsustainable because Rule 4 of the rules of 2002 is pari
materia with Section 5(4) of the Act of 1973, under which
such pension is payable irrespective of prior entitlements.
Acceptance of the respondents' stand would render the
pension provision for Chairperson and Members of the
Commission redundant, defeating legislative intent. The
decision reflects mala fide exercise of power and a colourable
attempt to deny him benefits despite earlier governmental
recognition of parity between Lokayukta and the
Chairperson's office. Learned counsels for the petitioner
further placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Union of India v. Gurnam Singh,
(1982) 2 SCC 314 and State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh,
(1970) 1 SCC 108, and urged that Section 26 of the Act of
1993 employs the expression "other conditions of service,"
which, as per the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court,
necessarily encompasses within its ambit the term pension.
Therefore, the absence of an express mention of "pension" in
Section 26 is of no consequence. It was further argued that
the controversy stands concluded in view of the 2012
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amendment to the Rules of 2002, which expressly
incorporated the word "pension." Consequently, there remain
no distinguishable features between the Lokayukta Act and
the Act of 1993, and since the matter has already been
decided by this Court in analogous circumstances, the
petitioner is equally entitled to pension for his tenure as
Chairperson of the Commission.
12. The learned counsels for the respondents Advocate
General Shri. Rajendra Prasad , assisted by Shri. Deepak
Chandak,AAG, Shri. Anirudh Singh Shri. Mahipal Bishnoi,
Shri. Manish Patel filed a reply to the petition wherein they
asserted that the petitioner is already in receipt of the
maximum permissible pension of ₹1,25,000 per month under
the Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of
Service) Act, 1958, for his tenure as Chief Justice, and that
no independent pension is admissible under the Act of 1993
or the Rules of 2002. According to them, Rule 4 of the rules
of 2002 merely aligns the service conditions of the
Chairperson with those of the Chief Justice, without
overriding statutory pension ceilings or authorising dual
pensions. It is urged that the Rules of 2002 contain no
provision for an additional pension for service as
Chairperson, unlike the Lokayukta Rules of 1974 which
expressly provide for a separate pension, and hence the two
offices are not pari materia. They further argue that the
decision in Mahendra Bhushan Sharma(supra) is
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inapplicable, as it turned on provisions materially distinct
from those governing the Human Rights Commission. They
asserted that the Finance and Home Departments, have
consistently maintained that the petitioner is not entitled to
an independent pension, and all his representations have
been duly considered and rejected at the competent level.
The respondents maintain that the denial of pension is
neither arbitrary nor violative of Articles 14, 16, or 21 the
Constitution of India, since the classification between the
Lokayukta and the Commission's Chairperson is founded on
statutory distinctions in their respective governing
provisions.
13. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and
gone through the materials available on record.
14. Issue for Determination
Whether Rule 4 of the Rules of 2002, as amended in
2012 , lawfully provides for payment of pension to the
Chairperson of the Rajasthan State Human Rights
Commission, even if such person is already in receipt
of pension from previous constitutional service?
Observations and Legal Analysis
15.The Foundational Principles of Pensionary Benefits
At the very threshold, this Court considers it apposite to
recall the foundational principles which govern the
jurisprudence of pensionary entitlements. Pension, in its
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truest conception, is not a gratuitous dole extended at the
pleasure of the State but a deferred portion of the
compensation earned by an employee in recognition of past
service rendered with fidelity to the sovereign. It carries with
it an element of right, flowing from constitutional guarantees
under Article 300A the Constitution of India, and therefore,
any deprivation of pension must be sanctioned by express
statutory authority and conform to the discipline of due
process. This understanding has been reinforced consistently
by the pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which
have clarified that pension is neither a bounty nor a matter
of grace, but an enforceable entitlement once the conditions
prescribed by law are met.1
15.1 Defining "Pension"
The expression "pension," though apparently simple, has
travelled a long historical journey before attaining its present
legal contours. The term itself is derived from the Latin root
pensio (from pendere, meaning "to pay"), and in its earliest
conception referred to a periodical allowance made by the
Sovereign as a mark of gratitude for services rendered to the
Crown. Over time, what began as an ex gratia grant matured
into a structured scheme, finding statutory expression and
judicial recognition as an enforceable entitlement. In the
Indian context, pension has always been understood as a
1 Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1971) 2 SCC 330 ; D.S. Nakara v. Union of
India (1983) 1 SCC 305 ; State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava (2013)
12 SCC 210.
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benevolent scheme of the sovereign, intended to reward
fidelity to public service and to secure those who have
devoted their lives in the service of the State.
This benevolent character finds resonance in the
constitutional doctrine of Parens Patriae, which embodies the
obligation of the State to act as guardian and protector of
those who, after completing their active tenure of service,
look to it for sustenance in the autumn of their lives.
However, while the State acts in a protective capacity, its
benevolence is neither unbounded nor unregulated. The
entitlement to pension is created, circumscribed, and
regulated exclusively by the statutory framework applicable
to the office in question. In Union of India v. P.N. Menon,
(1994) 4 SCC 68, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that
pensionary provisions are "entirely statutory in character"
and must be strictly governed by the relevant rules.
Similarly, in State of Punjab v. Justice S.S. Dewan,
(1997) 4 SCC 569, it was underscored that claims to
multiple pensions cannot be sustained unless expressly
conferred by the governing statutory provisions.
It is, therefore, axiomatic that no person may assert a right
to pension dehors the express language of the rules,
statutes, or notifications that govern the office held. Pension,
by its very design, embodies the principle of continuity of
sustenance after superannuation, but it does not extend to
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multiplicity of financial accretions for every public office
occupied, unless the legislative text clearly provides for such
an entitlement. In this backdrop, the duty of this Court is
confined not to assessing the desirability or fairness of the
claim, but to adjudging its legality within the strict contours
of the statutory framework.
15.2 The Purpose of Pension
The avowed purpose of pensionary provisions is to secure a
dignified livelihood and financial stability in the evening of
life, preventing destitution and hardship for those who have
retired after long service. Pension partakes the character of a
social welfare measure, embodying the State's obligation to
protect the financial security of its retired employees. Yet,
this benevolent object cannot be construed as permitting
augmentation of benefits by reading into the rules that which
the framers, in their wisdom, did not provide. The generosity
of the State in providing pensions must operate within the
four corners of statutory enactment, and not extend to
permitting cumulative or duplicative pensions where the
statutory text is silent. To hold otherwise would risk
unsettling fiscal discipline and create unintended classes of
superannuated officials enjoying overlapping benefits.
16.The Legal and Policy Framework Against "Pension
Stacking"
The issue raised in this petition does not exist in a vacuum.
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The jurisprudence of pensionary entitlements in India has
evolved against a consistent backdrop of fiscal prudence and
a conscious legislative intent to prevent what is often
described as "pension stacking," namely, the simultaneous
accumulation of multiple pensions arising from successive
appointments under the State. Such a practice, if permitted
indiscriminately, would not only create an inequitable system
where some public functionaries derive disproportionately
high lifetime benefits at the cost of the public exchequer, but
would also erode the delicate balance between recognition of
past service and the sustainability of pension schemes. The
law, therefore, has historically moved in the direction of
allowing only one pension for one stream of service, unless
the legislature, in clear and express terms, has carved out an
exception permitting a separate pension for a subsequent
office.
16.1 The Principle of "One Career, One Pension"
A discernible norm runs through the statutory frameworks
governing pensions that one continuous career of public
service yields one terminal pension. This principle is not
merely an accounting convenience; it is reflective of the
underlying philosophy that public service is a vocation, not a
source of multiplicative financial entitlements. Where an
individual, after retiring from one high constitutional or
statutory office, is appointed to another, the benefits of the
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second office ordinarily manifest in the form of salary,
allowances, and facilities co-extensive with the tenure of that
office. But once that tenure concludes, the law does not,
save for specific provision, contemplate the creation of a
second, independent pension stream. The jurisprudence thus
guards against the possibility of lifetime "pension layering,"
which, while attractive to individual claimants, stands
contrary to the principles of equality and fiscal responsibility
in a welfare State.
16.2 The High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of
Service) Act, 1954: A Case Study
The High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service)
Act, 1954, furnishes an instructive paradigm. Section 14 of
the Act, 1954 which prescribes pension for retired Judges, is
hedged with a significant proviso: that if a Judge at the time
of appointment is already in receipt of a pension for earlier
service under the Union or a State, the pension under the
Judges Act shall be in lieu of, and not in addition to, that
earlier pension. For ready reference, Section 14 of the Act,
1954 is reproduced as under:
14. Pension payable to Judges.--Subject to the provisions of
this Act, every Judge shall, on his retirement, be paid a
pension in accordance with the scale and provisions in Part I
of the First Schedule:
Provided that no such pension shall be payable to a Judge
unless--
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(a) he has completed not less than twelve years of service for
pension; or
(b) he has attaied the age of sixty-two years; or;
(c) his retirement is medically certified to be necessitated by
ill-health:
Provided further that if a Judge at the time of his
appointment is in receipt of a pension (other than a a
disability or wound pension) in respect of any previous
service in the Union or a State, the pension payable
under this Act shall be in lieu of, and not in addition to,
that pension.
Explanation.--In this section "Judge" means a Judge who has
not held any other pensionable post under the Union or a
State and includes a Judge who having held any other
pensionable post under the Union or a State has elected to
receive the pension payable under Part I of the First Schedule.
This proviso sends a clear legislative signal that Parliament
has deliberately foreclosed the possibility of dual pension
streams even within the same constitutional family of judicial
offices. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
which translates to the express mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of another, squarely applies; the express
prohibition of cumulative pensions in the context of High
Court Judges underscores that no second pension arises
unless specifically legislated. It would be incongruous to
suggest that while even Judges of High Courts are barred
from pension stacking, statutory functionaries such as the
Chairperson of a State Human Rights Commission may, by
implication, enjoy such an entitlement. The legislative silence
in Rule 4 of the rules of 2002 , rules on the aspect of dual
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pensions must therefore be read not as inadvertence, but as
fidelity to this wider legislative policy.
16.3 Harmonious Interpretation of Pension Rules (CCS and
RCS)
The same principle finds reinforcement in general pensionary
codes applicable to civil servants. Rule 7(2) of the Central
Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, as well as Rule 6 of the
Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules 2021 , make it explicit
that a government servant shall not earn two pensions for
the same service or post at the same time. Similarly, Rule 5
of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1996, places
categorical restrictions on multiplicity of pensions, making
clear that subsequent re-employment cannot generate a
fresh and independent pension. These provisions, though not
in terms binding on statutory authorities such as the State
Human Rights Commission, are nevertheless powerful
interpretive guides. When courts are confronted with
ambiguous or general language in special enactments, the
interpretive exercise is to harmonise them with the broader
statutory fabric of pension law, rather than to create an
anomalous departure. This interpretive discipline ensures
that fiscal and legal coherence is maintained across the
spectrum of public service.
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17. Integrated Analysis of Rule 4 of the rules of 2002 :
The Parity Clause, Provisos, and Pension Entitlements
For ready reference, the substituted Rule 4 of the rules of
2002 is extracted in extenso as under:
(4) Salary, Allowances facilities and other conditions
of the service-
The salary, allowances facilities and pension, payable
to and conditions of service of the Chairperson or
Members shall respectively be the same as those of
the Chief Justice or a Judge of the High Court of
Rajasthan:
Provided that the allowances and pension payable to
and other conditions of service of the Chairperson or
Members shall not be varied to his disadvantage after
his appointment:
Provided further that if the Chairperson or Members at
the time of his appointment is in receipt of a pension
(other than a disability or wound pension) in respect
of any previous service under the Government of India
or any of its predecessor Governments or under the
Government of a State or any of its predecessor
Governments, his salary in respect of service as the.
Chairperson or, as the case may be, Members may be
reduced -
(a) by the amount of that pension, and
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(b) if he has, before such appointment, received in
lieu of a portion of the pension due to him in respect
of such previous service the commuted value thereof
by the amount of that portion pension, and
(c) If he has, before such appointment, received a
retirement gratuity in respect of such previous service
by the pension equivalent of that gratuity.
17.1 The fulcrum of the present controversy undeniably lies
in the interpretation of Rule 4 of the Rajasthan State Human
Rights Commission (Salaries, Allowances and Other
Conditions of Service of Chairperson and Members) Rules,
2002, as substituted by the 2012 notification. The amended
Rule 4 of the rules of 2002 provides that "the salary,
allowances, facilities and pension payable to the Chairperson
or Members shall respectively be the same as those of the
Chief Justice or a Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan." The
petitioner contends that this formulation entitles him, over
and above the pension already receivable as a retired Chief
Justice, to a second, independent pension for his tenure as
Chairperson of the Commission. The respondents, in
contrast, submit that this provision is referential in nature,
aimed merely at fixing parity of emoluments with a Chief
Justice, and cannot be construed as creating a fresh
pensionary stream. This Court must, therefore, undertake a
meticulous textual, contextual, and purposive analysis to
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unravel the legislative intent underlying the parity clause and
its provisos, mindful of the established principles of statutory
interpretation and fiscal prudence.
17.2 At its core, the main enacting clause of substituted Rule
4 of the Rules of 2002 cannot and must not be read in
isolation. While it states that "the salary, allowances,
facilities and pension payable to the Chairperson or
Members shall respectively be the same as those of
the Chief Justice or a Judge of the High Court of
Rajasthan," this language is referential rather than
constitutive. The clause functions as a parity-in-quantum
provision, aligning the emoluments and service conditions of
Commission members with those of High Court Judges.
Jurisprudentially, referential clauses are recognized as
measures that adopt the benefits of a cognate office purely
as a benchmark, without independently creating fresh
entitlements. The legislative design also took cognizance of
the practical reality that any person appointed as
Chairperson or Member would invariably be an erstwhile
Chief Justice or Judge of the High Court already in receipt of
pensionary benefits from prior service. It is precisely for this
reason that the expression "pension" was consciously
inserted in the Rule to clarify the scope and manner of
pension payable under the parity framework, and to ensure
that such appointment does not operate to the disadvantage
of the appointee, nor result in ambiguity as to the treatment
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of pre-existing pension vis-à-vis the Commission post. Thus,
the reference to pension is not to create a second,
independent stream of pension but to define what pension,
and to what extent, is to be paid by aligning it with the
judicial office benchmark. Reading the main clause in
isolation, to suggest that a former Judge is entitled to a
second, full pension in addition to the pension already
receivable from prior judicial service, would invert the
legislative intent, transforming a parity measure into a
source of duplication. Such an interpretation would not only
disregard grammatical construction but would also contradict
established principles of public finance and the statutory
framework preventing dual pensions, unless expressly
provided.
17.3 The first proviso reinforces this interpretative approach
and further underscores the protective, non-creative nature
of Rule 4 of the rules of 2002. It provides that "the
allowances and pension payable to and other
conditions of service of the Chairperson or Members
shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his
appointment." Each part of this clause matters. The
opening words "Provided that" are the classic signal of a
qualifying safeguard to the main clause; they do not expand
the field of entitlement, they police it. The phrase "the
allowances and pension payable to" refers to benefits
referable to the office itself i.e., the single stream of pension
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and the allowances that attach to the Chairperson's post by
virtue of the parity formula in the main part of Rule 4 of the
rules of 2002. The use of the singular "the ... pension
payable" is deliberate and coheres with a single-pension
parity model; had the rule-maker intended duplication or
aggregation with any pre-existing pension, the text would
naturally have spoken in terms of "pensions" or of "any
pension in addition to." The words "and other conditions of
service" show that the proviso's protection is broad
(embracing tenure, leave, facilities, etc.), but it remains
tethered to what the office carries; it is not a charter for
creating new heads of benefit. The command "shall not be
varied" prohibits the State from altering, scaling down, or
restructuring the parity-linked package in a manner adverse
to the incumbent; "varied" is capacious, capturing
reductions in rate, quantum, indexation, or mode of
calculation, whether by subordinate legislation, executive
order, or administrative interpretation. The qualifier "to his
disadvantage" is a one-way valve: downward changes are
barred; neutral or beneficial revisions (for example, general
pay or pension revisions that raise the Chief Justice's scale)
may flow to the incumbent because they are not to his
disadvantage. Crucially, the temporal marker "after his
appointment" freezes the baseline at the point of entry i.e.,
once appointed, the incumbent's office-linked allowances,
pension, and service conditions cannot thereafter be tinkered
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with to leave him worse off than what the parity yardstick
then promised; this temporal focus again shows the proviso
is protective of status quo parity, not creative of cumulative
entitlements.
Applied to the present facts, the petitioner is already
receiving a pension of ₹15 lakh per annum for his prior
constitutional service as Chief Justice. The first proviso does
not create a second, parallel pension stream merely because
he later held the office of Chairperson; it simply guarantees
that the office-specific parity package (including the pension
payable to that office) will not, after his appointment, be
depressed below what the parity clause assures. Put
differently, the proviso operates as a shield against erosion,
not a spigot for a fresh flow of pensionary benefits. It also
answers a practical concern the rule-maker anticipated that
a person drawing a higher pension in his previous office
should not suffer a diminution merely because he accepts
the office of Chairperson. In other words, if the pension
already available from earlier service is higher, the State
cannot, after appointing him as Chairperson, alter the terms
in a manner that reduces him to a lower amount. Conversely,
if the parity formula applicable to the Chairperson's office
yields a higher level at any point during incumbency (for
instance, because of a general upward revision in the Chief
Justice's pension), the proviso disables the State from
capping the office-linked entitlement at some lower pre-
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existing figure merely to save outlay; in such case, the
higher pension would be made available. However, this
always operates within a single-pension framework traceable
to the office and subject to any overarching statutory caps.
Read harmoniously with the main clause (which fixes
equivalence with the Chief Justice) and the second proviso
(which separately provides a mechanism to adjust salary
against any pre-existing pension so as to prevent double-
dipping during service), the first proviso's words "not
varied to his disadvantage after his appointment" point
firmly away from "double pension" and toward non-erosion
of the parity-based, single pension that the office carries. In
established canons of construction, a proviso is ordinarily a
qualifier or safeguard; it "modifies, safeguards, or
regulates the main clause without enlarging it." That is
precisely how this proviso functions here: it locks in parity
for the Chairperson, prevents post-appointment downgrades,
ensures the incumbent is not penalised for accepting office
(no worsement), but nowhere licenses duplication or
cumulation of pensions.
17.4. The second proviso provides the clearest and most
decisive insight into the legislative intent regarding the
interplay between pre-existing pensions and the emoluments
of the office of Chairperson. It stipulates in unambiguous
terms that if a Chairperson or Member, at the time of his
appointment, is already in receipt of a pension (other than a
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disability or wound pension) in respect of any previous
service under the Government of India, a State Government,
or their predecessor Governments, then his salary in respect
of service as the Chairperson may be reduced by the amount
of that pension. The proviso further contemplates
adjustments in two additional scenarios: (b) if any
commuted portion of the earlier pension has already been
availed, then the amount of that portion shall be deducted,
and (c) if a retirement gratuity in respect of such previous
service has been received, then the pension equivalent of
such gratuity shall also be deducted. Each word and clause in
this proviso is deliberate and points unmistakably to a single-
pension framework.
The choice of expression "his salary ... may be reduced
by the amount of that pension" is crucial. It
demonstrates beyond doubt that the legislature envisaged
only one stream of pensionary benefit corresponding to the
office of the Chairperson, and not an additional or
overlapping entitlement. Had it been the intention to confer
a dual pension, there would have been no occasion to
mandate reduction of the salary by the quantum of earlier
pension; instead, both pensions could have been drawn in
parallel. The very fact that the rule-maker directed deduction
shows that fiscal prudence and avoidance of double pension
was the guiding consideration. The proviso thus operates as
an adjustment mechanism, ensuring that an incumbent who
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is already in receipt of a government pension does not
receive duplicative benefits, but at the same time does not
suffer any disadvantage in terms of parity with the office of
Chief Justice or Judge of the High Court.
The legislative purpose is twofold. First, it protects the
exchequer from the burden of paying multiple pensions for
sequential offices held by the same individual. Second, it
upholds the principle of parity embedded in the main clause:
that the emoluments and pensionary rights of the
Chairperson shall be aligned with those of the Chief Justice
of the High Court, and of Members with those of a Judge of
the High Court. To secure this parity, the proviso ensures
that whatever pension the individual is already drawing is
factored into his new service conditions, so that the overall
benefit does not exceed what is payable to a Chief Justice or
Judge in the ordinary course. In other words, the salary is
calibrated downwards by the amount of the pre-existing
pension to balance the two, thereby maintaining parity
without duplication.
Each component of the proviso reinforces this understanding.
The words "if the Chairperson or Members at the time
of his appointment is in receipt of a pension" identify
the triggering condition: an incumbent already enjoying a
pension from earlier government service. The qualification
"other than a disability or wound pension" is a humane
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carve-out, ensuring that special compensatory pensions
granted on account of disability or injury are not counted
against the salary, since they are distinct in nature and
purpose. The operative mandate "his salary ... may be
reduced by the amount of that pension" is the fulcrum
of the proviso, unmistakably showing that the scheme is one
of set-off, not addition. Sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) then
expand this principle by capturing situations of commutation
or gratuity, ensuring that the entire financial value of earlier
pensionary benefits is taken into account in adjusting the
salary, leaving no room for double receipt.
Applied to the case at hand, the petitioner is already in
receipt of a substantial pension of ₹15 lakh per annum from
his earlier tenure as Chief Justice. Under the second proviso,
his salary as Chairperson could therefore be reduced to the
extent of this pre-existing pension, thereby preventing the
possibility of a second, independent pensionary entitlement
accruing to him. This demonstrates the clear policy intent:
the scheme contemplates only one pension stream aligned
with parity principles, not a duplication of benefits for
successive constitutional or statutory offices. If the
legislative intent had been otherwise, the proviso would have
expressly provided for both pensions to be drawn
cumulatively, without any reduction mechanism. Its silence
on such a possibility, coupled with its express mandate of
reduction, conclusively establishes that only a single pension
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is envisaged. Viewed from the standpoint of the petitioner's
own argument, his construction would imply that, as
Chairperson, he ought to draw both full salary and full
pension simultaneously, a position that is expressly
disallowed. On the contrary, the statutory design makes it
manifest that wherever emoluments are received from a
subsequent office, they stand correspondingly reduced by
the amount of pension already drawn, and this principle
operates uniformly irrespective of whether the charge is
upon the State exchequer or the Union treasury.
It also merits emphasis that had the legislative intent been
to sanction additional pensionary entitlements, the
framework would have unequivocally provided for
continuation of the earlier judicial pension during the tenure
as Chairperson, with the further stipulation that on demitting
office, a separate pension relatable to the SHRC tenure
would accrue cumulatively. The deliberate choice, instead, of
a deduction mechanism demonstrates that the scheme is
predicated upon the principle of "salary during service,
pension thereafter," and not upon conferment of dual
pensions. Equally significant are the words employed in the
proviso "any previous service under the Government of
India or the Government of a State" which underscore
the constitutional philosophy that both Union and State
services ultimately draw upon a common source, namely, the
public exchequer. The distribution of subjects between the
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Union and the States under the constitutional scheme is one
of functional decentralisation, but the treasury in both cases
represents public revenue. Such revenue, being public
money, cannot be disbursed as largesse or bounty; its
allocation is circumscribed by principles of fiscal prudence
and statutory mandate. The second proviso, therefore, must
be understood as a constitutional guardrail against
overlapping or duplicative pensionary benefits, ensuring that
while parity is preserved, the sanctity of public funds is not
compromised.
Thus, the second proviso, when read textually, contextually,
and purposively, reinforces the conclusion already drawn
from the main clause and the first proviso: the Rules of 2002
establish a parity-based, single-pension framework. They
prevent disadvantage to the incumbent but do not authorise
double pensions. The reduction formula strikes a balance
between equity for the office-holder and fiscal responsibility
for the State. In essence, it operationalises the legislative
intent that the Chairperson shall enjoy parity with the Chief
Justice, but not at the cost of duplicative or overlapping
pensionary entitlements.
17.5 When the main clause and both provisos are read
harmoniously with the broader statutory framework namely,
the Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of
Service) Act, 1958, and the Central Civil Services (Pension)
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Rules, it becomes manifest that pension entitlements under
Rule 4 of the rules of 2002 , the Rajasthan State Human
Rights Commission are bounded by a defined architecture.
The legislative scheme envisages structured post-retirement
emoluments anchored to prior service, eschewing any notion
of multiplicity. Accepting the petitioner's construction would
produce an absurd and fiscally imprudent outcome, wholly
against the spirit of the statutory provisions : a retired Judge
appointed as Chairperson would be entitled to draw dual
pensions, thereby surpassing even sitting Judges of High
Courts, who are expressly precluded from overlapping
pensions. Such a result would violate the canon against
absurdity in statutory interpretation and run counter to
legislative intent. The parity clause, along with its provisos,
therefore, must be interpreted to ensure that the quantum of
emoluments during tenure is equivalent to that of a Chief
Justice or Judge, but without authorising duplication of
pensionary benefits, a conclusion consonant with principle,
precedent, and fiscal propriety.
17.6 The statutory landscape governing analogous tribunals
fortifies this conclusion. Under Section 10 of the Armed
Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, the Central Government was
empowered to frame rules on salaries, allowances, and
pensionary benefits. For ready reference, Section 10 of the
Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 is extracted below:
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10. Salaries, allowances and other terms and conditions of
service of Chairperson and other Members.--The salaries and
allowances payable to, and the other terms and conditions of
service (including pension, gratuity and other retirement
benefits) of, the Chairperson and other Members shall be such
as may be prescribed by the Central Government:
Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the other
terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson and other
Members shall be varied to their disadvantage after their
appointment.
And Rule 3 of the Armed Forces Tribunal (Salaries and
Allowances, etc.) Rules, 2009 explicitly mandated that where
a retired Chief Justice or Judge was appointed as
Chairperson or Member, his pay was to be reduced by the
gross amount of any pension or retirement benefit already
being drawn. Rule 3 of the Armed Forces Tribunal (Salaries
and Allowances, etc.) Rules, 2009 provided as under:
3. Pay and Allowances, Leave, Pension, Provident Fund,
Travelling Allowance, Leave Travel Concession,
Accommodation, etc., to the Chairperson and Members of the
Armed Forces Tribunal.- (a) When a Retired Judge of the
Supreme Court is appointed as Chairperson of the Tribunal, he
shall be entitled to salary, allowances and other perquisites as
are available to the sitting Judge of the Supreme Court, and
as provided in the Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and
Conditions of Services) Act, 1958 (51 of 1958), and these
shall apply mutatis mutandis alongwith rules made thereunder
as amended from time to time. The Chairperson shall be
entitled to take his spouse with him while travelling within the
country while on official visit to Benches.
(b) When a Retired Chief Justice of a High Court is appointed
as Chairperson of the Tribunal, he shall be entitled to salary,
allowances and other perquisites as are available to the sitting
Chief Justice of a High Court and as provided in the High
Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Services), Act 1954
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(28 of 1954), and these shall apply mutatis mutandis
alongwith rules made thereunder as amended from time to
time:
Provided that in case the Retired Judge of the Supreme Court
or the Retired Chief Justice of a High Court, is in receipt of, or
has received or has become entitled to receive any retirement
benefits by way of pension, gratuity, employer's contribution
to the Contributory Provident Fund or other forms of
retirement benefits, the pay of such Chairperson shall be
reduced by the gross amount of pension or employer's
contribution to the Contributory Provident Fund or any other
form of retirement benefits, if any (except pension equivalent
of retirement gratuity), drawn or to be drawn by him.
(c) When a serving or retired Judge of a High Court is
appointed as Judicial Member of the Tribunal or when any
person from the three services is appointed as Administrative
Member of the Tribunal, he shall be entitled to salary,
allowances and other perquisites as are available to the sitting
Judge of a High Court and as provided in the High Court
Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Services) Act, 1954 (28 of
1954) and these shall apply mutatis mutandis alongwith rules
made thereunder as amended from time to time:
Provided that in case the retired Judge of a High Court,
or a person from the three services, is in receipt of, or
has received or has become entitled to receive any
retirement benefits by way of pension, gratuity,
employer's contribution to the Contributory Provident
Fund or other forms of retirement benefits, the pay of
such Member shall be reduced by the gross amount of
pension or employer's contribution to the Contributory
Provident Fund or any other form of retirement
benefits, if any (except pension equivalent of
retirement gratuity), drawn or to be drawn by him.
This principle was later reinforced and made uniform by
rule 13 of the Tribunal (Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021,
which not only directed reduction of pay by the gross
pension but also categorically prohibited the grant of any
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"additional pension or gratuity" for service rendered in the
Tribunal, stipulating instead that such service would merely
count towards the pension of the service to which the
appointee originally belonged. For ready reference, rule 13
of the Tribunal (Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021 is
extracted below:
13. Pension, Provident Fund and Gratuity.-- (1) In case
of a serving Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court or a
Member of an organised Service appointed as the Chairperson
or Member, the service in the Tribunal shall count for pension
to be drawn in accordance with the rules of the service to
which he belongs and he shall be governed by the provisions
of the General Provident Fund (Central Services) Rules, 1960
or the Contribution Pension System, as the case may be ,and
the rules for pension applicable to him.
(2) In all other cases, the Member shall be governed by the
provisions of the Contributory Provident Fund (India) Rules,
1962 or the Contribution Pension System, as the case may be.
(3) Additional pension and gratuity shall not be admissible for
service rendered in the Tribunal.
The Armed Forces Tribunal itself, through internal
notifications, has operationalised this scheme in practice by
applying the "pay reduced by pension" formula to its
Members. Significantly, the petitioner has himself served in
such a comparable statutory position as Chairperson of the
Armed Forces Tribunal, yet no separate or additional pension
was ever contemplated or paid for that office. If his present
construction were to be accepted, he would then logically
become entitled to three pensions, one as a former Chief
Justice, another as Chairperson of the AFT , and a third for
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his tenure as Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission.
Such an outcome would not only be wholly incongruous with
established service jurisprudence but would also run directly
contrary to the consistent and deliberate central policy of
preventing multiplicity of pensions for sequential statutory
offices, while ensuring parity during tenure.
17.7 Indeed, while holding office as Chairperson of the
Human Rights Commission, he was not paid the judicial
pension in addition to his salary; nor was he ever granted or
permitted to draw any pension for his subsequent tenure as
Chairperson of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Instead, the
amount of pension already receivable was expressly
deducted from his emoluments, thereby demonstrating in
practice that the governing scheme envisaged only a single
stream of benefits. This contemporaneous conduct, accepting
pension-adjusted salary during incumbency, undercuts his
present plea for cumulative entitlements. Analogies drawn
from the judicial hierarchy further reinforce this principle.
When a District Judge is elevated to the High Court, he does
not simultaneously draw the salary of a High Court Judge
along with the pension of his earlier district judgeship.
Likewise, upon demitting office as a High Court Judge, he is
not entitled to two separate pensions, one for his service as
District Judge and another for his tenure in the High Court.
His pension is determined with reference to the last
substantive constitutional office held, and not cumulatively
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across both positions. Similarly, a retired Supreme Court
Judge who may subsequently serve as Chairman of the
Armed Forces Tribunal, and thereafter as Chairman of a Pay
Commission, does not on that account become entitled to
three pensions; his pre-existing judicial pension remains
intact, but no fresh pensions accrue from successive
statutory assignments. The rationale is consistent and
compelling: pension is attached to the last substantive
judicial or constitutional office, while subsequent positions
operate within an adjustment framework to prevent
duplication. Equally telling is the fact that in the petitioner's
own case, his pension as a former Chief Justice was adjusted
against his salary as Chairperson of the Human Rights
Commission, a process carried out in strict conformity with
the second proviso to Rule 4 of the rules of 2002. This
deliberate deduction was not an aberration but a direct
application of the parity scheme, which explicitly recognises
earlier pensions from Central or State Government service
and neutralises them against the salary of the new office.
The proviso thereby makes abundantly clear that there is no
concept of dual pensions for successive constitutional or
statutory roles; rather, there exists a single parity-based
entitlement calibrated by set-off.
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18.The Mahendra Bhushan / Lokayukta Precedent: A
Distinguishing Factor
The reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment of a
learned Single Bench of this Court in Justice Mahendra
Bhushan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (S.B. CWP No.
3890/2000, decided on 13.12.2001) does not materially
advance his case. For proper appreciation of the petitioner's
reliance, the pertinent portion of the judgment in Justice
Mahendra Bhushan Sharma (supra) is reproduced
hereunder:
"5. It would be profitable to note the provisions of the Acts
and the Rules at the threshold itself.
Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act of 1973.
"(4) The salary, allowances and pension, payable to and
conditions of service of the Lokayukta or Up-Lokayukta
shall respectively be the same as those of the Chief Justice
or a Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan:
Provided that the allowances and pension payable to and
other conditions of service of the Lokayukta or Up-
Lokayukta shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his
appointment: Relevant provision of Section 21:
21. Power to make rules - (1) The Governor may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for the
purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of
the foregoing provisions, such rules may provide for-
(b) the allowances and pension payable to and other
conditions of service of, the Lokayukta and Up-Lokayukta;
(e) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed or in
respect of which this Act makes no provision or makes
insufficient provisions and provision is in the opinion of the
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Governor necessary for the proper implementation of this
Act."
Rule 6 of the Rules of 1974 "6. Pension payable - The
Lokayukta and Up-Lokayukta in respect of each completed
year of service as Lokayukta and the Up-Lokayukta
respectively shall be paid pension at the rates applicable from
time to time in the case of Chief Justice and Judges of the
High Court"
Rule-13 "13. Other conditions of service. - The conditions
of service of the Lokayukta and the Up-Lokayukta, for
which no express provision has been made in the Act or
these Rules, shall be the same as are applicable
respectively to the Chief Justice and the other Judges of
the High Court at the commencement of these Rules, and
as amended from time to lime."
.
.
.
8. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the service of Lokayukla under the Act of 1973 is a service
separate and independent of the appointment as a High Court
Judge under the Constitution of India and, therefore, the
pension of the Lokayukta has to be fixed separately without
there being any ceiling of maximum pension as provided in
the proviso to part I of the First Schedule attached to the Act
of 1954 wherein it is said that pension under this paragraph
shall in no case exceed Rs. 1,80,000 per annum in case of
Chief Justice and Rs. 1,56,000 per annum in the case of any
other Judge. It is further urged that the Government of India,
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions,
Department of Pension and Pensioners Welfare, under its
notification dated 27th of October, 1997 made amendments
whereby the term "Emoluments" has been defined which
indicates that the emolument shall also include Dearness
Allowance admissible on the date of retirement/death and,
therefore, while calculating the gratuity of the petitioner on
the post of Lokayukta his emoluments shall be basic pay plus
( + ) dearness allowance admissible on the date of
retirement.
9. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act of 1973, the
salary, allowances and pension payable to and conditions of
service of Lokayukta shall be some as of the Chief Justice and
the allowances and pension payable to and any other
condition of service of Lokayukta shall not be varied to its
disadvantage after his appointment. Section 22 of the Act
gives an authority to the Governor to make Rules by issuance
of notification published in the Official Gazette, for purpose of
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carrying into effect the Act of 1973. Section 21 (2)(b) of the
Act of 1973 authorises framing of the Rules in respect of
allowances and pension payable to any any other condition of
service of Lokayukta and UpLokayukta. Rule 6 of the Rules of
1974 framed under Section 21 of the Act of 1973, provides for
pension, under it Lokayukta is entitled for a pension, at the
rate applicable from time to time in case of Chief Justice, for
each completed year of service as Lokayukta. Rule 13
provides that where there is no express provision made in the
Act or under the Rules the condition of service of Lokayukta
shall be as applicable to the chief Justice of the High Court at
the commencement of these Rules and as amended from time
to time. Rule 6 of the Rules of 1974 provides that Lokayukta
shall be paid pension at the rate applicable, from time to time,
in case of Chief Justice. Therefore, Lokayukta shall be paid
pension at the rate it is payable to Chief Justice. Rate so
provide is for the purposes of calculation of the pension of the
Lokayukta. Rate does not provide for maximum amount of
pension payable to Lokayukta. There is no ceiling limit on the
pension of the Lokayukta.
10. It is alleged in the petition that Justice M.L. Joshi, a
retired Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, was appointed as
Lokayukta under Section 3 of the Act of 1973 on 1.7.1983 for
a period of three years, as then by amendment in the Act, the
tenure was reduced from five years to three years but later on
it was restored to five years, and on completion of this tenure
as Lokayukta he was paid pension for every completed year of
service at the rate then applicable to the Chief Justice of the
High Court. After amendment in the Act of 1954 the pension
of Justice M.L. Joshi was also revised.
11. It is further alleged that Justice M.L. Shrimal, who was
earlier a Judge of the Rajasthan High Court and retired as a
Chief Justice of Sikkim High Court, was appointed as
Lokayukta on 3.1.1985. On completion of his tenure of five
years in the afternoon of 3rd of January, 1990, orders were
issued for payment of his pension at the rate of Rs. 18630/-
per annum instead of Rs. 22, 500/-, as required to be paid,
which was in addition to the pension he was getting as Chief
Justice of Sikkim High Court imposing a ceiling of Rs. 54000/-
on the ground that under the Act of 1954 the pension of the
Chief Justice of the High Court, in no case, would exceed to
Rs. 54,000/- per annum. The pension as a Chief Justice of the
High Court and Lokayukta were clubbed so as not to exceed
the maximum pension payable to a Chief Justice under the Act
of 1954. Justice M.L. Shrimal represented against the fixation
of his pension on the ground that his service as Lokayukta
was independent and under the provisions of the Act and the
Rules made thereunder he was entitled to pension as
Lokayukta independent of an in addition t any previous
pension payable to him as Chief Justice of the Sikkim High
Court. The State Government agreeing with the contentions of
Justice M.L. Shrimal under its order dated 4.10.1993 for a five
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year tenure as Lokayukta, ordered for payment of pension of
Rs. 22,500/- per annum which is in addition to the pension
which Justice M.L. Shrimal was getting as Chief Justice of the
Sikkim High Court.
12. Allegations made in the petition so far as they relate to
payment of additional pension on the post of Lokayukta for
two retired Judges irrespective of the ceiling on the pension of
the Chief Justice have not been denied by the State in its
return.
13. Thus, service of Lokayukta under the Act of 1973 has
been treated consistently by the State Government as service
separate and independent of the appointment as High Court
Judge under the Constitution of India. The State Government
allowed pension to retired Lokayukta with reference to the Act
of 1973 and the Rules of 1974 without clubbing the pension of
retired Lokayukta with the pension of the High Court
Judge/Chief Justice and without reference to Maximum ceiling
limit provided to the pension payable to the Chief Justice
under the Act of 1954.
.
.
.
17. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is allowed and the
respondents are directed to pay the pension to the petitioner
for the post of Lokayukta treating the petitioner's service as
lokayukta independent then that of a High Court Judge and
without putting the ceiling limit on his pension as prescribed
under the Act of 1954. The petitioner shall be paid gratuity
calculating the same on his pay as defined in FR 9(21)(a)(i)
plus Dearness Allowance admissible on the date of his
retirement."
In the first place, the said decision, rendered by a Single
Judge, does not constitute a binding precedent for
consideration by this Division Bench. Secondly, upon a close
scrutiny of the reasoning therein, it is evident that certain
fundamental aspects relating to the nature and permissibility
of dual pension entitlements were not addressed. The
learned Single Judge in Mahendra Bhushan Sharma
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proceeded to direct the grant of pension under the
Lokayukta framework without examining whether, in law, a
person who had already earned and was drawing pension
from one constitutional or statutory office could, in the
absence of an express legislative mandate, claim a second
pension for another tenure of service. The crucial distinction
between pension being attached to a specific service, and
pension being granted in addition to an already existing
pension, was not considered in that case. Likewise, the
broader question whether the statutory scheme under either
the Union or the State framework contemplates or authorises
"dual pensions" for presiding officers was left entirely
unexamined. Equally, the aspect of examining pari materia
or analogous provisions in other statutes, which could have
shed light on legislative intent in such circumstances, also
remained unaddressed.
Another plea raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the provisions of the Lokayukta Act and Rules are pari
materia with the State Human Rights Commission Rules of
2002, and therefore the analogy must necessarily operate in
his favour. However, even if such pari materia construction is
accepted, it does not advance the case of the petitioner, for
the simple reason that neither scheme contains any express
stipulation permitting the grant of double pension. As already
discussed, the doctrine of stare decisis is inapplicable in this
context, since the earlier judgment failed to adjudicate upon,
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or even advert to, the substantial questions of law relating to
dual pensions. This Court is of the considered view that such
substantial legal issues were not dealt with in Mahendra
Bhushan Sharma (supra), and therefore, the ratio therein
cannot bind or conclude the present controversy.
In contrast, the present case squarely raises these
questions, since the petitioner admittedly draws pension as a
retired Chief Justice of a High Court and now claims a further
pension for his tenure as Chairperson of the State Human
Rights Commission. This Court, upon an independent and
careful examination of the rules of 2002, as amended in
2012, finds no express provision which authorises the grant
of a second or additional pension to an incumbent already in
receipt of a constitutional pension. The statutory alignment
of the service conditions of the Chairperson with those of the
Chief Justice of the High Court cannot, by itself, be stretched
to read in a right to draw dual pensions, in the absence of
explicit legislative language to that effect. The omission to
consider this vital legal bar in Mahendra Bhushan Sharma
makes the ratio of that judgment distinguishable, and it
cannot be mechanically imported into the present
controversy. Respectfully, therefore, this Court disapproves
of the reasoning in Mahendra Bhushan Sharma (supra) and
holds that, until and unless the governing statute or rules
clearly provide that pension for such office is to be paid "in
addition to" or "over and above" any earlier pension, no such
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entitlement can be read by implication. Consequently, the
precedent relied upon by the petitioner does not assist his
claim.
19.Scope of Conditions of Service
This Court has duly considered the reliance placed by learned
counsels for the petitioner on the judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Union of India v. Gurnam Singh,
(1982) 2 SCC 314 and State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh,
(1970) 1 SCC 108. Undoubtedly, the propositions laid down
therein, namely that pension is an integral incident of service
and that "conditions of service" embrace not only the
incidents of tenure but also the gamut of retiral benefits
including pension and gratuity, are well-settled and
command full respect. At the same time, this Court is
constrained to observe that the ratio of the aforesaid
authorities, though correct in principle, cannot be
mechanically transplanted to the factual or statutory
framework governing the present controversy. In the
considered view of this Court, a clear demarcation must be
drawn between service benefits such as allowances, medical
facilities, promotional avenues, increments and the like ,
which accrue during active service, and retirement benefits
such as pension, gratuity, commutation, and leave
encashment, insurance cover etc. which accrue only upon
cessation of service. Anyways this court is guided by the
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judgements Gurnam Singh and Shardul Singh ,but they
do not, either expressly or by necessary implication, confer
any right to the receipt of multiple pensions for successive
offices held. Neither Section 26 of the Protection of Human
Rights Act, 1993 nor Rule 4 of the Rajasthan State Human
Rights Commission (Salaries, Allowances and Other
Conditions of Service of Chairperson and Members) Rules,
2002, read conjunctively or disjunctively, create any
entitlement to a dual pensionary stream. The judgments
relied upon by the petitioner undoubtedly underscore the
sanctity of pension as a protected condition of service and
lay down guiding principles in that regard; however, they do
not extend to the proposition that an incumbent who has
already been granted a constitutional pension for his tenure
as Chief Justice can simultaneously claim an independent
pension for his subsequent statutory appointment.
Consequently, the reliance on the aforesaid precedents,
though doctrinally sound within their factual matrix, is
misplaced and does not advance the case of the petitioner.
20.The Principle of Fiscal Discipline and Proportionality
It is a settled canon that the interpretation of pensionary
provisions cannot be divorced from the broader context of
fiscal responsibility and constitutional propriety. Pensions,
unlike contractual benefits, are continuing obligations
charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State. They are,
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therefore, not merely matters of individual entitlement but
questions of systemic fiscal design. Courts, while
adjudicating claims of this nature, must act with
circumspection, ensuring that judicial interpretation does not
unwittingly impose on the public purse burdens which the
legislature itself did not consciously create.
20.1 Judicial Deference to Fiscal Policy
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion,
underscored the principle that matters involving fiscal
implications are primarily within the legislative and executive
domain, and that courts must refrain from reading into
statutes financial liabilities not explicitly authorised by
Parliament or the State Legislature. The guiding norm is
clear: unless the text of the provision unequivocally
mandates a recurring financial outgo, judicial interpretation
must lean towards restraint. This is not a matter of judicial
abdication but of judicial discipline, rooted in respect for
separation of powers. For the judiciary to declare, by way of
interpretation, that the State must shoulder a second
lifetime pension for an office-holder, without an express
statutory sanction, would amount to judicial legislation, a
course impermissible under our constitutional scheme. When
faced with two plausible readings, the interpretation that
maintains fidelity to fiscal prudence and legislative intent
must prevail.
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20.2 Avoiding Duplicative Liabilities
The petitioner's construction of Rule 4 the rules of 2002, if
accepted, would inevitably create an enduring duplicative
liability upon the State exchequer. A second pension pegged
at the level of a Chief Justice is not a negligible or incidental
outlay; it is a recurring obligation which carries with it not
only the monthly pension quantum but also ancillary
liabilities such as periodic Dearness Allowance adjustments,
commutation rights, and family pension exposures. The
cascading effect of such interpretation would be to saddle
the State with open-ended financial commitments extending
beyond the lifetime of the incumbent to his dependents,
thereby creating an unforeseen and unbudgeted liability of
indefinite duration.
Equally significant is the disruption such interpretation would
cause to the coherent fiscal policy evident across cognate
statutory regimes. The High Court Judges (Salaries and
Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, the Supreme Court Judges
(Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1958, and the
Central and State Civil Services Pension Rules, all converge
upon a principle that forecloses dual pensionary streams for
sequential public offices. To carve out an implied exception
for the Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission, absent
explicit statutory mandate, would not only break this fiscal
and legal symmetry but also create a precedent with
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expansive ramifications, inviting claims from other statutory
or constitutional office-holders by parity of reasoning.
The Court, therefore, cannot be oblivious to the systemic
consequences of adopting the petitioner's construction. Fiscal
discipline and legal coherence converge upon the
respondents' interpretation namely, that the parity clause in
Rule 4 the rules of 2002 operates as a rate-referential
provision for determining the quantum of benefits, not as a
legislative device for authorising multiple pensions. It is this
construction which maintains fidelity to legislative design,
constitutional prudence, and the overarching principle of
proportionality in balancing individual claims with public
fiscal sustainability.
21. Application of Broader Doctrines
21.1 Statute Overrules Equitable Claims
It is a cardinal principle of law that pensionary entitlements
flow strictly from statutory provisions and cannot be
enlarged by equitable considerations or notions of fairness.
The petitioner's contention that denial of a second pension is
unjust and contrary to the dignity of his office cannot,
therefore, sustain in the face of the clear statutory
architecture. Rule 4 of the Rules of 2002, even as amended
in 2012 , does not contemplate a multiplicity of pensions. It
merely prescribes parity of conditions with the Chief Justice
for the limited purpose of salary and pension structure,
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without creating a substantive right to an additional pension.
In the absence of a specific statutory provision, the plea for
dual pensions is unsupportable.
21.2 Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation
The plea of legitimate expectation also does not come to the
aid of the petitioner. The doctrine applies where there exists
a clear and consistent past practice, or a categorical
representation by the State, giving rise to an expectation of
continuity. As elucidated in FCI v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed
Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71, the doctrine is confined to
situations where a reasonable promise is shown to have
been extended. In the present case, no instance has been
cited of any Chairperson of the State Human Rights
Commission being extended an additional pension over and
above a pre-existing constitutional pension. The mere fact
that internal notings of the Finance Department
contemplated parity of status cannot amount to a binding
promise or a crystallised practice. Consequently, no
legitimate expectation can be said to have accrued in favour
of the petitioner.
21.3 Articles 14, 16 and 21 the Constitution of India
The invocation of Articles 14, 16 and 21 the Constitution of
India is equally without merit. The classification between
those receiving a single pension and those claiming dual
pensions is not only rational but is also intimately connected
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with the objective of fiscal prudence and avoidance of
pension stacking. The petitioner already enjoys the
maximum pension admissible under the Supreme Court
Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1958, a
pension which in itself secures a life of dignity. The denial of
an additional pension for his tenure as Chairperson does not
impair his right to equality, does not result in hostile
discrimination, and certainly does not trench upon his right
to life under Article 21 the Constitution of India. On the
contrary, it reflects a reasonable balance struck by the
legislature between individual entitlements and larger public
finance considerations.
21.4 Comparative Jurisprudence
Further, comparative perspectives in advanced jurisdictions
fortify this conclusion. The jurisprudence in the United
Kingdom, United States, and Canada has consistently
disfavoured the concept of "double dipping" in pensions
unless specifically and unequivocally authorised by statute.
The policy rationale is clear: public pensions are a form of
deferred compensation, not an avenue for accumulation
across multiple tenures unless the legislature has expressly
provided otherwise. To interpret Rule 4 the rules of 2002 as
creating an entitlement to dual pensions would be to
judicially create a right that not only lacks statutory backing
but also runs contrary to settled fiscal policy both
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domestically and internationally. Similar regulatory trends
emerge across other major jurisdictions:
Germany permits receipt of pensions from different sources,
but imposes strict caps on total pension income to avoid
excessive accumulation. This reflects a regulatory balance
recognising multiple entitlements while safeguarding fiscal
prudence.2
Cyprus, through successive reforms, has sought to phase out
multiple pensions. Presently, earlier pensions may be offset
during a subsequent tenure, with a cap of two-thirds of the
highest salary, and from June 2026, pensions will be
suspended if a new public office is assumed, albeit with
limited exemptions for high constitutional offices such as
judges and the Attorney-General.3
Pakistan has recently moved to a strict prohibition: re-
employed civil servants must elect between drawing salary
or pension, but not both. Comprehensive reforms notified in
April 2025 abolished entitlement to multiple pensions,
recalculating benefits on the basis of averaged pay rather
than last drawn salary.4
The European Co-ordinated Organisations (including the
Council of Europe) have gone further by imposing an outright
bar under Article 32 of their Pension Rules, which forbids
2 Sigmalive English - Report on German pension cap rules.
3 Cyprus Mail - Coverage of Cyprus pension reform legislation, 2023-2026.
4 Dawn (April 2025) and The News International - Reports on Pakistan's pension
reforms eliminating dual pensions.
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concurrent pensions or the combination of pension with
indemnity, and prevents re-employment while drawing
pension within the organisation.5
22.Comparative Insight
Thus, across jurisdictions, the consistent theme is caution
against dual pension entitlements. Where allowed, they are
either capped (Germany), gradually abolished (Cyprus), or
strictly prohibited (Pakistan, EU). Even exceptions (U.S.
state-level cases) arise from specific statutory carve-outs
rather than general entitlement. The comparative
jurisprudence underscores that pensions are designed as
deferred remuneration for service to the State, not
cumulative benefits across successive tenures, unless the
legislature has explicitly provided otherwise.
23.Conclusion
23.1 In sum, the petitioner's case is founded on an
erroneous reading of Rule 4 the rules of 2002 and an
overextension of the doctrine of parity. Thus having no
express provision of dual pension, the broader doctrines of
statutory supremacy over equity, the limited scope of pari
materia interpretation, the inapplicability of legitimate
expectation, the constitutionality of rational classification,
and persuasive comparative jurisprudence all converge
towards a single conclusion: that there exists no statutory
5 Council of Europe, Pension Rules, Article 32 (Co-ordinated Organisations).
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right to claim an additional pension for service as
Chairperson of the State Human Rights Commission once a
pension is already being drawn for prior constitutional
service.
23.2 The present writ petition is thus devoid of merit and is
liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is
dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any,
also stand disposed of.
(ANUROOP SINGHI), J ( FARJAND ALI),J
96-Mamta/-
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