Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Pankaj Vishnoi vs State Of Rajasthan (2025:Rj-Jd:48332) on 11 November, 2025

[2025:RJ-JD:48332]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                           JODHPUR
            S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21673/2025
Pankaj Vishnoi S/o Sharwan Ram Vishnoi, Aged About 24 Years,
R/o Gaysukhdesar, Tehsil Nokha, District Bikaner (Raj.).
                                                     ----Petitioner
                             Versus
1.    State Of Rajasthan, Through Director, Department Of
      Medical And Health Science, Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.).
2.    The Directorate, Medical, Health And Family Welfare
      Services (SIHEW), Govt. Of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
3.    The Rajasthan University Of Health Sciences, Through
      The Director Of (Public Health) Medical And Health
      Services, Jaipur (Raj.).
                                                 ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)         :     Mr. Vijay Bishnoi


            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUNNURI LAXMAN
                                     Order
11/11/2025

1.    The present writ petition has been filed challenging the

action of respondent No. 2 -             Directorate, Medical, Health And

Family Welfare Services (SIHEW), Govt. Of Rajasthan, Jaipur in

withholding the joining of the petitioner on the post of medical

officer in pursuance of appointment order dated 11.08.2025.

2.    The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was selected

on the post of medical officer and he was given appointment by

appointment order dated 11.08.2025 and before he joined on the

said post, the impugned action of withholding the joining of the

petitioner has been done in consequence of the appointment order

only on the ground that on the date on which the final select list

was issued i.e. on 17.07.2025 an FIR was lodged by a woman on

the allegation of rape by the petitioner. The petitioner also

challenged such FIR in a separate writ petition registered as S.B.

Civil Writ Petition No.5283/2025 before this Court at Jaipur Bench

and stay was also granted in the said writ petition.

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3.    The grievance of the petitioner is that mere FIR is not a

barrier for consideration of appointment and joining of the

petitioner. FIR is only a nature of allegation which cannot

constitute as a proved allegation. It is also the contention of the

petitioner that that as per the decision of this Court in the case of

Neeraj Kanwar Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Civil Writ

Petition No. 9517/2024), which in turn relied upon the

judgment of a Three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (2016) 8

SCC 471, this Court had directed the appointment of the

petitioner therein. He also seeks similar directions in the present

writ petition.

4.    It is apt to refer to the relevant paragraphs of the judgment

relied upon by the petitioner in the case of Neeraj Kanwar (supra).

The relevant portion of the judgment in the case of Neeraj Kanwar

(supra) reads as follows:

      "20. Perusal of circular dated 04.12.2019 (Annexure R-
      1) shows that the same is in the nature of the
      Government's      administrative   guidelines   to    its
      functionaries and the ultimate decision-whether or not
      to appoint a candidate is to be taken by the appointing
      authority taking into consideration the facts and
      circumstances of each case, the nature of work and
      status of the post on merits and that in each case,
      while deciding on the suitability or unsuitability of a
      candidate, the appointing authority should assess his
      (candidate's) character by taking into consideration the
      circumstances of the offence.
      ......

20.4. The Circular ibid, relied upon by the respondents, no doubt stipulates that candidates against whom cases under Chapters XVI and XVII of the IPC are pending investigation or trial, or who have been convicted, should be deemed ineligible for appointment. However, this blanket disqualification

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must be read in harmony with the nuanced principles laid down by the three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, which emphasize that the appointing authority must assess the suitability of a candidate based on the nature of the offence, its relevance to the post, and whether it involves moral turpitude, rather than mechanically denying appointment due to the mere pendency of a case. The judgments cited by the respondents, such as Union of India v. Methu Meda and Bhinya Ram Jajra v. State of Rajasthan, no doubt, underscore the employer's discretion to evaluate antecedents, but they do not override the Avtar Singh's framework, which permits flexibility in cases of trivial offences or those not involving moral turpitude. In the petitioner's case, the offences under Sections 452, 341, 323, and 143 IPC, arising from a matrimonial dispute, do not prima facie reflect a character flaw that would render her unfit for the RAS post, warranting such a contextual evaluation as to attract a rigid application of the Circular.

20.5. The judgment in Avtar Singh's case explicitly cautions against arbitrary denials of appointment, and requires a proportionate response after considering the factual matrix, including the absence of any suppression by the petitioner and if offences are not multiple or heinous. This approach is also reflected in and the intent of the Circular ibid. As already observed, the appointing authority should weigh merits and demerits specific to each case, rather than applying a blanket bar. Consequently, the High Court and Supreme Court judgments cited by the respondents, while affirming employer discretion, must yield to the broader, reformative perspective of Avtar Singh, ensuring that the petitioner's appointment is not unjustly withheld based solely on the pendency of a criminal case like the one in hand arising out of matrimonial discord and not involving any heinous offence or moral turpitude."

From a close reading of the above judgment relied upon by

the petitioner, it is clear that it is the appointing authority who has

to assess the suitability of a candidate based on the nature of

offence, its relevancy to the post and whether it involves moral

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turpitude. This means that the employer has to apply his mind to

the facts of each case and take a decision thereon and there

cannot be any blanket denial of appointment merely on the

ground that an FIR has been lodged. Each case must be assessed

in the context of its own facts.

5. In the present case, there is no such occasion for the