State Of Rajasthan vs Rakesh Kumar @ Pappu And Ors
2025 Latest Caselaw 2028 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State Of Rajasthan vs Rakesh Kumar @ Pappu And Ors on 8 July, 2025

Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                  D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 113/1995

State of Rajasthan
                                                                      ----Appellant
                                       Versus
1. Rakesh Kumar @ Pappu s/o Banwarilal, r/o Veernagar
Mohalla, Mansa Mandi, Bhatinda (Punjab).
2. Banwarilal s/o Khilu Ram Arora, r/o Veernagar Mohalla, Mansa
Mandi, Distt. Bhatinda (Punjab). (abated on 22.05.2024)
3. Rajesh Kumar @ Chhillo s/o Hari Chand Arora, r/o Ward
No.24, Sri Ganganagar (Raj.).
4. Harichand s/o Khilu Ram, Arora, r/o Ward No.24, Setia
Colony, Sri Ganganagar (Raj.). (abated on 27.02.2020)


                                                                    ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)             :     Mr. Rajesh Bhati, PP
For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Bhanwar Singh Rathore
                                   Mr. Koshlendra Vallabh Vyas



     HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL

Judgment

Reserved on 03/07/2025 Pronounced on 08/07/2025

Per Hon'ble Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati,J:

1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State

laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 03.11.1993

passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No.2,

Sriganganagar, in Sessions Case No.39/1992 (State of Rajasthan

Vs. Rajesh Kumar @ Chili & Ors.), whereby the accused-

respondent, namely, Rakesh Kumar @ Pappu was acquitted of the

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (2 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

charges against him under Sections 302 & 201 IPC and Section

3/25 (1)(b) of Arms Act; accused-respondents Harichand, Rajesh

Kumar @ Chilli and Banwarilal were acquitted of the charges

against them under Sections 302 read with Sections 34, 120-B &

201 IPC, while extending all the accused-respondents the benefit

of doubt.

1.2. At the outset, it has been brought to the notice of this Court

that accused-respondent No.2-Banwarilal and accused-respondent

No.4- Harichand have expired, as reflected in the orders dated

22.05.2024 & 27.02.2020, respectively, whereby, the instant

appeal to the extent of the said deceased respondents was

dismissed, as having abated. Thus, the present appeal is surviving

only qua accused-respondents (surviving), namely, Rakesh Kumar

@ Pappu, and Rajesh Kumar @ Chilli, and the present adjudication

is being made accordingly.

2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the

year 1992 and the present appeal has been pending since the year

1995.

3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by the

learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-

State, are that on 02.01.1992 at around 10:45 p.m., one

Nanakchand (complainant) gave a verbal information before Police

Station, Kotwali, Sriganganagar, stating that on the said date i.e.

02.01.1992, his brother, namely, Ashok was engaged in the

business of sale of Ayurvedic medicines, and that, accused-

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (3 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

respondent Rajesh Kumar @ Chilli, his father i.e. accused-

respondent Harichand (now deceased) and Dr.Chandrabhan, were

also engaged in the same business.

3.1. It was further stated that about 12 days prior to the said

information, accused-respondents, namely, Rajesh & Harichand

and Dr. Chandrabhan alongwith the complainant's brother Ashok

were on a business tour at Degana. After reaching at home from

the said business tour, the complainant was informed by his

brother Ashok that while they were on business tour, Rajesh,

Harichand and Dr. Chandrabhan indulged into a fight with Ashok

while asking as to why Ashok conducted a medicine selling camp

with the said persons, and while saying so, the accused persons

threatened to kill the complainant's brother i.e. Ashok.

3.1.1. It was further stated that 8-9 days prior to the said date, at

Ganganagar Railway Station, accused-Harichand (now deceased),

caught the neck of the younger brother (Gopal @ Kalu) of the

complainant, while saying that Ashok i.e. younger brother the

complainant and Gopal @ Kalu used to intervene in the business

(sale of medicines) of the accused-respondents, and asked him

(Gopal @ Kalu) to tell Ashok not to make any such intervention in

future, otherwise, as threatened by the accused-respondents, his

brother Ashok would be killed. The said incident was narrated to

the complainant & his brother Gopal @ Kalu himself.

3.2. As per the complainant, on the date of the incident in

question i.e. 02.01.1992, in the evening, his brother Ashok went

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (4 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

out on his motorcycle, and when he did not return till 9:00 p.m.,

the complainant & his brother (Gopal @ Kalu) alongwith one of

their relatives i.e. Roshan Lal Kataria, went to search for Ashok;

during course of such search, they went towards the house of

accused-Harichand.

3.2.1. It was also stated that when they reached near Pola

Factory, the complainant party heard the sound of firing,

whereupon, they rushed towards the place of the said firing;

through the light coming from the electric pole, they saw accused-

Rajesh, his uncle Chandrabhan, one other person and one Jugraj

Singh Suthar, carrying a person in a street nearby, by dragging

him. One person, out of the accused party, went towards the

southern side on a motorcycle. When the complainant party

reached the said spot, they saw that the dead body of the

complainant's brother Ashok was lying in a bloodstained condition.

Thereafter, the members of the accused party fled away from the

spot.

3.3. On the basis of the aforementioned information, a case was

registered at the Police Station, Kotwali, Ganganagar under

Sections 302, 379, 34, 120-B IPC and the investigation

commenced accordingly. After investigation, no offence was made

out against Chandrabhan and names of accused-respondents

Rakesh Kumar and Banwarilal was added, whereafter, a

chargesheet was presented against accused-respondents Rajesh

Kumar, Harichand, Banwarilal and Rakesh under Sections 302,

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (5 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

201, 120-B, 34 IPC. A chargesheet was also presented against the

accused-respondent Rakesh under Section 25 of the Arms Act,

before the concerned Court. The charges after being framed, were

read over to the accused-respondents, who denied the same and

claimed trial, and the trial commenced accordingly.

3.4. Owing to the nature of offences charged, the matter was

committed to the Court of Sessions, where from the case was

transferred to the learned Trial Court for the necessary trial.

3.5. During the course of trial, the statements of 17 witnesses

(PW 1 to PW. 17) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to

Ex.P.59) and articles (Article 1 to 3) were exhibited on behalf of

the prosecution; in defence, no witness was produced and

documents (Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.12) were exhibited, for examination;

whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under

Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and false

implication in the criminal case in question.

3.6. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, having

found that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond all

reasonable doubts, extended the benefit of doubt to the accused-

respondents and consequently acquitted the accused-respondents

of the charges vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated

03.11.1993. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State has preferred

the present appeal.

4. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the

appellant-State submitted that there existed prior enmity between

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (6 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

the accused-respondents and the deceased. It was contended that

approximately 8-9 days prior to the incident, accused Harichand

(now deceased) had issued a threat to the complainant's younger

brother, Gopal @ Kalu, directing him to warn Ashok (now

deceased) against any future interference, failing which Ashok

would be killed. This incident was duly narrated by the

complainant, Nanakchand, in the First Information Report (Ex.P.2),

thereby clearly indicating that the accused-respondents were

actuated by a motive to commit the alleged offence.

4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that Madanlal

Arora (PW-14) deposed that accused-respondent Rakesh was

involved in an altercation with the deceased on 06.12.1991 near

the bus stand. It was also submitted that accused-respondent

Harichand had issued a threat to Gopalchand alias Kalu (brother of

the deceased), directing him to inform Ashok (the deceased) not

to interfere in their business dealings, failing which he would be

eliminated. These two incidents, it was urged, clearly establish

that the accused-respondents were harbouring the requisite

motive to eliminate the deceased, which ultimately culminated in

the commission of the alleged offence.

4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the

complainant, Nanakchand, explicitly stated in the information

furnished to the police that, upon Ashok (the deceased) not

returning home at night, he, along with Roshan Lal and

Gopalchand, set out in search of him. It was further stated that,

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (7 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

upon hearing the sound of gunfire, they proceeded towards the

Pola factory, where they witnessed accused-respondent Rakesh,

his uncle Chandraman, Jugraj Singh Suthar and one other

individual dragging a body. Upon reaching the spot, they

discovered the blood-soaked dead body of Ashok lying at the

scene of the incident.

4.3. Learned Public Prosecutor also contended that there were

two eyewitnesses to the incident in question, namely, Suresh (PW-

1) and his nephew Sanjay (PW-2). Both witnesses have

unequivocally deposed that on 02.01.1992, accused-respondent

Rakesh arrived at the shop of Suresh (PW-1) along with Ashok

(the deceased), and was subsequently joined by accused-

respondents Rakesh and Banwarilal. It was further stated that

they consumed liquor at the shop, following which an altercation

ensued, during the course of which accused-respondent Rakesh

shot by a firearm at the deceased.

4.4. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that during the

course of investigation, a bloodstained bullet was recovered from

the scene of the incident, which was subsequently sent to the

Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. Upon analysis, it was

found that the bullet bore human blood of Group B.

4.4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that a 0.32

bore pistol was recovered at the instance of accused-respondent

Rakesh, in the presence of recovery witness Dalbir Singh (PW-13).

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (8 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

4.4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the

examination of the barrel residue revealed that the two 0.32

calibre bullets had been fired from the 0.32 bore pistol recovered

during the investigation; thereby further corroborating and

strengthening the prosecution's case.

4.5. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Dr. K.N.

Markhande (PW-4), who conducted the post-mortem examination

of the deceased, deposed that there were two lacerated wounds,

one being an entry wound and the other an exit wound, located on

the neck of the deceased, which, in his opinion, were consistent

with injuries caused by a gunshot.

4.6. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that accused-

respondent Banwari Lal sustained an injury on the index finger of

his left hand, which was caused due to the discharge of a pistol,

thereby clearly establishing his presence at the scene of the

incident. It was further contended that the name of Banwari Lal

was erroneously recorded as Chandraman in the First Information

Report (Ex.P.2), as both individuals bear a close resemblance in

physical appearance.

5. Per Contra, Mr. Bhanwar Singh Rathore and Mr. Koshlendra

Vallabh Vyas, learned counsel for the accused-respondents while

opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State,

submitted that even though the prosecution has alleged motive on

the part of accused-respondents for committing the crime in

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (9 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

question, no evidence was brought on record to substantiate the

said motive.

5.1. Learned counsel further submitted that two key witnesses,

namely Roshan Lal and Gopalchand--who had accompanied the

complainant in search of Ashok (the deceased)--were not

examined before the Court. The non-production of such material

witnesses, who allegedly witnessed the accused-respondents

fleeing from the scene of the incident after committing the alleged

offence, casts serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's

version.

5.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution case

primarily hinges upon the testimonies of two alleged

eyewitnesses, namely Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW-2);

however, the complainant- Nanakchand failed to mention their

names as eye-witnesses in the FIR (Ex.P. ). It is also to be noted

that their statements are riddled with several material

contradictions, which have been duly and rightly taken into

consideration by the learned Trial Court while recording the

acquittal of the accused-respondents. Learned counsel proceeded

to point out certain key inconsistencies, inter alia, the following:

a) That both the witnesses failed to name accused-respondent

Harichand in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the

Cr.P.C.

b) That in their statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C., both

witnesses stated that only a single shot was fired by accused-

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (10 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

respondent Rakesh; however, during their deposition before the

learned Trial Court, they materially improved their version by

stating that two shots were fired.

c) That Sanjay (PW-2) deposed that accused-respondent

Banwarilal, while abusing the deceased Ashok, held him by the

hand and escorted him outside; whereas Suresh (PW-1)

contradicted this version by stating that accused-respondent

Banwarilal held Ashok by the neck and took him outside.

d) That Sanjay (PW-2) further stated that after some time,

accused-respondent Rajesh went outside to urinate, and was

followed by Rakesh, whereupon both accused-respondents

conversed for a while outside the premises; however, this version

finds no corroboration in the testimony of Suresh (PW-1).

e) That Sanjay (PW-2), in his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.,

claimed that he did not know the accused-respondents prior to the

incident and came to know the name of the deceased as Ashok

only because the accused referred to him by that name; whereas

in his testimony before the learned Trial Court, he stated that he

was acquainted with the accused-respondents.

5.2.1. Learned Counsel further submitted that it is significant to

note that the statements of the said witnesses under Section 164

Cr.P.C. were recorded on 30.01.1992, after an inordinate and

unexplained delay, and the prosecution has failed to offer any

satisfactory explanation for such delay. It was further contended

that Sanjay (PW-2) was a child witness, aged 12 years at the time

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (11 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

of the incident, and therefore, the possibility of him being a

tutored witness cannot be ruled out--more so in light of the

considerable lapse of time prior to the recording of his statement.

5.2.2. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the material

contradictions in the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, coupled with

the inordinate delay in recording their statements, the credibility

of their evidence is rendered doubtful, thereby weakening the

prosecution's case.

5.3. Learned counsel further submitted that Nanakchand (PW-3)

did not mention the presence of Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW-

2) at the scene, nor did the latter two mention seeing Nanakchand

there. This inconsistency among key prosecution witnesses casts

serious doubt on their presence at the spot and undermines their

claim of being eyewitnesses to the incident.

5.4. Learned counsel also submitted that the conduct of the two

eyewitnesses, Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW-2), appears

unnatural and inexplicable, as despite allegedly witnessing the

incident, they merely closed their shop and returned home without

informing the family or reporting the matter to the police. Hence,

reliance on their testimonies would be legally unjustified.

5.5. Learned counsel further submitted that the shop of Suresh

(PW-1), where the accused-respondents allegedly consumed liquor

with the deceased and the incident occurred, was not subjected to

police investigation--a fact corroborated by both Suresh (PW-1)

and the Investigating Officer, Veervardhan (PW-7).

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (12 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

5.6. Learned Counsel also submitted that though the Naksha

Mauka (Ex.P. 1) depicts dragging marks at the place of incident,

Dr. Markhande (PW-4), who conducted the post-mortem, found no

corresponding injuries or torn clothes on the deceased to suggest

dragging. This inconsistency casts doubt on the sequence of

events as alleged by the prosecution.

5.6.1. Learned counsel also submitted that regarding the Naksha

Mauka, that the last line appears to have been subsequently

added in different ink, indicating manipulation of the investigation.

Furthermore, as per the Investigating Officer Veervardhan (PW-7),

the photographs of the spot taken by Sarwan Kumar (PW-12)

were not produced in Court, thereby undermining the credibility of

the prosecution's case.

5.7. Learned Counsel further submitted that the statements of

the prosecution witnesses were taken after a long delay of 10-12

days, as has been stated by the Madanlal (PW.14).

5.8. Learned counsel for the accused contended that the time of

the incident was deliberately misstated as 10 o'clock in the FIR

lodged by PW-3 Nanakchand. It was argued that the incident

occurred prior to 10 a.m., and the FIR was lodged only after the

police had arrived at the scene and called Nanakchand for

recording the report. In support, reliance was placed on the

testimonies of IO Veervardhan (PW.7) and K. Narasimha Rao (PW.

17), wherein the latter admitted to having received a call from

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (13 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

City Kotwali regarding the murder at around 9:00-9:15 a.m. on

02.01.1992.

5.9. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-3 Nanakchand

was well acquainted with all the accused, including Banwari and

Rakesh, who resided in Manas Mandi and were related to him, as

evident from the prosecution's own version. Thus, it cannot be

said that Nanak Chand did any mistake in identifying the accused.

5.9.1. Learned counsel also submitted that even if it is accepted

that PW-3 Nanakchand mistakenly identified Chandrabhan as

Banwarilal, the mention of Rakesh's name in the Titamba

statement remains unexplained by the prosecution.

5.10.Learned counsel also submitted that, as evident from

Ex.P.11, no road light connection was provided nor any wiring laid

by the Municipal Council at the place of incident. Therefore, the

claim of the presence of light at the scene, as alleged in the

prosecution's version, stands falsified.

5.11.Learned counsel further submitted that the circumstances

surrounding the recovery of the pistol also cast serious doubt on

the prosecution's version. As per the prosecution, the keys to the

shop from which the pistol was allegedly recovered were found

beneath bricks outside the premises; however, post-recovery,

there is no mention regarding the lock or keys, nor has the

prosecution conclusively established that the recovery was made

at the instance of accused-respondent Rakesh.

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (14 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

5.11.1. Learned counsel further submitted that none of the

shopkeeper of the nearby area been produced before the court

who can prove that the shop from where the pistol was recovered

is in the possession of the accused.

5.11.2. Learned counsel also submitted that the said recovery had

two motbirs, namely, Dalbir Singh and Ramesh Kumar, however,

the recovery witness Ramesh Kumar has not been presented by

the prosecution.

5.12.Learned Counsel further submitted that in view of the

numerous material inconsistencies and discrepancies in the

prosecution's case, it has failed to establish the guilt of the

accused-respondents beyond all reasonable doubt, and therefore,

the learned Trial Court has rightly recorded the judgment of

acquittal.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the

record of the case.

7. This Court observes that the genesis of the prosecution's

case is the alleged prior enmity between the accused and the

deceased arising from business rivalry in the sale of Ayurvedic

medicines. It was contended that threats were extended to the

deceased by the accused persons, including Harichand (now

deceased), and that these threats manifested into the commission

of the alleged offence. However, as rightly noted by the learned

Trial Court, mere existence of motive, unaccompanied by reliable

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (15 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

and cogent evidence, is not sufficient to establish guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.

8. This Court further observes that the very foundation of the

prosecution's case, namely, the First Information Report (Ex.P.2),

suffers from serious discrepancies. The FIR states the time of the

incident as around 10:00 p.m. on 02.01.1992, but the evidence of

the Investigating Officer (PW-7) and witness K. Narasimha Rao

clearly reveals that a telephonic message regarding the murder

was received by the police station as early as 9:00-9:15 p.m. This

temporal inconsistency casts grave doubt on the spontaneity and

authenticity of the FIR.

9. This Court also observes that two key witnesses, namely,

Roshan Lal and Gopalchand, who allegedly accompanied the

complainant Nanakchand during the discovery of the deceased's

body and were said to have seen the accused dragging the body,

were not examined by the prosecution. Their absence from the

witness box, despite being material witnesses, invites an adverse

inference and significantly undermines the prosecution's case.

10. This Court observes that the primary prosecution witnesses,

Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW-2), who claimed to be

eyewitnesses to the actual shooting, are not reliable. Their names

were not mentioned in the FIR, and their statements under

Section 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded only after an unexplained delay

of nearly four weeks. Such belated statements reduce their

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (16 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

probative value and suggest that their testimonies may not be

natural or trustworthy.

10.1.This Court further observes that the depositions of PW-1 and

PW-2 are riddled with contradictions on material particulars. These

include inconsistencies regarding:

1) The number of shots fired (initially stated as one, later improved to two);

2) The role of Banwarilal (whether he held the deceased by the hand or neck);

3) The sequence of events, including who went out and when;

4)    Their prior familiarity with the accused;

5)    Their failure to mention each other's or the complainant's
presence at the scene.

These discrepancies are not minor but go to the root of their credibility.

10.2.This Court observes that Sanjay (PW-2), being only 12 years

old at the time of the incident, was a child witness. The possibility

of tutoring or fabrication of his account cannot be ruled out,

especially considering the delay in recording his statement and the

substantial improvements made in his deposition before the Court

as compared to his earlier version.

11. This Court further observes that the conduct of PW-1 and

PW-2 is unnatural and inconsistent with human behaviour. Despite

allegedly witnessing a murder committed in close quarters, they

did not alert the police or inform the victim's family, and instead

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (17 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

closed their shop and went home. This unusual conduct renders

their version doubtful and lacking in spontaneity.

12. This Court further observes that the prosecution failed to

inspect or seize the shop where the alleged incident of shooting

took place, despite both the eyewitnesses and the Investigating

Officer confirming its existence. Such an omission constitutes a

serious procedural lapse and creates a gap in the investigative

chain.

13. This Court further observes that the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P.1)

mentions dragging marks near the scene, allegedly indicating that

the deceased's body was dragged. However, the post-mortem

report and the medical testimony of Dr. K.N. Markhande (PW-4)

do not show any corresponding injuries or torn clothes. This

inconsistency casts doubt on the claim that the body was dragged

and raises suspicion about manipulation of the scene.

13.1.This Court observes that the authenticity of the Naksha

Mauka is also under question, as its last line appears to have been

written in different ink, indicating interpolation. Furthermore, the

prosecution failed to produce the photographs of the scene taken

by PW-12, which could have served as crucial corroborative

evidence.

14. This Court also observes that the prosecution's claim that the

accused were identified while dragging the deceased under a

streetlight is contradicted by Ex.P.11, a document issued by the

Municipal Council, which confirms that no streetlight or electric

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (18 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

wiring existed at the alleged spot. This contradiction negates the

very basis on which identification of the accused at the crime

scene is asserted.

15. This Court also observes that the recovery of the alleged

murder weapon, a 0.32 bore pistol, is shrouded in serious doubt.

The recovery was purportedly made at the instance of accused

Rakesh from a shop whose keys were found under bricks outside

the premises. However, the prosecution did not establish whether

the shop was in the accused's possession, nor did it produce any

shopkeepers or nearby witnesses to substantiate the same.

15.1.This Court observes that the ballistic examination linking the

recovered bullets to the 0.32 bore pistol lacks evidentiary

certainty due to procedural lapses. The chain of custody of the

bullet and the weapon was not conclusively proved, and the entire

recovery itself stands on a questionable foundation.

15.2.This Court further observes that although two recovery

witnesses were cited, only one (Dalbir Singh PW.13) was

examined. The non-examination of the second panch witness

(Ramesh Kumar) and the lack of evidence about the key-lock

linkage further weakens the credibility of the recovery.

16. This Court further observes that the mention of the name

"Rakesh" in the initial titamba report, despite the eyewitnesses

allegedly identifying him much later, remains unexplained. This

anomaly, coupled with the mistaken identity of Banwarilal as

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (19 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

"Chandrabhan," points to post hoc manipulations and further

erodes the integrity of the prosecution's version.

17. This Court further observes that the cumulative effect of all

these discrepancies, non-examination of material witnesses,

contradictory statements of key eyewitnesses, procedural lapses in

investigation and recovery, delay in recording statements, and

mismatch between the medical and ocular evidence, makes the

prosecution's case highly doubtful and incapable of standing the

test of criminal jurisprudence.

17.1.This Court is of the considered view that in circumstances

such as the present, judicial scrutiny must be guided by the

quality rather than the quantity of the testimonies adduced.

Where significant contradictions are apparent in the statements of

the alleged eye-witnesses, particularly concerning material

aspects required to establish the culpability of the accused-

respondents, the benefit of such doubt must necessarily enure to

the advantage of the accused-respondents.

18. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce

therelevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of

Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on

12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.

Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010,

decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (20 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):

"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:

(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;

(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."

Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):

"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:

"8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (21 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."

39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record;

(c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

19. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed

the impugned judgment of acquittal of Rakesh Kumar @ Pappu

under Sections 302 & 201 IPC and Section 3/25 (1)(b) of Arms

Act; accused-respondents Harichand, Rajesh Kumar @ Chilli and

Banwarilal under Sections 302 read with Sections 34, 120-B & 201

IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because

as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (22 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate

Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of

law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case,

the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment

had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length

and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with

examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and

thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error

of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in

the instant appeal.

20. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the

acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,

and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court

demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a

contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and

thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no

interference by this Court in the instant appeal.

21. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into

the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the

aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit

case warranting any interference by this Court.

22. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.

22.1. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481

B.N.S.S., each of the accused-respondents are directed to furnish

[2025:RJ-JD:28741-DB] (23 of 23) [CRLA-113/1995]

a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the

like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made

effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event

of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for

grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice

thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as soon as

they would be called upon to do so.

22.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the

learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.

(SUNIL BENIWAL),J (DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J

SKant/-

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)