Bhanwar Singh vs Ramesh Kumar And Anr. ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 16870 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Bhanwar Singh vs Ramesh Kumar And Anr. ... on 11 December, 2025

[2025:RJ-JD:53634]

        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                         JODHPUR
                 S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1465/2013

Bhanwar Singh S/o Shri Banshi Singh Rajput, aged about 43
years, R/o Subhash Nagar, Bhilwara (Raj.).
                                                                    ----Appellant
                                    Versus
1. Ramesh Kumar Sabu S/o Shri Jugal Kishore Sabu, R/o 8/217,
Vidhyadhar Nagar, Jaipur.
2. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., through Branch
Manager, Bhilwara (Raj.)
                                                                 ----Respondents


For Appellant(s)          :     Mr. Dhruv Gehlot for
                                Mr. Sanjay Nahar
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. U.C.S. Singhvi
                                Mr. Devendra Sanwalot



     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA SHEKHAR SHARMA

Order

ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED ON : 01/12/2025 ORDER RESERVED ON : 01/12/2025 FULL ORDER PRONOUNCED ON : 11/12/2025

Appellant-claimant- Bhanwar Singh has preferred this appeal

under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the

Act') against the impugned judgment dated 28.02.2013 passed

by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhilwara (for short 'the

Tribunal') in claim case No.590/2013 (470/2005) whereby the

Tribunal rejected the claim petition filed by the claimant.

2. Brief facts of the case in nut shell are that the appellant-

claimant was driving a Maruti Car bearing registration No.RJ14-

01C-9856. At about 12:30 am, when he reached near M.T.M. Mill,

an unidentified truck collided with the car, as a result of which the

appellant-claimant sustained various injuries of simple as well as

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grievous in nature. Thus, a claim petition was filed by the

appellant-claimant. After service of notice, respondent No.2-

Insurance company filed its reply and denied the averments made

in the petition. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the

Tribunal framed following three issues on 12.10.2009:-

"1- vk;k izkFkhZ fnukad 31-01-1997 dks okgu Øekad vkj-ts- 14&01lh-&9856 dks pykrk gqvk ,e-Vh-,e- fey] HkhyokM+k ds ikl nq?kZVukxzLr gqvk ftlls LFkkbZ rkSj ij vl{kerk dkfjr gqbZ\ &izkFkhZ 2- vk;k izkFkhZ {kfriwfrZ Lo:i 09 yk[k 21 gtkj #i;s ;k vU; dksbZ jkf'k foi{khx.k ls e; C;kt lfgr o i`Fkdr% izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ &izkFkhZ 3- vk;k okgu Øekad vkj-ts-14@01lh&9856 dk chek foi{kh chek dEiuh ds ;gka ugha gksus ls dksbZ tokcnkjh vk;n ugha gksrh gS\ &foi{kh chek dEiuh"

In support of his case, the appellant-claimant produced two

witnesses and also exhibited-documents. After conclusion of the

trial, the Tribunal rejected the claim petition of the appellant-

claimant.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the

impugned judgment dated 28.02.2013 passed by the Tribunal is

ex-facie illegal, arbitrary, perverse, and wholly contrary to the

settled principles of law governing adjudication under Section

163-A of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal,

despite rightly recorded the findings on the occurrence of the

accident and the resultant 12% permanent disability as well as on

the fact that the offending vehicle was duly insured with

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Respondent No.2, committed grave illegality while passing the

order impugned.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the

Tribunal, in deciding Issue No.3, manifestly exceeded its

jurisdiction, as the claim petition was filed under Section 163-A of

the Act. Learned counsel argued that there were no pleadings

alleging negligence, no issue framed to that effect, and no

evidence whatsoever led by the respondents to substantiate such

a case and therefore any finding based on negligence is wholly

unsustainable.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the

dismissal of the claim petition on a ground which was neither

pleaded by the parties nor framed as an issue, and for which no

evidence was led, is a clear violation of the principles of natural

justice. It is contended that the appellant was never given an

opportunity to meet or rebut any allegation of negligence, as such

a question was not part of the dispute before the Tribunal.

Therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law.

In these circumstances, learned counsel for the appellant prayed

that the impugned judgment dated 28.02.2013 may be quashed

and set aside and reasonable amount as claimed in the claim

petition may be awarded in favour of the claimant.

6. Learned counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company, on

the other hand, supported the impugned judgment and submitted

that the Tribunal has rightly dismissed the claim petition. It is

argued that the evidence on record clearly indicates that the

accident occurred solely due to the negligence of the appellant

himself, and therefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that

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the claimant was not entitled to any compensation. Thus, it is

prayed that the impugned judgment does not warrant interference

by this Court and deserves to be upheld.

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused

the impugned order and the findings recorded by the Tribunal.

8. Section 163-A of the Act was inserted in the Act via an

amendment in the year 1994. It is a beneficial legislation as it

awards compensation to the claimants on a 'No Fault Liability'

basis. Section 163-A of the Act reads as under:-

Section 163-A - Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis

[1]Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

Explanation

For the purposes of this sub-section, "permanent disability" shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923).

[2]In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.

[3]The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule.

9. By the 2019 amendment, which came into force on

01.04.2022, Section 163-A of the Act has now been repealed for

the reason that a similar provision has been inserted in the Act,

in fact, an entirely new Chapter, i.e. Chapter XI which bears the

similar provision in Section 164 of the Act, is now incorporated.

Be that as it may, for our purposes, what is relevant is that at

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the time when the accident occurred, it was Section 163-A of the

Act, which was applicable.

10. The Court takes note that the object behind the insertion of

Section 163-A into the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, by the 1994

Amendment, was to provide a speedy and effective remedy to

motor accident victims through a social security scheme based on

a structured formula. Section 163-A establishes a system of

no-fault liability, under which claimants are not required to plead

or prove any wrongful act, neglect, or default of the vehicle owner

or driver, thereby departing from the traditional fault-based claims

under Section 166 of the Act. The provision ensures immediate

and final relief, avoiding prolonged litigation, and allows victims or

their legal heirs to receive lump-sum compensation promptly.

Compensation is determined according to a structured formula in

the Second Schedule, taking into account factors such as the

victim's age and income, and is designed to provide uniform and

swift relief. The section begins with a "notwithstanding" clause,

giving it overriding effect over other provisions of the Act and

establishing a distinct, self-contained compensation scheme. In

view of this legislative intent, any attempt to import

considerations of negligence into proceedings under Section 163-A

of the Act would be contrary to the statutory scheme and the clear

purpose of providing quick and certain compensation to accident

victims.

11. The Apex Court in the case of Shivaji Vs. Divisional

Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. reported in

AIR 2018 Supreme Court 3705 relying upon the judgment in

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the case of United India Insurance co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar &

Anr. reported in AIR 2017 SC 5710 observed as under:

"5. The issue which arises before us is no longer res integra and is covered by a recent judgment of three judges of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar & Anr., wherein it was held that to permit a defence of negligence of the claimant by the insurer and/ or to understand Section 163A of the Act as contemplating such a situation, would be inconsistent with the legislative object behind introduction of this provision, which is "final compensation within a limited time frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability was taking an unduly long time". The Court observed that if an insurer was permitted to raise a defence of negligence under Section 163A of the Act, it would "bring a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act at par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self- contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention". Consequently, it was held that in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act, the insurer cannot raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim to counter a claim for compensation."

12. Hon'ble the Supreme Court, recently in the case of The New

India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Usha Devi & Ors.

(Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.15191 of 2020) decided on

14.07.2025, observed as under:-

"..... The High Court took note of the fact that there was collision between two vehicles, as the claim petition had been filed under Section 163A of the Act does not require any proof of negligence for seeking compensation. While entertaining a claim petition u/s 163A of the Act, the question of negligence cannot be looked into. This court in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. V. Sunil Kumar & Anr.[(2019) 12 SCC 398] has held:

"8. From the above discussion, it is clear that grant of compensation under Section 163-A of the Act on the basis of the structured formula is in nature of a final award and the adjudication thereunder is required to be made without any requirement of any proof of negligence of the driver/owner of the vehicle(s) involved in the accident. This is made explicit by Section 163- A(2). Though the aforesaid section of the Act does not specifically exclude a possible defence of the insurer based on the negligence of the claimant as contemplated by Section 140(4), to permit such defence to be introduced by the insurer and / or to understand the provisions of Section 163-A of the Act to be contemplating any such situation would go contrary to the very legislative object behind introduction of Section

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163-A of the Act, namely, final compensation within a limited time-frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability were taking an unduly long time. In fact, to understand Section 163- A of the Act to permit the insurer to raise the defence of negligence would be to bring a proceeding under Section 163-A of the act on a par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self- contradictory but would also defeat the very legislative intention."

13. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel and

the material on record, this Court finds that the learned Tribunal

committed a manifest jurisdictional error in embarking upon an

inquiry into the alleged negligence of the appellant while

adjudicating a claim petition filed under Section 163-A of the Act.

The Court unequivocally holds that in a claim petition filed under

Section 163-A of the Act, the question of negligence cannot be

inquired into by the Tribunal. The statutory scheme of Section

163-A embodies a no-fault liability regime, and the claimants are

entitled to compensation solely on the basis of the structured

formula prescribed in the Second Schedule of the Act, without any

requirement to plead or prove negligence.

14. It is further noted that the Tribunal, after considering the

evidence, had already come to a definite finding that the accident

resulted in 12% permanent disability to the appellant and the

offending vehicle was duly insured with Respondent No.2. No

counter-claim or appeal was filed by the insurance company

disputing these findings. Thus, the insurer cannot be permitted to

raise any question of negligence at this stage as the same has

attained finality.

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15. In the light of settled judicial pronouncements, it is well-

established that in proceedings under Section 163-A of the Act, no

finding can be recorded attributing negligence to the claimant, as

such a finding would undermine the very object and purpose of

the provision. In the present case, the Tribunal, while deciding

Issue No. 3, recorded a finding of rashness and negligence against

the appellant and, on the basis of the same, proceeded to decide

Issue No. 2 against him. Such an approach is legally untenable

and cannot be sustained.

16. Accordingly, the finding recorded by the Motor Accident

Claims Tribunal, Bhilwara, in the impugned order dated

28.02.2013, to the extent it concerns Issue No. 2, is hereby set

aside. The remainder of the discussion made by the Tribunal on

Issue No. 1 shall remain undisturbed. The matter is remanded to

the learned Tribunal to reconsider Issue No. 2 afresh, in

accordance with law and in light of the observations made herein,

strictly applying the provisions of Section 163-A, and after

affording both parties a fair and adequate opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal is directed to conclude the proceedings expeditiously

within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a

certified copy of this judgment. A copy of this order be sent

through E-mail to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.

17. With these observations, the present appeal stands disposed

of. Stay petition and all pending application(s), if any, stand

disposed of.

(CHANDRA SHEKHAR SHARMA),J 40-Anil/-

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