Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Bhanwar Lal @ Bhanwra Ram And Anr vs State on 28 April, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Garg
Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg
[2025:RJ-JD:19271]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal (Sb) No. 45/2018
1. Bhanwar Lal @ Bhanwra Ram S/o Shivnath, By Caste Jat,
R/o Kurada, Tehsil Parbatsar, District Nagaur.
2. Pemaram S/o Shri Laduram, By Caste Jat, R/o Village
Ratnas, Tehsil Makrana, District Nagaur. Presently Lodged
At Central Jail Jodhpur
----Appellants
Versus
State Of Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Nishant Bora with
Mr. Prithvi Singh
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Deepak Choudhary, AAG with
Mr. Pawan Kumar Bhati, PP
Mr. Vineet Jain, Sr. Advocate assisted
by Mr. Harshvardhan Singh
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
REPORTABLE
Judgment
Order Reserved on : 21/04/2025
Date of pronouncement: 28/04/2025
The instant criminal appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. has
been filed by the appellants against the judgment dated
21.12.2017 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge,
Parbatsar, District Nagaur in Sessions Case No.33/2000, whereby
the learned Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellants as
under:-
Offence Sentence
Sec. 498-A IPC Three years rigorous imprisonment with
fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of
fine, one month simple imprisonment
Sec. 304-B IPC Seven years rigorous Imprisonment with fine
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of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of
fine, to undergo three months simple
imprisonment.
Brief facts of the case are that on 24.03.2000, the
complainant Kanaram submitted a written report before the Police
station, Peelva detailing the circumstances surrounding the death
of his daughter, Vimla. She was married to Chaina Ram, S/o
Shivnath Ram, approximately four and a half years prior to the
incident. In his report, Kanaram alleged that the family members
of the accused husband had persistently subjected his daughter to
harassment for dowry. On the same day, Kanaram received
distressing news that his daughter was attempting to contact him.
Upon arriving at her matrimonial residence, he discovered Vimla
died. He contended that the accused individuals had poisoned her,
leading to her untimely demise.
On this report, the police registered FIR No. 26/2000 and
started investigation. After investigation, challan was filed against
accused Shivnath, Chainaram, Chotudi, Gomadevi under Section
498-A, 304-B, & 201 IPC and investigation against accused
Bhanwar Lal and Pemaram i.e. the appellants were kept pending
under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. Thereafter, a chargesheet was
presented against the present accused appellant Bhanwar Lal @
Bhanwara Ram and Pemaram under Section 299 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Charges were framed against the co-accused and
trial proceeded against accused Shivnath, Chaina ram, Chotudi
and Gora Devi. The learned trial court vide impugned judgment
dated 06.02.2002 acquitted all the co-accused of all the charges.
Later on, the present appellants arrested and trial
commenced. Thereafter, the case was committed for trial to the
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court of Additional Sessions Judge, Parbatsar, District Nagaur
where charges of the case were framed. In support of prosecution,
the prosecution examined 17 witnesses and exhibited 16
documents. Thereafter, the statement of accused persons were
recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C and in defence, the accused
persons examined two witnesses DW/1 Devkaran and DW/2
Banaram. After conclusion of trial, the trial court convicted and
sentenced the accused appellants as mentioned above.
Learned counsel for the appellant contends, as a preliminary
matter, that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond
a reasonable doubt. It is asserted that, based on a similar set of
evidence, four co-accused individuals, including the husband, have
already been acquitted, and the State has not filed an appeal
against that judgment of acquittal. During the trial, the
complainant, Kanaram, passed away and was consequently not
available for examination. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that all
material witnesses, including the mother of the deceased, PW/9
Kelki Devi, have made sweeping allegations against all accused
regarding demands for dowry, without making any specific
accusations against the present appellants. In cross-examination,
Kelki Devi was confronted with her previous statement in another
case, wherein she was declared hostile. Similarly, other witnesses,
including PW/7 Ashok Kumar, the brother of the deceased; PW/8
Teja Ram, a maternal uncle; PW/13 Amra Ram, maternal uncle;
and PW/15 Manju, the sister of the deceased, have also leveled
omnibus allegations against all the accused. These witnesses were
likewise confronted with their earlier statements during the trial of
the co-accused, in which they were declared hostile. It is further
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argued that the principal accused--namely, the husband
Chainaram, along with his father Shivnath Ram, mother-in-law,
and sister-in-law--have already been acquitted by the trial court.
The present appellants, being distant relatives, specifically the
uncle-in-law and brother-in-law (Jeth), were residing separately
from the principal accused. In such circumstances, the sentence
passed against the appellants may kindly be quashed and set
aside.
On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor and counsel
for the complainant opposed the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the appellants. It is argued that although during the
trial of co-accused, the witnesses were declared hostile, however,
in the present case, they have specifically named the present
appellants alleging harassment for dowry, therefore, there is no
occasion to interfere with the sentence awarded to the accused
appellants.
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments
advanced at bar and meticulously examined the impugned
judgment alongwith material available on record.
The conviction of the appellant is under Sections 304B and
498A IPC raising presumption regarding dowry death within seven
years of marriage. To appreciate the arguments raised by the
learned counsel for the parties, a perusal of Section 304B and
498A IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act would be
required. The same are extracted herein-below:
304B. Dowry death. -- (1) Where the death of a woman
is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
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years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry"
shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for
life.
498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty-. Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three years and shall also be
liable to fine.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "cruelty
means"--
(a) anywilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.
113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. - When the
question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman had been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
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demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, "dowry
death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B
of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)].
Sections 304B IPC and 113B of the Evidence Act work
together to address dowry deaths, establishing a framework
where the prosecution must prove certain elements, after which
a presumption of guilt arises against the accused. To secure a
conviction under Section 304B IPC, the prosecution must
meticulously establish all essential ingredients, particularly the
connection between the demand for dowry and the harassment
faced by the deceased. In the case of Sher Singh @ Partapa
vs State of Haryana reported in (2015) 1 SCR 29 it has
been held:
"16. As is already noted above, Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC were introduced into
their respective statutes simultaneously and, therefore, it
must ordinarily be assumed that Parliament intentionally
used the word "deemed" in Section 304-B to distinguish
this provision from the others. In actuality, however, it is
well-nigh impossible to give a sensible and legally
acceptable meaning to these provisions, unless the word
"shown" is used as synonymous to "prove" and the word
"presume" as freely interchangeable with the word
"deemed". In the realm of civil and fiscal law, it is not
difficult to import the ordinary meaning of the word
"deem" to denote a set of circumstances which call to be
construed contrary to what they actually are. In criminal
legislation, however, it is unpalatable to adopt this
approach by rote. We have the high authority of the
Constitution Bench of this Court both in State of
Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut
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Factory [AIR 1953 SC 333] and State of T.N. v. Arooran
Sugars Ltd. [(1997) 1 SCC 326] , requiring the Court to
ascertain the purpose behind the statutory fiction brought
about by the use of the word "deemed" so as to give full
effect to the legislation and carry it to its logical
conclusion. We may add that it is generally posited that
there are rebuttable as well as irrebuttable presumptions,
the later oftentimes assuming an artificiality as actuality
by means of a deeming provision. It is abhorrent to
criminal jurisprudence to adjudicate a person guilty of an
offence even though he had neither intention to commit it
nor active participation in its commission. It is after deep
cogitation that we consider it imperative to construe the
word "shown" in Section 304-B IPC as to, in fact, connote
"prove". In other words, it is for the prosecution to prove
that a "dowry death" has occurred, namely,
(i) that the death of a woman has been caused in
abnormal circumstances by her having been burned or
having been bodily injured,
(ii) within seven years of her marriage,
(iii) and that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative of her husband,
(iv) in connection with any demand for dowry, and
(v) that the cruelty or harassment meted out to her
continued to have a causal connection or a live link with
the demand of dowry.
It is not disputed that Vimla, daughter of complainant died
after 4-5 years of marriage. In the case concerning Vimla's
death, a comprehensive examination of the evidence reveals
significant flaws that undermine the prosecution's case against
the appellants, Vimla's uncle-in-law and brother-in-law. Central
to the charge under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code
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(IPC), which addresses dowry death, is the necessity of
establishing a clear nexus between the alleged dowry demands
and the circumstances leading to the death of the victim. The
Forensic Science Laboratory's findings of organo phosphorous
insecticide in Vimla's body indicate potential poisoning;
however, they offer no direct insight into any dowry-related
motivations that could implicate the appellants, who are distant
relatives and not immediate family members of the deceased.
In the case of Baijnath vs. State of M.P. reported in
(2017) 1 SCC 101, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
interpreted section 304 B, 498 A of IPC and presumption under
Section 113 B of the Indian Evidence Act which are extracted
below: -
"25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by
Section 304-B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are:
(i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or
bodily injury or by any cause other than in normal
circumstances.
(ii) is within seven years of her marriage.
(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of
the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for
dowry.
The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is attracted
qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to
cruelty. The Explanation to this Section exposits "cruelty"
as:
(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical).
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(ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her
to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any
person related to her to meet such demand.
26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by
her husband or his relative for or in connection with any
demand for any property or valuable security as a
demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the
common constituent of both the offences.
27. The expression "dowry" is ordained to have the same
meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961. The expression "cruelty" as explained, contains in
its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the
consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady
subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or
harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in
connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the
gravamen of the two offences.
............
29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the
proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or
in connection with any demand for dowry by the person
charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry
death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the
fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty
or harassment for or in connection with any demand for
dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable
contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively
mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily
ordained presumption of commission of the offence of
dowry death by the person charged therewith.
30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus
predicate the burden of the prosecution to unassailably
substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by direct
and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption
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engrafted in Section 113-B of the Act against the
accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband
or his relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua
non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the
person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution
fails to demonstrate by cogent, coherent and persuasive
evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either
of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by
taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the
shortfall in proof.
31. The legislative premature of relieving the prosecution
of the rigour of the proof of the often practically
inaccessible recesses of life within the guarded confines
of a matrimonial home and of replenishing the
consequential void, by according a presumption against
the person charged, cannot be overeased to gloss over
and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts
enumerated in the sections involved, lest justice is the
casualty."
In the case of Munshi vs State of Uttar Pradesh
reported in 2023 3 Supreme 447 the Hon'ble Apex Court has
observed as under:-
"In his entire statement, besides the general allegations
that the sister of the deceased was being harassed for
not meeting their demand of buffalo and a Vicky, the
appellant has not been specifically named. To put the
record straight, it is added here that Vishwaraj Singh's
conviction has been upheld. However, nothing specific
has been stated by Chander Singh (PW1) the
complainant to bring home the guilt of the appellant-
Munshi for raising presumption as contained in Section
304B IPC read with Section 113B of the Evidence Act. In
his cross-examination, he stated that he had seen his
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sister 4/5 months before her death. That means he had
not even visited the matrimonial house of the sister on
the birth of her daughter who was about two months old
at the time of incident. Similarly, in the statement of
Shivraj Singh, brother of the complainant, the
allegations are quite general in nature with no specific
allegation against the appellant soon before the incident,
which is sine qua non for invoking presumption under
Section 304B IPC and 113B of the Evidence Act."
Recently, in the recent case of Karan Singh vs. State of
Haryana reported in 2025 Supreme (Online) (SC) 514, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized the critical importance of
the prosecution's responsibility to prove all essential ingredients
of dowry death and cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Court reiterated that in cases involving dowry-related offenses,
including dowry death and cruelty, the prosecution must
establish the demand for dowry, the cruelty inflicted, and the
causal connection between these factors and the death. If the
prosecution fails to provide convincing evidence on any of these
elements, it will result in the acquittal of the accused. This
decision underscores the need for a thorough and strong
evidentiary foundation to secure convictions in such sensitive
and complex cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while
emphasizing the essential ingredients of the Section 304B of
IPC, made observations as under :
"6. The following are the essential ingredients of Section
304-B:
a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any
burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise
than under normal circumstances;
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b) The death must have been caused within seven years
of her marriage;
c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected
to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative
of her husband; and
d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection
with, any demand for dowry.
7. If the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the
death can be called a dowry death, and the husband and/
or husband's relative, as the case may be, shall be
deemed to have caused the dowry death. Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides that dowry means
any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly by one party to a
marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the
parents of either party to a marriage or by any other
person, to the other party to the marriage or to any other
person. The dowry must be given or agreed to be given
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection
with the marriage of the said parties. The term valuable
security used in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961 has the same meaning as in
Section 30 of IPC."
In the present case, the trial highlighted that all material
witnesses declared hostile, thereby weakening the prosecution's
narrative. Their failure to corroborate previous statements,
alongside notable contradictions in their testimonies, further
erodes the foundational legitimacy of the claims made against the
appellants. The lack of credible and coherent evidence indicating
that the appellants were involved in dowry harassment or
demands prior to Vimla's death is particularly pivotal. Without this
crucial component, the essential elements required to satisfy the
burden of proof for a charge of dowry death remain unfulfilled.
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Legal precedent emphasizes that mere circumstantial evidence,
without the necessary linkage to the appellants' actions or
intentions, cannot sustain a conviction.
Therefore, in light of the significant hostile nature of the
witnesses, and the absence of direct involvement by the
appellants in the events surrounding Vimla's demise, the
conviction under Section 304-B IPC lacks substantive legal
grounding. The prosecution has not met its burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants were responsible
for dowry-related harassment leading to Vimla's tragic death,
leading to the conclusion that the case against them must be
dismissed.
In the aforementioned circumstances, the presumption
arising either under Section 304-B of the Penal Code or Section
113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked against the
appellants. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish any case
for offence under Section 304B IPC against the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt, therefore, they are liable to be acquitted from
the charges levelled for the offence under Section 304-B IPC.
So far as the allegations levelled under Section 498-A IPC is
concerned, it is imperative to underscore the legal threshold
required for establishing an offence of cruelty. The provision
specifically necessitates that the allegations be not merely general
or vague, but rather anchored in specific instances of cruel
behavior by the husband or his relatives. In the present case, the
testimonies provided by witnesses fail to meet this requisite
standard. Instead, the allegations appear to be directed broadly at
all accused persons, including individuals who have previously
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been acquitted. The lack of particularity in these allegations
creates a substantial gap in the prosecution's narrative, hindering
the establishment of culpability for Section 498-A IPC against the
appellants.
Furthermore, the legal principle of proving a case beyond a
reasonable doubt underscores the prosecution's burden within the
framework of criminal jurisprudence. This foundational tenet
serves as a protective measure against wrongful convictions,
warranting that all elements of an alleged crime must be cogently
demonstrated through reliable evidence. In this instance, the
evidence presented is characterized by a notable absence of
specificity and an array of contradictions among the witness
statements. Such inconsistencies not only undermine the
credibility of the accounts provided but also propel the case into
the realm of speculation rather than verifiable fact. Consequently,
the lacunae in the evidence underscore the prosecution's failure to
substantiate the claims made against the appellants.
Also significant is the aggravating requirement under Section
304-B IPC, which addresses dowry deaths and mandates proof of
dowry harassment in conjunction with the death of a woman
under suspicious circumstances. The prosecution bears the same
burden of proof in demonstrating that the appellants were
engaged in acts that amounted to dowry harassment. However,
the absence of consistent and corroborative evidence, along with
the implausibility of the witness testimonies, leads to a conclusion
that no convincing and reliable proof has been provided that could
link the appellants to the alleged dowry harassment or the
circumstances surrounding the death.
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In light of these considerations, this Court opinions that the
evidence fails to meet the requisite legal standards for sustaining
charges under both Section 304-B and Section 498-A of the IPC.
This lack of credible support for the allegations raised leads to an
unequivocal determination that the prosecution has not
established its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the
appellants are entitled to acquittal on all counts, as the legal
principles dictate that acquittal is warranted in the absence of
conclusive evidence supporting the charges.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment dated
21.12.2017 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge,
Parbatsar, District Nagaur in Sessions Case No.33/2000 is hereby
quashed and set aside. The appellants are on bail. They need not
surrender. Their bail bonds stand discharged.
Keeping in view, however, the provisions of Section 437-A
Cr.P.C. the accused appellants are directed to forthwith furnish
personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- each and a surety bond
in the like amount before the learned trial court within a period of
one month, which shall be effective for a period of six months to
the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition
against the judgment or for grant of leave, the appellants, on
receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before Hon'ble Supreme
Court.
The record of the trial court, if any, be sent back forthwith.
(MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J
124-BJSH/-
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